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The principal objective of this research is to provide a theoretical and empirical
framework for analysing the business activity of Greek companies in the Balkans. The
theoretical part will present a framework for explaining the strategic aspects of the
internationalisation process of the Greek companies in the Balkans, by integrating the
resource based theoretical approach, which examines inter- alia ownership resource
requirements, and the transaction costs approach, which involves examining variables
relating to internalisation control and resources costs. This theoretical framework is then
applied to the empirical examination of various aspects of the internationalisation process
of Greek companies in the Balkans. These break down into three main areas: the
internationalisation decision itself; the entry mode strategies; company restructuring in
relation to ownership resources commitments and the implications for performance in
terms of profitability during a systemic transformation process from a command to a
market economy.
The various sections in this study stress, in parallel with the impact of the conditions
existing in the Balkans as well as in the Greek market, and the importance of the market
characteristics in the Balkans, i.e. the structural reforms, as a determinant of Greek FD1 in
the comparatively less attractive Balkan countries. The choice of Greece was based on
the fact that Greece plays an important role acting as a gateway for the flow of foreign
investment to the region, as well as being a major investor in the region, given its
geographical position.
This research is about economies and companies in transition. The term transition will be
used in two contexts. On the one hand, to understand the structural transformation of the
Balkan economies, and on the other, to understand the more evolutionary changes
adopted by the Greek companies in their effort to respond to the logic of full economic
integration in the Balkan region. The need for understanding this transition compels an
examination of the challenges faced by the economies, and companies in question. The
outcomes of these diverse expectations are explored, using the evidence in this company-
level study on determinants and performance of Greek FDI in the Balkans. It investigates
FDI in the period from 1990 to 1999. This was the period of most radical economic
changes in the region, when new economic systems were emerging, radical policies for
economic stabilisation were implemented and the economies took many big steps
towards systematic transformation.
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction to the Purpose and Main Themes of the Study
1.1 Introduction
Since the Balkan countries cut from communism a new geographical space for business
activities emerged.1 Economic conditions have undergone radical changes reformulating
the business relationships of the Balkan countries with foreign companies. The
significance of the Balkan markets has gained increasing interest among scholars to
understand the nature of these economies and their new business opportunities.2
The Balkan region has been subjected to at least five powerful external forces in history,
which have affected their economic relations with each other. First, the region was
dominated by the Ottoman Empire for 500 years. Second, the WWII followed by the
collapse of the international trade and payments systems in the interwar period. Third,
the imposition ofwar- time controlled economies in the WWII followed by the divisions
of territory at Yalta, the division of the Iron Curtain. Fourth is the disintegration of the
former Yugoslavia. Fifth, the sudden collapse of the communist system and equally
sudden intensification of linkages with the EU. Greece was an exception in the third and
fifth stages, having liberalised in the 1950s and in the 1960s having begun integration
with the EU culminating in membership in the 1980s (Jackson 2001:41).
The Balkan countries experienced an overall transformation of their societies (Veremis
and Daianu 2001). In the attempt to set up market economies, much attention was
devoted to measures such as macro-stabilisation, inflation, privatisation, price and trade
1
For the purpose of this research, the Balkan region consists the following countries: Albania, Bulgaria,
FYROM, Romania and Yugoslavia.
2
The socialist legacy as well as the recent transformations in these countries presents an institutional
environment that is very different from a typical Western economy. Foreign companies should therefore
be aware of the different consequences strategic measures may have on performance, than they would
have in a stable economic environment, as the success of economic transformation depends on the ability
of companies to adjust to the changing business environment.
liberalisation.' It is evident that research in these fields is necessary in order to
understand the structural changes. However, the lack of microeconomic research reflects
a more general neglect of the region's economies.
Until 1989, the Balkans under a command market system had small volumes of trade
with the world economy. The small volumes of trade with other countries were
conducted on the basis of counter- trade negotiated with state- trade monopolies (Neale
and Shipley 1990). The revolutions of the 1990s brought dramatic changes for existing
business relationships and opened major business opportunities. These abrupt changes
can be regarded as turning points that change the way Greek companies perceive these
markets, which they once considered out of reach.4
The beginning of the 1990s gave rise to a number of questions concerning the impact of
changing economic geography on the economic performance and outcomes on both
sides of the East- West frontier. In this new setting, several border conditions are
changing. Germany for example is transformed from the eastern border to the central
part of the new Europe. While Greece, the most peripheral member of the EU finds
neighbours to trade with after decades of isolation. The Balkans seems to provide
Greece with opportunities for rapid expansion of its trade. Greek companies were quick
to position themselves in the Balkan markets. This is illustrated by the acceleration of
Greek direct investment and reorientation in the pattern of international trade between
Greece, the EU and its northern neighbours. However, companies operating in the region
faced a distinct institutional framework, which predetermined the strategic opportunities
for businesses. That has created challenges for Greek companies.
3
For more details, see the studies of Petrakos and Totev (2000), Gligorov (1999, 2000), Gligorov et al.
(1999), Hunya (1997, 2000), Dobrinsky (1997, 2000), Dobrinsky et al. (1994).
4 The current process of Greek- Balkan integration is an example of the re- emergence of strong trade
linkages between two groups of economies, which, albeit geographically close to each other, had no FDI
links over a forty- year period. The rapid and deep liberalisation of external relations after 1989 has led to
a trade- investment re- orientation and to a rapid build- up of pressures towards a new pattern of
production in accordance with western market pressures.
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1.2 Challenges Faced by the Balkan Economies
The Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have to a great extent transformed
their economic systems and become similar to other medium- income market
economies, while progress has been slower in the Balkans. The turn of the last decade
was a milestone in the economic turnaround in all the Balkan countries. Nevertheless,
both the starting point for the reforms and the speed of the transition has differed
considerably between countries in the region. The move to a market economy has not
been quick and straight- forward. There is strong diversity in the progress and shape of
the transition and in the timing and form of economic recovery. In the Balkans, the
economic changes have been more erratic and are subject to a high degree of political
uncertainty. These differences in economic reform reflected in the progress of economic
transition.
The differences between Greece and its northern neighbours should also be identified.
First, Greece has developed in accordance with market principles and democratic ideals
of the EU. Second, Greece has been a full member of the EU since 1981. It has benefited
from the subsidy programmes of the EU and has taken steps to conform to the rules and
regulations of the EU. The Balkan states are preparing and positioning themselves for
joining the EU. They have all entered into some type of formal trading arrangement with
the EU. Some countries have even made formal applications for membership. Third,
Greece and its Balkan neighbours find themselves presently at different levels of
economic development. Differences manifest in terms of level of economic
development, structure of production, per capita income and purchasing power.
The collapse of communism in the Balkans has left significant economic challenges in
its wake. A system, built and consolidated for more than half a century, collapsed and
has given way to a completely new reality for the states. The first challenge is the
removal of the centralised economic system that allocates resources by command and set
prices without reference to market forces.'^ The second challenge involves the re¬
capitalisation of the national industrial base. The establishment and consolidation of
macroeconomic stability, the implementation of trade liberalisation and improvement in
access to EU and regional markets will offer new opportunities for higher growth and
employment. Seizing these opportunities will require a dynamic private sector, willing to
invest and produce in the Balkans, and the mobilisation of significant FDI.
Table I. Basic Economic Indicators of the Balkan Countries and Greece





Albania 1991 -27.1 72.9 8.6 36.0
1995 13.3 85.9 16.9 6.0
2000 7.8 184.1 18.4 4.2
Bulgaria 1991 -11.7 88.3 11.1 333.5
1995 2.1 83.8 111 62.1
2000 5.9 71.0 18.14 1 1.4
Greece 1991 3.1 103.1 7.7 19.5
1995 2.0 106.9 10.0 8.9
2000 4.3 347.7 1 1.3 3.1
FYROM 1991 -9.8 90.2 23.5 1 15.0
1995 -1.2 69.0 37.7 15.9
2000 5.1 96.0 32.1 6.0
Romania 1991 -12.9 87.1 n.a. 174,5
1995 7,1 89.7 9.5 10 5
2000 1.6 75.0 10.5 40.7
Yugoslavia 1991 -14.2 85.8 214 121.0
1995 6.1 47.6 24.6 78.6
2000 10.7 42.0 40.5 85.6
Source: EBRD Transition Reports, Various issues, National Bank ofGreece.
Privatisation remains one of the key elements of structural reform. Rapid privatisation of
companies will not only help them to improve their competitiveness and productivity
levels, but most importantly will create a private sector that is the backbone of a nascent
5 The transition is a fundamental reordering of the economic sphere. The expectation is that the market
will make the system more efficient and more rational. However, this belief ignores a simple fact; the
market in the West developed from within. The market mechanism was called upon to sort out emerging
disequi 1 ibria in the commodity, financial and labour supplies when these were expanding to satisfy
diversified and increased needs. The markets in the Balkans are expected to transform complex and
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market economy. Moreover, privatisation will be a major tool for the development of
capital markets and the inflow of FDI that brings to the host economies much needed
capital, advanced technology and managerial expertise.
The experience of the Balkans demonstrates that macroeconomic stabilisation is not
sufficient to guarantee a framework for the reform process. Since structural reforms and
privatisation lag in progress, the new private economic agents continue to face distorted
incentives and weak discipline. This combined with ineffective institutions and weak
financial supervision, may end in an economic collapse across the Balkan region, as was
the case of Bulgaria in 1996. It is therefore important that the Balkan governments will
pursue their commitment to structural reforms and privatisation.
Despite early expectations for fast recovery and growth, the market driven economic
environment seems to follow until recently a rather disappointing path. It shows that
market driven reforms has generated strong pressures, which are clearly observed in the
Balkans. The last decade of transition that we witnessed in the Balkans has left many
unanswered questions without a clear, straightforward answer.
1.3 A Historic Reference to the Greek Economic Activity in the Balkans
For a number of Balkan countries, the Greeks have merely resumed their centuries-long
entrepreneurial activity there, after a break of around eighty years. During the 19th
century, Greek communities were still living in what are today Albania, Bulgaria,
Romania and these communities were engaged in commercial activities. However, the
violence unleashed by the Balkan wars (1912-13), followed by the two World Wars and
the Cold War (1945-89) changed and divided the region. However, the end of the Cold
War in 1989 and the subsequent break-up of the former Soviet Union, created conditions
suitable to the re-emergence and resumption of Greek international business in that area.
developed economies based on centralised planning into Western type economic structures. This, if
nothing else, raises questions regarding the capability of the market to carry out the transition process.
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The process started at a slow pace during 1989-91, but accelerated after 1992, ending
eighty years of isolation and treating it as a mere intermission.
This historical dimension is considered by a number of Greek economists as the main
determinant of present Greek FD1 and trading activity in that area, with the argument
that history repeats itself. Consequently, Katseli (1994) points out that from the 17th
century Salonika was the biggest commercial centre of the Balkans and Greek
commercial networks united the markets of the Balkans, with those of Constantinople
and the Black Sea basin with Italy and the south of France. Almost all the transactions in
Balkan trade during the 18th and 19th centuries were made in the Greek language.
Katseli (1994) adds that in 1815 Greeks conducted three quarters of the French trade in
the Eastern Mediterranean.
Karafotakis (1994) too, shares the same view pointing out that at the end of the 19th
century, a partial retreat of Greek positions in the Transbalkan trade is observed as an
outcome of the initial nationalistic targets from all Balkan countries. The situation
worsened after the Balkan wars. However, it showed some stability in the inter-war
period. Babanasis (1997) argues that until the end of the 19th century, the major trading
partners of Greece were the Balkans countries. In 1887, 58.3% of Greek imports and
12.3% of Greek exports were with those countries, while in 1912 the figures were 40.2%
and 17.8% respectively. The Greeks in Russia despite their small number (around
10,000), had approximately 160 entrepreneurs, who controlled trade and shipping
activities in the Black Sea region, with the assistance of the Greek communities of
Romania and Bulgaria, so much so that the Russians and the British called them the
kings ofwheat.
These considerations clearly indicate that there may be a fountain of good will towards
Greek entrepreneurial activity in the region. As mentioned above this is an area where
the Greeks have extended economically during their long history and strong ties of
friendship with the various peoples have been established over the centuries. Therefore,
6
it is natural for Greece to consider this region as its natural hinterland. It would appear
that the commercial links that the old thriving Greek communities of merchants had
established with the locals were being resumed and re-established by the Greek
entrepreneurs in the last twelve years.
Greece and its Balkan neighbours have followed a different trajectory in arriving at their
present predicament. In spite of their differences, history has brought these countries
together again, imposing on them a symbiotic relationship the type of which was absent
before 1989. It is this new reality that lends itself to a rethinking of each and every
Balkan country and how it stands to be affected by the prospects of future collaboration
both on a regional and on continental level.
1.4 The Research Problem and the Contributions of the Study
Much of the analysis in the Balkans has focused upon macroeconomic developments
because most progress has occurred in this area. This study will focuses on determinants
of investment decision and characteristics of FD1 projects. We define FDI as a strategic
movement of companies tending to exploit specific advantages more profitably outside
their domestic market (Dunning 1981 ).6
The principal objective of this research is to provide a theoretical and empirical
framework for analysing the business activity of Greek companies in the Balkans. The
theoretical part will present a framework for explaining the strategic aspects of the
internationalisation process of the Greek companies in the Balkans, by integrating the
resource based theoretical approach, which examines inter- alia ownership resource
requirements, and the transaction costs approach, which involves examining variables
6
Definition: Foreign Direct Investment: is a category of international investment made by a resident
entity in one economy (direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise
resident in an economy other than that of the investor (direct investment enterprise) Direct investment
enterprise is an incorporated enterprise in which a foreign investor owns 10 per cent or more of the
ordinary shares or voting power for an incorporated enterprise or an unincorporated enterprise in which a
foreign investor has equivalent ownership. Ownership of 1 0 per cent of the ordinary shares or voting stock
is the guideline for determining the existence of a direct investment relationship". (OECD 2002)
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relating to internalisation control and resources costs. This theoretical framework is then
applied to the empirical examination of various aspects of the internationalisation
process of Greek companies in the Balkans. These break down into three main areas: the
internationalisation decision itself; the entry mode strategies; company restructuring in
relation to ownership resources commitments and the implications for performance in
terms of profitability.
The above issues are concerned with the economic determinants of FDI. The aim is to
understand not only why companies invested in the region, but also why many others did
not invest, based on an analysis of their ownership advantages. To analyse the above
issues, we have selected five host countries so to reflect a variation in both the host
country policy environment as well as the observed FDI during the process of transition.
These are Albania, Bulgaria, FYROM, Romania, and Yugoslavia.
The economic changes that occur in the Balkans and their growing importance in the
transition process of the region's economies has necessitated the need for meaningful
research to be conducted into this relatively new area of international business studies.
More precisely, several basic questions need to be asked and answered. These questions
include: Why do companies invest? How do they invest? What means do these
companies employ to evaluate the performance of their investments and subsequently
what levels ofperformance these companies have achieved? Yet, despite a few previous
qualitative research efforts in the Balkan area, our understanding of the activities of
Greek companies operating in the Balkans via FDI is still very limited.7
7
To understand the interaction between investors and the local economy, it is first necessary to understand
the Greek investors as such. What are they doing in the region, why are they doing it and which factors
influencing what they are doing. These questions have motivated this study because transition economists
need to understand the motives, strategies and determinants of FDI before engaging in impact analysis.
Some studies modelling impact have made very simplified assumptions about FDI and as a result reached
peculiar conclusions. These studies have been published in the Greek press. However, their inappropriate
research methodology and data collection makes them very simplistic (Arvanitides 1999, Boukogiannis
1994, Drakos 1994, Sarantopoulos 1994, Lambrou 1996, Pepelasis 1996, Seimanidi 1996). Thus, better
models can only build on a better understanding of international business.
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This research is about economies and companies in transition.8 The need for
understanding this transition compels an examination of the challenges faced by the
economies, and companies in question. The outcomes of these diverse expectations are
explored, using the evidence in this company- level study on determinants and
performance of Greek FDI in the Balkans. It investigates FDI in the period from 1989 to
1999. This was the period of most radical economic changes in the region. When new
economic systems were emerging, radical policies for economic stabilisation were
implemented and the economies took many steps towards systematic transformation.
1.5 Structure and Methods of Analysis
Part one gives an overview of the issues and outlines the research questions. Part two
develops the theoretical basis for the empirical analysis in part three. Part four
concludes. The methods of inquiry change for each stage of the analysis; i.e. the entry
strategies, ownership strategies, operations, and performance of Greek companies in the
Balkan markets are analysed and explained on the basis of strategic aspects (i) of
Dunning's eclectic framework, (ii) the transaction costs theory and (iii) the resource-
based approach. These approaches have been thoroughly analysed by scholars and have
a long and rich history in international business research.9 Since this research covers a
new and under-researched area, the basic facts on the local environment and on recent
trends in FDI are presented first. A broad base population has been selected for this
analysis. The database for this study was developed with a questionnaire survey of a
'convenient' sample of companies, containing information on the company specific data.
s The term transition will be used in two contexts. On the one hand, to understand the structural
transformation of the Balkans economies, and on the other, to understand the more evolutionary changes
adopted by Greek companies in their effort to respond to the logic of full economic integration in the
Balkan region. In the first case, we have radical discontinuity and in the second, a notable adaptation. In
both cases, the transition process seems to be inevitable.
9
See Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Eramilii and Rao (1993), Caves (1982), Dunning and Rugman
(1985), Dunning (1988), Rugman and Verbeke (1992).
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Chapter two provides a review of the literature and the main theoretical themes upon
which our empirical analysis will be based. Chapter three provides a synopsis of the
Balkan business environment and FDI trends. It also provides an analysis of the
privatisation process and quotes from the experience of Greek companies participating
in the privatisation process in the Balkans.10 Chapter four and five describe the research
methodology employed in this study. The multitude of analytical approaches by
economists on determinants of FDI is reviewed in chapter six. Decisions concerning
involvement or non- involvement in a country, which are part of the decision process,
are also presented here.
In chapter seven, the differences between investors and non- investors are analysed.
Active companies are investigated further to distinguish investors from companies with
trade or FDI activity. The ownership specific advantages approach as defined by
Dunning has been selected as the analytical framework. The application in the empirical
investigation provides insights that are hoped to advance the underlying theory. The
analysis of the FDI decision- making process is based on an econometric analysis of the
ownership specific advantages of the Greek companies.
In chapter eight an analysis of the entry mode decision- making process is presented,
along with the conceptual framework for the choice of ownership structure. The analysis
of the entry mode decision- making process is based on an econometric analysis of the
ownership specific advantages of the Greek companies. Chapter nine discuss the
challenges of company transformation in the Balkans and explores the adjustment
measures taken by companies according to their mode of entry. Chapter ten examines
10
We believe that chapter three should not be viewed in isolation form the results presented in the second
and main part of our research, that is the analysis of the Greek FDI in these markets. The reader after
reviewing the first part should be better able to understand the economic environment of these countries,
and what Greek investors are looking for. Naturally, the first question that comes to the reader's mind
concerns the economic performance of the Balkans in the post- 1989 period. In this respect, it is important
to analyse and compare the Balkan economies to each other and where possible to the CEE economies in
order to make an evaluation of the characteristics of the on going transition process. Overall, the economic
performance of the Balkans in the 1990s shows some similarities and differences that we think are
important to record them, in a consistent manner.
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the differences in the operating profitability of each entry mode. Restructuring factors
affecting performance are discussed, by examining the causality of restructuring strategy
and performance of each ownership structure. The fourth part of this research is the
concluding chapter. It presents an interpretation of the research findings and their
limitations.
1.6 Conclusions
Since the Balkan countries began their transition from communism to a market
economy, a new geographical space for business activities emerged for the Greek
companies. Economic conditions have undergone radical changes that have reformulated
business relationships with Greek companies. The economic changes that occur in the
Balkans and their growing importance in the transition process of the region's
economies has necessitated the need for meaningful research to be conducted into this
relatively new area of international business studies.
Few studies have provided empirical evidence or explored the implications concerning
the issues associated with both determinants and performance of entry strategy in
international markets. This study's main purpose is to contribute towards
internationalisation theory by explaining the strategic aspects of internationalisation and
use this framework to explain the entry strategies of Greek companies entering the




Companies decide to invest in a foreign country, and compete with host country
companies, if they possess specific assets (that can earn economic rents that are high
enough to counter the higher cost of servicing these markets) that can be employed
elsewhere. Dunning (1993) integrated the concept of company specific assets into his
eclectic OL1 paradigm. He calls them ownership advantages, and adopts a very broad
definition including all sources of competitive advantage. Along with locational
advantages and internalisation incentives, they are the pre-condition to establish foreign
production. This explanation of FD1 as a function of company specific or ownership
advantages is related to the resource based view of the company in the literature'
(Penrose 1959, Wernerfelt 1984, Conner 1991).
Since Hymer (1960, 1976) and Kindleberger (1969) many sources of company specific
advantages have been analysed. In order to induce FD1, the advantage has to be both
transferable within the company and specific to the company. Thus companies have to
possess some degree of monopolistic power. Relevant corporate assets include physical
assets, intellectual property rights and intangible assets. In terms of Prahalad and Hamel
(1990), competitive advantages arise from core competencies such as technological
know-how. Advances of common governance arise from economies of scale on
company level. Operating in a foreign environment exposes companies to challenges
that stimulate the development of specific competencies and learning opportunities,
which are not available to purely national companies (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989).
1
In particular, the resource-based view provides insights in the analysis of strengths and weaknesses as
well as the development of company resources and capabilities as a basis for taking advantage of market
opportunities (Barney 1986, 1991, Dierickx and Cool 1989, Wernerfelt 1984).
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According to Dunning (1993) the theory of MNE activity stands at the intersection
between a macroeconomic theory of international trade and a microeconomic theory of
the company. It is therefore difficult to analyse the process of Greek FDi in the Balkans
under a single theoretical framework.
We aim to identify under what circumstances which entry mode implemented by Greek
companies in the Balkans is the most efficient choice in the long run. By analysing the
choice of entry of companies in the Balkans, we examine the long- run return on their
investment in an entry mode, adjusted for risk." Hence, we address the impact of an
entry mode on both the returns on investment and long- term horizon.
Business analysts and organisational theorists tried to identify the main reasons for FDI.
Others focused on the individual company to explain existence of FDI. Main
contributors to the latter are Buckley, Casson, Dunning and Rugman. The second stream
investigates why companies of one nationality are more appropriate to survive in foreign
markets than companies originally located in those markets. It also investigates why the
foreign companies are interested in keeping control over subsidiaries in foreign
countries. Hymer (1960) tried to explain the activities of companies outside their
national borders mainly proclaimed this explanation/
The Internalisation Theory is said to be the modern theory of the MNE. It illustrates that
the MNE uses its internal markets to produce and distribute products in an efficient
manner in situations where a regular market fails to operate. It may also be considered as
a general theory in so far as it is able to predict situations in which companies choose to
~ The attractiveness of a market has been characterised in terms of its market potential and investment risk.
Market potential is an important determinant of overseas investment. The investment risk in a host country
reflects the uncertainty over the economic and political conditions, which affect the survival and
profitability of a company (Root 1987, Stopford and Wells 1972).
A shortcoming of Hymer's theory was that he did not focus on transaction costs, which are exogenous
and the MNE reacts with creating an internal market as a substitute for either a missing regular- external-
market or to replace more expensive transactions. Nevertheless, Hymer's theory prepared the ground for
all coming theories by recognising the advantages of MNE to use internal markets across nations.
internalise foreign markets.4 But it may be better described as a paradigm rather than a
theory, because actions of MNE vary according to the different kinds of market failure.
In contrast to the Internalisation Theory, Dunning's Eclectic Paradigm is not a theory of
the MNE itself. It is rather a theory of the activities of companies engaging in
international investments. Dunning was the first to put the concept of the eclectic
paradigm of international production forward.
Theoretical justification for the contention that some entry modes should consistently
outperform others is based on previous entry mode research in the contingency tradition.
Dunning's (1988) eclectic theory of international production is used as a general point of
departure for developing the argument that mode selection has an impact on subsidiary
performance. This research will concern with three ownership- based modes. Of these,
greenfield and acquisition are wholly- owned modes, and the third, joint ventures, is
characterised by shared ownership between Greek and host- country partners. A model
of performance will be developed from entry mode research, comparing each pair of
these modes in turn, and using the ownership- resource requirements and internalisation-
control costs concepts from the Eclectic Theory.
In the 1990s, the role of FD1 in transitional economies has renewed interest in the
question as to why some modes of entry offer lower costs than others, and why certain
circumstances seem to favour certain modes over others. Linking all these together
generates a high degree of complexity. Although the eclectic theory has been regularly
revised to accommodate the changing foci of applied research, it is too much of a
paradigm or framework and too little of a model to provide detailed advice on research
design (Dunning 1980).
4 Internalisation theory explains the emergence of companies from the failure of markets. Its roots are in
the transaction cost approach initiated by Coase (1937) but it has largely been developed independently of
the work on transaction cost by Williamson (1975, 1981). Early contributions are Caves (1971), Buckley
and Casson (1976), McManus (1972), Swedenborg (1979), Rugman (1981) and Hennart (1 982).
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The internationalisation of companies is a topic, which has been studied from many
different disciplines.3 This present research focuses on international business, in which
several explanations of the internationalisation of the companies can be distinguished.
The numerous disciplines described, can be divided into two broad groups: static and
dynamic approaches. Given the aim of the research, namely to investigate and evaluate
(i) the factors that determine the FD1 activity of Greek companies in the Balkans, (ii) the
choice between different entry modes and (iii) the resulted performance, based on the
cost and benefits trade off, we believe that static approaches are appropriate for use.6
2.2 The Scope of the Company: The Internalisation Theory
Probably the most commonly accepted theory that provides an economic rationale for
the existence of the MNE today is the internalisation theory developed by Buckley and
Casson (1976), Caves (1982), and Casson (1987).7 Bringing transactions under the
control of the company in international operations rather than the market is what has
become known as internalisation. It assumes that when market is internalised the
collective efficiency of the company as a group is increased. The direct co-ordination of
transactions leads to economies of scale and it helps reduce the costs associated with
opportunism, bounded rationality and uncertainty (Caves 1982).
Building on Hymer's idea of company specific advantage, the internalisation theory
assumes that a company invests abroad on the basis of a specific asset under its control
"
The limitations of the internationalisation process models are their weak delineation of theoretical
boundaries that is the underlying assumptions and scope of the models, their the weak explanatory power,
and their the insufficient congruence between the theoretical and operational level (Andersson 1993).
5 Static approaches compare different states instead of processes, and try to find the best solution for a
certain state. Most of these static approaches evaluate company's involvement in foreign countries based
on their costs and benefits. Examples of static approaches are: Hymer's theory (Hymer 1960, 1976),
transaction cost economics (Hennart 1982, Teece 1981, Williamson 1975), internalisation theory (Buckley
and Casson 1976, Rugman 1981), Dunning's eclectic paradigm (1981), the strategic behaviour approach
(Kogut 1988), the resource- based approach (Wernerfelt 1984) and the eclectic theory of the choice of the
international entry mode (Hill et al. 1990).
The theory applies the principle of transaction cost (Coase 1937, Williamson 1979) to explain the
rational for the existence of a MNE as an institution making FDI on the basis of market information and
vertical integration.
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8that gives the company an advantage over those who do not have such an asset.1 Due to
uncertainty involved in foreign markets, the theory assumes that the cost of an
administered exchange will be lower than the costs of market exchange. This theory
rests on two general axioms. First, companies choose the least cost location for each
activity they perform.4 Second, companies grow by internalising markets up to the point
where the benefits of further internalisation are outweighed by the costs.10
According to the internalisation theory, MNEs always avoid joint ventures since they are
inferior to wholly owned subsidiaries, which allow the MNE to maximise the returns on
ownership specific advantages (Caves 1982). Joint ventures are fraught with danger for
the MNE, as they may negatively affect the MNE's company specific advantages
(Rugman 1982). The benefits of cooperation may never offset the strategic risks and
transaction costs. Internalisation theory, thus, cannot explain joint ventures (Dunning,
1989, Parry 1985).
The 'evolutionary' approach of internalisation is based on data gathered from Swedish
companies in their later stages of FDI. Two elements of gradual expansion are central to
the evolutionary approach of intemationalisation. First, market commitment and second
market knowledge. First companies are expected to expand internationally through an
,s
Rugman and Verbeke (1993) proposed a modified internalisation theory, which is based on concepts
combining the field of strategic management with international business (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989, Doz
1986, Ghosal 1987). Rugman and Verbeke made an explicit distinction between company specific
advantages and country specific advantages, whereby the former can be both location bound and non-
location bound.
9 The first axiom did not receive the attention it deserved. Rugman (1981) minimised the relevance of
location- specific variables in internationalisation theory by including spatial cost savings as a company-
specific variable. Buckley (1983) criticized this point of view by referring to the role the location choice
and the non- traded inputs play in the competitive positioning and growth pattern of companies.
1(1
In its most general sense, the second axiom can be interpreted as being tautological, or as Buckley
(1983) formulated eloquently: a concept in search of a theory. However, additional assumptions about
transaction costs for particular products and for trade between particular locations were specified (Casson
1982). For example, the market for know- how is imperfect, long- term contracts are difficult to enforce,
and tariffs and other financial burdens cause internal transfer pricing. The company is an alternative to a
market, as the internal market is used to produce and distribute goods and services efficiently in cases of
external market failures (Rugman 1982). The MNE arises when markets across national borders are
internalised. Markets that are often internalised are intermediate markets with imperfections, such as
markets for knowledge (Buckley and Casson 1976).
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establishment chain (Johanson and Wiedersheim- Paul 1975, Johanson and Vahlne
1977). Second, companies are assumed to expand in increasingly psychically distant
countries, in line with growing international experience and declining risks (Johanson
and Vahlne 1977)." The interplay between the two aspects determines the
internationalisation decisions companies take.
The views of researchers of internalisation theory do not differ in substance from those
of transaction costs economists, but in emphasis. Whereas Williamson focus primarily
on market failure due to lock- in effects arising from asset specificity (as these are
discussed in the transaction cost analysis of FDI section), internalisation theory focuses
on market failure in markets for information. Rugman (1981, 1985) and Hennart (1995)
argue that internalisation is a sufficient explanation for the existence of international
business activities. This view contrasts with Dunning's paradigm where all three
conditions (ownership, location and internalisation) are necessary to explain FDI.
Internalisation theory, like Hymer's theory, treats all foreign investments as an
expression of the exploitation of a company specific advantage on a foreign market, but
it does not incorporate strategic issues. Internalisation theory provided the wholly owned
subsidiary as the only solution to the problem of imperfect international markets, while
there are a number of other modes which companies can adopt in international markets
such as joint ventures. It also ignores the cumulative nature of activities gained by a
company in relation to other companies within the industry or national markets (Mattson
and Johanson 1987).
2.3 Dunning's Eclectic Paradigm Theory
The idea of formulating a holistic framework by which it was possible to identify and
evaluate the significance of the factors influencing both the initial act of foreign
11
Psychic distance is defined as factors that prevent or disturb the flow of information between firms and
markets (Johanson and Wiedersheim- Paul 1975).
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investments by companies and the growth of such investments was presented in the
work of Dunning (1977) in what has come to be known as the eclectic framework.12 The
framework tries to explain the activities of companies by drawing from several strands
of economic theory, mainly international economics and location theory. The basic
premise of the framework is that FDI is undertaken if three conditions are met
simultaneously. If not, exporting or licensing may be superior strategies.
Based on the acronyms of the three components, this approach is commonly known as
the OLI paradigm. First, the investing company needs ownership advantages (O) that are
specific assets to obtain a competitive advantage over local competitors. They include
property rights and intangible assets; named Oa advantages, as well as advantages
13*
arising from common governance, named Ot advantages. Oa advantages include
advantages due to abilities that facilitate the generation of new assets, especially
knowledge. Ot advantages are capabilities of organising Oa advantages with
complementary assets. They include those of branch plants of established companies
over de novo companies and those arising specifically from multinationality.14 Second,
the host country must possess Iocational advantages (L), which include factor cost
12
Dunning's paradigm is not faultless. Grosee and Berham (1992) consider it a good summary of the
several determinants of FDI. Graham (1998) says it is simply a taxonomy and not a behavioural model.
Rugman (1985) argues that only the internalisation advantages are relevant. Markusen (1995) points out
that the paradigm does not consider alternative choices, such as joint ventures. Buckley and Casson (1998)
stressing its static nature, say that it is not a good instrument to address the crucial issue of the 1990s, the
high degree of volatility in the international business environment.
13
Dunning (1993) made a distinction between ownership specific advantages (Oa) and transaction
advantages (Ot). Oa corresponds with the type of ownership specific advantages, which stem from the
exclusive possession of, or access to, particular income- generating assets, and Ot with the other two
ownership- specific advantages. The Oa advantages involve the ownership of specific assets by MNE,
which other companies do not own. Given the notion that the differences between companies' assets can
only occur in a situation of structural market imperfections, the Oa advantages are similar to Hymer's
(1960, 1976) monopolistic advantages. The Ot advantages include the ability of companies to capture the
transactional benefits from the common governance of multiple and geographically dispersed activities.
14 The uniqueness of ownership advantages and the degree of delayability they confer will depend in part
upon the structure of the markets in which the company competes and its competitive position vis-a-vis
industry rivals. Conditions in the host country may also make FDI easier or harder, depending upon the
company's motives for investment. In the case of market- seeking FDI, cost advantages of local
production may be vital for export to other markets. Local resources may be unique or scarce, giving an
edge to early investors with resource- seeking motivations. The ability to undertake FDI is contingent on
both the strength of a company's ownership advantages and the extent of locational early mover
advantages (Rivoli and Salorio 1996).
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advantages, proximity to the market, the existing economic structure, and the legal, and
political frameworks.'3 Third, internalisation incentives (I) must make it more efficient
for the companies to use their competitive advantage by selling components internally
rather than in the market place. These advantages may arise from market failure as
discussed in the transaction cost and internalisation literature (Caves 1971, Buckley and
Casson 1976) but may also arise because of distortions in the regulatory environment.16
Therefore, in order for FDI to take place, the company must have ownership and
internalisation advantages, and a foreign country must have location advantages over the
company's home country. The eclectic paradigm has contributed to making the
internalisation operational by adding location factors, thus assisting the assimilation of
the theory of FDI into international economics. The framework was also the first to
incorporate contributions from classical trade theories into FDI. With this framework,
Dunning (1981) was able to explain the reasons and differences in the industrial pattern
of the FDI and to evaluate the significance of ownership and location variables.17
The general nature of the paradigm makes it a very powerful tool for descriptive and
classificatory analysis of foreign investment, but its general nature limits its predictive
power to serve as an explanatory theory. The contribution of the internalisation model to
13 In addition to ownership specific advantages, location specific advantages are essential in determining
which companies will engage in cross- border value adding activities. Although the decision of where to
set up a production facility is treated separately from the other two advantages, it cannot be seen as an
independent decision. These location- specific advantages include, for instance, low transport costs, the
availability of resource endowments, infrastructure, economic and political stability, and low input prices.
16 The eclectic paradigm recognises that structural and transaction cost market imperfections are important
in explaining MNE. Companies have ownership- specific advantages, which can be more profitability
exploited outside the companies' domestic markets, and internalisation of these advantages obtains the
highest value (Dunning 1981, 1988, Teece 1986). Thus, the last strand of the OLI paradigm comprises the
internalisation advantages that MNE have in transferring assets within their organisations instead of via
the market, because of market failures. The greater the perceived costs of transactional market failure the
more likely it will be that MNE exploit their ownership- specific advantages within the company. Some
possible internalisation incentive advantages are high search and negotiating costs, and possible lock-in
situations and high costs of legal enforcement (Buckley and Casson 1988, and Williamson 1985).
"
This framework suggests that countries with low labour costs and natural resources tend to have above
average inward investment because of their location advantages (Jeon 1992). On the contrary, rich
industrialised countries have above average FDI, because of their factor endowments, which favour
mobile ownership advantages
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the literature on FDI lies in its explanation of the choice of markets that companies make
and the degree of the companies' involvement in a specific country- market. Resource
commitment and experience have been accepted as important factors for the explanation
of international business behaviour as a process. Critics have, however, found the model
to be too deterministic (Reid 1981, Turnbull 1987).
Dunning's theories based on market imperfections offer explanations of the why, where,
and who of FDI (Dunning and Rugman 1985). Dunning (1993) maintains that the
eclectic paradigm is not a theory of MNE or FDI per se, but rather an organisational
framework for examining the activities of companies engaged in cross- border activities.
It prescribes a conceptual framework for what is rather what should be. However, the
paradigm only describes the status quo of international production. Dunning assumes in
his paradigm that there are two kinds of market failures. The first is that of structural
market failure which forces companies to gain and sustain control over their property
rights. The second is the failure of intermediate product markets to transact goods at
lower net costs than those an organisation might have to incur via internalisation.
2.4 Transaction Cost Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment
Williamson (1975) uses the concept of transaction cost market imperfections in his
analytical framework.18 A transaction is defined as the transfer of a good or service
across a technologically separable interface (Williamson 1975). A most efficient
governance structure means that the total production and transaction costs are, in the
long run, less than those of any governance structure. Production costs include the direct
and indirect costs of making the products, such as the costs of labour. Transaction costs
ls Williamson builds on Coase (1937) who rationalised the existence of companies and specified the
conditions of market failure. Transaction cost economics elaborates Coase's view focusing on the most
efficient governance structure for a given type of transaction.
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are the costs connected with finding a contractual partner, specifying a contract, and
securing that the ex- ante defined goals will be met ex post (Williamson 1975).19
Different combinations of the three characteristics of transactions will lead to different
optimal governance structures. Companies prefer to internalise transactions (creating a
wholly- owned subsidiary or in Williamsonian terms, a hierarchy) in cases of high
uncertainty, and recurrent transactions. This governance structure is the best safeguard
against opportunistic behaviour. In a hierarchy, authority and rules can be used to ensure
that employees will not behave in an opportunistic way (Williamson 1975, 1985).
Since the work of Williamson, transaction cost economics, have developed in many
directions.20 In an international context it has been advanced simultaneously, but largely
independently, as internalisation theory following Caves (1971), Buckley and Casson
(1976), Rugman (1981), Hennart (1982), Teece (1986).21 Transaction cost economics
treats decisions on engaging in a transaction and its internalisation as distinct, therefore
is a static approach. Some dynamic approaches to transaction costs have aspired to
overcome this limitation.22
19 These costs are determined by three characteristics of transactions (asset specificity, uncertainty-
complexity, and frequency), given two assumptions about human behaviour. First, bounded rationality and
second, opportunism (Williamson 1975).
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Initially, transaction cost economics focused on explaining why and when a particular governance
structure is chosen, neglecting the international context. Williamson (1992) admits that his analysis of
MNE is brief and incomplete.
21 Teece (1986) asserted that MNEs prefer to internalise certain transactions to reduce the effects of
opportunistic behaviour, which can be very great in an international environment.
Buckley (1988), Buckley and Casson (1985) incorporate dynamic aspects of corporate expansion and
strategic actions, which are taken not to overcome market failure, but to create or exploit it. Internalisation
incentives arising from strategic positioning have been incorporated in one internalisation theory.
Langlois' (1992) dynamic view of transaction costs sees boundaries of companies entirely determined by
capabilities of the company rather than market failure. Kogut and Zander (1995) depart from the market-
failure approach of transaction cost arguing that the transfer of tacit knowledge explains internalisation.
Markets are not considered to be a feasible alternative because of the need for an organisational mode to
transfer tacit knowledge. Thus the creation, accumulation and transfer of tacit know- how determine the
evolutionary growth of companies.
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Companies organise their cross- border operations as international trade, or equity
investment as joint or wholly owned ventures.' These modes provide varying degrees of
control over the local operations. These models have been analysed with the transaction
cost approach (Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Hennart 1991) as well as broader eclectic
frameworks (Hill et al. 1990, Bell et al. 1997).
Transaction costs are the unobservable costs of using the price mechanism. They appear
in many forms, including directly attributable costs such as costs of negotiating and
contributing a separate contract for each transaction and discovering what the relevant
prices are (Coase 1937). They also appear as opportunity costs of a sub- optimal factor
allocation, for example due to time lags or acceptance of a second best offer as expected
search costs exceed expected efficiency gains. In other words, they are the costs arising
from the loss of efficiency in factor allocation due to less than perfect markets.
The trade- off between these costs of the market and of internal organisation determines
the optimal organisational from for a given transaction, and thus the boundaries of the
company. This analysis is concerned with the choice of organisational form in an
international context. A model of international transaction cost should explain the
internalisation of transactions between business units located in different countries,
while considering the costs of trans- border transactions and of operating in different
economic environments. The choice of organisational form for a transaction depends on
the transaction cost of alternative modes. In the international context, the trade- off is
between the costs of using international markets for goods and services and the costs of
the internal organisation of a FDI project. The costs of organising a transaction, both
Joint ventures only exist if the markets for intermediate inputs are inefficient (Hennart 1988). Then,
joint ventures will be the most efficient governance structure when transactions are characterised by a
moderate level of asset specificity and uncertainty. Given these transaction cost market imperfections,
joint ventures are the best alternative for coordinating assets which can be shared at zero or low marginal
cost, and cannot be separated from unwanted assets, i.e. company specific assets (Hennart 1988). In order
to remain the most efficient alternative, it is important that effective safeguards exist against the risk of
opportunistic behaviour of the partners (Buckley and Casson 1988, Kogut 1988, Brown et al. 1989).
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internally or externally depends on the potential market failure for the goods or services
transferred.
Asset specificity is the core determinant of internalisation in the transaction cost
framework by Williamson (1985): it motivates vertical integration. Asset specificity
refers to investments by either partner specific to business relationship. These are sunk
costs that are unrecoverable costs in the case of a change of partners (Alchian et al.
1972). In international business transaction- specific investments are higher than in a
national environment. This is due to higher costs of negotiating, partner search costs,
bargaining and co-ordination. Asset specificity arises with investment in physical assets
or human capital, notably if resources are committed to product or process
customisation. The relevant resources then have to be acquired and integrated into the
new affiliate, causing costs of two kinds. Transaction costs in the markets where
resources are acquired, and costs of adapting an acquired resource to the needs of the
project (Meyer and Erstin 1998).
The price mechanism generates an optimal allocation of goods if all agents have full
information. If information about the traded goods is incomplete, or information itself is
the traded item, then various forms of market failure arise (Arrow 1971). Such demand
externalities (Williamson 1985) include information asymmetries24, the free- rider
potential for users of brand names who may degrade the quality of standards (Davidson
1982, Anderson and Gatignon 1986). It also includes externalities from the public good
character of knowledge within the firm (Caves 1971 M).2^
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Asymmetric information with respect to doing business in their home country as well as advantaged
access to local resources enables domestic agents to exercise some kind of bargaining power in
determining the ownership choice of the foreign partner (Svejnar and Smith 1984). At this point we depart
from the assumption that the ownership structure derives exclusively from the determination of foreign
partners' preferences without any constraints on behalf of domestic partners. In our conceptual framework
inspired mostly by Nakamura and Xie (1998), the ownership structure is assumed to derive from a process
of weighing costs and gains of various ownership options combining arguments based on transaction cost
theory and arguments about the potential strategic benefits of cooperating with domestic partners.
Like public goods, knowledge is non- rivalrous in consumption in that its use by one agent does not
reduce its utility for other agents. These market failures are conceptually distinct from asset specificity
because they arise from the non-specific nature of intangible assets (Kay 1991).
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International business is subject to various sources of uncertainty arising from the
unpredictable impact of organisational variables on corporate performance or
inadequacy of information (Miles and Snow 1978, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).
Uncertainty reduces the possibility of writing complete contracts while increasing the
probability of situations arising in which the partners need a joint reaction in response to
changes in the environment. Therefore higher uncertainty, and higher risk aversion
(Chiles and McMackin 1996) increase the preference for internalisation. This is because
risk sharing may first reduce effects on the outcome of the joint project, and second
eliminate effects on the terms of trade between the partners.
Within organisations hierarchies replace prices as co-ordination mechanisms.
Management co-ordinates individual activities, gives directions and monitors agents.
Many of its activities revolve around the collection, communication and evaluation of
information (Casson 1997). The costs of managing across borders exceed those of a
national company. Firstly, this is due to specific administrative costs of international
production, and secondly, monitoring is more costly (Flirsh 1976). However, companies
may reduce these costs of internal organisation if they can utilise economies of common
governance, low psychic distance, experience and superior sources of funding (Comes-
Casseres 1989, Dunning 1993).
International business has major cost components that are sunk costs that are incurred at
entry and unrecoverable or fixed costs and independent of turnover. Country specific
sunk costs are incurred upon entering a foreign country when investors need to study the
legal, socio- economic framework and to establish contacts with local partners and
government authorities. Goods have to be adapted to local tastes and legal requirements.
Subsequent transactions can use existing facilities and thus have lower set- up costs,
which consequently makes them more likely to be internalised.
Economies of common governance exist both for international business as well as for
business with any partner country. Companies with a larger turnover are able to utilise
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such economies and incur lower costs when adding an additional operation to their
portfolio. The internal transaction cost per unit thus declines with increasing turnover.
Williamson (1985) describes this effect by pointing out that the more frequently
transactions incur the lower is the internal transaction cost per transaction. These effects
reduce fixed costs thus making internalisation more likely. Companies differ not only
with respect to their sensitivity- independent fixed costs, but also in their ability to
manage sensitive transactions. Capabilities that increase an organisation's ability to
reduce uncertainty of internal transactions reduce the transaction cost (Casson 1995).
As the costs of business in a foreign country increase, the more distant and different this
country is from the environment in which the company is used to operate. This effect
increases both internal and external transaction cost. Risk assessment is hampered
because the investor is not used to the nature of many sources of risk and political
influences on trans- border transactions (Caves 1982). The costs of establishing a
business in a distant country increase with the need to gather information, train local
staff and adapt management to the local environment.26 Companies can reduce the costs
of distance if their management is familiar with the local environment through personal
experiences and contacts (Gomes- Casseres 1989).
Experience in international business helps to overcome the obstacles of distance and
reduce operating costs. Experience is gathered in every business context and may be
transferable to related projects and permits continuous reductions of production costs.
Two specific experience effects apply to the mode of business (Padmanabhan and Cho
1996) and to the partner country. First, experience in managing foreign subsidiaries
reduces the cost of additional operations. Second, any experience in a country reduces
26 The increasing costs of physical distance have three implications. First, the choice of organisational
form for a given transaction depends on the differential impact of physical distance on costs of markets
and internal organisation (Clegg 1990, Root 1983, Davidson and McFetridge 1985). Second, companies
prefer to enter countries closer to home early in their internalisation process. Third, cultural gaps raise
obstacles to integrating acquired companies. Considering organisational costs, greenfield investments are
preferred to acquisitions if post-acquisition costs of matching organisational structures are high (Jemison
and Sitkin 1986, Kogut and Singh 1988).
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the costs of future projects in similar countries. The accumulation of experience leads to
reductions in transaction costs, compensating the effect of distance.
Internalisation decisions are frequently interdependent with investment decisions and
thus with the commitment of the investor to bear country specific investment risk.
Transaction cost often ignores this aspect because it does not arise in perfect capital
markets. Either a risk-sharing contract is established, or each partner receives a share in
the integrating company to reverse the impact on the risk portfolio of each individual.
However, international capital markets are not perfect. A company wishing to internalise
its business in a foreign country has to contribute a major share of capital. If local capital
markets are underdeveloped, this capital may have to be raised on international capital
markets rather than the locally. Thus, the investor has to bear the country risk
(underdeveloped local capital market) associated with the project because he has to
invest at least some equity as lenders otherwise would not be willing to finance foreign
operations. By shifting it to a local partner the risks can be reduced (Brouthers 1995).
Unfortunately the literature does not provide distinct concepts of uncertainty that fit this
model. Presumably, internalisation effects are mainly associated with industry
uncertainty, whereas the business deterrent is associated with environmental risk. This
separation is helpful for analytical purposes. The trade-off between different kinds of
risk implies that agents may be willing to accept higher levels of industry risk if country
risk is low. In empirical research country risk (economical and political risk) is rarely
shown to influence FDI unless measures of managers' perceived risk are used (Kim and
Hwang 1992, Erramilli and Rao 1990). Economic development influences several
determinants of the model, including country risk, the technological capabilities of the
recipients of technology transfer, the development of financial markets and the
regulatory environment.
Because of governmental regulation of FDI, few scholars argue that the choice of
organisational form depends on the companies' relative bargaining power vis-a-vis host
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governments (Fagre and Wells 1982, Lecraw 1984, Korbin 1987). Gomes- Casseres
(1991) combines this argument with transaction cost, arguing that the decision on the
organisational form of business can be divided into two stages. First, the determination
of the company's preferences and second the negotiations with the local government.
Transaction cost economics describes markets and companies as alternative forms of
organising business transactions. If the conditions are close to the assumption of
standard economic models, then the transaction is coordinated through a price
mechanism. Flowever, if markets fail, then the transaction may be internalised in a
company and coordinated by hierarchy (Williamson 1981). Yet, the dichotomy of
companies and markets is unsatisfactory to describe modes of modern business
(Stinchcombe 1990).27
In the literature the notion of organisational forms that mix elements of markets and
hierarchies has received considerable attention. Some researchers of transaction cost
treat contractual arrangements, explicit or implicit, as intermediate forms of
28internalisation between markets and hierarchies. Hennart (1993) presents a model that
locates contracts in the continuum between markets and firms. He assumes convex total
costs and suggests that intermediate forms are cost efficient. In this approach, each
organisational form is described by the combination of price and hierarchical
mechanisms it employs to coordinate transactions.29
27 Price systems indirectly control individuals by creating incentives to provide a revenue- maximising
quantity, and quality of output. Hierarchies directly control agents by imposing behavioural constraints.
Under both regimes, agents may seek ways to reduce their contribution. For each transaction, the recipient
has to measure quality of received products or to monitor their agents' efforts. These efforts, plus the
losses resulting from undetected cheating or shirking, are transaction costs of the chosen organisational
mode. Hennart (1993) distinguishes them as cheating costs (for price systems) and shirking costs (for
hierarchies).
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Williamson (1991) describes intermediate forms such as various forms of long- term contracting,
reciprocal trading, regulation, franchising and the like as hybrid modes. They are located between markets
and hierarchies with respect to incentive adaptability and bureaucratic cost. Shelanski and Klein (1995)
review transaction cost and state that governance structures can be described along a spectrum. Similarly,
joint ventures are described as cooperative modes in which control is shared by two or more parents who
only partially internalise the operation (Beamish and Banks 1987, Jarillo 1988, Buckley 1997).
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An alternative interpretation of the dependent variable is to treat different organisational modes as
alternatives with no implicit order. Buckley (1985: 52) argues that a simple spectrum running from
27
So far the transaction cost approach has been presented for given transactions. However,
decisions on the organisational mode and the transaction itself are related. For the
empirical analysis, it is necessary to distinguish various transactions that may be found
between Greek and Balkan companies. Transaction costs are particularly high in the
Balkans during the process of economic transition. With the dissolution of the central-
plan, administrators became economic agents. The old economic system disintegrated
before the institutions supporting the new market system could be created. Managers had
to act on markets that did not yet exist; they lacked both the (tacit) knowledge on how to
use the market mechanism and the market knowledge about potential partners and
competitors. As agents without experience on the market, they have to identify potential
types of business and the preferences of potential business partners. Thus, agents engage
in considerable search processes to set up transactions and to find the right prices. The
transaction costs of this search inhibit many potential transactions. Transaction costs are
further increased by lack of information, and legal-enforcement systems, which in many
cases are corrupted. Information asymmetries and opportunities for opportunistic
behaviour had galore (Petrakos and Totev 2001).
Until today transaction costs theory is the most dominant explanation of the existence
and growth of FD1. Its major contribution is the ability to explain why companies are
more efficient than markets. The theory, however, does not take into account country
specific issues such as countries' economic condition, which cannot be ignored when
considering how and where to invest abroad.
2.5 Ownership Based Entry Mode Strategies
The ownership structure that companies select when investing abroad is a question
usually addressed in the FD1 literature. The choice of appropriate mode of entry into
new markets is a key strategic decision for international business. The choice critically
wholly- owned foreign subsidiary to simple contracts is an inadequate representation of the nuances and
complexities of the different arrangements.
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influences the likely success of the foreign operation since it affects the profitability and
the performance of the respectively invested assets (Davidson 1982, Root 1987)2°
International business is subject to higher transaction costs than domestic business, due
to extensive imperfections on international markets. This makes the choice of an optimal
organizational form a key issue in international business strategy. Companies entering a
foreign market can choose among an array of possible organizational modes, including
joint- or wholly-owned ventures. These alternatives differ in the control that the entrant
attains over the local operations, and have been analysed in the literature by applying
transaction cost economics (Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Hennart 1988, 1991, 1995).
Foreign companies decide on the extent of ownership by taking into account the costs
and benefits resulting from their alternative choices/' This research suggests that entry
mode decisions are related to a number of contingencies; further, the non- uniform
distribution of these contingency factors among modes suggests that each mode has a
unique contingency profile which influences its performance.
A number of contingency variables have been empirically linked to the entry mode
choice. Some of the earliest research in the area proposed an incremental model of
internationalisation. In this model a company moved through ever increasing levels of
international resource commitment as its size, product diversity, and foreign experience
grew. Johanson and Vahlne (1977) made the incremental process more explicit, adding
the theoretical rationale that managers' growing understanding of foreign markets over
time and exposure leads to a higher comfort level with more psychically distant
j0 Maximisation of performance and gains from operating abroad with respect to the ownership share
provides the optimal demand for it. In particular, optimal ownership can be thought of as a mechanism to
provide maximum gains as well as to protect proprietary rights, which cannot be fully contacted out and,
at the same time, as an incentive device for reducing monitoring costs.
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The benefits depend on the affiliate's profits and the amount of transferable assets, for which a price has
to be agreed. The costs depend on potential spillovers, due to leakage of important information- based
assets to competitors within the same industry, which may lead to a reduction in future profits, and
monitoring expenses necessary to prevent agency problems connected to controlling an investment and its
related workforce in a foreign market.
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locations. Dubin (1975) and Davidson (1980) provide further support for this contingent,
incremental entry mode relationship.
A variety of studies have considered country, industry and company specific factors and
their contingent influence on wholly owned entry mode decisions. Caves and Mehra
(1986) found that entry mode selection was influenced by a variety of industry and
company specific factors. These factors include company size, research intensity,
industry growth, and industry concentration. In a partial departure from the incremental
adopted models by earliest researchers, Caves and Mehra (1986), and Zejan (1990)
argued that previous investments in a country were irrelevant, and that the selection
between greenfield and acquisitions modes was fully explained by the degree of
multinationality, technological diversity, and the size of the parent company.
Other studies have compared joint venture and wholly owned entry modes. Gatignon
and Anderson (1988) found that locational factors, the degree of multinationality,
influence the decision between joint ventures or wholly owned entry modes. Kogut and
Singh (1988) found that industry, company, and country- specific factors influence the
selection decision between the three ownership- based entry modes. In addition, several
company specific variables were linked to wholly owned and joint ventures modes
(Kogut and Zander 1993). Furthermore, Anderson and Gatignon (1986) Kim and Hwang
(1992) and Agarwal and Ramaswani (1992) examined a wide variety of entry modes.
They found that locational, ownership and internalisation advantages contingently
influenced all the various entry modes.
Formal control over the local operation is gained by forming a joint venture. Two or
more partners cooperate by forming a venture in which they each hold equity and share
revenues. It places the local business unit under joint control of the legally independent
local and foreigner partners (Kogut 1988, Flarrigan 1988, Parkhe 1993, Ramamanathan
et al. 1997). Through profit sharing, joint ventures create incentives to support the
success of the venture. However, they do not fully eliminate the incentives to shirk if
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one agent's benefit from shirking exceeds her share in profit foregone. The partial
internalisation may create complex governance problems between the partners, notably
if they enter the joint venture with different objectives.
On the other hand, the entrant can obtain almost full control over the local operation by
establishing a wholly- owned subsidiary. This integrates the foreign operation into the
investing company's activities and eliminates the need to accommodate the interest of
the local partner. Control may then only be limited by legal protection of local
stakeholders, governmental interference or changes in the legislation. As a trade- off,
however, the investor then has to integrate a foreign business unit in its hierarchy and
control potential shirking of employees in the foreign affiliate.
In economies in transition, additional factors may affect the mode choice. Entrants may,
at least initially, not find suitable partners or companies to acquire and thus accept lower
degrees of involvement. Greenfield investment may be too slow to achieve the desired
strategic objectives, notably if companies pursue first mover advantages. Acquisition
opportunities are often dependent on the privatisation process, which is highly
politicised and subject to interference from various governmental agencies (Antal-
Mokos 1998). Initially, investors may prefer joint- ownership to ease access to local
institutions (Stopford and Wells 1972, Thornton and Mikheeva 1996).
Foreign companies entering the transition economies have superior experience in the use
of markets. However, they too face high transaction cost. Their transactions are affected
by lack of information about their partners, by complex negotiations with partners
inexperienced in business negotiations (Antal- Mokos 1998), by an unclear regulatory
framework and an inexperienced bureaucracy (Thornton and Mikheeva 1996). This
weak institutional framework implies that cheating costs are potentially high. The
reaction, from a transaction cost point of view, would be to internalise the business
transaction. However, shirking costs are also high. The central- plan regime was based
on a hierarchy in the whole economy that established quantitative output targets with
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few incentives to provide quality and customer service. Furthermore, foreign investors
wishing to establish a wholly- owned operation could often only do so through an
acquisition in the privatisation process. This, however, requires complex negotiations
with governmental authorities (Brouthers and Bamossy 1997) as well as involvement in
the process of company restructuring (Pohl et al. 1996, 1997). Post- socialist companies
need major changes not only in corporate strategy but also in the organisational structure
and culture (Newman 1998, Meyer and Bjerg- Moller 1998). Often, investors are also
expected to assume financial and environmental liabilities of the acquired company.
Thus, the costs of setting up an efficient local operation are very high.
2.5.1 Resources Commitment and the Choice of Entry Mode
A company seeking to enter a foreign market must make an important strategic decision
on which entry mode to use for that market. Because all of the modes under
consideration involve resource commitments, companies' initial choices of a particular
mode are difficult to change without considerable loss of time and money (Root 1987,
Kumar and Subramaniam 1997). Entry mode selection is a crucial strategic decision,
determined by the scale of investment and the risk- return on investment (Cateora 1993,
Czinkota et al. 1993, Daniels and Radebaugh 1993, Paliwoda 1993, Young et al. 1989).
Normative decision theory suggests that the choice of a foreign market entry mode
should be based on trade- offs between risks and returns. A company is expected to
choose the entry mode that offers the highest risk- adjusted return on investment.
However, behavioural evidence indicates that a company's choices may also be
determined by resource availability and need for control (Cespedes 1988, Stopford and
Wells 1972). Resource availability refers to the financial and managerial capacity of a
company for serving a particular foreign market.
Researchers have suggested that different entry modes require different resource
commitments (Daniels 1970, Vernon 1983). Anderson and Gatignon (1986) developed a
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transaction cost model that considered the trade- off between the costs of mode control
and the costs of mode resource commitment. Hill et al. (1990) elaborated on this idea of
resource commitment when they differentiated between joint ventures and wholly
owned entry modes. Resource commitment has been used widely to contingently
differentiate between joint ventures and wholly owned entry modes. The greater the
degree of ownership in the entry mode is, the larger the resource commitment. For
example, in a joint venture, a company's resource commitment is minimised relative to a
wholly owned entry mode because of the shared resources commitment between
companies (Hill et al. 1990, Daniels and Magi 11 1991, Anderson and Gatignon 1986).
Errammili (1991) and Errammili and Rao (1990) used market knowledge to explain why
companies use specific entry modes. Davidson (1982) found that companies having
lower market knowledge tended to reduce the strategic risk by entering these markets
through joint ventures rather than wholly owned modes. Therefore, resource- based
contingency theory has been used extensively to differentiate between joint venture and
wholly entry mode selection.
The important difference between the acquisition and joint venture modes is that
companies in a joint venture share and provide access to some of their internal resources,
while in the acquisition mode no such access is provided. A company will tend to favour
an acquisition entry mode if it can not find a suitable partner predisposed to providing
access or sharing the required resources, or if it is not itself predisposed to providing
access to internal resources. A company will use the joint venture mode to rectify a
resource deficiency only if it is willing to risk providing access to such resources, and
can find a willing and suitable partner having appropriate resources to share or provide
access (Hill et al. 1990). The critical factor in the joint venture is finding partners that
are predisposed to providing such access to resources/2 A company's predisposition to
provide another company with access to its resources will depend upon its perception of
This predisposition must be based on inter- company trust, and a perception that access and sharing of
resources will not negatively impact the company strategically (Daniels and Magill 1991).
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the risk of exposing its critical resources. A company unnecessarily exposing critical
resources may provide its partnering company with a competitive advantage (Col I is
1991, Hamel and Prahalad 1990, Prahalad and Bettis 1986, Stalk et al. 1992). Therefore,
the perceived nature and type of resources being exposed is important to the entry mode
selection process. If companies want to protect these vital core resources and the
perceived risks of having them transferred to the second company are high, then they
should procure the needed resources through an acquisition.
The contingency relationships delineated above not only influence the selection of the
entry modes, but also their profitability. Companies already having the appropriate
resource incur minimal resource- based costs during market entry. However, companies
not having the required resources must procure them using a joint venture or acquisition.
Such a transaction will have an associated cost. A company using an acquisition entry
mode will have several costs associated with procuring the necessary resources for
market entry particularly in the inefficient market situation, which an acquisition
represents. This puts the acquiring company at a disadvantage for evaluating the value of
the resources being purchased. The transformation and integration of acquired
companies is subject to tensions between radical change to match the strategy and
corporate culture of the acquirer, and preserving what is valuable in resources and
cultural attributes in the acquired organisation (Carlin et al 1995, Newman and Nollen
1998, Uhlenbruck and DeCastro 1998, Stiglitz 1999, Soulsbyand Clark 1995).
Joint ventures have minimal risks associated with resource overpayment because of the
symmetrical and ongoing nature of the transaction process. The risk of paying too much
for these resources is limited because all partners face the same potential information
asymmetry problem. Therefore, neither partner has a clear ability to induce the other
partner to overpay or over-commit without incurring the same problem himself. This
situation leads to a situation where neither party wants to induce the other to retaliate. In
addition to the above retaliatory motivation game, a positive motivational economic
game is also present. Given that joint ventures are benefiting from either sharing
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resources or remuneration, all parties will be reticent to cheat for fear they will lose
these benefits. Therefore, all parties attempt to actively support the joint venture and do
not cheat. This positive economic game dilemma produces a non- cheating environment
based on the accruing benefits to all parties (Harrigan 1986).
2.5.2 Organisational Control and the Choice of Entry Mode
Organisation control costs depend upon the entry mode selected.JJ In this study
organisational control is defined as the efficient and effective management of the
relationship between the parent and entry entity that enables the parent to best meet its
overall goals and objectives. Organisational control has frequently been associated with
different entry modes. Previous research has suggested that entry modes having different
ownership levels are associated with specific control capabilities and capacities."14
Higher operational control results from having a greater ownership in the foreign
venture. The level of control is lowest in the case of joint venture and highest in the case
of a wholly owned subsidiary.
Control plays an important role in the capacity of a company to achieve its goals.
Typically, as organisations expand into foreign markets, there are concurrent increased
in the complexity and differentiation of their structures (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967), as
well as in the risks of conflicts, opportunistic behaviour and competing goals between
units. As a result, managers are confronted by the increasingly crucial need to monitor,
coordinate and integrate the activities of the organisation's business units, including
joint ventures (Child 1977, Mintzberg 1979).
In a joint venture, the multiple ownership arrangement has costs associated with the
ongoing management of the relationship (Beamish and Banks 1987, Killing 1983). Thus,
By control we mean authority over operational and strategic decision- making (Anderson and Gatignon
1986), which is desirable to improve a company's competitive position and maximise the returns on its
assets and skills.
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based on management control issues, the wholly owned modes appear to be intrinsically
distinct from the joint venture mode. For effective control, joint ventures may depend on
mechanisms that take time to develop and consume managerial attention, such as trust.
They also bear the additional cost of having more relationships to manage. The entity
itself has two parents, as opposed to one, and the parents themselves also must maintain
a relationship (Woodcock et al. 1994, Beamish and Banks 1987, Killing 1983).
In contrast, a greenfield venture is under its parent company's sole management and
control from the outset. Thus it attracts only those additional costs or risks associated
with being distant from the parent. These base costs are common to all foreign
investments. Since the joint venture mode bears higher resource and management
control costs, it is expected to perform at a lower level than the greenfield mode.
Greenfield investments tend to outperform acquisitions because of lower control costs.
Literature suggests that integration and control issues are linked to the failure of many
acquisitions to perform up to their purchasers' expectations. In a greenfield venture, a
company faces only minimal control costs, since there is no question of having to
integrate different corporate cultures and divergent strategic viewpoints. The new entity
becomes an extension of the existing one, admittedly with significant start- up costs, but
with a much lower long- term risk of continuing integration problems faced by acquired
companies. Because they bear lower costs of management control, greenfield
investments are expected to perform better than acquisitions.
Acquisitions incur high control costs. First, organisational culture differences may
exacerbate the management control problem between the two merging entities. Cultural
differences may limit the effectiveness of behavioural- based control mechanisms that
rely upon trust, value congruence and respect (Nahavandi and Maleksadeh 1988). This
may force the acquiring company to use a restricted set of control mechanisms, which in
turn may decrease the implementation efficiency of the organisation control (Woodcock
For more details see the studies of Anderson and Gatignon (1986), Calvet (1981), Caves (1982),
Davidson (1982), Root (1987).
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et al. 1994). Organisational culture differences may also impede organisational
integration, yet executives often erroneously predict that organisational integration will
produce post- acquisition synergies. The opportunity costs of not gaining these synergies
immediately may be significant (Nahavandi and Maleksadeh 1988, Chatterjee 1992,
Porter 1987).
Having decided to enter a foreign market, a company has to determine the appropriate
mode for organising its foreign business activities. Each of the modes of entry has
different implications for the degree of control that a company can exercise over the
foreign operation and the risks that it must bear to expand into the foreign country. Thus,
identifying the appropriate entry mode in a given context is necessarily a difficult and
complex task. The choice, however, is a critical determinant of the likely success of the
foreign operation (Root 1987, Davidson 1982, Killing 1982). Unfortunately, much of the
existing literature on the choice of entry mode focuses in a piecemeal fashion on many
seemingly unrelated factors including country risk, country familiarity, the stage of
country development, technology, and transaction costs. There is a need for a unified
framework within which different factors can be placed and the relationships between
them analysed. A previous attempt to provide such a framework was made by Anderson
and Gatignon (1986)j;> and Dunning (1977, 1980, 1988).
Anderson and Gatignon (1986) discuss two general categories of risk: internal and
external. They suggest that companies are interested in subsidiary control as a means of
controlling risk and improving performance. They state that companies trade various
levels of control for reduction of resource commitment in the hope of reducing some
forms of risk while increasing their returns. They hypothesise that the greater the
° The shortcoming of this framework stems from their attempt to reconcile different entry mode
explanations within a transaction cost framework. The position taken here is that while transaction cost
explanations are of major importance, transaction cost logic alone does not provide all of the answers.
Transaction cost explanations of the choice of entry mode focus on each entry decision in isolation,
treating each as a self- contained decision. A company's choice of entry mode may depend upon the
strategic relationship the company envisages between operations in different countries. Thus, a particular
entry decision cannot be viewed in isolation. By limiting the framework to transaction cost explanations,
the role that regional- domestic competition plays in determining the appropriate entry mode.
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country risk and asset specificity, the higher the control sought by the company. They
also suggest that a company's international experience is positively related to the
amount of control sought because more experienced managers have a more accurate
perception of foreign risks and returns.
2.5.3 Comparing International Ownership Based Entry Mode Performance
A theoretical relationship is developed for international entry modes that are based on
the contingency characteristics of resource requirements and organisational control
factors. It suggests that different entry modes have different performance outcomes
based upon their resources and organisational control demands (Woodcock et al. 1994).
The importance of entry mode selection to a company's competitive advantage in a new
international market has been studied widely, yet the majority of these studies have not
examined mode performance (Anderson and Gatignon 1986, 1988 Beamish and Banks
1987, Hennart 1988, 1991, Mill et al. 1990, Gomes- Casseres 1991).
Currently, no empirical linkage has been made between theoretical selected international
entry mode choices and company performance (Woodcock et al. 1994) though scholars
have examined mode performance differences (Makino and Beamish 1998, Woodcock
et al. 1994). However, the literature has acknowledged the importance of doing so
(Woodcock et al. I994).j6
With respect to mode type, previous research shows that new wholly owned ventures
tend to outperform joint ventures (Nitsch et al. 1996, Woodcock et al. 1994). Despite
this evidence, few researchers have explicitly measured and compared the performance
"'6
Empirical research comparing international ownership based entry mode performance has been sparse,
owing to the difficulty associated with collecting valid data for a company's international venture and or
subsidiary performance. Subsidiary performance data are difficult to obtain because they are usually
confidential. Furthermore, when performance values are obtained they are often hard to interpret because
management accounting practices differ between companies and countries, and internal subsidiary
performance measures do not have to conform to legal or accounting standards (Woodcock et al. 1994).
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of the various international entry modes, and fewer still have attempted to develop a
theoretical argument for performance differences (Woodcock et al. 1994).
Although there is no theoretical- empirical research to guide us in making predictions
concerning the relationships between the various variables, entry mode choice and
company performance, previous literature does not suggest several reasons why the
mode of entry may have an impact on performance. The objective of this study is to
explain what affect contingency factors have on the performance of the different
international ownership- based entry modes. Therefore, this study examines whether
certain contingent mode characteristics produce performance differences between the
three international ownership based entry modes (Woodcock et al. 1994: 255).
It is becoming axiomatic that investing abroad can have serious implications on
corporate accomplishments (Daniels and Bracker 1989, Geringer et al. 1989). Because
investing in a foreign country is deemed to be substantially more risky than remaining in
the domestic market, Miller (1987) suggests that companies should consider assessing
several dimensions of the foreign environment in an effort to allow the company to
optimise its returns for the risk assumed. In that respect Agarwal and Ramaswani (1992),
Known and Konopa (1993), and Ekeledo and Sivakumar (1998) suggest that a company
is expected to choose the entry mode that offers the highest risk- adjusted return on
investment/7 They contend that the level of control and resource commitment associated
with each entry mode alternative may reflect this risk- mode- performance relationship.
37 The company's competitive position, thus, is mainly determined by its temporary competitive
advantages. This explains the rather short- term orientation of the strategic behaviour approach. Given a
relative advantage, the MNE will try to maximise short- term profits, even at the expense of long- term
considerations, to prevent other companies from appropriating their competitive advantages (Buckley
1990). A wholly owned subsidiary will be preferred over other alternative governance structures, if this
serves the MNE's relative competitive position best (Contractor and Lorange 1988). Joint ventures also
function as an effective mechanism for the improvement of a company's relative competitive position.
MNEs are expected to establish a joint venture only if this mode of entry maximises profits by improving
the MNEs' relative competitive position. Then, the advantages minus the disadvantages ofjoint ventures
relative to all other alternative governance structures are highest (Contractor 1990). Some of the strategic
advantages of joint ventures are economies of scale, learning effects, reduction of risk and competition,
access to know- how, skills and assets, and so on. Disadvantages are the cost of coordinating activities, the
dissipation of know- how, and possible opportunistic behaviour (Porter and Fuller 1986).
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They also propose that since risk and control are related to a company's costs and
returns of doing business in a foreign market, the risk- return/ cost- control tradeoffs
model is offered as an explanation of a company's behaviour of maximising profit by
choosing the optimal entry mode for a desired market.
Recent attempts to relate entry mode choices to company performance do not
empirically examine theory driven selection criteria for companies' international entry
mode choices (Anand and Delios 1997, Chan 1995, Makino and Beamish 1998, Nitsch
et al. 1996, Simmonds 1990, Woodcock et al. 1994). Typical is Woodcock et al. (1994)
who explained that their study did not test the theoretical arguments that cause
performance variance.
A study by Li and Guisinger (1991) looked at performance differences between all three
ownership- based entry modes. The study hypothesised that new ventures would have
the lowest failure rate, acquisitions the highest, and joint ventures a median rate. This
study found the relationship between new ventures and acquisitions to be in the
hypothesised direction and significant.
Woodcock et al. (1994) made three major points with respect to the relationship between
entry mode choice and performance. First, companies must consider the risk of exposing
their core resources to other organisations in making the mode selection decision.
Second, they suggest that in acquisitions, companies risk paying too high a price for the
target company and therefore reduce their future performance. Third, they suggest that
joint ventures and greenfields reduce the impact of acquisition risk. They found that the
new venture mode outperforms the joint venture mode and the joint venture mode
outperforms the acquisition mode.
Nitsch et al. (1996) who suggested the same cost- risk relationships as in Woodcock et
al. (1994), found that joint ventures and greenfield ventures provided better performance
than did acquisitions. Pan et al. (1999) suggest that management control will reduce
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costs for wholly owned subsidiaries as compared to equity joint ventures. Pan and Chi
(1999) use arguments and data sets similar to Pan et al. (1999). They found that equity
joint ventures had higher performance than wholly- owned modes.
2.6 Conclusions
During the past three decades difficulty in establishing a general theory for
understanding the behaviour of a company in the international context, has accompanied
the growth of the field. The reason is that most of the contributions in the literature
derives from a variety of academic disciplines, ranging from neoclassical economic
theory to industrial organisation theory. This wide range of contributions in the
international business literature has resulted in a considerable diversity within the field
and a lack of a common framework (Dunning 1993). The study of FDI as a separate
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body of literature was introduced in Hymer's doctoral dissertation in 1960.
Hymer's contributions in the field of international business was to realise that FDI could
not be explained as if it was portfolio investment, that is, inter- country movements of
capital responding to differential rates of return on capital.39 He noted that neo-classical
financial theory with its restrictive assumptions of perfect competition, zero transaction
costs and interest- rates differentials as the sole drivers of capital movements could not
s
Hymer (1960, 1976) explained FDI as an international extension of industrial organisation theory. He
criticised the model of perfect competition of neoclassical economics, which asserts that international
trade is the only possible way to have international involvement. Hymer challenges the assumption of the
model of perfect competition that information is costless and freely available. According to Hymer, local
companies are better informed about the local environment situation than foreign companies. In order to
be able to provide an explanation for the existence of FDI, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, MNEs
that own and control foreign subsidiaries must possess company specific advantages that outweigh the
disadvantages of being a foreign company. Second, the market for selling these advantages must be
imperfect. These monopolistic advantages imply the existence of structural market imperfections.
Hymer's view on MNE as monopolistic rent seekers formed the basis for Kindleberger's (1969) market
imperfections paradigm and for Cave's (1971) early work. Hymer's market imperfections theory of FDI
postulates that wholly owned subsidiaries are the best alternative in the case ofmonopolistic advantages,
while arm's length transactions are the best alternative in the absence of these advantages.
"'9
Hymer's contributions to the literature was a major step forward and a radical departure from the neo¬
classical approach, that first introduced FDI as an autonomous discipline needing special explanation other
than portfolio investment or perfect competition. However, Hymer's theory paid less attention to strategic
issues such as competition among companies entering a particular host country.
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explain why companies transfer intermediate products such as knowledge and
technology, across international borders, while still retaining control over them. Based
on theories of structural characteristics of markets and industries, he argued that
structural market imperfections enable organisations to utilise the power given by their
specific advantage to close markets and to obtain superior rents on their activities.40
Although his theory of ownership specific advantage did explain an important condition
for the establishment of MNE, it failed to explain why companies had to locate sales or
manufacturing subsidiaries abroad. Ownership specific advantages could be exploited by
other means such as exports. Apart from the emphasis it gives to the desire to
appropriate the maximum economic rent of their assets to strengthen their positions, a
special advantage does not necessarily lead to foreign production.41
Hymer was much concerned with explaining why FDI occurred. However, he did not
explain why it occurred in a particular country and not in another, in other words, where
FDI occurred. The question concerning the country in which a company is located is of
great importance, especially if the company considers issues such as comparative costs,
resource endowments, and economic conditions.
Hymer's (1960) market imperfections theory of FDI uses the concept ofmarket power in
explaining the existence of MNE. The market power held by companies is believed to be
based on their monopolistic advantages. Whenever companies possess monopolistic
advantages, they will invest outside their own country only by retaining full ownership.
Alternatively, an arm's- length contract will be selected. This dichotomy is a rather
limited perspective as it ignores all kinds of intermediate or hybrid forms of
40
Such advantages have been recently explored by other researchers to include technologies, product
differentiation, marketing, and investment in branding, distribution and service (Porter 1980, 1985).
41 When Hymer wrote his thesis (1960), international business activities had not grown and spread as they
have today. In the current business environment, companies have assumed different characteristics,
compared to the early sixties. Companies operating across borders can be found attaining special
advantages in many ways that arise from their feature of multinationality, that is, spreading direct
investments over many countries.
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organisation, such as joint ventures. 42 A second point of criticism on Hymer's work is
the use of monopolistic advantages, which automatically lead to revenues.43 Even if an
advantage can be patented, it will not exist forever, because the patent system is not a
perfect system (Hennart 1982). Hence, it can be concluded that Hymer's assumption of
eternal monopolistic advantages is not realistic.44
Transaction cost economics is complementary to these two approaches, since its unit of
analysis and its focus differ. Transaction cost economics evaluates decisions at the level
of the individual transaction while the strategic behaviour approach and the resource-
based approach respectively take the company and organisational units as the unit of
analysis. Furthermore, transaction cost economics uses the long- term or structural
efficiency as the criterion for choosing between alternative governance structures. The
inclusion of structural efficiency considerations adds to the decision criteria of the
strategic behaviour approach and, to some extent, of the resource based approach. The
strategic behaviour approach ignores the concept of structural efficiency completely,
whereas the resource based approach makes an explicit distinction between strategic
intent and structural efficiency, which are integrated into one model (Tallman 1991).
However, the attention this latter concept receives in the resource- based view is much
shallower than in transaction cost economics.45
4" A comparable narrow focus was advocated in the initial publications on transaction cost economics
(Coase 1937, Williamson 1975). In more recent contributions, the existence of hybrid governance
structures was acknowledged (Hennart 1988, Riordan and Williamson 1985, Williamson 1981, 1985,
1991). The main arguments of transaction costs economics concern the hybrid organisational structure of
joint ventures. They are partly co-ordinated by prices and by hierarchy mechanisms. The transaction costs
literature emphasises the effects of the incomplete internalisation and sensitivity to market failure.
4j This automatic way of generating revenues is in sharp contrast with the strategic behaviour approach,
which states that obtaining revenues depends on the strategic choices companies make. These
monopolistic advantages are company specific and remain valuable for a very long time without being
appropriated by other companies. This conception of everlasting is beyond the contemporary reality of
business. Nowadays, competition is so severe that nearly every advantage a company has over other
companies will only be valuable for a short time. Competitors try to acquire or imitate such an advantage,
making the comparative advantage worthless.
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In contrast, the strategic behaviour approach and the resource-based approach acknowledge that
company specific advantages are only temporary. Both approaches recognise that these company specific
or competitive advantages have to be protected against the appropriation of imitation by competitors.
4~ Transaction cost economics only concentrates on structural efficiency at the level of the transaction,
completely ignoring strategic considerations. This is problematic, because transaction cost economics
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A second shortcoming of transaction cost economics is that it focuses only on the
minimisation of costs when comparing alternative governance structures, and ignores
possible benefits (Kogut 1988). Such an approach seems to assume that the benefits are
similar for all possible governance structures. However, it disregards the existence of
benefits, which may accrue from unique characteristics of the different modes of
organisation.46 A final weakness of transaction cost economics involves the implicit
assumption of identical production functions across companies (Conner 1991). This
suggests that all managers of all companies have the same management capabilities and
routines, and use them in the same way. This assumption is not realistic, as it denies the
existence of company specific differences in this area.47
Internalisation theory, which is perceived as a general theory for the existence of the
MNE (Rugman 1979) is frequently considered to be analogous to transaction cost
economics. Both transaction cost economics and internationalisation theory rest upon the
early work by Coase (1937).48 While Williamson was working on his markets and
hierarchies dichotomy, Buckley and Casson formulated their internalisation theory. The
fundamental ideas underlying the two concepts are identical: companies use their
internal organisation structure to overcome problems, which are caused by inefficiencies
in factor markets.49 Nevertheless, there are some differences between these theories.
assumes a situation of imperfect competition in which strategic behaviour is important (Harrigan 1985,
Hennart and Park 1994). Moreover, strategic considerations turn out to have a decisive impact on
ownership decisions (Hill et al. 1990, Kim and Hwang 1992). Companies may select a mode of entry,
which is not efficient for the specific transaction but which is the best alternative for the firm as a whole,
i.e. for strategic considerations (Kim and Hwang 1992, Kogut 1988).
45 One example is the synergy between companies, which can be achieved in joint ventures by combining
and exchanging relevant know- how. This synergy will result in higher benefits than a company would
gain in a wholly owned subsidiary (Contractor 1990, Contractor and Lorange 1988).
47 Unlike transaction cost economics, the resource- based approach assumes that all companies have a
different and unique stock of capabilities and resources (Penrose 1959).
4S
Parry (1985) disputes that internalisation theory is a general theory of FD1, since it cannot provide
explanations for the choice between exports, licensing and FDI or for the existence ofjoint ventures.
49
Both theories assume that these inefficiencies can be dealt more efficiently within rather than outside
the company. In this regard, Hennart (1988) stressed that organisations may fail too. Thus, he proposed a
theory offirm failure, which shows that companies are not more efficient than markets where high
transaction costs are concerned. He emphasised the necessity for companies to reduce shirking and to
control internal loss of information. These are aspects, which are neglected by transaction cost economics
and internalisation theory.
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Transaction cost economics focuses on the level of the single transaction, whereas
internalisation theory takes the company as the unit of analysis. Another difference is
that the second axiom of internalisation theory requires some additional constraints to
prevent it from being tautological (Buckley 19 8 3).50 A last difference is that
internalisation theory explicitly takes location specific advantages into account, whereas
transaction cost economics disregards these advantages.
The two eclectic approaches (Dunning's OLI and Hill et al.) also incorporate location
specific advantages. Dunning's paradigm, distinguishes three kinds of advantages,
which are believed to explain the foreign activities of the whole population of
companies. Two of these advantages (location and internalisation) are comparable with
those of internalisation theory, although the precise interpretation of the advantages
differs. For instance, internalisation theory combines ownership specific advantages and
internalisation advantages since the former advantages have to be internalised to be
effective.1,1
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Only then, internalisation theory is able to determine what transactions need to be internalised and what
mode of entry should be selected. Transaction cost economics can provide the framework required (Teece
1986).
Hill et al. focused on the level of the individual company, whereas Dunning attempted to explain why
the whole population of MNE developed cross- border activities. Hill et al. assumed that the competitive
advantages of companies are temporary advantages, while Dunning's ownership specific advantages are
monopolistic advantages. A shortcoming of Hill et al. (1990) eclectic framework is that no explicit
attention is paid to the resources and capabilities of companies. Hence, the resource- based theory is not
incorporated in their eclectic framework (Itaki 1991, Rugman 1986).
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CHAPTER THREE
Analysis of the Business and Investment Environment of the
Balkans
3.1 Introduction
The Balkan region has been changing in a very fundamental way, under the impact
of various interacting forces of economic transition that are shaping the new
economic landscape. The old structures of internal economic relations have
collapsed, while new economic structures have been, often forcefully and painfully,
in the making. Since the start of economic transformation, the adjustment to the
market economy has been characterised by persistent macroeconomic instability, and
lack of consistence in economic policies, leading to repetitive economic crises.
They have been a number of attempts to identify the reasons and to offer plausible
explanations for the transition process of the Balkans. Here we review the qualitative
explanations for the poor performance of the Balkans such as the insufficient
commitment to the market and to integration with the West, and the enduring
administrative weaknesses of the governments to propose valid strategies for growth.
The Balkans retain their regional importance owing to the size and strategic location
on several of the main transport routes to Western Europe, CEE, Russia and Asia. In
the event that political developments were to permit it, neighbouring countries could
benefit from recovery and reform in the region through two main channels. First,
restorations of trade linkages and, second, making the region a more attractive
destination for FDI by increasing co-operation on trade, simplifying border crossings
and co-ordination of regional infrastructure and regulation.
3.2 Economic Policy and Transformation
Initial conditions and the policies of the last decade determined the backwardness of
institutional reforms. Reforming institutions is complicated, since the capacity for
institution building is restricted due to limits imposed by the tensions of economic
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transition. The old structures of the command economy have been removed.
However, market driven institutions to guide and support the transition process have
not been properly established.1 Inherited contact with Western markets in the region
have been weaker than in CEE, delaying easy acceptance of market supporting
institutions during transition. The UN sanctions on Yugoslavia caused negative
disincentives for trade and investment in the Balkans.
In the course of economic transformation, a number of transitional weaknesses
emerged. These were weaknesses in the economic structure, such as the existence of
inherited large sectors of loss making companies, and weaknesses in the institutional
framework, which created bottlenecks in the functioning of markets and weakened
the foundations of an effective and clear corporate governance for foreign investors.
Last but not least, the transition crises caused a degradation of the financial systems
and markets, therefore damaging a central principle of the transition process.2
Structural changes were few, resulting in a long lasting transition recession. The
establishment of the free- market institutional framework turned out to be a long trial
and error process. The result was a delay in the reallocation of resources previously
employed by the socialist industry. Unclear property rights, the non- functioning
legal system and the underdeveloped financial system may be viewed as major
characteristics of these frameworks.
The restructuring of the real sector required a political will to privatise and liquidate
loss- making companies. In turn, there was a need for administrative backing to
implement and sustain the will to lift that responsibility off the governments'
shoulders. Lack of political will and misconceptions about privatisation and
liquidation let the economy lose several years. Therefore, governments retained
1 The policy makers in the Balkans failed to set up and maintain a rational reform agenda leading to
macroeconomic stabilisation and growth. Even in the case where the right policy mix was designed,
serious delays were encountered in the implementation of critical elements of the reform agenda. Lack
of commitment and coherence was the main characteristics of the policy makers.
2 According to the managers that participated in the research the main source of financing has been
the use of own funds. As a result, the demand for bank loan and equity financing for these companies
has grown, mainly for medium- term loans for the reconstruction and expansion of existing production
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control over the SOE, slowed the liberalisation of economic life and kept the
business environment rather unfriendly. In addition, premature liberalisation and
opening up of the economies contributed negatively to the development of the
Balkan economies as the abrupt lifting of these barriers was equivalent to the
reduction of the viability threshold for companies. Bureaucracy and corruption were
endemic and privatisation slow, and opaque (Gligorov et al. 1999, 2000, Dobrinsky
2000).
The choices made at the beginning of the systemic changes by the countries are
different. Bulgaria and Albania- like Poland and the Czech Republic- began their
reforms with liberalisation. Romania on the other hand, began with measures aimed
at the decentralisation of the economy. That choice determines the transition
models." The process of decentralisation in the Balkans is confronted with similar
difficulties and restrictions. The lack of experience of the proper institutions in the
area of competition policy is among the basic causes of the complicated and
inconsistent nature of the decentralisation processes. Attracting FDI largely depends
on the speed of the process of decentralisation of the economy.
3.3 Regional Economic Structures and Performance
The Balkan region is less developed and more backward in terms of transformation
than the CEE region. Although the population in the Balkans is only 20% lower than
in CEE, the overall GDP of the former group is one quarter of the latter's. Per capita
GDP is only one third of the level ten years ago. Looking at per capita GDP levels in
table 3.1, the Balkans have around US$ 1,600 or less while the CEE countries 2-3
times that level. Whereas the CEE succeeded in increasing their GDP per capita by
47% in the period 1989- 99, the Balkan countries recorded the decline of 21% in the
facilities. The development of an effective banking sector is a key priority for efficient distribution of
financial resources and thus for long-term economic growth.
J
When reforms begin with price liberalisation, as in Poland and the Czech Republic, a shock therapy
effect is observed. If the emphasis if on decentralisation, a gradualism effect is observed. However,
neither transition model is applied in its actual form (UN-ECE 1997, OECD- CCET 1997). The
difference consists in the sequence and the extent.
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period 1990- 99.4 Most of the Balkan countries show relatively high economic
growth rates following the Kosovo war. Their average rate of GDP growth in 2000
was quite impressive: at 6.0%, it was 2.7% higher than the rate of growth in the CEE
countries.
The highest rate of growth in 2000 was in Yugoslavia, a reflection of rising exports
and the recovery of industries that had gone into a deep decline during the Kosovo
conflict. Albania witnessed a reconstruction-type upswing fuelled by domestic
consumption financing from abroad. FYROM and Bulgaria have medium-high rates
of growth after years of severe transformational recessions. Romania struggles with
slow growth due to protracted transformation. One encouraging characteristic is that
all Balkan countries in 2000 witnessed a positive GDP growth rate. That means that a
decade of transition was needed for the Balkan to get out of this explicit recession.
Table 3.1 Basic Indicators of the transition economies, 1999- 2000
GDP Growth, real. %
Country GDP in USD GDP in GDP/ GDP/ GDP/ GDP/ 1990-1998 1999 2000 2001
mil (1999) USD mil Capita Capita Capita Capita Average
(2000) USD USD USD at USD at
(1999) (2000) PPP PPP (2000)
(1999)
Albania 3,665 3,871 1,149 1,125 2,420 2,400 -1.3 7.3 7.8 6.0
Bulgaria 12.405 13.025 1,510 1,513 5,170 5,610 -4.4 2.4 5.0 4.8
Yugoslavia 16,450 18.210 1,965 940 2,580 940 -7.1 -19.0 10.7 5.0
FYROM 3,432 3.607 1,699 1,620 4,530 4,524 -1.3 2.7 5.1 6.0
Romania 34,027 34,571 1,515 1,613 5,920 6,240 -2.7 -3.2 1.6 4.1
Average 13,995 14,657 1,567 1,362 4,124 3,943 -3.3 -2.0 6.0 5.1
Czech 53,118 54.286 5,166 5,640 13,030 13,750 -0.5 -0.2 2.2 3.0
Republic
Hungary 48,203 50,854 4,790 5,460 11,190 12,230 -0.6 4.5 5.5 5.5
Poland 154,146 161,082 4,024 4,410 8,840 9,440 1.8 4.1 4.5 5.0
Slovakia 18,842 19,218 3,654 4,010 10,710 11,260 -0.2 1.9 2.0 3.0
Slovenia 20,01 1 20,911 10,078 11,000 15,580 16,790 0.4 4.9 4.5 4.5
Average 58,864 61,268 5,542 6,104 11,870 12,694 0.18 3.0 3.7 4.2
Source: Hunya 2000, EBRD Transition Reports 2000- 2001.
Taking the figures per capita in PPP USD as an indicator from table 3.1, we find
great differences between the Balkan countries. Romania appears in 2000 to be the
most developed country in the region with a GDP per capita level equal to US$
4 All Balkan countries have experienced a deep recession after 1989. The characteristics of this
recession are the significant drop in output, the soaring inflation rates as a result of the market
liberalisation- the inflation in Yugoslavia was a result among other things of the civil wars and
embargoes, while in the other Balkan countries it can be attributed to the delayed reforms- and the
high unemployment rates. Only Bulgaria and Romania have relatively modest rates of unemployment
but these are more a reflection of delayed restructuring policies, designed to avoid or reduce social
tension, rather than of an improvement in underlying economic performance.
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6,240, while Yugoslavia appears to have the lowest GDP per capita PPP at US$.
Second, using the same indicator, the Balkans are well behind the more advanced
transition countries of the CEE region.
While economic performance in these two regions was undoubtedly highly divergent
during the course of transition, the difference in the growth patterns has recently
surfaced as one of the main characteristics of this dividing line. Most countries, with
the exceptions of Romania and Yugoslavia, have made considerable progress
towards macroeconomic stability. Elowever, this progress towards macroeconomic
stability has not been sufficient to set them on the path of sustained recovery.
3.3.1 Flows of FDI to the Balkan Markets
Being geographically remote from the EI J markets, the negative side effects of
sanctions and civil war from 1992 to 1998 on Yugoslavia were detrimental for the
Balkans and in effect amounted to a strong external shock that added to an already
severe transformational recession. Political instability in the region has been a strong
deterrent to FDI, unlike the CEE economies. Regional trading links have been
broken during a decade ofmilitary conflicts and sanctions adding to the impediments
for significant FDI in the region.
Table 3.2 FDI Inflows in the Balkans (in USD million)
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Albania 4 55.9 41.5 58 53 70 90 48 45 41 143
Bulgaria 4 56 41.4 102.4 210.9 162.2 256.4 636.2 620 755.3 1000
FYROM 0 0 0 19.1 24.0 9.5 1 1.2 30.8 120.3 38.07 104
Romania 0 710.9 363.5 414.3 907.6 322.4 720.6 1215 2031 1023 1000
Yugoslavia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 728 103 103 54
Figures from EBRD Transition Report 2000
Albania:
While remaining stagnant at US 41 mn in 1999 due to the spillover effect from the
Kosovo conflict, FDI in Albania tripled in 2000. Looking at the data in table 3.2, FDI
into Albania has been relatively limited over the past decade; the figures include both
greenfield investment and investments as part of the privatisation process. This
suggests that after privatisation is completed the amount of new investment in
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greenfield projects might be very low unless a new FDI policy is developed and
more vigorous promotion initiatives introduced. FDI in Albania remains low, and
will only increase with continued political and macroeconomic stability, and the
achievement of greater security. Recent changes to the tax legislation by removing
tax incentives for foreign investors are not encouraging.
BULGARIA:
Looking at the data in table 3.2, between 1992- 96, Bulgaria absorbed about US
773.3 million in FDI. After the change in government in 1997 and the perceived
improvement in the investment climate, FDI increased, reaching US 636.2 million
for that year alone. Over 1998, Bulgaria attracted US 620 million in FDI,
substantially less than the projected US 1 billion.D Because of macroeconomic
stabilisation and privatisation efforts, FDI inflows rose to a record US 1 billion in
2000, with privatisation- related inflows accounting for almost half of the total.
Finally, while foreign investors are increasingly launching greenfield projects, yet
they have shown little interest in taking over and restructuring inefficient privatised
companies. Despite increased FDI inflows in the past three years, FDI is still
hampered by unclear legislation and overly bureaucratic procedures. Flowever, these
impediments are a result of the reform measures introduced by the government. The
government has undertaken a series of legal reforms, resulting in frequent changes to
laws and regulations relevant to domestic and foreign investors alike. However, the
administrative reforms were often not pursued with the same vigour, resulting in
administrative procedures not being in line with new legislation.
FYROM:
In the early years of independence, FYROM's attempts to attract FDI were seriously
hampered by the uncertainty surrounding the future of the country and its ability to
survive. Therefore, looking at the data in table 3.2, between 1993 and 1996 FYROM
attracted only US 63.8 million. The increased investor interest peaked in 1998 with
US120 million invested, against US 30 million over 1997, and only US 11 million
5
Such a projection was conditional on the expected sale of a number of SOEs, most notable the
Telecommunications company. The crisis of confidence affecting investors following the Russian
crisis, and concerns about the war in Kosovo also contributed to this lower than anticipated result.
the year before that. By 2000, total FDI had reached US 357 million. The investment
climate is still quite difficult for the SME sector. Interest rates and social security
costs are high, and registration procedures are complicated. Yet, the country has now
reached a stage in its transition where the SME sector has the potential to expand
rapidly and become the main engine for growth in the economy.
ROMANIA:
Looking at the data in table 3.2, Romania has attracted the biggest share of FDI in
the Balkans. However, attracting FDI has not been in the focus of the governments'
economic policy in the last few years. This negative position can be mainly
explained by the strong influence of local economic interests. Political stakeholders
and their economic associates are in no way xenophobic. They just feel that they
cannot compete with foreign investors in an open and transparent environment and
try to maintain an advantage by keeping foreign investors at a distance.
YUGOSLAVIA:
From the data in table 3.2, it is evident that Yugoslavia has attracted the lowest share
of FDI in the Balkans. The government has already initiated measures to liberalise
the trade regime that would also help to attract FDI. Yet, FDI inflows will unlikely
increase considerably until the current uncertainties surrounding the political and
economic situation wither away. The economy continues to carry the burdens of a
lack of working capital, low utilisation of industrial capacity, high unemployment,
extremely low investment, high public expenditures, and the illiquidity of banks and
companies. A major problem for FDI is the inefficiency of capital markets. Most
commercial banks suffer severe liquidity problems and have not yet adjusted to
market- based operations. The restructuring of the banking system will be vital for
the success of the economy. Privatised and newly emerging companies will need a
well- functioning and capitalised banking system, if they want to invest and expand.
The importance of FDI for the development prospects of the Balkans is in the fact
that, beyond financing, it can accelerate the recovery of the economies from the
recession, and provide considerable positive effects, such as the transfer of modern
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technology and growth of exports. It is more realistic to expect FDI inflow in
privatisation related projects than in greenfield projects, which are much more
sensitive when investment climate, as the one in the Balkans, is in question.
FDI in the Balkans is impeded by entry and exit conditions. Looking at exit first, we
argued that no country has introduced and implemented bankruptcy laws properly.
Though production has fallen rapidly, exit is less than prompt and most of the region
is still going through the transitional recession. There have been problems with the
creation of new companies. The barriers that new businesses face are those that have
to do with the availability of finance,6 the availability of markets, business regulation
and taxation.7
The Balkan region certainly has some advantages for attracting FDI, including the
availability of qualified and cheap labour, and a domestic market with a growth
potential. Unfortunately, there are many more obstacles to these inflows. The most
serious among them are the high political and commercial risks, the poor
infrastructure, and the completely discontinued transition process in the region. In the
Balkans, there are no institutional mechanisms, which would assist the development
of the SME sector as well as the restructuring of existing companies. This sets a
major limitation for FDI and is a serious obstacle to more active participation in
company restructuring and the acquisition of new knowledge suitable in transition.
Regarding the political risk, four managers from the mining, eighteen managers from
the food and beverage companies and two managers from the telecommunication
companies, changes in government policies caused problems related to repatriation
of earnings and the financial obligations of the Greek companies towards their
Balkan partners. The reason, according to the above twenty- four Greek managers, is
6 There are certain problems with the financing of new companies in the Balkans. One has to do with
the non-availability of certain financial services. The other problem is the non-existence of credit lines
for start up companies that have no collateral to support their investment plans. This is the
consequence of the non-existence of supported financing schemes for SME. The third problem is the
high interest rates for loans that are available (East West Institute 2000: 19).
7
The tax structure is primarily based on direct taxes and only partially on indirect taxes, a situation
that is not consistent with a modern market economy. The tax system does not fulfil the criteria of
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that the Balkan governments believe that the above three industries have the potential
to modernise the production capacity of their countries. Therefore, the authorities
found mechanisms to influence the amount of earnings the companies could
repatriate. The retained funds were used for further investments in the host countries.
Regarding the financial obligations of the Greek companies towards their partners,
the twenty- four managers further reported that when a new government was elected
in any Balkan country demanded higher and higher financial contributions from the
Greek companies to the capital structure of their Balkan partners. The new
governments have decided that the price paid a few years ago to acquire the shares of
a SOE does not reflect its present business value. Therefore, a re-evaluation of the
initial agreement had to be drawn from beginning in order to set a price for the
purchase of the remaining shares of the companies. This was a direct way to exert
pressure on the Greek investors and an indirect way to increase the state revenues.
In addition to the problems in privatisation and financial market institutions, all the
Greek investors have complained about the high level of instability and
unpredictability in the region. However, this complaint also refers to tax and other
special rules under which foreign investors have operated. For investors, who are
obliged to make outlays in the present under the expectations of returns only in the
future, stability and clarity in rules and conditions are of primary importance.
3.3.2 Regional Market Structures and Performance
Bulgaria and Romania began transformation much later than Hungary and Slovenia,
starting under difficult circumstances, suffering from economic underdevelopment,
but both remain politically committed to liberalisation and European integration.
FYROM has confronted numerous economic crises related to its relative under¬
development, remoteness from European markets and domestic political problems.
Burdened by the legacies of underdevelopment and then hampered by the absence of
efficiency, neutrality, equity, transparency and simplicity. The reform of the present tax system is
therefore a priority (East West Institute 2000: 19).
54
viable state institutions, Albania has staggered from one crisis to another.8
Yugoslavia occupies a special position in the context of the transition. Being one of
the relatively large economies in the Balkans and strategically located on the main
transport routes to Western Europe, it is both an important market for neighbouring
countries and an important transit country. However, the economy has been in a
parlous state for a long time, suffering from the break-up of the former Yugoslavia,
leading to the loss of markets, and then from four years of conflict and international
sanctions.
One of the tests verifying the market quality of the physical and human capital in
transition economies and its capability to adjust to market conditions is the ability to
produce output which is marketable on the international markets. Looking at table
3.3, the dynamics of both industrial output and of exports during the past decade are
indicative of the differences in the adjustment to the new market pressures between
the Balkans and the CEE. While aggregate gross industrial output in the Balkans in
1999 was still less than half of its 1989 level that in the CEE had practically
recovered from the transformational decline. The divergence in export performance
has been more pronounced. While the value of the CEE aggregate exports has more
than doubled during the last decade, in 1999 Balkans' aggregate dollar exports were
still below their 1989 level. The knock-on effect of price and trade liberalisation was
equivalent to the erosion of a large share of the existing physical and human capital
and hence in considerable losses in output generating capacity.9
s
Albania and FYROM have growing relatively rapidly largely on the basis of low value added
products, whereas Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia have been growing more slowly while building
a more advanced industrial base. At this point it is important to say that under the previous economic
system, Albania and FYROM were self- supporting countries with a low degree of industry
specialisation. Therefore, local companies have not established any strong alliances with companies
from other more advanced socialistic countries; thus, it was extremely difficult for these companies to
seek foreign business partners at the beginning of transition.
9 The determinant of the falling has been the reduction of the growth potential caused by a decline in
the available and employable production factors.
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Table 3.3 GDP, industrial output and exports in transition economies 1991- 2000
GDP Gross industrial output Dollar exports
Average annual rates ol'growth (%) Average annual rates of growth (%) Average annual rates of growth (%)
Country 1991-95 1996- 99 1991-99 1991-95 1996-99 1991-99 1991-95 1996-99 1991-99
Albania -2.1 4.3 0.5 -22.7 -1.4 -13.9 -2.6 5.5 0.9
Bulgaria -2.6 -4.7 -2.9 -7.5 -7.1 -7.3 0.5 -8.2 -3.5
Romania -2.1 -2.5 -2.9 -7.1 -7.1 -7.1 1 1.6 0.4 6.5
FYROM -5.5 2.0 -2.4 -13.7 0,7 -7.5 1.6 -2.2 -0.1
Yugoslavia -13.7 0.2 -9.2 -15.7 -3.9 -10.6 -19.9 -0.5 -1 1.8
Czech
Republic
-1.1 0.4 -0.4 -5.4 1.0 -2.6 19.1 5.0 12.6
Hungary -2.4 3.9 0.4 -2.5 8.7 2.3 6.2 17.5 11.1
Poland 2.2 5.4 3.6 4.4 6.3 5.2 9.8 3.2 6.8
Slovakia -2.9 5.1 0.6 -5.1 2.8 -1.7 16.1 4.1 10.6
Slovenia -0.6 3.9 1.4 -4.3 1.0 -2.0 15.1 1.6 8.9
GDP Gross industrial output Dollar exports
Average annual rates of growth (%) Average annual rates of growth (%) Average annual rates of growth (%)





Albania 7.3 7.8 7.6 16.0 12.0 14 28.3 -10.0 9.2
Bulgaria 2.4 5.0 3.7 -12.3 2.3 -5.0 -4.5 20.0 7.7
Romania -3.2 1.6 -0.8 -7.9 8.2 0.2 2.4 21.9 12.2
FYROM 2.7 5.1 3.9 -2.6 3.5 0.5
Yugoslavia -19.0 10.7 -4.1 -23.1 10.9 -6.1 -47.6 15.1 -16.2
Czech
Republic
-0.8 3.1 1.2 -3.1 5.1 1.0 -0.4 10.4 5.0
Hungary 4.4 5.2 4.8 10.4 18.3 14.4 8.7 12.3 10.5
Poland 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.8 7.1 5.9 -2.9 15.5 6.3
Slovakia 1.9 2.2 2.1 -3.6 9.1 2.8 -4.6 15.8 5.6
Slovenia 5.2 4.8 5.0 -0.5 6.2 2.8 -5.6 2.2 -1.7
Source: Dobrinsky 1999, UN/ECE various publications, own calculations
The impact of weak foreign demand was manifest in the trade performance. The
dollar value of total east European trade in 1999 was lower than in 1998, the first
time it had fallen since 1991. In the Balkans, the fall in the value of total exports and
imports was particularly large. Looking at table 3.3, the trade figures for 1999 reflect
the lagged effects of the 1998 crisis. On the contrary, in 2000, the rate of growth of
dollar exports was in the double digits in almost all of the Balkan countries. The
strong growth in the demand for exports from the region had three consequences: (i)
it stimulated growth in manufacturing output; (ii) it stimulated higher rates of
capacity utilisation and fixed investment; (iii) it encouraged more efficient use of
existing capacities and raising expectations for FDI.
Structural deformation or structural development delays characterise the Balkans.
The figures in table 3.4 demonstrate an unprecedented restructuring that will take
time to readjust to the natural optimum levels. The countries of the region show a
relatively similar picture for the level of industrialisation in 1991- 1998.
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Table 3.4 Composition of GDP (%) in transition economies 1990- 2000
Agriculture Industry and Construction Services
Country 1990-95 1996-98 1991-98 1990-95 1996-98 19991-98 1990-95 1996-98 1991-98
Albania 50.1 53.7 51.5 29.0 23.0 27.4 20.9 23.3 21.1
Bulgaria 13.5 14.6 16.0 38.3 31.9 35.2 48.2 53,5 48.8
Romania 20.7 10.4 20.2 43.5 42.2 43.2 35.8 37.4 36.6
FYROM 11.3 12.8 11.8 34.8 28.9 32.9 54.0 58.3 55.3
Czech
Republic
5.5 4.6 5.2 45.8 41.0 44.4 48.7 54.3 50.5
Hungary 7.5 6.7 7.0 32.6 30.8 32.5 60.0 62.5 60.5
Poland 7.5 7.2 7.1 42.5 38.8 40.5 50.0 54.0 52.0
Slovakia 6.1 5.8 5.8 44.5 38.3 41.6 49.4 55.9 52.6
Slovenia 5.2 4.5 4.9 40.2 37.6 39.3 54.6 58.0 55.8
Agriculture Industry and Construction Services
Country 1999 2000 1999-
2000
1999 2000 1999-2000 1999 2000 1999-2000
Albania 52.6 51.0 51.8 25.4 26.3 25.8 22.0 22.7 22.4
Bulgaria 17.3 14 15.6 26.8 28.6 27.7 55.9 57.4 56.6
Romania 15.5 11.4 13.4 36.2 42,0 39.1 48.3 46.6 47.4
FYROM 9.2 8.6 8.9 27.1 28.4 27.7 62.9 63.0 63.0
Czech
Republic
3.7 3.4 3.5 38.2 38.3 38.3 58.9 58.3 58.6
Hungary 4.9 5.2 5.1 36.0 36.5 36.3 58.6 58.3 58.5
Poland 3.9 3.7 3.8 35.8 36.8 36.3 60.2 59.5 59.9
Slovakia 4.9 3.8 4.3 36.9 35.9 36.4 61.0 60.3 60.6
Slovenia 3.7 3.6 3.7 38.3 39.8 39.1 58.0 56.6 57.3
Source: IMF: Country Reports, Various Issues, WIIW, and EBRD Various Issues
Looking at the data in table 3.4, of the sectoral GDP composition, we can observe
with respect to the type of structural adjustment under way that Albania was the least
industrialised country, with a 27.4% of its GDP generated from the industry and
construction sectors. During the period 1991- 98, Romania's industrial and
construction index was the highest not only compared to the Balkan countries but
also compared to most of the CEE countries, except for the Czech Republic. Second,
the GDP structures of the Balkans have a greater dependence on agriculture that the
CEE countries, with the cases of Albania being the most profound.10 Although in
1999- 2000 the indicators for the Balkans have been improved for the agriculture and
services shares, yet the Balkans are less industrialised than the CEE countries.
10 Romania, Bulgaria and FYROM despite their differences represent more industrialised economies,
while Albania lag behind. Albania has the highest share of agriculture in GDP. Bulgaria and Romania,
although far from Albania, still show a high percentage of agricultural share in GDP. FYROM is less
rural country but still has higher shares of agriculture in GDP than the CEE countries. These figures
might indicate a possible divide in the transition countries with the Balkans having a less advanced
economic structure than the CEE countries. Albania maintains one of the lowest shares of industry
and services in the region, experiencing a backward adjustment to the pressures of transition.
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While most of the transition countries have liberalised their economies, the Balkan
region has continued to be full of barriers and restrictions. The consequence has been
that the region has continued to experience trade and other policy-induced shocks."
It has also motivated most of the states in the region to consider advancing either on
the path of regional or on that of European integration. As the EU has conditioned
further EU integration on further regional integration for many of the Balkan
countries, the level and development of regional trade and economic integration has
12become an important institutional and policy issue. Development depends crucially
on the business environment, while the success of transition is determined by the
commitment to institutional change." If these problems are not addressed decisively,
the old barriers to trade and FDI will continue to persist.
The Balkan counties had very unbalanced industrial structures. Some countries
inherited large debt burdens. With the emergence of the transition, new challenges
confront organisational structure. Porter (1990) considers that the performance of an
industry depends on a strong competition policy. This contradicts the performance of
the Balkan economies under the communist regime. The total lack of competition
and the organisation of most industries in monopolies led to very poor performances
and subsequently urgent need to restructure them when transition started.14 The
process of privatisation and FDI therefore strongly depends on the speed of creation
of proper institutions in the area of competition policy.
11 The barriers to trade and development in the region and between the region and the world are partly
the consequence of the slow transition and partly a result of the failure to deal with the problem of
development. Because of the lack of regulation the Balkan markets cannot be described as liberal.
Their illiberal character is visible in the conditions that determine entry to and exit from the market.
12 Similar considerations apply to FDI flows. A high level of investment usually accompanies a high
and growing level of foreign trade. Thus, trade creation should be followed by investment creation,
and trade destruction by a lack of investment opportunities. Security concerns affect investments even
more than they affect trade, so that a low level of FDI, especially that which is regional, will be,
ceteris paribus, a sign of high security and political risks. Given that security risks are a form of
instability a high level of risks will also indicate a high level of regional disintegration.
13
Privatisation is the most important institutional change when it comes to the efficient allocation of
resources. In the Balkans, delay in privatisation can be often observed. Another aspect of privatisation
has to do with the disintegration of the region, which led to decreased interest of foreign participation
in privatisation. The regional risk has had an influence that cannot de disregarded. Therefore, it is
necessary to create incentives for FDI that out-weigh the systematic regional risks.
14 Limited progress in improving competition structures has been achieved across the region. While
most states have taken some steps to tighten credit and subsidy policies, soft budget constraints still
exist in the Balkans. The most direct way of governmental support is through soft government loans.
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3.3.3 Assessing the Progress of Transition in the Balkans
In this section, we are going to assess the process of transition in each of the Balkan
countries based on the findings of the EBRD's transition reports and own research.
The findings of this section are summarised in table 3.5.
Table 3.5 Transition Indicators in 2000
Enterprises Market & trade Financial institutions Total Average
Private Large Small Governan Price Trade and Competiti Banking Securities
sector scale scale ce and liberali FX system on policy reform and market
share in privati privati restructuri sation interest rate and non
GDP sation sation ng liberalisation bank
(%) financial
institutions
CEE 76.0 3.07 4.33 3.06 3.20 4.33 2.93 3.40 3.26 27.58 3.4475
Czech 80.0 4.00 4.33 3.33 3.00 4.33 3.00 3.33 3.00 28.32 3.5400
Hungary 80.0 4.00 4.33 3.33 3.33 4.33 3.00 4.00 3.66 29.98 3.7475
Poland 70.0 3.33 4.33 3.00 3.33 4.33 3.00 3.33 3.66 28.31 3.5387
Slovakia 75.0 4.00 4.33 3.00 3.00 4.33 3.00 3.00 2.33 26.99 3.3737
Slovenia 55.0 3.00 4.33 2.66 3.33 4.33 2.66 3.33 3.66 27.30 3.4125
Baltic 70 3.33 4.33 2.77 3.00 4.22 2.55 3.22 2.77 26.19 3.2737
Estonia 75.0 4.00 4.33 3.00 3.00 4.33 2.66 3.66 3.00 27.98 3.4975
Lithuania 70.0 3.00 4.33 2.66 3.00 4.00 2.66 3.00 3.00 25.65 3.2062
Latvia 65.0 3.00 4.33 2.66 3.00 4.33 2.33 3.00 2.33 24.98 3.1225
SEE 61.0 2.73 3.66 2.13 2.67 3.60 1.86 2.66 1.73 20.97 2.6215
Albania 75.0 2.00 4.00 2.00 3.00 4.33 1.66 2.66 1.66 21.25 2.6562
Bulgaria 70.0 3.66 3.66 2.33 3.00 4.33 2.33 3.00 2.00 24.31 3.0387
FYROM 55.0 3.00 4.00 2.33 3.00 4.00 2.00 3.00 1.66 22.99 2.8737
Romania 60.0 3.00 3.66 2.00 3.00 4.00 2.33 2.66 2.00 22.32 2.7900
Yugoslavia 45.0 2.00 3.00 2.00 1.33 1.33 1.00 2.00 1.33 13.99 1.7487
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2001
In Albania, the process of large-scale privatisation at the early stage of transition was
characterised by little private ownership. The economic programme in 1991,
contained measures of privatisation strategy very similar in its broad aims to those
adopted in the Czech Republic.15 However, the government could not embrace
reforms in a coherent way because of its attitude to transition policies. The
government so far had difficulties to privatise strategic sectors that would attract
significant inflows of foreign investment. On the contrary, small- scale privatisation
has been more successful and it was pursued at a speed, which compares favourably
with that achieved in the CEE countries. Due to the absence of coherent privatisation
policies, the small- scale privatisation proceeded faster than the privatisation of state-
owned banks and the restructuring of the capital market. Regarding the process of
13
The idea behind the model was based on the assumption that the state should eliminate the state
from making business decisions, and to develop a system, open enough to evaluate from within itself
(Aslund and Sjoberg 1992).
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governance and restructuring, the early transition process was characterised by
moderately tight credit and subsidy policy, but little action was taken to strengthen
the bankruptcy legislation The government has made progress on price liberalisation,
reflecting economic costs. Regarding the competition policy, the government is in
the process of reducing the market power of monopolies, including brake- ups of
dominant conglomerates. However, in this respect much more has to be done. As far
as the banking reform and interest rate liberalisation is concerned, there is a
significant progress of interest rates and credit allocation and there is a market
potential for foreign financial institutions, but yet much work has to be done.
In FYROM, the process of transition is quite similar to the one in Albania. However,
it performs better in large- scale privatisation. The process of corporate governance
and restructuring, small scale privatisation, price liberalisation, and the reforms on
securities markets and non bank financial institutions have the same characteristics
with Albania, yet FYROM has performed slightly better on competition policy and
banking reforms.
In Bulgaria, as well as in Romania, the process of transition is satisfactory. More
than 50% of SOEs are in private ownership and significant progress on corporate
governance has been achieved on these enterprises. The success of small- scale
privatisation can be also attributed to a big number of foreign SMEs that have
invested in the Bulgarian and Romanian markets. In Bulgaria, the process of
governance and restructuring is more advanced than in Albania, while in Romania it
is the same. The two governments have achieved substantial improvements in
corporate governance, by implementing control measures and motivate new
investments at the enterprise level. Furthermore, the price liberalisation process is
very comprehensive, reflecting economic costs. There are significant actions on the
behalf of the two governments to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a
competitive environment, which will generate efficient allocation of resources. As
far as the banking reform and interest rate liberalisation is concerned, there is a
substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency and of a framework for
prudential supervision and regulation. Measures included first the full interest rate
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liberalisation, second the significant lending to private companies and third the
significant presence of private banks, with Bulgaria performing slightly better.
The Yugoslav government has continuously implemented measures of strong
administrative control rather than liberalisation. Price liberalisation has been partial,
even reversed on several occasions by general or selective price freezes. The
government recently adopted a competition law. Yet, since the economy remains
highly monopolised, it seems clear that the law is not being implemented. In
addition, small- scale privatisation has been partially implemented, resulting mainly
in widespread ownership by insiders. Large SOEs have still not been privatised
though current financial constraints may compel the government to start selling
shares in the most profitable companies. Privatisation is impossible without radical
economic reforms and inclusion in international financial institutions. Finally, little
progress has been made in reforming banks and other financial institutions. Banks
are heavily burdened by enormous amounts of bad loans.
Although the expectations of privatisation-related FDI are high, to expect an
intensive inflow of that type of FDI in Yugoslavia would not be realistic. The
country's capital stock has been halved. This is a consequence of permanent
disinvestments during the last decade, and extensive damage of infrastructure and
productive capacity during the NATO air strikes. To attract more privatisation
related FDI, the government has to reconsider the shift of privatisation method from
the distribution of property to direct sales to strategic foreign investors.'6
Progress has been made in the development of the private sector in virtually all
countries in the region. Over the first five years of transition, this share was 39%. In
2000, 48% of the GDP of the Balkans were produced by private sector entities.
Today, the private sector currently generates almost 60% of GDP in all countries in
the region, except FYROM and Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, this share remains low in
comparison to the CEE economies. Alongside the progress in establishing private
16
It is mainly the supply of state assets that determines the amount of privatisation-related FDI. Some
governments, such as the Albanian, have in fact not much to sell as assets available for privatisation
have already been given away in to insiders at large, leaving little scope for foreign investors.
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sector activity, progress also has been made in liberalising markets and trade and
foreign exchange (FX) systems. Trade and FX regimes have been relaxed and many
quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions have been lifted. Yet, a
further lowering of trade protection, through the elimination of non-tariff barriers,
more uniform and lower tariff structures, is still warranted. This is important
especially in light of the need to integrate more closely with Western Europe. Price
liberalisation has also seen substantial progress and state procurement at non-market
prices has been largely phased out. Competition policy and legislation have been set
up, yet enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power have been limited.
The banking system is of crucial importance to economic performance. A special
feature is the underdevelopment of capital markets. Therefore, banks became the
primary institutions to perform assessment and monitoring of the risks and returns of
financial intermediation. The initial conditions regarding market-orientated reforms
in the banking sector were not favourable for a prompt transition and they still have
an impact on banking system development.17
In the Balkans, the small-scale privatisation has advanced more rapidly than the
large-scale privatisation, creating a new entrepreneurial class. The new SME act as
an agent of open economy, acting as intermediates between the old economic
paradigms and the new market forces. Flowever, there is considerable variation in the
growth of small private companies throughout the region. To a significant extent, this
is due to the differences in the quality of governance across countries. Furthermore,
the formal ownership changes in the Balkans based on the mass privatisation scheme
did not bring sufficient clearness in the actual exercising of ownership rights.
Institutions such as capital market and financial institutions did not always follow the
reform processes of privatisation and liberalisation. The first phase of transition,
17 The financial sector is not yet providing the effective intermediation necessary for sustaining
growth. Banks are still not prepared to shift towards financing enterprises and developing the
infrastructure for an expansion of retail banking while the countries remain burdened with large, state-
controlled banks with sub-standard portfolios. The effective functioning of these markets exerts
pressures for better business practices and more rigorous corporate governance. Thus, it would be
necessary to find a way to insure the banking sector so that it could offer credit possibilities that
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show that a lack of market institutions can jeopardise sustainable macroeconomic
results and growth performance. Therefore, there is a need for developing new
institutions that will advance and support reforms. The quality of the new institutions
reflects the maturity of the Balkan markets. The markets have been developed in an
environment of weak rules of law and low state financial capacity, representing
transitional institutions that need time to reach a market economy standard. However,
the extent to which Balkan countries can secure property rights and contracts and
enforce competition policy is crucial for success during the second transition period.
It is important for the governments to continue to emphasise capital market
development, so that they can use the stock exchange for public offerings connected
with privatisation. There is a need to streamline decision-making and make on
institutions responsible for privatisation. The institutions should have sufficient
authority and independence to carry out their mandate. Standardising the
privatisation process so that clear transactions are being handled will facilitate this.
Greek investors believe that the Balkan governments should do as much as possible
within existing legal framework rather attempting to amend everything, as constant
changes contribute to uncertainty and slows down the privatisation process
considerably.
Enterprise restructuring has been slowed by the ineffective implementation of
bankruptcy laws. Though most countries have adopted bankruptcy laws, the number
of bankruptcies and liquidations has been relatively small. The wide variation across
the Balkans in privatisation strategies and in the organisation and functioning of
securities markets has produced a broad range of corporate governance structures.
Countries should devote much greater effort to microeconomic issues, structural
reform, and completing the transition to market economies. Macroeconomic stability
18alone is not a sufficient condition for sustainable economic development.
would support start up activities for SME. Therefore, setting up appropriate financial institutions that
would offer credits and also lower the risks of doing business would be crucial.
18 There is a perception that pursuing sound fiscal and monetary policies constitutes economic
success. The governments must to privatise the SOEs, reform the legal and regulatory regimes and
strengthen their financial systems. A key fiscal challenge is to control government spending by
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Regulations governing the creation and operation of private-sector companies need
to be liberalised. The financial system needs fundamental reform to create well-
regulated, well-supervised market-orientated banking systems.
Summarising the above evidence, the creation of a sound and favourable business
environment must be based on a stable legal framework that clearly defines property
rights; on efficient administrative and legal structures that ensure enforcement of the
law and contractual obligations; and on the development of market competition,
reduction of transaction costs, and lowering of the tax burden. It should also support
specific steps aimed at encouraging the development of the SME sector.
3.4 Regional Trade and Integration
Over the last decade, the EU has emerged as the most important trading partner for
the majority of the Balkan countries. Given that most Balkan countries, except for
FYROM, have redirected trade from their traditional partners primarily to the EU,
the already marginal links between Balkan countries have in no way been
strengthened, while trade links among Albania, Bulgaria and Romania have become
even weaker. Over 50% of the region's trade is to and from EU countries. Looking at
table 3.6, overall, regional trade is very limited.19 Balkan countries trade mostly with
industrialised countries, and to a lesser degree with one another mainly for four
reasons; (i) this is because regional integration of a low-income economy with low-
income countries usually makes an economy poorer; (ii) the demand in the Balkans
is weak and relatively unsophisticated, and competitive companies chose more
complex markets; (iii) the countries in the region have relatively similar product and
quality structures; (iv) the economic and political instability of the regional markets
as well as the tariff and non-tariff barriers impede regional trading.
restricting expenditures on unprofitable SOEs and reforming the tax system to improve revenue
collection. On the monetary front, they should adopt a clear mandate to maintain price stability.
19 The low volume of trade implies even less adequate forms of economic co-operation. This is
because foreign trade always creates a basis for the development of higher forms of international
economic co-operation. This phenomenon can be explained by a relative underdevelopment of the
region, as well as the model of inward- looking economic development followed by all countries in
the region. This situation along with an unfavourable location in the EU economic space resulted in
unfavourable implications for the economic structures and international trade performance of these
countries. The absence of regional trade cooperation has limited the market access for exporting
industries, limiting the prospects for export- led development.
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At the beginning of their transformation process, all economies faced a dramatic
decline, both in exports and imports as well as a geographical reorientation of trade
to developed market economies, mainly to the EU. The new orientation towards the
EU may be attributed to the operation of the market mechanisms. The loss of the
CEE, CIS, Russian and the regional markets is not a direct result of the market
mechanisms but is more a result of the political and economic processes in these
countries that lead to the destruction of previous stable trade patterns.
Table 3.6 Balkans- EU Direction of Trade 1995- 2000 (in % of total)
Exports 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Imports 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Albania Albania
EU 79 86 87 93 94 91 EU 77 76 84 83 80 76
Balkans 5 4 7 2 3 1 Balkans 1 1 10 6 5 7 6
Other 15 10 5 5 4 8 Other 12 14 1 1 12 13 18
Bulgaria Bulgaria
EU 39 40 45 51 54 52 EU 38 36 42 46 50 45
Balkans 13 1 1 7 7 10 12 Balkans 4 3 3 3 2 4
Other 48 49 48 48 36 36 Other 57 60 55 51 48 51
FYROM FYROM
EU 34 43 37 44 45 49 EU 40 39 37 36 40 48
Balkans 34 32 33 29 31 30 Balkans 29 21 22 22 20 19
Other 32 25 30 27 25 21 Other 31 40 41 42 40 33
Romania Romania
EU 54 56 57 65 66 67 EU 51 52 52 58 61 57
Balkans 2 2 1 3 3 4 Balkans I 1 1 1 1 1
Other 44 42 42 32 31 32 Other 48 47 46 41 38 42
Yugoslavia Yugoslavia
EU 58 76 83 73 70 68 EU 72 67 76 65 61 57
Balkans 4 3 3 7 8 9 Balkans 8 14 5 8 12 18
Other 38 21 14 21 22 23 Other 20 19 20 27 28 25
Source: National Customs Departments and Institutes of Statistics.
Albeit these common characteristics, all the Balkan countries have not experienced the
same depth of trade integration with the West and particularly with the EU. For all the
countries, a re-integration of markets is essential for the attraction of FDI.20 Low
tariffs and simple tariff systems as well as free-trade agreements can be useful steps.
In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, the foreign trade developments are volatile.
The volatility is mostly caused by the changes in the trade regimes and policies as
well as in macroeconomic developments and lack of vigorous reform programmes
rather than by security concerns and involuntary trade diversions. Bulgaria has
20 All the above considerations suggest that, given the level of regional trade integration, the Balkans
as an economic region is practically non-existent. Trade liberalization is not enough to bring in trade
diversion in the presence of a very strong attractor like the EU. Apart from low levels, trade is volatile
in the Balkans. That shows that the volatility is generated in the region or that it is caused by the
developments in the region. This being the case, the Balkans can be seen as a trade-averting region
and one of trade destruction rather than creation. The fundamental reason for this is that of lack of
security.
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developed EU trading links, orientated towards Germany, Italy and Greece. Romania
has redirected its trade developing strong links with the EU markets, and in particular
with Germany, Italy and France. On the contrary, the neighbouring markets of
Bulgaria and Flungary correspond to a minimum fraction of Romania's trade. Trade
liberalisation in Albania led to a surge primarily in imports. However, due to a
complete economic collapse in 1997, trade with many Balkan countries experienced
a drop, as did its overall foreign trade. The opening up of Albania, which was
previously probably the most closed country in Europe, in terms of trade, has led to
only a small increase in its trade in the region and to a much larger increase in trade
outside of the region. Indeed, that activity has continued even after the economic
collapse in Albania. In the past decade, Yugoslavia suffered from a high trade deficit.
In 1998, foreign trade lost its pace due to the slow down of the economy and
imposed sanctions from the EU and the US as a consequence of the Kosovo crisis.
Table 3.7 Share of exports and imports in GDP (%)
Exports Imports
1990 1994 1998 1999 2000 1990 1994 1998 1999 2000
Czech 18.3 37.4 47.8 50.6 52.7 20.1 40.1 52.3 54.1 58.9
Republic
Hungary 28.7 25.8 48.9 51.1 55.3 26.0 35.2 54.7 57.2 63.2
Slovakia 37.4 48.5 50.2 51.8 61.8 42.0 46.4 61.5 57.4 66.5
Slovenia 23.6 47.2 46.4 43.0 46.7 27.0 43.0 50.5 49.5 54.3
Poland 26.7 18.5 19.1 17.0 19.7 20.8 23.3 27.8 26.2 30.4
Average 27.0 35.5 42.5 42.7 47.2 27.18 37.6 49.4 49.9 54.7
Albania 11.0 7.1 8.4 7.7 9.3 18.1 30.3 32.9 32.9 29.3
Bulgaria 21.7 40.5 40.3 29.8 39.9 26.4 40.7 43.6 41.1 54.5
FYROM n.a. 34.5 38.6 32.6 38.8 n.a. 40.4 48.9 49.1 61.0
Romania 11.5 20.2 25.7 23.4 32.1 17.5 21.8 34.0 28.7 39.3
Yugoslavia 19.8 12.0 15.4 8.5 10.3 26.3 14.5 26.1 18.7 22.0
Average 16.0 28.6 25.7 20.4 26.1 22.1 29.5 37.1 34.1 41.2
Source: EBRD Transition Reports, various volumes, WIIW, various issues and National Bank of
Greece- Strategic Planning and Research Division.
Looking at the share of exports and imports in GDP in table 3.7, the Balkans is
lagging behind the other regions to a considerable extent and this applies especially
to Albania and Yugoslavia. The Balkans also took the lead on the import side.
Bearing in mind the current level of regional integration, which is shown by trade
flows, the Balkans virtually does not exist as an economic region. Intra- regional
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trade flows are insufficient and the bulk of trade accounts for trade with the countries
outside the Balkan region, taking an inter- industry character with the EU countries.
Examining the information from the above tables, we can make a number of
observations. First, the trade relations among the Balkan economies have declined in
significance, with the exception of FYROM and Yugoslavia. Second, the trade
relations of the Balkans with the EU significantly increase. Overall, it seems that a
radical deterioration in trade volumes have taken place in the geographical
composition of trade in the Balkans in the last decade.
Trade integration is an important tool, probably the leading component of the
broader, longer- term integration of the Balkans into EU structures. These countries
are so small that their development depends critically on international trade and
access to the European market, which typically accounts for more than 50% of their
21
exports. Trade integration is also essential to reduce the dependence of these
countries on aid from the international community. This vision of regional co¬
operation and eventual integration with the EU contrasts sharply with present reality.
Trade relations in the countries of the region are characterised by a variety of
22restrictions and impediments to trade with each other and with the rest of the world.
Integration in international trade with the rest of the world, including membership in
the WTO, should be actively pursued. Naturally, the EU would be the main source of
increased external demand as well as foreign investment, as it already is, because of
geographical proximity, size and openness. There is also little doubt that intra-
21 Since the Balkan economies are on the whole quite small, they would be expected to rely on and
benefit a great deal from international trade. Yet, the existing levels of protection are high resulting in
significant distortions and economic costs. The Balkans in their present state is an inefficient market
because of the high degree of monopolisation, the lack of development of the financial infrastructure,
and a very approximate reaction ofmarket agents to the changing conditions of commercial activity.
It should be stressed that there are many institutional capacity and trade policy constraints, which
need to be urgently addressed. For example, reforms, which result in lower and more uniform
protection, exclusively through tariffs, or increase their supply capacity to export, would yield very
significant benefits to the Balkan countries. Because of their relatively small size and the low level of
trade and investment links with the rest of the world, these economies would also greatly benefit from
increased external demand for their products, and from higher levels of FDI.
Barriers to intra- regional trade and investment should be lowered to speed- up regional integration
and integration of the Balkans with the EU and the WTO. The opening up of the EU markets is
essential for economic growth and development, while liberalisation throughout the region is
important not only for prosperity, but also for stability.
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regional trade can expand and be a stimulus for growth, though the economic
structures of some of the countries are quite similar leaving less room for obvious
increased trade opportunities based on structural complementarities.
Table 3.8 Openness (exports & imports/GDP) in the Balkans and CEE
24
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Yugoslavia 35.3 36 44.4 40.0 27.1 32.3
Albania 85.7 49.5 53.6 60.4 35.6 23.0 34.0 40.6 38.5
FYROM 80 93 81 71 60 77.3 91.0 81.7 99.8
Romania 53.6 43.3 44.1 50.1 55 56.9 58.0 52.1 71.4
Bulgaria 97.5 78.4 80.9 85.2 103.3 97.0 91.0 70.8 94.4
Slovenia 100,8 96.8 97.2 94.6 93.1 96.7 96.9 92.5 101.0
Slovakia 90.5 99.2 96.4 100,5 105.8 95.9 111.7 109.1 128.3
Poland 32.6 34.3 41.8 41.1 43.0 47.6 47.0 43.2 49,8
Hungary 53.9 50.2 61.0 60.9 65.0 88.3 103.6 108.4 1169
Czech Republic 62.9 76.7 77.5 92.3 87.8 88.5 100.2 104.7 1 11.5
Source: EBRD Transition Reports, various volumes, WIIW, various issues and National Bank of
Greece- Strategic Planning and Research Division.
As we can see from table 3.8 trade plays a varied role in the Balkan, with trade/GDP
ratios ranging from a high of 99.8% in FYROM to a low of 32.3% for Yugoslavia. In
terms of aggregate size of the trade sector, there is a big divide between Bulgaria,
Romania, and FYROM on one hand, and Albania, Yugoslavia, on the other. As
already noted, the countries in the region gravitate towards out-of-the Balkan
markets. In addition, more developed countries in the Balkans are either small or not
all that open to trade. Conventionally speaking, an economy is open when the given
ratios are more than 50%. In this sense, Albania and Yugoslavia would be considered
relatively closed economies.25
Though the Balkan countries have been able to preserve macroeconomic stability,
the high security risk and the small market have been detrimental to growth prospects
and therefore for development. The main reason for this negative performance of
investments is the overall macroeconomic situation and slow microeconomic
restructuring, but an additional factor is to be found in the weak-banking sector. The
key issue for both is the increase of the openness of the economy. Though exports
24
A number of studies have suggested that investment in developing countries is positively associated
with indicators of openness (Harrison and Revenga 1995, Haufbauer et al. 1994) suggesting that
investors prefer countries with relatively liberal trade regimes and wider free trade agreements.
In Albania, reasons are to be found in the size of the industries and productivity levels. In
Yugoslavia the ratio reflects distort impacts of embargoes, sanctions, and military conflicts.
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and imports add to more than 50% or so of the GDP, with the exception of Albania
and Yugoslavia, this is due significantly more to imports than to exports.
However, both should be increased if the economies are to grow and develop. The
greater openness of Bulgaria and FYROM does not necessarily mean immediate
trade potential. It is an evidence of getting some fundamentals right. These
fundamentals are to establish international trade contracts, with a probability to resist
competitive pressures and perhaps cluster internationally. It is likely that a country's
greater openness would correlate to sustained greater output and higher income.
Differences in progress toward EU integration among Balkan countries imposed
different dynamic effects on their production and economic welfare. Greece is a
member of the EU, while Romania and Bulgaria have signed association agreements
and are included in the pre- accession strategy of EU, which reflects on product
specialisation and foreign trade turnover.26 There are possibilities for expanding trade
between Bulgaria, FYROM, Albania and other Balkan countries.
This could be promoted by signing bilateral free- trade agreements, aimed at
abolishing trade restrictions and further opening their markets. The first step for
increasing economic links among the Balkan countries is to increase their trade
relations. Strengthening regional trade links could increase regional trade flows. This
could create exceptionally strong impulses for economic development, with the
additional advantage of lower transportation costs.
However, policies towards regional integration are political, as well as economic,
decisions. From the economic point of view, regional economic association brings
immediate benefits and increases the welfare of participating countries, when they
are at more or less comparable economic levels and have similar economic potential.
In such a case, eliminating trade restriction between the members of regional
26 The expected positive effects of the association with the EU depend upon an interrelation between
restructuring the economy and trade policy. One of the ways to foster this process is by the creation of
a competitive market and widening the export structure. The liberalisation of foreign trade cannot be
considered a mean for fostering growth without significant structural changes of the economy.
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integration agreements brings benefits to all. In the longer term, it brings the
enlargement of markets and the potential to attract investors.
One way to foster trade and FDI in the Balkans in the near future would be to sign
27
preferential trade arrangements among Balkan countries. By developing regional
integration, market enlargement could be attained, which would allow Balkan
countries to exploit economies of scale and develop a competitive product structure.
The EU Association Agreement is a crucial point of reference with regard to current
political and economic developments in the Balkans.28
3.4.1 Assessing the Characteristics of the Greek- Balkan Business Relations
Greece is a very important business partner in the Balkan region, especially for
countries like Albania and FYROM, which have strong dependency of exports and
imports from Greece. Since 1990, total investments in the Balkans passed the
threshold of 5 billion dollars. This is making Greece the country with a significant
share of FDI in the region. Available data show Greek exports to the Balkans in 2000
comprised 11% of Greek exports, the highest share of any member country of the
OECD. In terms of sectoral diversification, manufacturing industries have invested
more than US 3.4 billion during the past 11 years. Today more than 3% of the Greek
9Q
GDP has being invested in the Balkans.
27 This would increase their manufactures' production, due to changes of the existing pattern of trade
and would lead to gains for production by co-ordinating their trade policies with the other countries.
28 Benefits of signed the EAA are: (i) access to EU markets; (ii) assistance in promoting economic
reforms; (iii) regulation of foreign trade corresponding to the requirements of the Balkan countries'
acceptance to the EU; (iv) assistance in improving the quality and competitiveness of the Balkan
products; (v) fostering of restructuring and economic growth; (vi) increase of exports, based on
development of competitive advantages; (vii) creation of bilateral free trade areas for non- agricultural
products, abolishment of quantitative restrictions.
29 Greece is Albania's second- largest trading partner, with 14% of all exports to, and 32% of all
imports from, Greece. Two hundred Greek companies have invested in Albania's infrastructure,
energy, telecommunications, banking, constituting % of all foreign capital. Seven point two percent of
FYROM's exports are forwarded in Greece, while 10.1% of FYROM's imports are coming from
Greece. Greece is the largest foreign investor, with 70 Greek companies having conducted over a
quarter of a billion dollars in trade to date. Greek companies will expand FYROM's electrical grid,
modernise its oil refineries and construct a thermoelectric plant and a new oil pipeline connecting
Thessaloniki to Skopje. Greek investments that already realised estimated to be around US 350
million, creating 5,000 new jobs. Greece is Romania's 12th largest investor, with 1,700 companies. It
is also the 9th investor in terms of size of invested capital, which represents a 7.4% of the total FDI in
Romania. A remarkable 35% of the invested capital comes in the form of acquisition of local
70
Taken all together, over 70% of foreign businesses active in the Balkans today are
based in Greece. This direction is based on two very important comparative
advantages possessed by Greece. First Grefece's current geo-political, or, more
appropriately, its geo-economic position, which has forged well- developed political
and economic ties with the broader region of south- east Europe. '0 Second Greece's
property as the only EU member- state in this region, something that helps in the
assumption of initiatives to strengthen EU relations with the Balkans. Economic
development of the Balkan countries will depend to a significant extent on expanding
and strengthening ties with the EU.
After some 40 years of separation, a regional market of 70 million people is shaped
in the Balkans, including Greece, an EU member country. To the extent that
geography plays a role in shaping preferences in economic interaction, a regional
market will gradually emerge in the Balkans, driven by distance, size and proximity.
With the existing diversity in GDP structures, this trend will favour intra- regional
co-operation in investment and trade. Available statistics indicate that the basic
characteristic of the Greek- Balkan economic relations is fast expansion of the
volume of trade, a relatively high diversification in sectoral specialisation and a high
share of intra- industry trade, compared to the Greek trade with the EU (National
Statistical Service of Greece, 2000). However, the abandonment of the EU markets
in favour of the Balkan markets could jeopardise the competitiveness of the Greek
economy. The performance of the Greek economy still depends on its exports to the
EU. Therefore, it is questionable whether a high commitment of production factors to
companies. In Yugoslavia, 230 Greek companies have invested and are preparing for the country's
eventual re- integration into European structures and organisations. In Bulgaria, Greece is the largest
foreign investor in terms of the number of companies. Around 500 Greek companies operate
employing 45,000 people. By the end of March 2000, the Greek invested capital represents 8% of the
total foreign capital injected in Bulgaria. In Bulgaria, Greece is one of the six big investors. Greek
banks control approximately 20% of the domestic financial market.
30 Reflecting the earlier discussion in terms of knowledge of the market, the geographical factor
emerges as a strong determinant of the Greek entrepreneurial activity. Thus, the majority of
companies are developing in Albania and Romania, the two neighbouring countries, with Bulgaria,
FYROM and Yugoslavia following. Geographical proximity, therefore, is important as it has been
found to be in the Austrian case, where according to Plasonig and Buchleitner (1991) the
concentration of about 80% of the Austrian joint ventures in the Hungarian market is due to
geographical proximity. A similar picture emerges in the CEE countries, where German companies
are the most important investors in Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic and the second most
important source of FDI in Poland, with Austria also having a very strong presence, particularly in
Slovakia and the Czech Republic (UNCTAD 1998).
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the Balkans is desirable at this point due to absence of strong export orientation of
the Balkan companies and low penetration of high technology to their production
process.
Table 3.9 Balkans- EU Direction of Trade 1995- 1999 (in % of total)
Albania Bulgaria FYROM Romania Yugoslavia
Exports to:
France 0.24 3.35 1.06 5.82 2.93
Italy 16.0 12.33 6.22 19.50 8.60
Germany 57.0 9.88 17.98 18.10 11.4
Greece 1.64 8.20 6.32 7.01 4.53
Austria 1.44 1.40 1.40 2.40 1.75
Source: National Customs Departments and Institutes of Statistics.
Table 3.10 Balkans-- EU Direction ofTrade 1995 - 1999 (in % of total)
Albania Bulgaria FYROM Romania Yugoslavia
Imports
from:
France 1.50 3.80 2.20 5.88 3.2
Italy 41.1 7.43 6.68 16.3 10.33
Germany 4.40 13.08 14.18 17.2 12.7
Greece 26.4 4.85 5.62 1.79 4.0
Austria 1.50 2.70 2.50 2.94 3.23
Source: National Customs Departments and Institutes of Statistics.
Greece, as an EU member represents for the Balkans an important partner who can
assist them in their transformation process to market based economies. Therefore,
economic co-operation and trade integration between Greece and the Balkans can be
mutually beneficial. This integration manifests itself in numerous ways, including
rising growth rates of exports and imports and rising shares in total Greek trade, as
the data in table 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 demonstrates.
Table 3.11 Growth rates of Greek- Balkan trade
Rates of exports 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1991-99
Romania 65% 32% 0% 11% 84% 1% 15% 24% 9% 27%
Bulgaria 91% 99% 118% 44% 3% -27% 16% 49% -4% 43%
Albania -21% 254% 268% 79% 17% 29% -12% -17% 18% 68%
FYROM 965% -89% 190% 463% 33% 6% 63% 233%
Yugoslavia 2% -56% -100% -51%
Serbia 704% 36% 0% -37% 176%
Rates of imports 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1991-99
Romania 47% -21% 13% 50% 38% 12% 61% 4% 10% 24%
Bulgaria 64% 15% 39% 70% 45% -20% 28% 2% -9% 26%
Albania 11% 60% 2% 142% 1% 2% 13% 9% 6% 27%
FYROM 466% -83% 194% 179% 75% 7% 2% 120%
Yugoslavia -6% -70% -100% -59%
Serbia 7316% 95% -22% -36% 1838%
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece
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For comparison, we also present the growth rates of exports and imports of EU to
and from the Balkan countries during the period 1992-98, in table 3.12. The
information in the tables 3.11 and 3.12 confirms that the Balkans represent an
increasingly dynamic export market for Greek products. Its importance is likely to
increase, as Greek companies, which find it difficult or unprofitable to place their
products in the competitive EU markets, will find an easy outlet in the Balkans.
Imports are also accelerating fast, but not to the same degree as exports.
Table 3.12 Growth Rates of EU- Balkan Trade
Rates of exports 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1991-98
Romania 49,8% 10.4% 15.4% 44,0% 15,3% 1,0% 20,4% 22,3%
Bulgaria 18,6% 7,0% 22,1% 27,9% -25,3% -4,4% 44,3% 12,9%
Albania 80,4% 21.3% 8,6% 31,7% 35,8% -46,9% 25,5% 22,3%
FYROM 48,9% 36,0% -22,3% -18,2% 52,8% 19,5%
Yugoslavia -10,1% -10,1%
Serbia 120,9% 70,3% 417,9% 35,5% 5,2% 129,9%
Rates of imports 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1991-99
Romania 4,9% 4,5% 59,7% 34,0% 3,4% 10,4% 12,3% 18,5%
Bulgaria 24,5% -4,5% 43,1% 41,7% -9,1% 7,9% 13,4% 16,7%
Albania -14,9% 29,7% 54,2% 37,2% 27,1% -14,3% 13,1% 18,9%
FYROM 108,7% 19,1% -24,7% -11,1% 37,1% 25,8%
Yugoslavia -10,3% -100,0% -55,2%
Serbia 66,7% 720,0% 1102,4% 108,7% -73,8% 384,8%
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece
The main conclusions of the above analysis can be summarised in four points. First,
the relatively strong performance of Greek exports as compared to imports. This is
also true for the EU exports, but not to the same degree for the Greek exports.
Second, the higher ratio of export to import growth rates characterising Greece's
trade with the Balkans compared to EU trade with the Balkans. Third, the larger
trade exposure of Greek trade to the Balkans compared to the EU. Fourth, the
dichotomy of the geographical distribution in trade between Greece- Balkans and
EU- Balkans, that is the stronger preference of the Greek companies to trade with the
Balkans compared to the preferences of the other EU countries to trade with the
Balkans.
Considering the above and in relation with the characteristics of the Greek and
Balkan economies and the change in the export orientation of Greek companies after
1989 we make two observations. First, Greek companies find a new opportunity to
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be competitive in their export activities, by exporting in the Balkans. Second, the
Greek companies having developed their trading activities in the Balkans can take
the opportunity to expand their activities, finding comparative advantages in the
Balkans that were not available in the EU. Trade with the Balkans offers Greece the
missing component in its trade relations that would balance and ameliorate the
implications of the existing inter-industry type of specialisation and trade with distant
EU markets.
3.5 Investment Developments and the Process of Privatisation in Attracting FDI
Attracting FDI via privatisation was a key objective of the Balkan countries. It has,
however, been worsened by repeated failures to implement a coherent policy in the
first years of the transition (Stern 1998). The slow advance of privatisation was the
result of limited political initiative, poor implementing procedures, and little interest
on the behalf of the buyers. The business environment is characterised by an
inadequate legal framework and macroeconomic instability, which has affected the
extend of economic restructuring, favoured widespread asset stripping and failed to
limit the rising need for SOEs subsidisation in favour of domestic buyers.
The four issues raised quite often by all the Greek investors that participated in the
research are: (i) the share and role of the state sector in the economy remained
profound and that ownership structure has an unfavourable impact on the overall
level of economic efficiency; (ii) the rather weak impact on the financial and capital
market development; (iii) the insufficient demonopolisation of the market and
development of the competition policy; (iv) the low transparency of the continuously
changing legal framework for the privatisation process which created a favourable
space for many arbitrary decisions which led to different irregularities, expansion of
corruption, and widespread perception of privatisation as an irregular activity.
Unfortunately, the privatisation programme did not fully account for its actual effects
for microeconomic characteristics due to the desire to make it fast and irreversible. It
was assumed that a deterministic approach, where full credit was given to the market
as the sole economic regulator, would bring immediate positive changes in the
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economy. This approach was not successful because the starting point was quite
distinguishable from the situation in which a market can regulate the state without
any purposive intervention. In addition, the economic reference points were not
included in the initial aims and the interests of different economic groups were not
defined. Thirty- seven Greek managers explained that the reason behind this
unsuccessful deterministic approach was that the governments in the process of
formulating the privatisation policy did very little to define the economic interest
groups that would attract FDI; the foreign investors. The process therefore, turned
into the privatisation of insiders who retain the power over the companies. There was
favouritism toward insiders. As a result, the privatisation process has produce state-
sanctioned monopolies that continue to prevent the emergence of private sector
competitors. To overcome this problem, the above thirty- seven Greek managers
suggested that the privatisation programme should proceed along a path that leads to
corporate restructuring and modernisation rather than de- capitalisation and asset
stripping.
According to the above thirty- seven Greek managers, the implementation of the
privatisation programmes has been uneven, and there continues to be a disparity
between what is on the books and what happens in practice. Slow and inefficient,
indeed corrupt in many cases, were the main characteristics of the privatisation
programmes, in particular in sectors such as public utilities and finance. Therefore,
the scope of large privatisation that is to attract strategic foreign investors in the
31Balkans has remained limited in practise.
While the conditions surrounding privatisation are specific to the Balkans, and in fact
to each individual country, they illustrate that the efficiency of the markets for
companies have a major impact on the Greek companies' ability to acquire local
companies. The costs of searching for suitable targets, analysing their economic
''1 The slowness of privatisation has serious drawbacks. One is that the business life of much of the
property to be privatised tends to decline. The longer it takes for a company to be privatised and the
more new assets and investment the foreign company needs to make up for the lost time against other
privatised and de novo competitors. The other is that since any type of privatisation is politically
controversial, the longer the procedure drags on, the more undermines political support for
privatisation, especially when the other major bidder is the existing managers and workers.
75
viability, negotiating with management and owners and fulfilling side- conditions
imposed by governments are examples for transaction costs.
According to twelve Greek managers that have participated in the Albanian
privatisation programme the absence of an overall long- term privatisation strategy
identifying the legal framework, the policies and the methods of implementation of
the programme was the most important shortcoming of the transformation package.
The ad- hoc nature of the privatisation programme meant that policy makers did not
pay attention to all aspects of privatisation. As ten Greek of the above twelve
managers further reported, in the Albanian privatisation programme the question of
post-privatisation ownership structure did not receive sufficient attention at the
design stage. The rapid transformation of ownership meant that issues relating to
corporate governance and company restructuring were not be given sufficient
consideration before the implementation of the programme.32 Therefore, it was not
clear from the beginning what are the shareholder rights of the state and how the
state will contribute in the restructuring of the companies.
In the case of two large companies, a cement company and a telecommunication
company, the privatisation programme has not resulted in the concentration of share
ownership in the hands of the owners. The existence of a property rights structure, in
which ownership is dispersed among a lot of shareholders and there is not one party
that can have enough power to determine the members of the Board of Directors and
the strategic development of the company, led in many cases to weak constraints on
pursuing managerial objectives, according to the opinion of the managers in the
telecommunication and cement companies. The undeveloped nature of the legal and
financial systems means that an effective system of corporate governance could only
emerge from a gradual concentration of share ownership. That means adding
additional transaction costs for the Greek investors. According to the managers of the
above two Greek companies they had to purchase additional shares over time to
strengthen their position in the privatised company, and secondly they did not have
32 Indeed these inefficiencies of the privatisation programme created a vacuum in which the Balkan
managers could acquire increased powers and direction to use in their own, rather than the Greek
owners' interest, leading to management conflicts.
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the necessary freedom to organise their strategy according to the rules of the market
economy. On many occasions, the domestic partner strongly opposed the reduction
of the labour force and activated the local authority's bureaucracy as a mean of
increasing his power in the decision making of the company.
Another problem was the lengthy procedure and much duplication in completing the
application for privatisation. This inevitably resulted in delays. As a Greek manager
explained, 'we abandoned any effort to participate in the privatisation process at that
stage since we felt that the Albanian authorities were deliberately slowing down the
negotiations and the evaluation of our offer. They wanted to increase the price and
attract other bidders that would accept more favourably a shared ownership.
Although the privatisation authorities meant to act as monitors of the process, they
exercised preferences for buyers and influenced the outcome of the process and
selected people who were not the highest bidders at the auction'.
In Bulgaria, increasing macroeconomic imbalances had a negative impact on
privatisation. Despite this recent progress, finding suitable investors is still
considered a weakness in the privatisation process, partly influenced by problems
experienced by potential bidders in obtaining information on rules and procedures.
With privatisation developing slowly, it was difficult for Greek investors to
overcome the resistance of certain groups, such as SOE managers, government
officials, and large banks. All parties initially rejected privatisation schemes based on
the Czech models.33 Fifteen Greek investors that have participated in the
privatisation process complained about an over- centralisation in decision making in
public administration, confusion over criteria used to evaluate bids, and favourable
conditions granted to employees. These investors believe that the only attractive
option in the privatisation process until the time that they have participated in the
privatisation programme was the tax relief and purchase discount schemes that
" The Bulgarian programme differs from the Czech programme in some important ways. The creation
of privatisation funds was not anticipated when the Czechs designed their original programme.
Bulgaria made the privatisation funds as integral part of the programme and created an extensive
regulatory structure including a Securities and Stock Exchange Commission, which granted licences
and regulated the activity of the funds (Miller and Petranov 2000:229).
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provided powerful cost incentives to those choosing to participate through the cash
privatisation programme.
Bulgarian legal regulations concerning privatisation outline no strict, clear rules
regarding the selection of buyers, making the privatising authorities' selection
process fully discretionary. Several reasons for the slow pace of the process can be
discerned, the leading one being the institutionally determined obstacles to it. The
ambiguity predetermines the slowness of the procedures. Seven Greek managers
reported that few public officials seem to perceive privatisation as a political process
of property transfer. Since the prevailing philosophy among the privatising state
bodies is the search for strategic investors, it is predominantly closed procedures that
are being used to sell state- owned companies which are the least regulated and state
no clear criteria for buyer selection. Therefore, the process has turned out to be slow,
not transparent enough and extremely dependent on the discretion of the privatising
officials.
Four Greek managers admitted that despite notable improvements, the privatisation
process continues to suffer somewhat from administrative problems. While the
multiplicity of approaches to privatisation reflects an understandable goal of
maximising flexibility, this has also sometimes contributed to confusion and strained
the capacity of public administration in co- ordination and implementation.
Since 1990, Romania's policy has been to encourage FDI. According to nine Greek
managers the debate among the Romanian politicians was not whether to promote a
market economy that is open to FDI, but over how to achieve this objective. There is
still, however, significant resistance to FDI from certain government parties which
are lacking the necessary training and enforcement power and from managers of
SOE. Fourteen Greek investors claimed that they had to pass through non-transparent
procedures. One of the most difficult aspects, according to the above fourteen Greek
investors, is represented by the fact that the legal and institutional system is
unpredictable. Even issues that have been agreed upon or even included in a law can
be changed at discretion.
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Seventeen Greek investors believe that the authorities in power do not want foreign
investors because these investors could affect the personal Romanian interests
involved in privatisation, and they could have too much influence in the economy.
The same seventeen investors further explained that the privatisation agencies have
professional interests in remaining as members of managerial boards of the
companies. Privatising their companies would exclude these executives from
decision-making positions. Their political decisions have not been transparent,
business-friendly and consistent, and their role is counter- productive. There is still a
strong tendency to retain control over the economy by maintaining high level of
bureaucracy, rather than letting market forces play out.
Twenty Greek companies that participated in the Romanian privatisation programme
strongly believe that the Romanian administrators should do as much as possible
within existing legal framework rather than attempting to amend everything, as
constant changes to the legal framework contributes to uncertainty and slows down
the privatisation process considerably. It is very important for the government to
continue to emphasise capital market development, especially so that it can use the
stock exchange for public offerings connected with privatisation. According to nine
investors that have attempted to participate in the Romanian privatisation
programme, the non-existence of efficient capital markets, limited their ability to
acquire local companies by acquiring their shares in the stock market.
Nine Greek companies stated the urgent need for clear governance and faster
restructuring, suggesting that the high dispersion of ownership in Romania may have
serious negative consequences. Not only is restructuring likely to be postponed, but
the high dispersion will also impede corporate takeovers, due to both high transaction
costs and well- known free- riding problems where small shareholders hold out for a
price reflecting the maximum gain from the takeover. Furthermore, five Greek
companies were deterred from investing in Romanian companies that were privatised
with the MEBO method for the fear that insiders will take advantage of their special
knowledge and control over the management at the expense of other investors.
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Fifteen Greek managers in Romania reported that the negotiations on the
establishment of a joint venture or acquisition of a former SOE have been lengthy
and tedious. Problems had been encountered with official obstruction and protracted
and complex negotiations with the local authorities, especially as a result of
inconsistent in views between decision makers and frequent changes in policy and
directions. The policy makers due to their frequent lack of experience in international
business and their unclear lines of responsibility inhibited them. The above fifteen
managers further reported that they received conflicting information from different
ministries and government agencies involved in the privatisation process, since every
now and then a new privatisation committee was appointed.
Romania's current institutional structure for privatisation is too complicated. There is
a need to streamline decision- making and make one institution responsible for
privatisation. That institution should have sufficient authority and independence to
carry out its mandate. Standardising the privatisation process so that it is clear how
each transaction is being handled and therefore attract more foreign investors will
facilitate this.
In FYROM after a successful launch in 1991, privatisation stalled and only resumed
in 1994 with the enactment of the current legal framework. Under this law, the
managers of SOEs were allowed to propose the privatisation method and were given
preferential treatment if they were interested in acquiring shares. '4 The privatisation
methods used, coupled with regional instability, acted as a major deterrent to foreign
participation in privatisation. Recognising the limitations of MEBO, the government
took steps to reorient the process towards outsiders in 1998-99.3:1 A major step
towards greater transparency in the privatisation process is being taken with revision
of the original privatisation law. The expected gains from privatisation however,
have been limited by continuing institutional weaknesses such as an inefficient and
underdeveloped financial sector and lack of transparency.
j4
Therefore the managers were proposing a business plan to suit their ambitions rather than a plan that
will attract strategic foreign investors. This resulted in a wide participation of insiders in privatisation.
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According to six Greek managers, until 1996- 1997 the lack of publicly available
information of companies' financial status, like in the case of Bulgaria, in addition to
unstable political climate and a small domestic market, has initially deterred them
from investing. Inefficient legal framework concerning property rights and
cumbersome tax and customs procedures were also major deterrents. Last but not
least another significant negative aspect of the privatisation process was mentioned
by the above six managers; the overvaluation of the SOE in association with the
investment risk in the country deterred us to participate in the privatisation process.
However, after 1997-98, according to the above six managers, the government has
changed its perception and policies of the privatisation programme and it perceived it
as a vehicle for increasing the efficiency of the economy. That is because the
government started to believe that higher efficiency in an company can be achieved
with dominant foreign owners, who care and who are committed to preserve and
increase the value of their shares in the company. The common understanding is that
commitment comes when somebody pays for the share he receives. That is why the
main method for privatisation is the sale, or case-by-case method, rather than
vouchers or some other non-cash system. The primary objective of the process,
therefore, is to increase the efficiency of the economy through the conversion of
companies with social capital into companies with defined ownership.
Most people in Yugoslavia believe that the companies they work in belong to them
and not to anybody else. Therefore, insider privatisation was preferable to any
other.36 In fact, most of the employees see no reason to privatise the company in
which they already have all the rights of the actual owners. However, even in that
case, no obligation was legislated and no dates were set. Starting in mid-1995,
privatisation has become one of the most discussed issues.37 However, the high level
of political risk impeded larger inflows of foreign capital.
"° Even when shares were made available to outsiders as well, insiders tended to purchase the majority
of the shares, as they had privileged access to company information and could benefit from discounts
and the opportunity to pay in instalments.
j6
In a number of laws that were passed in the parliament this sense ofjustice has been recognized and
insiders were given preferential treatment to all the other potential foreign investors.
However, the process itself has not progressed all that much. This is not altogether related to the
foreign investment legislation because the law on foreign investment that was adopted in the spring of
1996 gives some significant possibilities for foreign investment.
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Yugoslavia lacks the necessary legal and institutional mechanisms to guarantee the
■) o
security of investments and ensure that markets function effectively. Both public
and private sectors are characterised by a lack of regulative structures, resulting in
monopolies, price- fixing, tax evasion and corruption. A potential Greek investor
reported that T was deterred by the absence of adequate legal provisions on contracts
and property rights. Even under the right macroeconomic conditions, many Yugoslav
companies would presently not be attractive to my company, therefore reducing our
ability to synergistically develop resources, and securing that the ex ante defined
goals will be met ex post'.
The absence of competition and adequate regulation has led to inefficiency,
mismanagement and a decline in the value of the SOE. The introduction of new
regulatory mechanisms and market conditions will hopefully end preferential
conditions for many companies and those dependent on existing state structures for
profits. Anti- reformist groups are likely to mobilise popular resistance by exploiting
these problems. This form of political opposition would limit the scope for
introducing effective economic reform and privatisation.'y
Since the necessary legal conditions for the process of privatisation have not been
created, attempts to enter the process of privatisation from the best possible starting
positions are becoming evident. Five Greek investors in Yugoslavia believe that the
government by avoiding launching a process of wide and rapid institutional
privatisation of the state sector, has indirectly allowed non- institutional privatisation,
which has speeded development of the private sector.
j8 The reluctance to abandon the old concept of social property has led to solutions that do not ensure
the implementation of quick, comprehensive and compulsory privatisation. Some of the most
profitable and competitive companies have been excluded from privatisation, or were privatised using
non- transparent methods that enabled asset stripping (Uvalic 2001).
j9 The new government will face difficult challenges in the areas of enterprise and bank privatisation.
Both sectors continue to be affected by former heritage of social ownership, under which, companies
were owned collectively by their workers and governance was weak and highly politicised. Several
privatisation initiatives since 1992 have accomplished very little as they have failed to challenge the
authority of managements and employees in social enterprises. The new government must amend the
existing privatisation law with a view to addressing weaknesses in the present legislation.
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The cases of spontaneous and nomenclature privatisation have been reported. The
experience of five Greek investors in Yugoslavia is that only those who were close to
the members of the state establishment could use their position in the shape of
strategic capital, omissions in legal regulations and avoidance of legal sanctions, in
order to build what are now, financially, the most powerful private companies. The
above five Greek managers explained that the privatisation law was made so as to be
convenient for those who are close to the fire, which means that the best opportunity
would be given to those who are either in it or at least have good connections with
the government.40 The above five Greek managers further reported that the local
authorities often regulate and control the entry market requirements based not on
market standards but rather on personal preferences and influences.
All the ten Greek companies from our sample that have invested in Yugoslavia,
believe that the Yugoslav government must make a clear distinction between
deficiencies in the laws themselves, obstacles, and limitations concerning these
models, which derived from the environment. Strategies to attract FD1 should not be
carried out in a closed system. In such circumstances, according to the opinion of six
Greek managers privatisation becomes an aim in itself or, in other worlds a means
for keeping the existing configuration of political interests.
Successful privatisation will require credible legal structures and effective regulatory
financial institutions. The new government in Yugoslavia agrees that one of the most
urgent tasks in this respect is the radical reform of the banking system. Such reform
will be vital if foreign investors are to have adequate access to capital. Reform will
also be important for securing support from international financial institutions and
creditors. It was observed earlier that the absence of effective regulations and laws
serves as a disincentive to investment. A new administration must therefore
introduce provisions on competition, contract and property law to create a stable
environment for investment and business transactions. Transparency in the
111
This refer to the fact that privatisation is not obligatory and that it authorises the government to
arbitrarily exclude any company from this process and to carry out privatisation far from public
scrutiny, by selling a SOE directly without public bidding. The intention of the lawmakers was that
the privatisation will be carried out under strict control of the executive authorities and that the
government will choose which SOE to privatise, when, and at which price.
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application of these rules, are vital for ensuring the legitimacy of new institutions and
for avoiding public perceptions of corruption and discrimination.
The Balkans have adopted a positive attitude towards privatisation, yet eighteen
potential Greek investors hesitated, owing to insufficient knowledge of the
legislation and the lack of experience in the implementation of particular
privatisation methods. Concerning the characteristics of the privatisation transactions
concluded up to now, we can make the following conclusion. The reasons for the
delay in privatisation are not economic, as they are an outcome of the conflict
interests of different political and financial groups and the lack of a will among the
main forces to speed up the process. The main conclusion is that the existing
problems in the privatisation procedures have appeared because the process involved
institutions, which are interested in delaying rather than accelerating privatisation as
in the case of the Romanian privatisation programme.41
All ten Greek investors in Yugoslavia proposed that quick and transparent
privatisation is the best tool for combating instability, which is a characteristic
feature of any economy during transition42. Accelerating the privatisation process
requires major amendments in the legislative framework, accompanied by a change
in the approach of all government authorities toward privatisation. The governments
should have a more reliable and consistent policy regarding FDI therefore
minimising the risks and the uncertainty of foreign investors. The introduction of
competition law is very important. The completion of the restructuring of large
41
Considering the procedures, the Greek investors agreed that the privatisation authorities should
reduce the duration of the privatisation. They suggested that it would be most appropriate to bring the
privatisation process within a reasonable frame of time, thus the decision making process needs to be
kept as simple as possible, with simple lines of communication between the responsible parties.
42
In certain cases the urge of the governments to speed up the privatisation process, resulted in
observed cases of competition restrictions and preferential treatment of certain clients, lack of
openness and manipulated privatisation transactions as in the case of Yugoslavia. Transparency is
important in order to prevent the institutions from becoming captive to political interference and
pressure of powerful industrial groups, as Greek investors in Romania and Yugoslavia have reported.
Thus, it is necessary to limit the conditions of the transactions. This would facilitate new potential
buyers. Reducing the conditions of the transactions will provide better opportunities for post-
privatisation control over the agreed commitments, as well as legal stability of the transaction. There
is a need for a concerted privatisation strategy. It is necessary to remove any discrimination between
the domestic and foreign investors. Competitions and auctions are the procedures that are shortest and
the most clearly legally regulated ones.
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monopolies is a prerequisite for successful privatisation. The privatisation will
restrict or eliminate the state monopoly and will facilitate the inflow of investments.
3.6 Conclusions
A significant part of the region still faces significant delays in implementing
successful reforms, which make the recovery prospects of the region look unstable.
Being the most fragmented region of Europe with so many problems, unavoidably
has affected the economic structures and therefore made the transition a rather
painful process. The peripheral position of the Balkans with respect to the major
European markets has exacerbated the disadvantages of fragmentation and isolation,
which make economic interaction even more difficult. Developmental strategies
depend not only on what is going on inside these countries; i.e. the structural
reforms,43 but also from foreign investors, i.e. the external driven growth.44
Albania's economy presents a very controversial picture. Distorted initial economic
conditions influenced the speed and characteristics of the transition process.
Macroeconomic indicators performed well, but microeconomic development,
structural and institutional reforms did not progress in the same pace. Bulgaria's
economy was characterised by a long- lasting underperformance. The transition
4j When economic policy reforms were inconsistent, privatisation was slow, FDI was insignificant;
thus macroeconomic stabilisation and growth were undermined. FDI can play a crucial role in the
regional economies' recovery and restructuring for sustainable growth. A commitment by the Balkan
countries is to implement more forcefully macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reform
programmes designed to place the economies on sustained growth paths. Sustaining macroeconomic
stability is crucial in the development of functioning economies and in the creation of an environment
conducive to private sector development and investment. By stabilising the economic and legal
environment an increase of market seeking investment will be achieved. The latter is involving
imprecise property rights, underdeveloped institutions of market economy, unstable and unpredictable
monetary and fiscal policy. Improvements in these areas will affect market- seeking investment, via
the influence on the choice of companies between export and FDI. The Balkan countries were slow to
pursue structural reform on many levels, including the implementation of the necessary legislation for
attracting FDI. This was undoubtedly one of the key reasons for the slow inflow of FDI.
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The only way to attract FDI is to bring business legislation and practices into line with European
and international norms. In varying degrees, all of the economies have made significant progress in
the creation of the necessary legislation, which enhance the environment for FDI. However, there are
significant inconsistencies in the implementation of the legislation. The business environment will
improve by making the legal framework for foreign investors transparent and efficient, and by trying
to reduce the vast bureaucracy. At the same time the governments must proceed with new
administrative practises, which minimises the scope of corruption and ensuring the stability of the
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period quickly removed the institutional framework of the centrally planned
economy, while the establishment of the free market mechanisms turned out to be a
long stop and go process. Unclear property rights and the weak financial system may
be viewed as major characteristics of economic underdevelopment. In contrast to
other transition countries like Poland, Bulgaria could not combine the economic
decline with real positive structural changes.
Although in Yugoslavia radical economic reforms are likely to be costly in the short
term, they are nonetheless unavoidable and must be seen in the light of substantial
benefits expected in the long term. Undoubtedly, the main problem in the economy is
the lack of fundamental systemic change. It is not an exaggeration to claim that
Yugoslavia is still at the process of the first transition period. FYROM's economic
performance has demonstrated considerable adaptability and resilience. On the other
hand, because of regional instability, loss of savings and economic scandals, the
authorities have to aim for a higher degree of stability to rebuild confidence both for
domestic as well foreign strategic investors. Romania's transition experience is an
example of the importance of structural reforms for durable macroeconomic
stabilisation. At the same time, it is an evidence of the pains of such reforms.
The existing evidence suggests that the Balkans have large potential to attract FDI.
Trade liberalisation is likely to facilitate export and efficiency seeking investments.
Regarding liberalisation, we can argue that even in the cases in which countries were
ready to liberalise internally, the overall liberalisation was constrained by the fact
that they had found themselves in a region that is full of trade and investment
barriers. Therefore, the extent and effectiveness of liberalisation have been
constrained by the illiberal environment that the region as a whole presents.45
business environment. Last but not least, the Balkan countries should strengthen the institutional
framework, improve financial intermediaries and markets and enhance information transparency.
45 For that purpose the Balkan countries must reduce protection through lower tariffs. Exporters
cannot compete effectively, if they must pay high tariffs and duties. They must eliminate non- tariff
trade barriers, through the removal of licences and quotas, and they must also remove the barriers to
entry so the market will act in a more effective regulatory environment than the state ever could.
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Clearly, there is a need to set up credit lines and facilities for the SME sector. In the
light of credit provision, corruption and bribery in corporate lending should be dealt
as soon as possible otherwise the informal sector will continue to be the main source
of credit to the private sector. Opening up the domestic market to foreign financial
institutions with superior lending policies and risk management policies banks that
will create the conditions for increased lending to the private sector, is the first step
towards the development of the banking sector. The governments should introduce
non- discriminatory tax system, which is a crucial issue for economic development
and promoting new investment. Last but not least, the governments must accelerate
privatisation and structural reform in the financial and enterprise sector. This can be
achieved by acknowledging that their value is what the market will pay rather than
what the governments are expecting to achieve.
The structural reforms described above can together make an enormous contribution
to creating a favourable investment climate for long-term growth. While attempting
to forecast long-term growth rates, it is possible to identify two reasons for optimism
and one for pessimism. The two reasons for optimism are the scope for large
productivity gains from structural change and enterprise restructuring and the
productivity potential of the skilled workforces. This combination creates a strong
potential for growth. Well-functioning markets will drive the actions and investments
that can realise this potential. The main reason for pessimism is the weaknesses of
the institutions, policies and practices that are needed to underpin a market economy.
As highlighted above, there are a number of important steps which governments
should take to improve the business climate and, in particular, to strengthen the
institutions that support FDI. Important progress has been made in the creation of the
legislation necessary in order to attract FDI, although as discussed above, some
problems such as inconsistent implementation and frequent changes in the legislative
framework persist. The need to develop the institutions of private governance is
obvious, although not receiving the necessary systematic attention.
Taking into consideration the evidence in this chapter about the economic
development and privatisation process in the Balkans, a non- exclusive list of the
investment environment would include first of all the policy failure explanations that
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attribute poor transition performance to delayed reforms and non- persistent policies
of privatisation and market liberalisation. Second, the market failure explanations
that consider the shock therapy of massive privatisation, liberalisation and
deregulation in the absence of appropriate institutional arrangements as the primary





This chapter will ascertain the difficulties and problematic issues that arise by
conducting empirical organisation and management research in transition economies. It
questions the notion of universality of the way various methods and techniques are
applied in the field. The chapter describes and reflects on methodological difficulties
that we have encountered in conducting organisation and management research of Greek
companies in the Balkans since the change processes started in the socialist bloc in the
late 1980s.
This chapter contains examples that illustrate some of the problematic issues that we
have faced in our empirical work. They provide evidence of the specificity of the Greek
corporate context seen as a field for conducting field studies and point out the need to
conceptualise different methodological issues in order to successfully administrate the
different stages through the fieldwork. Besides addressing and reflecting upon problems
and obstacles, we suggest measures as to how we overcame these methodological
difficulties. They are many possible practical ways to solve methodological obstacles,
although researchers should be aware that adjustment and contextualisation of these
measures into various conditions might be necessary.
4.2 Methodological Approach
One of the fundamental problems concerning studies on transitional economies is the
absence of a grand theory, which would model the impact of these economies to the
decision making of Western companies prior to their investment and their operations in
these countries. Another main problem is caused by the fact that the majority of the
existing empirical studies in transitional economies have not integrating theories
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designed in the West with empirical data collected in the East. A lack of interaction
between theories and field data is one reason that some scholars continuously stress the
uniqueness and importance of triangulating theories developed in the West and integrate
them in a post-socialist context.
Recognising the limitations inherent in these research methods, this study uses
methodological triangulation by combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Since
the strength of each method is closely linked to its weaknesses, we can improve the
accuracy of our judgement by triangulating theories.1
As studies on FD1 activity in the Balkans present a relatively new field of research in
transitional economies, there are numerous themes waiting to be explored. However, in
order to deepen the understanding of the modus operandi of Greek FD1 in the Balkans,
we have consider besides placing emphasis on the collection of earlier studies and
findings of Greek companies in the Balkans, also to attempt to solve a variety of
transformation problems within the framework of our exploratory study. Thus, the tools
for data collection that this study makes use of are2 besides (i) examination of official
documents, archival materials, internal company reports, that is use of earlier studies and
findings, we also used (ii) in- depth face to face interviews and (iii) mail questionnaires.
Although the mail questionnaires collected the basic hard data, emphasis was placed on
the soft data, i.e. the ideas and judgements of the managers/
A pilot study was initially made in April 1998. Due to time and attention requirements
of an extensive list of categories, participants in the pre test questionnaire stressed the
need for using a short questionnaire in order to maximise both data accuracy and
response rate. On the basis of pre test respondents' comments regarding the most
1
For more details on the issue see the studies of Webb and Dawson (1991), Eisenhardt (1989), Brown and
Starkey (1994), and Yin (1994)
" The data collection covered the history of the companies, organisational and technological changes since
the initial investment in the Balkans, the relationship between the Greek and the local company, labour
issues, product development, export activity, investments in technology and performance issues.
Perceptual measures are particularly useful in the measurement of internalisation advantages since past
experience has shown that it is a difficult construct to quantify (Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992).
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important variables and the maximum feasible length of the questionnaire, the original
list was reduced accordingly. The questionnaire has been designed according to the
following objectives: (i) to collect information on the dependent variables. That is the
business activities of the sample companies in the Balkans and to collect exploratory
information on attractions and obstacles to investment, separating market from factor
cost FDI; (ii) to collect information on the business characteristics that according to
theory would be relevant for the choice of organisational form; (iii) to collect company
specific data relevant for the decisions concerning investment activity based on the
organisational form; (iv) to collect exploratory information on the operational
performance of the Greek FDI in the Balkans.
When possible problems of the data collection are evaluated, 'non-personal' mail
surveys pose a considerable risk of high non-response. The possibility of high non-
response is not only caused by insufficient enterprise information but also by decreasing
enthusiasm on the managers' part to participate in surveys of which there have been
more and more during the last few years. We overcame this 'survey exhaustion' by
informing managers prior to distributing the questionnaires.4 This method has proved to
be a more effective way of receiving complete questionnaires than simply sending
reminders to the managers.
The access to the companies was negotiated with the managers through several
telephone conversations and it was confirmed in written form prior to the first visit there.
The interview process started by making telephone calls to the companies. The aim was
to find the most appropriate officials in the companies agreeing to participate in the
survey with enough knowledge of the company's overall activities? Appointments for
4 If they agreed to participate, the author visited the companies personally to meet the respondents. We felt
that personally meeting the respondents strengthened our credibility and motivated companies to take part
in the research. We presented and explained the research also in written form, through a covering letter
that we attached to the questionnaire. In this short presentation of the research, we stressed the
confidentiality of the data and the name of the company that they represent.
3
As a rule, we had more than one respondent in a company, depending on the size and the importance of
the company. In this way, we obtained a more realistic image of the company, rather than of the personal
opinion of a single respondent (Venkatraman and Grant 1986). Further, the respondents were part of the
91
interviews were made by telephone in accordance with the wishes of the executive
interviewee before the interview date. This gave the interviewee the opportunity to
prepare the necessary information concerning the interview.
4.2.1 Conducting Organisational Research with Greek Companies
Universal issues concerning organisational research are not dealt with here, instead
emphasis is put on those areas, which we have encountered when conducting
organisational research of Greek companies in the transition economies. The main focus
of this section is placed on problems linked with sampling, questionnaire design, and
data collection. Research problems and solutions are approached in light of the author's
own experience of these problems.
There are specific issues that must be addressed when conducting organisational studies
of Greek companies, and we have found them problematic in our own fieldwork.
Identifying the field, getting the access to it, dealing with the secrecy and mistrust while
being in the field, are methodological issues not to be ignored. At the same time these
particular features, form and define both the context and the content of the research
process. Therefore, they need to be given voice and to be made explicit.
In the Greek- Balkan context there is a lack of systematic information at different levels.
There are no reliable databases, files, registers or archives that may provide the
preliminary information (information about the Greek companies in the Balkans) that we
needed at the pre-access stage. This is the stage at which the organisations that may
constitute the field for studying the issues under investigation must be identified. Under
such circumstances, we have conducted the Greek companies as to identify whether they
are exporting, investing or are indifferent to the Balkan markets. Once the pre-access
phase, that is the companies willing to participate in the research have been identified, is
management team of their company thus ensuring that the questionnaires have been completed by
organisational members involved in the strategic decision making process (Huber and Power 1985).
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complete and the field has been identified, we were faced with the challenge of
achieving access to the field in question.
Meeting all the perfectionist requirements of sampling is a very challenging task in
Greece, as national company registers for companies active in Greek- Balkan trade
relations are deficient. For example, company registers do not always contain
information even about owner or address of a company, which makes it impossible to
detect these 'phantom' companies. Furthermore, there is no official list of companies,
which have made direct investments or export in the Balkans. Secondly, the company
registers include a great number of non-active companies. Many of these 'idle'
companies have been registered with a speculative intention to start operations, only if
the opportunity arises in the Balkans. To make the sampling even more complicated, it
has been estimated that there are thousands of 'shadow' companies, which are very
active but have not been registered in Greece, as they have registered in off- shore
locations, such as Cyprus and Luxemburg. The large number of these 'phantom', 'idle',
'shadow', and 'unofficial' companies made it very impossible to precisely define the
company population of Greek companies in the transition economies.
One way to tackle difficulties concerning the population definition was to concentrate on
officially registered companies, and to consciously exclude 'shadow' and 'unofficial'
companies. Despite the extensive parallel economy, it was appropriate to exclude the
hidden company activities, since it was impossible, to carry out research on the 'shadow'
or 'unofficial' companies. The exclusion of the unofficial entrepreneurship allowed us to
focus on easier though not on easy task i.e. the separation active registered companies
from the 'unofficial' ones. We exclude passive companies by searching the registers for
companies' turnover, sales, profits or employment, thereby enabling a division of the
companies into active versus passive categories. For example, data basis of various
industrial confederations and business associations were combined. The base population
was retrieved from the database of the Ministry of National Economy, the Greek
consulting firm ICAP, and the Hellenic Bank of Industrial Development.
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The base population has been selected in view of the two research objectives. The first is
to understand FDI activity to the Balkans and the second is to test theory of international
business. These two objectives are to some extent conflicting. Transition economists,
and policy advisors, would prefer to use a very broad sample to get as close as feasible
to explaining the activity of FDI. To be relevant for economic policy, the selected
industries should be relevant for the host countries, and typical or representative for
investment at large. Thus, sample companies should be active in the Balkans with a
variety of organisational forms and they should be representative of selected industries
The analysis of theoretical propositions on the other hand requires focus on some
selected industries only to reduce variations from influences other than those analysed in
the theory. The analysis arising for transaction cost economics further require for the
sample that it should include industries facing major trade barriers, such as dairy
products, and it should include technology intensive industries, as variation of these
characteristics is important to analyse transaction costs propositions. Finally, it should
include labour intensive industries such as textiles to be able to test propositions derived
from the literature review.
A compromise was made to focus on sectors of interest from both the theoretical and
policy analysis perspective. The base population for the survey covers manufacturing as
well as service companies.6 This choice is based on the comparatively important role of
both sectors investment in the region. In addition, the theoretical frameworks have been
developed for both sectors. Though we have considered the idiosyncrasy of the service
companies as discussed by Buckley et al. 1992, we have decided to include them in our
6 The principal motive to include service sector companies is according to the theory of FDI, where
service companies are under pressure to follow abroad their important customers, for fear that they lose
out to competitors. While this emphasises the defensive nature of FDI in services by treating it as a
derivative of foreign investment in other industries, nothing prevents service industries from behaving
aggressively. Thus service companies establish themselves in foreign markets, expecting to exploit any
company specific advantages they may possess, in the same way as any other company. This reflects the
desire of the service companies to internalise company specific comparative, as well competitive
advantages, in terms of know- how and strong financial position. The strategic intent, that is to serve their
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research, since they represent a very vivid category of Greek companies investing in the
Balkans.7 Although the FDI theory was originally developed to explain foreign
production, its application to service industries is considered equally appropriate. FDI
theory has been applied in the past to explain the internationalisation of the service
industries (Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992).
The theoretical requirements of variation in technology and marketing intensity apply to
all industries. Labour intensive production is important, except the service sector. The
companies that cover the base population have been selected so as to reduce variation
but retain policy relevance. These companies are, the tobacco companies, the food and
beverages companies, the telecommunication companies, the electronic components
manufacturers, the building materials companies, the financial services companies, the
mining companies, the textile companies, the petroleum companies, the plastic products
companies, the pharmaceutical companies and the furniture manufacturers.
Considering our research theme, it is our intention to select different sized companies,
with diverse activities in different industries. In this way, emerging theory may be tested
in different settings, extending it and improving its external validity. The presence of the
companies has been taken to include both the running of installations there and trading
therein. The sample came not from a single industry and hence the generalisabiI ity of the
results is not limited. Caution must be also be exercised in drawing cause- effect
inferences from the study because of the use of cross- sectional data.
Getting access to particular companies (mostly SMEs) turned out to be extremely
difficult and time consuming process. The secretaries of the managers were 'unwilling',
in many cases, to connect us with the managers over the telephone and continuously
refused to arrange an appointment with them as soon as possible. Thus we started
Greek corporate clients in the region, is transformed into an enabling factor for the execution of a wider
strategic intent, namely the acquisition of extensive, region-wide banking networks.
7
Pye (1998), Lyles et al. (1996), Shaukat (1997), Uhlenbruck and DeCastro (2000), Pitelis and lammarino
(1999) also included service companies in his research on western FDI in Central Europe.
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collecting the data by studying archival materials provided by the secretaries. Knowing
that the researcher is a Greek student studying at the Edinburgh School of Management,
the secretaries behaved in an unfriendly and even freezing manner. This was a key point,
which could determine whether the fieldwork was going to be facilitated or blocked.
Much more importantly, they were the ones to arrange all the appointments with the
other managers for our next interviews over the following days. The secretaries were
also responsible for introducing us to many of the managers and employees and for
taking care of various practical issues. This example illustrate that the general managers'
secretaries play a key role when it comes to getting access to the general manager and,
more importantly, to the company. Whereas the general manager can usually only find
time for a single interview, the secretary was often the person to connect us to the other
respondents and to facilitate (or obstruct) the process of collecting field data.
The lack of interest in helping young researchers could be interpreted in various ways.
First, there is a general lack of experience with researchers in Greek companies.8
Managers usually perceive it as a personal favour to the researcher that they accept the
latter's fieldwork. In general, managers did not initially approach our study as a mutual
process from which they too might learn and benefit. They approach the interview
approach as a one-way communication (that we learn something from them) and not a
two-way communication (that they can learn something from our analytical work and
experience in the field). This leads to the second explanation, which could be formulated
as a question. Do managers (especially those belonging to the upper management levels)
really not reflect upon the possibility of getting feedback from us, or they do not
intentionally want to know how an outsider understands and interprets their
organisational reality? Having had the possibility of asking insiders about this particular
issue, we tend to say that the reason for this behaviour is rather lack of experience than
deliberate resistance to receiving feedback.
h
Before the start of the transformation of the Greek economy in 1980s, the research on private and public
companies and their management was considerably different from today, since it focused more on pure
system descriptions rather than in-depth analysis of organizational behaviour.
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Fieldwork in Greek companies is not the art of the possible, it is rather the art to try
making it possible. To offer feedback is not an efficient tactic for acquiring entry to
companies in the corporate context. Knowing the cultural context of the country where
the investigated settings are situated (Greece), being competent regarding the norms and
basic attitudes of the people whom we encountered as carriers of the particular national
cultural heritage, and being sensitive towards the concrete situation, are necessary
conditions for negotiating and getting access to the field. That is also one of the key
reasons that motivated to us to study the Greek FDI activity in the Balkans, and not the
experience of other foreign investors such as the Italians.9
In Greece, the very appearance of researchers on the company's stage is still perceived,
by the majority of the managers, as new and 'very strange'. Managers and employees in
Greek organisations are not at all used to encountering, and much less working with,
people from academia. The vast majority is highly suspicious and resistant. It requires a
great deal of sensitivity and effort to make them providers of information. Thus all the
participants were given a personal written guarantee of complete confidentiality in their
responses.10
When we asked people from the companies in which we gathered data to act as
respondents, we always made it clear that the particular study was either purely
theoretical or developed for teaching and training purposes. This is absolutely necessary
bearing in mind the typical mistrust in Greek organisations together with their lack of
experience with having researchers from the academia conducting empirical
investigations. When detecting doubt amongst managers who have been asked to act as
informants, we always showed them the interview-guide. Respondents were assured
'
By studying parent companies based in a single country (i.e. Greece) controls for the impact of national
cultural differences in the mode of entry, differences which are very difficult to model (Kogut and Singh
1988). The choice of Greece was based on the fact that it plays an important role acting as a gateway for
the flow of foreign investment to the region, as well as being a major investor in the region, given its
geographical position and political links.
10
Hence, in keeping with this confidentiality clause the data presented in this paper are based upon the
summary statistics and analysis drawn from the database of survey respondents. The author's strict
adherence to disclosure ethics do not allow for the data and names of the companies to be made public.
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confidentiality and anonymity. They all started or finished with almost the same phrase:
I am not sure whether what I can tell you will help you.
Data collection procedures in the interview stage were influenced by the need to collect
as much information as possible to capture contextual nuances. From the study of the
literature and information from the first pilot studies, a detailed list of issues to be
probed and investigated during visits to the companies' headquarters was developed.
During the interview process, an interview guide was made to ensure that the key topics
were discussed. It was through the responses obtained from key issues that more specific
questions were formulated.
The interviews were structured and the author carried them all out face to face with the
company executives and over the telephone for additional input. The semi- structured
character of the interview offered the opportunity to have a more relaxed discussion,
giving the interviewees the opportunity to offer his/ her input (Brown and Starkey 1994,
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois 1988). To our surprise, the interviewees were very open even
to questions that we had previously considered being sensitive.
In all of our studies, the manager(s) who is (are) responsible for the Balkan/ international
markets was (were) the first to be interviewed. This approach helps in several ways.
Having conducted the interview with the particular manager(s), our introduction to the
following interviewees was: 'We are conducting a study on ... (the concrete subject was
mentioned). We have the Balkan/ international markets manager permission to do it in
your company. He (she) has already acted as our respondent and has given us a long
interview'. We knew that this detail would carry weight. And in all cases it did.
Informants felt more secure. 'If the managers have agreed to give him an interview, it
can't be wrong if we agree, too'. The danger of acting as a respondent was thus,
eliminated for most organisational participants.
Since the data collection was taking place in Greek organisations but the data were
analysed and presented in a non- Greek context (i.e. in the University of Edinburgh), it
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was helpful for us to clearly communicate this fact to the respondents. This eliminated
much of their anxieties. In many of the managers that we have interviewed and they
were willing to discuss issues further but they were reluctant due to their corporate
guidelines, we made this point explicit: 'Edinburgh is far away and the analysis will not
be written in Greek language. Even if you (the manager) make mistakes and tell me
something 'wrong' (in the sense that it is not approved in the company), nobody in
Edinburgh or in Greece will know about it'.
An issue that deserves attention is the use of a tape recorder. Whereas this is defined as
'accepted methodology' for collecting data in the western context, it is not always an
'accepted' in the Greek environment. In some of the company visits we only took notes
during the interviews and did not even ask whether we could tape them. In bigger and
more ambitious companies that we believed that the managers have many information
and experience to share with us, we have taped all conducted interviews. In the latter
case, some respondents became very nervous while others were extremely serious
simply because of the tape-recorder. It was intentional that we did not tell anybody in
advance that we intended to tape the interview. We did not ask for permission to use it,
because we were confident that the respondents would prefer not having their answers
taped, thus being directly 'connected' with anything that they reveal to us (this has been
always the case in our previous attempts). We simply took out the tape-recorder at the
last moment and started with the first question. At that point, our dilemma was whether
to adopt an ethical attitude and get less rich data or merely start the tape-recorder and get
as much as possible. We often opted for the latter solution. However, ethical issues were
stressed to an even greater degree when respondents asked us to switch off the tape
recorder. This often occurred at times when the respondent volunteered the most
significant information, and he did not want his name to be associated with the
information that he have passed on to us. However, we respected their wish, trying
instead to memorise the information and integrate it in our data interpretation.
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We applied different tactics with respondents that were young graduates and they have
graduated from a British university. We began the session with informal chatting on
themes of mutual interest, such as their experiences from studying in the UK, which had
nothing to do with the interview itself. Since we confronted the respondents by simply
taking out the tape recorder and putting it on the table, to be switched on at the start of
the interview, it was worth investing time in relaxing the atmosphere and reducing the
sense of invasion of their emotional territory. We took that time because we wanted to
make sure that the respondents were relaxed and felt comfortable before starting the
actual interview. Afterwards, we could conduct and tape the interviews.
The difficulties with using a tape recorder make the process of taking field notes even
more important, because feld notes are an ongoing stream-of-consciousness
commentary about what is happening in our research. We were tape- recording the
interviews because whatever statements the managers made it was often difficult to
know what will and will not be useful in the future.
Another specificity in conducting feld research in Greek organisations is the fact that
insiders are not using the business language that can be used in a proper, meaningful
academic research. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to simplify the terms and
explain the terms, which create possible misunderstandings. Even more important than
elsewhere, it was essential to check the understanding of the terminology through a pilot
study and discuss with the respondents how they understood the questions.
Although in many cases the managers provide a 100% of what we requested, yet
sometimes the language, and the quotations of the managers could not be easily
translated to English, and when they did, they lost some their meaning or accuracy. Lack
of comprehensive terminological knowledge can create situations where questions are
not completely understood or where questions are completely misunderstood and falsely
interpreted. As the translation jeopardises the vocabulary equivalence, a translation back
into the original language was always necessary to pinpoint possible differences between
the original questionnaire and the translated one.
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Table 4.1 Problems and research approaches in management research in the Greek companies
Research Problems Research Approach
Identification of the field, getting access to it, and entering it. Do not expect to be able to identify the field on the basis of databases,
registers, archives, etc. - there is a lack of reliable, systematised
information. Make intensive use ofmany sources of information, and as
many as possible registries.
Act according to the social and behavioural norms of the country and the
particular organisation.
Accept and respect the fact that access often depends upon insiders placed
on lower levels of the organisational hierarchy.
Secrecy and mistrust in the investigated organisation Be very sensitive especially at the beginning of the field study. Find out
what norms are valid in the investigated setting. Try to identify the
'chemistry' of the interactive situations and influence it carefully.
Try to interview representatives of the upper levels at the beginning of the
study and let the lower levels know about these interviews when you ask
them to act as respondents.
In case you collect the data in Greece and conduct the analysis and publish
it in a non- Greek context, tell the respondents. This will relax the
respondents and they will be more inclined to giving you more valuable
information.
Respondents' suspicion and fear when the researcher uses a
tape recorder when conducting interviews.
Focus on taking field notes. In case you want to tape the interviews, avoid
asking directly for a permission to do so. The risk of being refused is
extremely high. Approach this issue according to the situation. Use
different techniques depending on whether you know the respondent or not.
Reduce the effect of "confrontation" caused by the tape recorder by
applying different techniques for the purposes of encouragement,
reinforcement, query, etc.
Sampling
Deficient enterprise registers (a vast number of non active
companies and deficient addresses)
Combine various registers. Carry out large 'convenient' sampling.
Questionnaire
Command of foreign languages may be weak.
Use local languages. Do back translation of questionnaire.
Terminology may cause misunderstandings. Avoid the use of very modern business concepts and define the concepts, if
possible. Conduct a pilot study.
Difficulties in designing scale in a manner, which would
indicate the absolute advancement in the transformation
towards market economy.
Focus on absolute transformation instead of relative transformation.
Possible bias concerning 5 plus point numeric scale. Use a 4-5 point scale.
Data Collection
High non-response of "non-personal" mail surveys. Explain the purpose of the study clearly.
General managers do not have time to participate in the study Focus the questionnaire by abandoning unnecessary questions.
Manager does not want to reveal information on ownership or
enterprise performance.
Modify the sensitive questions to less sensitive ones. Start interviews and
questionnaires with less sensitive issues.
Promotion of own management's or company's individual
success by exaggeration of company's performance
Inform that the names of companies will not be mentioned under any
circumstances in reporting research findings. Double check performance
figures, if possible.
The distinction between relative and absolute change is reflected in the
operationalisation of the research. An effective approach would be to concentrate on
analysing the absolute state of a company in a transition economy in a given moment
and then to repeat the research after a certain period of time. However, since we do not
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have opportunity to replicate the survey, a pragmatic way to explore the transformation
and adjustment issues in the corporate level would be through a retrospective approach.
In other words, by asking what state the organisation was in, for instance, in year 1991
when the Greek company invested in the Balkans and the amount of resources that it has
committed since then, and by asking what characterised the change during these years.
This is particular important if we want to examine the adaptation of the Greek
companies in the Balkans irrespective of their ownership characteristics, i.e. joint
ventures, acquisitions and greenfields.
If the questionnaire is too complex, it may lead to non- response. Thus, the
questionnaires should be as clear and as focused as possible. The design of the mail
questionnaire paid attention to the ease of completion, potential sensitivity of
information, but it was not easy to avoid quantitative questions to secure high return and
thus a good representation of the population." The wording of the mail questionnaires
and of the questions asked in the personal interviews were not strictly specified, but
nevertheless focused since information is sought on an area experienced by the
respondents. This enables us to direct and interpret the process to achieve the purpose of
the data collection method, namely to focus research attention on the experience of the
respondents as related to the purpose of the study (Merton et al. 1956).12
We tried to minimise the number of closed- ended questions since they may introduce
bias. This happens either by forcing the respondent to chose from given alternatives or
by making the respondent select response categories, none of which may really apply to
their situation or frame of reference. Obviously this can lead to distortion of validity and
" Often micro- level studies turn to surveys and questionnaires as a source of useful company specific
information. Regarding FDI motivation this is one of the best ways to find out exactly why companies
chose to invest in a foreign country. By employing ranked- response questions and other types of
quantifiable questions we could easily compared and analyse the data, although at the expense of
providing less- detailed information.
12
We obtained the case history material of the companies in the sample by using the structured interview
method. Structured interviews were used because it seemed an appropriate technique for collecting
detailed company information. The structured interview method enabled comparative data to be obtained,
through the use of standard questions. By conducting a personal interview with the managers it is possible
to overcome any suspicions they might have about my motives for obtaining information about their
business activities (Mann 1985).
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to an overuse of the response do not know. Therefore in the pilot questionnaire we
mostly focused on open- ended questions, which were designed to study opinion. For
exploratory research in which attitudes or type of behaviour are not known, the open
1 ^
ended questions would be better than closed type. Although responses to open- ended
questions in the pilot mail questionnaires were short and difficult to interpret some times
our choice is justified on the previous grounds.14 After scanning for information, and
questions that can be used in the final questionnaire, our mail questionnaire contained
mostly closed- ended questions. The author developed most measures, including those of
motives, problems and others. These measures were developed based on the literature
review and personal interviews with Greek managers.
The question of the most appropriate scale should also be given serious thought when
questionnaires for transformation studies are designed. Questions were restricted to a 4
and 5- point scale because of pre test respondents' comments that numerous response
categories (7 or more point scale) exceeded their ability to discriminate, producing noise
rather than precise data.
Many transition studies have indicated that managers are extremely reluctant when it
comes to supplying researchers with information on organisation performance. This is
because the less controlled business environment of the transition economies has created
an atmosphere of suspicion. A pragmatic way of avoiding non-response caused by very
sensitive issues is to translate sensitive questions into less sensitive ones. For example,
We considered the following issues in order to choose the open- ended questions for the pilot
questionnaire (Lazarsfeld 1944, 1966). We wish to learn about the process by which the respondents
arrived at a particular point of view. That gives us the ability to appreciate the validity of what the
respondent said in the light of how he said it. Second, the respondents' level of information is high, thus
an open- ended question can be asked. Third, it is particularly appropriate to use open- ended questions
when we desire to know the respondent's frame of reference or the level of information possessed.
14 Another reason for asking open- ended questions in the pilot mail questionnaires was to develop a clear
understanding of the business environment since no adequate academic FDI literature exists for the
Balkans. The objective here was to gain insight about the market environment facing Greek companies
entering the Balkan markets during the early transition period. The published surveys in different Greek
business magazines is not considered to be useful for academic research since they are based on surveys,
which due to sampling errors are not accurate, having low degree of validity of findings. Furthermore, the
different methodologies employed by the researchers suggest that they cannot and they should not be
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asking about exact profit figures may lead to non-response, thus, a more appropriate
method may be to ask about the percentage of the turnover or the change in profitability.
The exaggeration of management's or company's success has occurred in some
researches in Greece, as exaggerating about the corporate performance is a characteristic
of the Greek corporate culture. A concern of the survey is that data provided by the
respondents may reflect the perception of the respondents rather than the true values for
the variables, thus containing a response error. However, we believe that this will not
generate distortion of the views in our research. The use of objective character questions
might limit this concern. Furthermore, the accompanying letter with the questionnaires
stated that the information provided would not be published and it is only for academic
use. In other words, consciously to exaggerate the performance and activities of their
companies would not have promoted the companies involved in the study. In addition,
answers from the respondents will be compared to data available from other sources,
such as company reports and other managers within the organisation, thus further
reducing the concern for bias in the survey data.
4.3 Reliability, Validity and Relevance
Following Yin (1994), several measures were taken to ensure the validity and reliability
of the data collection. The validity of the case studies was enhanced by using multiple
sources of evidence during data collection including face to face interviews, mailed
questionnaires, internal reports, published data from leading Greek business papers and
magazines. To ensure reliability, the data collection was made using a structured
questionnaire. The questionnaire ensured that all necessary information was requested as
required by the research model. The mail questionnaire that was the main instrument for
the survey data went through several stages of testing and development before reaching
the final form. Last but not least, having access to relevant informants aspect, which
compared directly. The reliability and validity problems of these surveys are questionable, and any
conclusions based on their findings and analysis should be drawn with some caution.
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affects reliability to a great extent, the interviewed managers had in all of the cases good
knowledge about the issue under investigation.
The need for correct analysis of narrative data is a decisive factor relating to reliability.
In this study this has been safeguarded in two ways. First, the research instrument is
made in such a manner that misunderstandings should not occur in the data- gathering
phase. The questions were pre-tested during the preliminary- pilot questionnaire survey.
Second, the participants were able to get a feedback on their answers to ensure that they
reflected the real circumstances. In some cases additional information was added to
ensure that facts and participants' views were correctly interpreted, thus ensuring
external validity. Gathering data during the same time period (1989- 1999) in all cases
has ensured validity issues and the comparability across companies and countries.
4.4 Strengths and Limitations of the Chosen Method
The difficulty in establishing samples for mail surveys arises from the fact that we
cannot expect an answer from every company that appeared in the random selection of
companies.'3 Depending on the study sample, the fact that some companies have had
frequent contact with questionnaires was an asset in eliciting their- co- operation in the
study. Familiarity with questionnaire format and structure may make completion easier
(Anderson and Douglas 1974).
Since the cases selected all involved negotiations that covered the period 1989- 99, some
time had elapsed between the actual negotiation and the interviews. Huber and Power
(1985) suggest that information rationalisation and other memory biases may affect the
accuracy of information obtained after the fact. In order to reduce the effects of these
potential reporting biases, we addressed the questionnaires to the most knowledgeable
informants, offsetting informants and pre tested questions. Additionally, managers were
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kindly asked to retrieve and review relevant company data prior to the questionnaire. In
such situations, a mail questionnaire allowing some intra- company consultation, may
lead to more accurate information (Kalton and Moser 1979)."'
Incomplete information might result not only from the nature of the study but also
because our study is initiated to look at specific aspects of corporate behaviour with the
result that only a partial picture might be provided. Some parts of the study specifically
chapter (?) intended to explore the role of the Greek companies in restructuring Balkan
companies. Another part of the study intended to illustrate the link between ownership
structure and company performance. The timing of the study also raises difficulties of
interpretation. The interviews conducted in the last two years, but after 2 years time
might be out of date, under the changing business conditions prevailing in the region.
Therefore a longitudinal approach would be useful. However, we could not follow a
population over time, and a longitudinal study by itself cannot identify and isolate the
cause of the change (Hoinville and Jowell 1978).
An important downside is the lack of representativeness of the study findings, i.e.,
companies' performance may not be indicative of economy- wide trends. Furthermore,
we do not have comprehensive data on all Greek companies in the Balkans. Therefore
we cannot link easily a smaller sample of companies to the broader trends in the
manufacturing or service sector. Another problem is the subjective narrative of
13
That means that the actual number of questionnaires which we will be able to analyse will be less than
the number in the original sample and that it might lose some of the randomness which makes sampling
error mathematically measurable.
16
Although the interview method is essential in understanding the interviewee's experience of strategic
situations as expressed in their own words, this method of data collection has a major drawback in the
sense that the interviewer faces the danger of relying exclusively on second hand accounts of others.
Referring to this particular problem, Taylor and Bogdam (1996) assert that as a form of conservation,
interviews are subject to the same fabrications, deceptions, exaggerations and distortions that characterise
talk between any person. This limitation further gives rise to a related problem for the researcher, namely,
that of the existence of discrepancies between what interviewees might choose to say in an interview
occasion and what they actually did say. However we overcame this limitation by using official
documents and company records as complementary tools for data collection in the research. The analysis
of such documents not only provided knowledge about the attitudes and dispositions of those who have
written and maintained them, but they also lend insight into the perspectives, assumptions, concerns and
activities of those who produce them.
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managers regarding the causes of restructuring. Therefore, we can only use the
interviews to complement the analysis of the financial performance of companies in
getting a better understanding of the elements of a successful restructuring strategy.17
The use of a common questionnaire gives a consistency of approach and an interpretive
validity that permit stronger inferences to be drawn than could be from cases compiled
for differing objectives. The use of parallel cases from the Balkan countries also helps to
guard against biases within any one country, especially because cross- country
comparisons are facilitated by efforts to match some companies across countries by
sector, by size or by ownership type.
Exploratory research may be in particular useful for developing theory (Fredrickson
1983, Snow and Thomas 1994, Yin 1994). Considering that until today no systematic
research concerning FDI and strategic decision making of companies in the Balkans has
been undertaken, and no coherent theory exists, this kind of research may now be
appropriate. When building theory, theoretical sampling is appropriate (Eisenhardt
1989). Therefore concerning our research theme, internationalisation, adaptation and
performance in the Balkan economies, we have studied different size companies, with
diverse activities in different industries. Thus the characteristics underlying different
companies in our sample vary considerably, and for this reason the biases may cancel
one another out to an extent (Simon 1969). In this way, the emerging theory may be
tested in different settings, extending it and improving its external validity.
The main purpose of the research design employed in this study, is to ascertain the
relevant variables for a particular area of study. Such an approach will be used to help
formulate a framework for analysis. By being open, probing and seeking the why, how,
what and where, we can minimise personal bias and maximise the gaining of new
17
Unlike the macroeconomic outcomes of transition, which can be quantified, changes in the behaviour of
managers and the way that companies are restructured are less amenable to quantification. Indeed it is
quite difficult to establish performance criteria by which to judge whether the post- restructuring
performance was successful or not.
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perspectives. The flexibility inherent in our design does not mean absence of direction to
the inquiry. Rather, flexibility means that the focus is initially broad and becomes
progressively smaller as the research goes on (Adams and Schvaneveldt 1985).
The first aspect of the study, as has been established in the preceding discussion, is
directed towards the identification of the main strategic roles assigned to Greek
companies in order to generate a conceptual framework and comparative findings. This
aspect of the study deals with the antecedent conditions that led to the specific strategies
chosen by Greek companies entering the Balkan markets. Why are certain strategic
decisions made? What factors influence certain strategic choices over others? The
assumption is that these sets of questions will reveal significant data about the roles of
strategies in making foreign market entry decisions. The employed methodology can
develop a deep understanding of the relations between different actors in and around the
companies. Of course there is a trade- off between the depth of studies and the number
of them that can be carried out; the range of studies often offsets the lack of depth.18
As well as considering the problems that arise when looking at any company study, it is
also necessary to be careful when looking at the full range of studies and drawing
conclusions from patterns among them. When studying companies, bias can arise both in
the selection method of the researcher and by the force of circumstance.19 However, we
avoided this bias, since we did not know in advance which companies are active in the
Balkans, thus we did not choose a joint venture company that is responding actively so
as to identify the dynamics of change. The return includes companies without business
18
We studied with a relatively small sample that we could work for longer period of time, so to develop a
deep understanding of the relations between different actors in and around the companies. Of course there
is a trade off between the depth of the studies and the number of them that can be carried out; the range of
studies offsets the lack of depth (Alreck and Settle 1995).
19
As an example of the second type of bias, it is in general only possible to carry out a case study where
one has permission from the management to do so. It may well be the case that those managers who are
willing to give permission are precisely those who are more dynamic and less resistant to change. As an
example of the first type of bias, it is often the case that companies studied are chosen as interesting
examples of a particular aspect of transition that interests the researcher.
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contracts in the region, as, ex ante, it was not known whether or not companies were
active in the Balkans.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have ascertained the difficulties and problematic issues that arise
when conducting empirical research in the transition economies. It questioned the notion
of universality of the way various methods and techniques were applied in the field. The
chapter provides insight as to how to solve some problems a researcher may meet when
carrying out studies of Western companies in the former socialist bloc. Our reflections
provide evidence of the specificity of the Greek companies in a transition economy
context seen as a field for conducting empirical studies. The phenomena studied must be
put in the specific context, otherwise data would remain meaningless. In other words,
research that is not grounded in the context lacks relevance and construct validity.
A clear understanding of the context is needed in order to be able to cope with, and
successfully administrate the different stages through which the fieldwork is taking
place. This would broaden our view of methodological issues and dilemmas by
conducting organisational studies. The examples listed in the chapter suggest that we
need alternative approaches that are not preoccupied with holding onto and acting
according to 'cook book' research approaches described in the western dominated
methodological literature.
There are a variety of specific techniques we considered that are contextually based and
that need to be explored in order to be able to generate data in an environment (Greek-
Balkan business environment), which appears to be specific in many aspects. Our
experience indicates that conducting research of Greek companies in the transition
economies is influenced by three crucial elements: (i) universal requirements of
scientific research, (ii) experience on special conditions of Greek companies, and (iii)
sufficient resources. We did not only concentrate on requirements of scientific research,
as even the most advanced research methods do not guarantee success if the research
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cannot be executed in the original form. In addition to requiring sufficient knowledge in
general issues linked with conducting empirical research, the researcher must also have
experience with transition-specific factors (based on the transitional experience of the
Greek economy) as well as sufficient resources to be able to carry out the research
successfully.
Conducting empirical research in the transition economies is sometimes as much
creative art as perfectionist science. Transition economies present a tremendously
interesting research laboratory for scholars interested in organisational and management
issues. This chapter was aimed at offering a possible key to researchers about to sit in
the driver's seat of a research vehicle. Some of the hints presented in this chapter may be
worth reviewing before starting a research journey on the slippery and narrow roads of
empirical research in transition economies.
CHAPTER FIVE
The Research Methodology- Definition and Analysis of the Employed
Variables
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will provide the link between the literature that was reviewed in
chapter two, and the variables employed in our research, so that the reader of this
dissertation will be convinced that our approach and hypotheses are appropriate for the
achievement of the objectives described and analysed in chapter one. In the first part, we
present the characteristics of the companies in our sample, which are used to analyse the
business activity of the Greek business in the Balkans.
5.2 The Sample
5.2.1 Sample Characteristics
Four hundred and three companies were contacted. The return figures (230) include
responses from 122 companies that they are involved in FDI, 41 companies replied that
they are not attracted by the Balkan markets, thus classified as indifferent, and 67
companies that explained that they are not active in the region in a FDI form, but rather
through exports. Seventy- five companies did not reply to our questionnaire. In addition
98 companies replied that they are not willing to complete the questionnaire, mainly as a
matter of corporate policy. The return rate of 57% is high relative and even better to
similar studies on transition economies.1
Looking at table 5.1, food and beverages companies are relatively more active in terms of
FDI in the Balkans, with financial services companies following. Food and beverages and
textile companies demonstrate the same export activity. As we can see from table 5.1,
labour intensive Heckscher- OhIin- type industries such as textiles, food and beverages
1
For more details see the studies ofMeyer (1998), Genco et al. (1993), Wang (1993), Shaukat (1997).
are the main recipients in our sample of FDI and export activities in the Balkans.2 In
contrast with Greece's industrial and export structures, capital- intensive industries with
significant economies of scale are dominant among the most internationalised companies.
Highly skilled labour is the rule, and half of the industries represented can be considered
to be technology- intensive. High- technology manufacturing, which includes
pharmaceutical companies, electronic components manufacturers, telecommunication
companies, as well as some food and beverages companies, indicates that the
technological factor is indeed particularly significant in FDI, allowing companies to
exploit their ownership advantages due to technological competence and know- how.
Table S.I Sectoral distribution of companies by types of market penetration strategy
Sector Indifferent Exports FDI Total
Tobacco 5 3 6 14
Food & Beverages 26 17 31 74
Telecommunications 0 0 7 7
Construction materials 0 0 13 13
Financial Services 0 0 19 19
Mining 0 0 7 7
Textile 6 17 14 37
Petroleum Products 0 3 5 8
Electronic equipments manufacturers 0 9 6 15
Furniture manufacturers 4 5 6 15
Plastic products manufacturers 0 9 6 15
Pharmaceutical companies 0 4 2 6
Total 41 67 122 230
Table 5.2 shows that in regard with the capital invested in the Balkan affiliates, 32
companies have invested more than US$ 10 million in their affiliates. Thirty- nine
companies have invested US$ 5 million to US$9,9 million in their affiliates. Fifty- one
companies have invested US$ 0,5 million to US$ 4,9 million in their affiliates.
Table 5.2 Questionnaire Returns in the FDI Category- 122 companies
Group Capital invested in the Balkan subsidiary (in million $) % Number of companies
Large More than $10,000,000 26% 32
Medium $5,000,000- $9,999,999 32% 39
Small $500,000- $4,999,999 42% 51
Total 100% 122
"
This activity is in accordance with Jeon (1992) who noted that companies in Heckscher- Ohlin type of
industries tend to pursue FDI in LDCs. Therefore the industrial structure of the outward Greek FDI in the
Balkans could be expected to be quite different from inward FDI in the more developed EU economies.
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Table 5.3 Distribution of Sectors According; to the Cap ital Invested in the Balkan Affiliates
Sector Small Medium Large Total
Tobacco I 5 0 6
Food & Beverages 11 11 9 31
Telecommunications 2 2 3 7
Construction materials 4 4 5 13
Financial Services 3 7 9 19
Mining 0 3 4 7
Textile 14 0 0 14
Petroleum Products 0 3 2 5
Electronic equipments manufacturers 5 1 0 6
Furniture manufacturers 5 1 0 6
Plastic products manufacturers 4 2 0 6
Pharmaceutical companies 2 0 0 2
Total 51 39 32 122
Table 5.3 shows the distribution of sectors according to the capital invested in the Balkan
affiliates. Table 5.4 shows the distribution of sectors according to the capital invested in
the Balkan affiliates and the mode of entry. Across the sectors, a variation can be
observed. From table 5.4 it is clear that the majority of joint venture companies (15) have
invested no more than US$ 4,9 million in their affiliates. In the acquisitions category,
there is a mixed preference between the choice of small (investments no more than USS
4,9 million), medium (investments no more than USS 9,9) and large (investments more
than USS 10 million) affiliates, although the preference for medium and large affiliates is
slightly stronger. On the contrary, for the greenfield investors there is a clear preference
for large (investments more than USS 10 million) affiliates. Observed ownership patterns
differ across industrial sectors.




Sector Small Medium Large Small Mediu
m
Large Small Medium Large Total
Tobacco 0 1 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 6
Food & Beverages 2 3 1 4 8 7 5 0 1 31
Telecommunications 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 0 1 7
Construction materials 1 0 0 1 1 3 2 3 2 13
Financial Services 1 3 2 0 0 5 2 4 2 19
Mining 0 0 1 0 3 3 0 0 0 7
Textile 9 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 14
Petroleum Products 0 0 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 5
Electronic equipments 0 0 0 3 1 0 2 0 0 6
manufacturers
Furniture 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 6
manufacturers
Plastic products 0 0 0 4 2 0 0 0 0 6
manufacturers
Pharmaceutical 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
companies
Total 15 9 7 16 23 21 18 7 31 122
Total per mode of 31 60 31 122
entry
As we can see from table 5.4, the majority of the companies preferred the acquisition
strategy, while the number of companies that chose greenfield or joint ventures is the
same. With the exception of building materials companies and the service companies
(financial service companies and telecommunications), acquisitions and joint ventures
were the most preferred modes of entry in the Balkans.
Across the countries, a variation can be observed. From table 5.5 it is clear that in terms
of the share of companies in our sample reporting FD1, Albania and Romania lead with
28% and 26% respectively, followed by Bulgaria 22%, FYROM 16%, and Yugoslavia
8%.
Table 5.5 Geographical distribution of the FDI
Sector Albania Bulgaria FYROM Romania Yugoslavia
Tobacco 2 1 1 1 1
I:ood & Beverages 3 9 7 10
2
Telecommunications 1 1 0 2 3
Construction materials 7 2 1 3 0
Financial Services 3 8 2 5 1
Mining 1 1 2 1
2
Textile 9 0 5 0 0
Petroleum Products 3 0 1 0 1
Electronic equipments manufacturers 0 3 0 3 0
Furniture manufacturers 3 2 0 1 0
Plastic products manufacturers 2 0 0 4 0
Pharmaceutical companies 0 0 0 2 0
Total 34 27 19 32 10
5.3 Variables Used to Analyse and Explain the Internationalisation Decision Making
Process
5.3.1 The Conceptual Framework
Notwithstanding the interest of previous research in the transition markets, and the very
existence of FDI, which intend to exploit cost or financial advantages, strictly subjective
motivation considerations have apparently weak influence on the explanation of company
specific advantages and the presence of FDI in the Balkans (Rizopoulos 2001).
Therefore, these approaches seem to be insufficient to explain FDI in the Balkans and
therefore, it seems necessary to propose a more ownership specific framework to explain
FDI activity on behalf of the Greek companies. Competitive company advantages or
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disadvantages are the main factors explaining international transfer of assets, which
seems to constitute an appropriate basis to analyse Greek FD1 in the Balkans (Rizopoulos
2001). In this perspective, FDI can be defined as a strategic movement tending to exploit,
preserve or acquire specific advantages of the companies.
Much of the literature on foreign market entry concerned the choice between exporting
and FDI (Root 1987, Young et al. 1989, Buckley and Ghauri 1993). The cost- based view
of this decision suggests that a company must possess a compensating advantage in order
to overcome the costs offoreignness (Flymer 1976, Kindleberger 1969). This led to the
identification of ownership specific advantages as the key elements in successful foreign
entry (Hirsh 1976, Horst 1972).
Dunning (1993) has emphasised that the returns to FDI, and hence FDI itself, can be
explained by the competitive-ownership advantages of companies, indicating who is
going to produce abroad and for that matter, other forms of international activity (ibid:
142), by locational factors influencing the where to produce (ibid: 143) and by the
internalisation factor that addresses the question ofwhy firms engage in FDI rather than
license foreign firms to use their proprietary assets (ibid: 145). Companies having
ownership specific advantages are expected to exploit them more profitable outside their
domestic market (Dunning 1981, Teece 1986).
Location factors are not stressed and are controlled (partially) since only a homogeneous
areaJ (the Balkans) is studied and we only considering Greek subsidiaries, following the
proposition of Nitsch et al. (1996) and Woodcock et al. (1994). We recognise that
country- specific differences exist between the Balkan markets, but we feel that grouping
them in this fashion is defensible in light of Greece's stated objective to develop itself in
a single, common, united Balkan Economic Area (Labrianidis 2000).
This practice of focusing on these countries as one group of transitioning economies can be found in
Fischer and Gelb (1991), Kornai (1992), and Peng (1993), among others.
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We treat the Balkans as a single market for the following reasons: (i) all the economies
are very similar on broad- based economic measures towards the transition process from
a command to a market economy. Considering some general indicators of progress in
transition to a market economy, we find that all countries are in a very similar situation
(EBRD Transition Reports 1998, 1999, 2000), (ii) geographic proximity to Greece; (iii)
constraints of economic development are similar to all the Balkan countries. Their
common experience under the central planning regime suggests that they are all members
of a broader, clearly identifiable class of social- political- economic systems (Kornai
1992). Second, their phenomenal transition toward market- based economies, albeit with
different speed and pace, have led to a similar changes in their institutional infrastructure;
(iv) over 78% of all the industry sectors in our sample are located in all the Balkan
countries, thus, we are able to absorb any specific locational differences; (v) from a
certain point of view the Balkan countries resemble Greece. Following the fall of
Greece's autarchic economic policies in the mid 1980s, Greece took steps to attract FD1
and put in place the preconditions for growth. Greece has integrated into the EU. It has
stabilised the macroeconomic indicators and liberalised the national market. It has
succeeded in attracting increasingly sophisticated FDI, and it is in position to attract net
transfers and structural aid from the EU. This past experience is an asset to the Greek
companies in the Balkans. They draw on their expertise in the Greek market to overcome
the inefficiencies of the Balkans.
5.3.2 Hypotheses and Variables
According to the OLI paradigm, ownership advantages combining with locational
advantages are a necessary condition for international business. In this section, ownership
advantages are discussed with respect to their relevance for business with the Balkans to
develop propositions on determinants of Greek- Balkan business. The kinds of ownership
advantages considered, based on the literature review in chapter two, are financial asset
advantages (Oa advantages), economies of common governance (Ot advantages), and
threats to existing O-advantages requiring cost oriented restructuring. For the ownership
characteristics of the companies the data were obtained with a one-year lag. The reason
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that the data were obtained with a one- year lag is that the companies were willing to
provide only the last year's data.4
In chapter eight, we have used a different set of ownership specific advantages variables,
for analysing the preference of ownership strategies on behalf of Greek companies. The
reason that some company characteristics such as profitability and advertising
expenditures were omitted in chapter seven, is that these variables made the explanatory
ability of our model rather unsatisfactory. The resulting multinomial logistic regression
had a statistically insignificant (statistically insignificant chi- square value) overall
explanatory power (p>0.10). Furthermore, in each of the pairs examined, export vs.
indifferent, FDI vs. indifferent, FDI vs. export, the regressions had a statistically
insignificant explanatory power (p>0.10).5
a) Financial Asset Advantages
Financial resources are a company specific advantage in the presence of asymmetric
information about investment projects (Myers and Majluf 1984). Therefore, companies
with internal funds, or low leverage, are more likely to choose FDI entry while
companies that need to raise funds externally prefer lower risk modes of entry Chatterjee
(1990). The financial resources of the investing company thus determine its ability to
establish operations that draw on the investors' own transferable resources.
HI: the higher the total debt of a company, the less likely it is to prefer a capital
investment activity such as FDI in the Balkans, than an export or indifferent strategy.
4
Any effort to ask for the data of the past two to three years in many cases was not successful and the
nature of the bureaucratic mandate of Greek Company House where the data of most the Greek registered
companies are available was not very supportive towards our research.
5
To isolate ownership advantages from internalisation aspects all forms of international business are
considered jointly. This includes not only FDI but also trade. However, we do not have any information
about contractual cooperation agreements, thus we exclude this case from our analysis. Three alternative
expansion strategies are distinguished, i.e. exports to the Balkans, FDI to the Balkans and finally any other
strategy indifferent to the Balkan region.
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H2: the higher the total debt of a company, the less likely it is to export in the Balkans,
thus being indifferent to the Balkan markets.
H3: the higher the long- term debt of a company, the less likely it is to prefer a capital
investment activity such as FD1 in the Balkans, than an export or indifferent strategy.
H4: the higher the long- term debt of a company, the less likely it is to export in the
Balkans, thus being indifferent to the Balkan markets.
b) Advantages of Common Governance
Advantages of common governance are defined by Dunning (1993) as advantages of
organising Oa-advantages with complementary assets. He distinguishes advantages of
branch plants of established companies over de novo entrants, and advantages from
international experience as such. At firm level, a large corporation can economise on
headquarters functions, such as marketing and finance. These economies of common
governance ofmulti-plant companies create advantages that rise directly in relation to the
company size (Buckley and Cason 1976, Caves and Mehra 1986). Investing abroad may
entail certain fixed costs, which must be incurred if any foreign production is to occur.
The size of the company, as measured by its assets (Kogut and Singh 1988, Yu and Ito
1988), would seem to be crucial for several reasons. The assumption is that the size of the
company affects its decision to enter a foreign country and the form of its involvement
(Kumar and Steinmann 1991). Because large companies are often considered better credit
risks than small companies, large companies may have an easier time financing the fixed
costs entailed in investing abroad. If foreign investing is perceived to be inherently risky,
the risk may appear to be relatively more foreboding to a small company than to a large
one (Horst 1972). The size of the company reflects its capacity for absorption of these
costs (Buckley and Casson 1976), for achieving economies of scale (Hood and Young
1979), and is expected to positively correlate with its propensity to enter foreign
1 18
markets.6 On this interpretation the size variable may incorporate all or most of the other
ownership- specific advantages, thereby producing a cumulative and dynamic effect on
the expansion of companies (Hood and Young 1979). Thus, larger companies have lower
marginal costs of adding the Balkans to their operations. They can be predicted to be
more active in Balkans and smaller companies.7
H5: the larger a company is the more likely is to prefer FDI in the Balkans than an export
or indifferent strategy.
H6: the larger a company is the more likely is to prefer export in the Balkans than being
indifferent to the Balkan markets.
International companies have competitive advantages that arise from their international
activities as such. This includes international accumulation of know how (Cantwell
1989), arbitrage opportunities, flexibility for production shifting (Kogut and Kulatilaka
1994), superior recognition of opportunities, and international diversification of risk. A
company's level of international experience has also been shown to influence entry
choices. Companies with higher experience may be expected to prefer investment modes
of entry. With increasing experience, companies acquire knowledge of foreign markets,
perceive less uncertainty, and become more confident of their ability to correctly estimate
risks and returns and manage foreign operations (Johanson and Vahlne 1977, Davidson
1982). As a result, they become more aggressive in committing resources and assuming
control (Anderson and Gatignon 1986).8 Greek companies, which are more familiar with
6 The more frequently transactions incur the lower is the internal transaction cost per transaction. This
effect reduces fixed costs, and thus making internalisation more likely (Williamson 1985).
Empirical evidence indicates that the impact of company size on FDI is positive (Buckley and Casson
1976, Caves and Mehra 1986). Grubaugh (1987) tests the determinants of US FDI at a sectoral level. He
finds that size tends to favour multinationality, a result compatible with Horst's (1972) seminal study on
company determinants of FDI. As Grubaugh argues, these findings support Hymer's hypothesis about the
importance of size in encouraging a company to become a multinational. Juhl (1979) examines the sectoral
patterns of German FDI in Less Developed Countries (LDC). His results confirm the importance of size as
the main determinant of such a strategic decision.
8
Companies without foreign market experience are likely to have greater problems in managing foreign
operations. Less experienced companies perceived considerable uncertainty, overstate risks and understate
returns (Davidson 1982). Thus, they shy away from making significant resource commitments and
assuming control (Johanson and Vahlne 1977). This makes the choice of not investing more probable
(Caves and Mehra 1986, Gatignon and Anderson 1988, Terpstra andYu 1988).
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foreign tastes and habits, may want to create export platforms there from which to satisfy
other foreign markets. Companies may not be interested in satisfying just the demand of
the Balkan markets but in using their local plants as export platforms as well.
Companies with international experiences thus can be expected: (i) to know better how to
make best use of new opportunities in the Balkans; (ii) to have lower costs of entry as
they utilise synergies with other international operations, and (iii) may increase the value
of their network by covering more countries. Companies with international experience
can use their industry- specific skills developed in foreign countries to overcome any
market specific inexperience vis-a-vis local competitors (Vernon 1966, Caves 1971,
Galbraith and Key 1986).
H7: the more a company exports, the more likely it is to prefer FDI in the Balkans than
an export or indifferent strategy.
H8: the more a company exports, the more likely it is to prefer to export to the Balkans
than being indifferent to the Balkan markets.
H9: the more geographic diversified exports are the more likely a company is to prefer
FDI in the Balkans than an export or indifferent strategy.
H10: the more geographic diversified exports are the more likely a company is to prefer
exporting in the Balkans than being indifferent to the Balkan markets.
c) Threats to existing ownership advantages
Trade theory suggests that location of foreign production would be based on comparative
advantages of cost factors. FDI would move where production costs are lower. However,
the low cost factor is a very incomplete framework to analyse the location of FDI. While
popular debate is often focusing on production costs, research suggests that attraction of
markets is at least as important (Meyer 1997, Caves 1982, Dunning 1993). Dynamic
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Greek companies facing constraints to growth, or threats to survival, with their present
strategic configuration are forcefully pushed into exploring new opportunities. Barriers to
growth rise in their present markets (both Greek and international markets). If markets
are saturated or rising costs reduce competitiveness in established markets, this creates
strong inducements towards restructuring, relocation and search for new markets in the
Balkans. Such a strategy is likely to include high start-up costs thus demand more
dynamic followers.9
Hll: the higher the growth rate of sales, the more likely a company is to prefer FDI in
the Balkans than an export or indifferent strategy due to market opportunities in the
'virgin' Balkan markets.
H12: the higher the growth rate of sales the more likely a company is to prefer to export
in the Balkans than being indifferent to the Balkan markets due to market opportunities in
the 'virgin' Balkan markets.
The high wage costs in Greece in the early 1990's put competitive pressures in particular
on labour intensive production. The developmental model of FDI (Ozawa 1979, Meyer
1997) stresses the importance of such competitive push for the relocation of production
and sourcing. If the model is applicable to the Balkans, sourcing of intermediate inputs
and even relocation of production would be a major motivation for business activity. If
companies use FDI to minimise costs, they will move to the location where production
costs are lowest. Companies with labour intensive production processes are most likely to
shift procurement to the region, or to set up local production. We emphasise the role of
labour costs arguing that labour intensity positively influence FDI taking into
; Market related advantages are becoming increasingly important. This can be attributed, firstly, to
worldwide converging structures of demand for many goods. Secondly, economies of scale and scope
allow the use of physical production facilities and intangible assets to serve multiple markets. More
importantly, product development and other research activity have a high component of sunk costs that
enable supply of additional markets at low extra costs. With high development costs, few if any
competitors are likely to giving opportunities for selling a product globally, and lengthening a product
cycle. Markets also become the overriding consideration for the location of production in the presence of
protectionism, transportation costs, or close interaction between the productive and sales operations. This
investment depends primarily on the potential market (market size and growth).
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consideration the low cost labour force in the Balkans. In labour intensive industries,
there is an incentive to take advantage of cheaper labour costs in the Balkans through
FD1. Thus, following the literature emphasising the importance of labour costs for
decisions over location of production to the Balkans, the following hypothesis is
proposed.
H13: the higher the unit labour costs of a company, the more likely it is to prefer to
relocate their business activities in the Balkans, than an export or being indifferent to the
Balkan countries.
HI 4: the higher the unit labour costs of a company, the more likely it is to prefer to
export in the Balkans than being indifferent to the Balkan countries.
Greek scholars studying the internationalisation activities of Greek companies in the
Balkans systematically continued to differentiate between companies active in FDI and
companies exporting in the Balkans. In addition, they did not consider why certain Greek
companies show no interest in any of these two internationalisation approaches. By doing
so, they failed to capture the creation of a theoretical infrastructure of the differences
prevailing among these three company categories, which is a critical aspect for
understanding and explaining their similarities and differences. This is important if we
consider the lack of previous experience and of suitable structures for
internationalisation, which characterised the majority of Greek companies of the 1980s
and the early 1990s.
In figure 5.1, by distinguishing between Greek companies that commit themselves in FDI
or export activity or simply indifferent to any of these two strategies, we take into
account, among other things, their ownership specific characteristics discussed in the
literature review and on the above stated hypotheses, and are summarised in the
following table. By not evaluating the companies' ownership specific characteristics
differences, we do not notice how these advantages influence their strategic decisions.
Individual cases are incorporated and examined in taxonomical isolation (export vs. FDI,
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export vs. indifferent, FDI vs. indifferent) in chapter 7 for the purpose of a comparative
analysis.
Figure 5.1 Stages of expansion strategy choice






The ownership characteristics we use are summarised in table 5.6, include a set of
variables that represent financial-asset advantages, size advantages, human capital
advantages, growth rate of sales, and finally, following the example of Agarwal and
Ramaswami (1992), Erramilli (1991) and Kogut and Singh (1988), advantages related to
the geographical diversification, and export intensity of the companies.
Table 5.6 Definitions of the Variables of Greek Parent Companies
Variables Definition
Financial Asset Advantages
TDEBT Total debt/ total assets
LDEBT Medium & long- term debt/ total assets
Advantages of Common Governance
SIZE Total capitalisation of the company (measured in 6).
INTL_T Value of exports/ sales of the Greek parent company
GEOGR Number of different geographical markets in which the Greek parent company is active
Threats to existing ownership advantages
GROWTH RATE Percentage change of sales in the year of the investment over the previous year, and is used as
a proxy for growth.
LABOUR Number of sales/employees
Table 5.7 Expected Coefficients
Variables Export vs. FDI Export vs. Indifferent FDI vs. Indifferent Hypotheses
Financial Asset Advantages
TDEBT - - - HI, H2
LDEBT - - - H3, H4
Advantages of Common Governance
SIZE + + + H5, H6
INTL_T + + + H7, H8
GEOGR + + + H9, HIO
Threats to existing ownership advantages
GROWTH RATE + + + Mil. H12
LABOUR + + + HI3, HI4
5.3.3 Analysis of the Descriptive Statistics
As we can see from table 5.8, the descriptive statistics for the companies in the FDI
category are in line with the initial expectations as these were explained and presented in
the hypotheses. That is, the companies in the FDI category have a lower total and long-
term debt, are larger (in terms of their total capitalisation). Furthermore, they are more
export orientated both in terms of exports' turnover and number of foreign markets that
they serve, they are more dynamic in terms of their turnover growth, and they are more
labour intensive compared to the companies in the export and indifferent category.
Table 5.8 Total sample descriptive statistics of Greek companies' ownership advantages
Variable
Total Indifferent Exports FDI
N=230 N= 41 N=67 N=122
Tdebt (% of total debt) 46.9(20.3) 50.9(15.6) 47.0(18.5) 45.6(22.4)
Ldebt (% of long term debt) 12.0(13.2) 14.0(13.1) 13.9(14.1) 10.5(12.6)
Size (total capitalisation in million €) 45,1 (141,5) 4,2 (5,0) 7,4(7,5) 79,6(187,9)
Growth rate (% change in turnover) 11.8(13.5) 11.4(14.3) 9.32(14.4) 13.3(12.6)
Labour (sales/ employees) 127,647(218,449) 49,860 (36,273) 59,125 (52,974) 190,739 (282,363)
Intl t (export turnover/ total turnover) in % 9.0(10.5) 2.1 (6.1) 8.4(9.5) 11.4(10.9)
Geogr (number of export markets) 6.5 (6.7) 1.4(3.9) 6.1 (6.7) 8.2(6.7)
Indifferent companies carry higher total and long-term debt burden, are less labour
intensive, and less geographically diversified in terms of their exports than the FDI and
export companies. Indifferent companies have lower growth potential compared to the
FDI category, but contrary to what was expected, they have higher growth potential than
the export orientated companies. Export orientated companies carry lower debt burden
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than the indifferent companies but higher than the FD1 companies, while their relative
size is smaller than the FD1, but bigger than the indifferent companies. They are also less
labour intensive than the FDI, but less labour intensive than the indifferent, more
geographically diversified in terms of their exports than the indifferent but less
diversified than the FDI companies, while their export intensity is higher than the export
intensity of indifferent companies, but lower than the FDI companies. Last but not least,
their growth potential is lower than the other two categories of companies.
5.4 Variables Determining Ownership Structures in the Balkans
5.4.1 The Conceptual Framework
The previous section has focused on the determinants of FDI. This section takes the
analysis one step further by investigating investment characteristics, based on a
transaction costs theory of ownership choice and upon the ownership- company
specific based view of the company. The model considers the entry mode choice as a
decision over the origins of the resources that shall be employed in the new venture. The
model is applied to analyse the ownership structure Greek companies select when
investing in the Balkans by using an eclectic approach based on the transaction cost
theory (Andersson and Svensson 1994).
In choosing the desirable ownership structure, Greek companies should decide whether
full or partial ownership of the affiliate's assets is preferred and what degree of
partnership, if any, they want to establish with partners. That is, companies should choose
the degree of partnership as well as the degree of control that they want to have over their
affiliates. Our analysis will be based on the assumption that companies aim at
maximising their expected rate of return from operating abroad, which, in turn, implies
minimising the risk and cost of establishing their production units abroad. The viewpoint
adopted in this section, and analysed in the review of the literature, is that international
entry mode choices are most usefully and tractably viewed as a trade-off between control
and the cost of resource commitments, often under conditions of considerable risk and
uncertainty (Calvet 1981, Caves 1982, Davidson 1982, Root 1987, Vernon 1983, Hill et
al. 1990). (See figure 5.2)
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Since a company may choose to share the ownership of its affiliate abroad for a variety of
economic or strategic reasons, this section will be concerned with the identification of the
factors that might determine such a choice. We will mainly focus on the economic
reasons for the observed variety of ownership structures. The operational definition of the
modes is as follows. A greenfield mode was defined as an entry involving one parent,
which built and operationally equipped the plant. An acquisition mode was defined as an
entry that involved only one parent, and plant and equipment were purchased from the
previous owner. A joint venture was defined as an entry that involves more than one
parent (a Greek parent company and an existing Balkan company), and the parents
operationally equipped its plant. These definitions ensure that the entry modes are
mutually exclusive (Woodcock et al. 1994: 265).
Most studies on the foreign establishment mode treat greenfields and acquisitions as
representing alternative establishment modes, with joint venture being only a matter of
the degree of ownership (Zejan 1990, Hennart and Park 1993). While accepting the
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theoretical reasons and empirical evidence for such a position, Kogut and Singh (1988)
argue for the need to treat joint venture as a third alternative mode. This study follows the
proposition of Kogut and Singh (1988) by including joint venture as a 3rd alternative
entry mode.
International business is subject to higher transaction costs than most domestic business,
due to extensive imperfections on international markets. This makes the choice of an
optimal organisational form a key issue in international business strategy. Companies
have developed special modes to cope with international challenges. Companies entering
a foreign market can choose among an array of possible organisational modes, including
joint- or wholly-owned ventures. These alternatives differ in the control that the entrant
attains over the local operations, and have been analysed in the international business
literature by applying transaction cost economics (e.g. Anderson and Gatignon 1986).
Greek companies will decide on the extent of ownership (or, otherwise, on the degree of
control) of their affiliates abroad taking into account the costs and benefits resulting from
their alternative choices. The benefits depend on the affiliate's profits and the amount of
transferable assets, for which a price has to be agreed. The costs depend on potential
spillovers, due to leakage of important information-based assets to competitors within the
same industry, which may lead to a reduction in future profits, and monitoring expenses
necessary to prevent agency problems connected to controlling an investment and its
related workforce in a foreign, unfamiliar market. Maximisation of net profits from
operating abroad with respect to the ownership share provides the optimal demand for it.
In particular, optimal ownership can be thought of as a mechanism to provide maximum
gains as well as to protect proprietary rights, which cannot be fully contracted out and, at
the same time, as an incentive device for reducing monitoring costs.
Transaction cost theory arguments together with ownership advantages, and resource-
based theory considerations influence the set of determinants of the optimal ownership as
produced by the maximisation of net profits. Our analytical framework draws upon both
resource-based and transaction-cost theories. The resource requirements have to be
matched with resources available to the investor through an acquired company. Beyond
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this, the decision has to account for the costs of acquiring and integrating the resources
causing costs of two kinds: transaction costs in the markets where resources are acquired,
and costs of adapting an acquired and/or transferred resources to the needs of the project.
The model presented complements the literature with insights gained through our case
research on foreign investment into the Balkans.
Company and industry characteristics can be used as relevant proxies. Company size,
providing market power and hence potential increases in future profits, is hypothesised to
positively affect the full ownership choice. Company characteristics, such as profitability
and growth rate exert a similar effect, while capital intensity and resource intensity may
lead to sharing ownership. The already-existing presence in foreign markets may create
information externalities, thus reducing the need to share ownership with domestic
partners. R&D intensity together with labour costs are thought to induce foreign
companies to select full ownership, while marketing intensity is hypothesised to exert a
negative influence on sharing ownership.
In many ways, the entry mode findings will be a reflection of the nature of the ongoing
process of economic transformation that can be found in the Balkans. In this context
establishment strategy refers to the company's choice of whether to enter a new market
by buying existing units in the host country, that is acquisition or through establishing
new ventures, that is greenfield.
5.4.2 Hypotheses and Variables
a) The Resource Dimension
To understand the contribution of the resource- based view in the framework it is
necessary to review factors that influence mode choice. Resources can be obtained in
bundled form by taking over an existing local company - an acquisition, they can be
redeployed within the company to establish a greenfield venture, or invest together with a
local company- a joint venture. The ownership choice depends first on the resources
needed, behind which lie the strategic objectives of the project, and second on the
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resources that are found (i) within the entering Greek company, and (ii) in bundled form
in local companies.
The strategic intent of an investment often predetermines its entry mode. Frequently, FD1
is undertaken to pursue strategic objectives concerning the control of some local
resources in foreign markets. The type of resources sought varies with the strategic intent,
for instance resource-seeking investment. Resource-seeking investment may aim at
utilising the human capital of a local company due to wage differentials. To access local
human capital, a direct take-over may be more efficient because setting up a new
operation and hiring key individuals does not permit the entrant to tap team-embedded
tacit knowledge. Resources in the target industry are also essential for companies
operating abroad in resource intensive industries as they lack industry-specific assets.
They face higher operating costs in the new markets because they are less well equipped
to build an operation de novo (Teece 1982). Thus, resource requirements arising from the
strategic intent may shift the balance of arguments between the investment modes, often
in favour of an acquisition. If the local resources are a necessary but not sufficient
condition for the success of the new operation, then investors may choose joint ventures
rather than acquisitions.
Since a major motive underlying FDI in the Balkans appears to be resource seeking, we
explore the possibility of labour costs affecting the Greek companies' choice regarding
the affiliate ownership structure. Transaction cost considerations may lead the companies
to share in order to gain access to skilled labour (Monteverdi and Teece 1982, Anderson
and Schmittlein 1984). On the other hand, given that it is unreasonable for companies to
pay relatively high wages for nothing, the rationale behind a possible labour cost effect is
that industries may experience high unit labour costs due to a skilled and highly qualified
workforce. Companies operating in those industries may possess an intangible asset-
workforce's capabilities, which is likely to yield large profits. Therefore, we explore
whether high unit labour costs tend to lead to high foreign ownership share.
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HI5: The more labour intensive a company is, the greater the probability of observing
fully owned affiliates.
From the data provided in the questionnaire as well as following Gomes- Casseres (1989,
1990), we identified as resource- intensive the industries of food and beverages, tobacco,
textile, furniture, plastics, petroleum, construction material, telecommunication and
pharmaceutical companies. It seems plausible that access to the best resources is already
in the hands of local companies, and that the best way to access these resource is to invest
in the local company that holds them. Production processes specialised in the use of a
particular input quality may be dependent on one source for their raw material. Such
dependence arises particularly in industries processing natural resources (Williamson
1981). Resource orientated companies may not find a way to efficiently contract out the
required resources and set up fully- owned affiliates thus use the joint venture channel to
gain access to them.10
HI6: The more resource intensive a company is, the more likely is to choose shared
ownership.
b) Transaction Costs Incentives
A major cause ofmarket failure is asymmetric information on properties of the product to
be transferred (Arrow 1971). Related phenomena are externalities from the public good
character of knowledge within the firm (Caves 1971:4), and the free-rider potential for
users of brand names who may degrade the quality of products (Anderson and Gatignon
10
Availability of resources is a major driving force for the expansion of Greek companies in the Balkans.
The redeployment of resources from Greece can in part offset the costs of entry, reducing entry costs of
greenfield vis-a-vis acquisitions and joint ventures. Therefore, greenfield could be more feasible for Greek
investors with resources that can be transferred and constitute core competences of the new business
subsidiary in the Balkans. Such resources can be employed in the Balkan subsidiary without incurring the
initial sunk costs of their development, and the subsidiary can attain competitiveness from competences and
resources shared with the investing company. This makes greenfield a natural choice for companies with a
strong competitive advantage. Companies that can transfer their resources in the Balkans wish to build a
subsidiary, which replicates the production technology and- or organizational structure of their existing
operation. On the other hand, companies with competences that are bound to the location need to acquire
new resources for project, by acquiring a domestic company or by setting up a joint venture with a local
partner.
130
1986). These properties of knowledge inhibit the use of contracts for its transfer.
Therefore, international business scholars such as Buckley and Casson (1976), Rugman
(1981), and Casson (1995) argue that information asymmetries and related market
failures are a rationale for the existence of multinational companies.
Information asymmetries arise especially for firms with knowledge-based assets.
Technology intensive companies face information asymmetries in the transfer of
production technology, in uncertain assessment of market opportunities for innovative
products, in the necessary feedback from sales to product development, as well as in the
training-needs of sales and service personnel (Caves 1982). Information asymmetries
may require multiple quality and quantity controls and thus increase measurement costs
(Hennart 1982). Second, measurement costs increase with the transfer of information,
such as marketing, and technological knowledge, especially of recent origin (Williamson
1981). Product sensitivity also increases with the transfer of product innovations, which
are more difficult to evaluate than process innovations (Brada 1981) and with the transfer
of unstructured, poorly- understood products and processes (Anderson and Gatignon
1986).
Kogut and Zander (1995) differentiated between joint ventures and wholly owned
subsidiaries in their study of the impact of knowledge transfer on mode choice. Noting
that knowledge- transfer is most efficient in wholly owned subsidiaries, they showed that
the more tacit, less teachable and more complex company specific knowledge is, the
more likely it will be transferred via a wholly owned subsidiary. This suggests that
companies with greater reliance on difficult to transfer knowledge will prefer the wholly
owned mode to others (Anderson and Gatingnon 1986 and Kim and Hawng 1992). Caves
(1996) argues that the choice of ownership structure for the affiliate can be significant
affected by the potential risk of misappropriation of the technological developments.
When the company is research intensive and property rights are weakly protected, foreign
companies are more likely to establish fully owned affiliates (Davidson 1982), thus
protecting the long- term viability and a company's competitive position from sharing or
exposing core resources to a potential competitor. A fully owned affiliate has the
advantage of being tailor-made to tit the foreign company's objectives with respect to
R&D. Additionally, all the potential gains of these activities can be fully internalised by
the affiliate and parent company. In case of partial ownership, the cost of co-ordinating,
monitoring and defining the proprietary rights may outweigh the potential gains of a
partnership with local agents.
H17: The more research intensive is the company, the more ownership the company
demands in its affiliate and, hence, the greater the probability of observing fully owned
affiliates.
The marketing of goods is information- intensive. The units co-ordinating local
marketing exchange sensitive marketing information with headquarters. Moreover,
control of product quality is essential to maintain the reputation of a worldwide brand. It
would be expected that in industries where sales- promotion expenditures are important,
this might lead the company to be strongly concerned about free riding on its brand
name." Taking a full ownership in the affiliate may be the way selected by the company
to protect its intangible assets from misappropriation. The assumption implicit in this
proxy is that money spent on advertising generates company specific assets in the form of
brand recognition and product differentiation. We suggest that when companies operate
in marketing intensive industries they are more likely not to share ownership (Anand-
Delios 1996). Therefore, companies that invest heavily in brand- name capital will avoid
free riding by other companies by preferring wholly owned subsidiaries.
H18: The more marketing intensive a company is, the greater the probability of
observing fully owned affiliates.
"
The reputation of the expanding company is also affecting the choice of the foreign mode of entry.
Companies must invest heavily in advertising and their brand name to obtain a good reputation. This
process of reputation building is time consuming and uncertain. High investments in reputation do not
automatically lead to a good reputation. Each minor deviation from the behaviour that the company
prescribes may have a disastrous impact on the company's reputation.
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c) Ownership Advantages- Financial Asset Advantages
The greater the size and the market power of a company, the larger will be its potential
for increasing profits. Therefore, the larger the share that the foreign partner may
demand. The larger in terms of its capital invested, an affiliate is, the more likely is to
possess the necessary financial resources for full ownership of its foreign subsidiary and
its better positioned for a more resource demanding full ownership structure than a
smaller company.
On the other hand, a Greek operation in the Balkans that requires larger resources relative
to the resource availability of the parent company in Greece is more likely to be
structured as jointly owned. We examine whether resource limitations (including size)
make the Greek companies prone to utilise proportionately more joint ventures, which
allow them to share costs and risks, as well as complementary assets and skills with host
country partner companies.
H19: The larger in terms of its capital invested, an affiliate is, the greater the probability
of choosing full ownership choice.
Companies characterised by high capital intensity require a large resource commitment
but may yield large profits. Although high profits may induce companies not to share
ownership with local partners, high capital requirement may lead them to share potential
financial risks by engaging in a partial ownership structure. This may be particular
relevant if the Greek company cannot afford the entire investment and sees the
partnership option as a way to complement its resources
H20: The higher the capital intensity of a company is, the greater the probability of
sharing ownership.
Profitable companies interested in maximising their share in profits in the Balkans require
a larger share in the ownership structure of their Balkan subsidiary, which may yield
larger profits. Future profits may induce companies not to share ownership with local
partners, thus engaging in a partial ownership structure.
H21: The higher the growth in profits is, the greater the probability of choosing full
ownership choice.
In growing companies, expected profits from an affiliate may be greater than those in less
growing or declining companies. Therefore, the foreign partner's demand for ownership
will be higher, the more dynamic the Greek company is.
H22: The higher the growth of sales is, the greater the probability of choosing full
ownership choice.
d) Ownership Advantages- Advantages of Common Governance
The gradual increase of companies' international involvement is explained by an
interplay between the development of knowledge on foreign locations and operations in
the countries, and, on the other hand, an increasing resource commitment. Knowledge on
foreign markets is experiential knowledge, which cannot be taught. It can only be
acquired through experience and active involvement in the country. Such knowledge is
essential for resource commitment because it enables recognition of business
opportunities and reduces market uncertainty. Therefore, past commitment and
accumulated experience in foreign markets determine the future activities, resource
commitments and involvement on a foreign market. A company with greater international
experience is more likely to be able to bear the risks and management responsibility
associated with full ownership of foreign operations and thus, may find it less compelling
to form a joint venture to share risks (Caves and Mehra 1986).
On the other hand, greater international business experience may enable the company
effectively to deal with the costs and uncertainty associated with accepting equity
partners and to become more willing to choose shared ownership (Zejan 1990).
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Therefore, we explore whether international business experience tend to lead to high
foreign ownership share. We argue that the companies' choice of entry mode depends on
the strategic relationship it envisages between operations in different countries.
H23: The more experienced in foreign markets a Greek company is, the greater the
probability of observing fully owned affiliates.
The above stated hypotheses provide the opportunity for studying the conditions
influencing the choice of market entry strategies, and thus of the strategic aspects of
internationalisation of the Greek companies in transitional economies. To a large degree
the choice of the investment structure depends on the resources needed in the new
venture, and on the resources that are found within the entering company. Thus, the
resources that companies possess determines whether they pursuing an internal growth
strategy i.e. greenfield. or an external growth strategy i.e. acquisitions and joint ventures
(Penrose 1959).
The choice of entry mode between joint venture, acquisition and greenfield in the
Balkans based on the following variables is examined using a multinomial logistic model,
presented in chapter eight. These variables are based on a company's capabilities, since
these capabilities yield competitive advantage in the marketplace. They are defined as
follows.
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Table 5.9 Definitions of the Variables of the Parent Greek Companies
Variables Definition
The Resource Dimension
LABOUR Number of sales/employees
RESRC The resource intensity is measured by a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the main economic
activity of the company is in a resource- intensive industry and 0 otherwise.
Transaction Costs Incentives
R&D Technological intensity is proxied by the percentage ratio of R&D expenditures over sales.
ADVERT Advertising intensity is proxied by the ratio of advertising expenditures/sales (of the Greek
parent company in Greece), and attempts to control for possible sales promotion effects on the
ownership choice of Greek companies in the Balkans
Ownership Advantages- Financial Asset
Advantages
SIZE The size of the company is measured by the affiliate's capital (measured in USD) in the year
of the investment.
INV Capital intensity is proxied by the ratio of total assets/ sales.12
PRF The proxy for profitability is the operating profit margin over the year before to investment in
the Balkans.13
GROWTH RATE Percentage change of sales in the year of the investment over the previous year, and is used as
a proxy for growth.
Ownership Advantages- Advantages of
Common Governance
GEOGR Number of different geographical markets in which the Greek parent company is active
Table 5.10 Expected Coefficients
Variables Joint Ventures Wholly Owned Hypotheses
The Resource Dimension
LABOUR - + H15
RESRC + - H16
Transaction Costs Incentives
R&D - + H17
ADVERT - + H18
Ownership Advantages- Financial Asset Advantages
SIZE - + H19
INV + - H20
PRF - + H21
GROWTH RATE - + H22
Ownership Advantages- Advantages of Common Governance
GEOGR - + H23
5.4.3 Analysis of the Descriptive Statistics
As we can see from table 5.11, companies with larger affiliates in terms of their capital
invested, higher growth of sales, higher labour, advertising and capital intensity, are in
12
Capital Intensity Ratio Definition (INV variable): A company's total assets divided by its sales, or the
amount needed to generate a € in sales. This ratio of total assets to sales is called the capital intensity
ratio. It tells us the assets needed to generate €1 in sales; so the higher the ratio, the more capital intensive
is the company (Ross et al. 1995: 90). The capital intensity ratio (total assets/ sales) should not be confused
with the total asset turnover, which is a company's sales divided by its total assets (Ross et al. 1995:62).
L'
The reason for choosing the operating profit margin instead of the net profit margin is to control for
differences in tax liabilities among the listed and non- listed companies in the Greek stock market
pace with our initial expectations as these were presented in the hypotheses statements.
For the remaining four variables (the resource and technological intensity, international
business experience and profitability), the results of the descriptive statistics are not
entirely in line with our initial expectations. Indeed, the resource and technological
intensity is a characteristic of companies both in the wholly owned and joint venture
category. Last but not least, the internationally experienced and profitable Greek
companies seem to prefer wholly owned affiliates and join ventures in equal terms.
Looking at the descriptive statistics in table 5.11, the Greek companies that choose
acquisitions as mode of entry seem to have invested the highest amount of capital for
their Balkan affiliates ($31,5 million), compared to joint ventures and greenfield
investors. Joint venture companies are more capital intensive (5.6), suggesting that capital
intensity may be a factor leading to sharing ownership. Greenfields and acquisitions are
less capital intensive, thus having less capital requirements, than the companies that
choose joint venture as their entry mode to the Balkan markets. Regarding the variable
measuring the profitability of the Greek parent company, acquisitions seem to have the
lowest profit margin (1 1.4%), while joint ventures and greenfields demonstrate a higher
profit margin during the year before the investment in the Balkans. The average growth
rate of sales over the year before the investment in the Balkans is higher for acquisitions
(15.3%), compared to greenfields and joint ventures. The results for the R&D variable
demonstrate that joint ventures and acquisitions are committing the same share of their
sales revenues for R&D expenses (0.004), followed by greenfields. Acquisitions and joint
ventures are more resource intensive companies (0.8) compared to greenfields (0.7).
Acquisitions have a more labour intensive production (€219,585) as it is demonstrated by
the ratio of sales over employees, compared to greenfields and joint ventures.
For acquisitions (0.007 of sales revenues), sales- promotion expenditures are more
important than joint ventures and greenfields as it is demonstrated from the ratio of sales
expenditures to sales revenues. Finally, companies under the acquisition category seem to
have a higher geographic diversification of their exports (9.6) of their international
business activities than the joint ventures and greenfield investors.
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Tabic 5.11 Descriptive statistics of ownership advantages






M S.D M S.D M S.D M S.D
SIZE (affiliate's capital in million $) 19.6 67.3 31.5 94.0 5.9 6.0 10,1 16.5
1NV (total assets/ turnover) 4.2 5.4 4.0 5.6 3.1 3.2 5.6 6.4
PRF (% change in operating profit margin) 12.9 10.3 11.4 9.8 14.4 9.5 14.4 11.9
GROWTH (% change in turnover) 13.3 12.6 15.3 13.1 11.8 12.4 11.0 11.4
R&D (RD expenditures/ turnover) 0.003 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.0002 0.001 0.004 0.01
RESRC (1= resource intensity, 0=
otherwise)
0.8 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.8 0.4
LABOUR (sales/employment) 190,739 282,363 219,585 356,797 144,753 98,770 180,891 239,797
ADVERT (advertising expenditures/
turnover)
0.006 0.008 0.007 0.01 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.003
GEOGR (number of export markets) 8.2 6.9 9.6 7.1 5.0 6.3 8.7 6.5
5.5 Variables Describing Company Adaptation in the Balkans
5.5.1 The Conceptual Framework
A problem that we faced when looking at Greek companies in the Balkans, is the
doubtful quality of the evidence. One aspect of this problem is that any funds directed
towards restructuring, are likely to be suspect (since companies may choose to provide
inaccurate data) or at the very least misleading (due to inflationary pressures and
dramatic changes in exchange rates). The empirical literature on company behaviour
during transition utilises a wide array of restructuring measures, based either on
accounting or qualitative data (Djankov and Pohl. 1998, Djankov 1999). Because
quantitative data can be misleading in the conditions of transition, as we have explained,
objective measures acquire an unusual importance as a source of information as to what
is really happening inside the Balkan subsidiaries. Our research provides qualitative,
objective measures in chapter eight, so that it will become possible to discover patterns of
adjustment on behalf of the Greek subsidiaries. Qualitative measures enable us to build a
picture of the relations between different actors in and around the companies during their
restructuring and adjustment to the local economies. This is crucial if we are to
understand the various incentives that companies face (Yin 1994).
We have avoided quantitative measures such as the percentage of money invested in each
aspect of the company or increases in labour productivity in order to demonstrate the
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extent of resource commitment for two reasons. First in the pilot questionnaire, the
companies avoid indicating the necessary financial information, and second this measure
(labour productivity) may be misleading since substantial improvements in labour
productivity might not arise from a proactive strategy (Ericson 1998). Instead, labour
productivity growth may simply account for a low initial level of efficiency, i.e. for the
elimination ofwaste (Djankov 1998).
Therefore, we focus on the level of resource commitment on behalf of the Greek
companies, thus using the term adaptation, rather than restructuring, which we believe is
more appropriate and can be measured. Restructuring primarily is a problem faced by
joint ventures and acquisitions, not by greenfields. Therefore, we used measures that we
believe are necessary for successful adjustment and operation in transition economies.
In the light of the above discussion, Djankov (1998) defines restructuring as the
adaptation process that enables organisations to reach commercial viability. For the
purpose of our research, and since in our sample we have included greenfield investments
we use a different term and a new approach, namely organisational adaptation aimed to
capture the resource commitments both for companies with local partners, i.e.
acquisitions and joint ventures as well as greenfield investments. In particular, the
resource commitment view provides insights in the analysis of the Greek subsidiaries'
development in understanding and evaluating the business environment in the Balkans.
We consider this evolutionary perspective to assess the adjustment strategies of the three
ownership strategies since the growth and prosperity of a company depends on its
adaptation to the local environment, irrespective of its ownership structure (Kogut and
Zander 1993, 1996, Kogut 1996, Murrell 1992). For this purpose, we define
organisational adaptation as resource commitments in organisation and operations
towards success in a volatile and changing market environment. The resource- based
model is relevant to companies which intend to improve their competitiveness by taking
into considerations the factors that may enhance their competitiveness in risky and
turbulent business environments like the Balkan markets.
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The reason that motivates this approach is that restructuring primarily is a problem faced
by joint ventures and acquisitions, not by greenfields, which they have to adapt to the
local environments, providing the necessary resources such as marketing to promote their
products in a market that they might not have previous knowledge of. Therefore, we used
measures that we believe are necessary for successful adjustment and operation in
transition economies.
In slowly transforming economies, the relative importance of the main forces driving a
company's adjustment towards the principles of a command economy can be different.
Their effects can be less pronounced and deserve special treatment. In this respect, the
measurement of adjustment plays an important role. Changes in performance outcomes
may be hardly visible yet as the market has not stabilise. In this case, it is necessary to
look at the variety of adjusting activities undertaken by the companies. Together with the
analysis of performance indicators, this could help to create a more objective picture of
the adjusting process in a region, which is still in a fragile economic process.
Here the term adaptation is used to refer to actions taken to change the structure of the
company along four dimensions: internal organisation, employment, output and
investment. Using variables such as adjustment of employment, change of product mix
etc., chapter eight takes special interest in the impact of different forms of ownership
corporate strategy in the Balkans. An important question we address is the issue of
whether restructuring efforts and related investments should be distributed equally across
the organisation or whether certain parts of the organisation require special attention.11
Our approach was influence by the studies of Nitsch et al. (1996) and Woodcock et al.
(1994).
Organisational adaptation to changes in the environment is one of the primary concerns
of strategic management (Fiol and Lyles 1985). Scholars have suggested that different
configurations of strategy and structure may be appropriate for different states (Ansoff
14 Various studies have focused on single or multiple organisational functions as deserving most attention
in companies in transition countries, among them marketing (Albach 1994, Filatotchev et al. 1996),
production (Albach 1994) and human resources (Filatochev et al. 1996).
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and Sullivan 1993).15 Closely linked to this literature is the strategic adaptation literature.
Strategic adaptation literature states that companies should cope with environmental
change, by adapting the organisational strategy and structure to the new conditions
(Jennings and Seaman 1994, Sharfman and Dean 1997, Chackravarthy 1982).1(1 They
stipulate that when environmental conditions change, the organisation should adapt its
strategy and structure to the changed context, according to some prescribed rules and
logic, displaying a high level of organisational adaptability. However, these theories have
been developed and tested mainly in western business environments (Eisenhardt and
Zbaracki 1992). Therefore may not be applicable in transitional economies.
As we have explained a limitation of the organisational and strategic adaptation theories
is that they have been developed and tested mainly in Western business environments.
Economies in transition may pose very different challenges to managers and the
assumptions behind these theories may not hold anymore. It may therefore be appropriate
to study the strategic decision making process, taking into consideration more
perspectives on strategic decision-making than only the rational normative. In this way, it
may be possible to better understand and predict the strategic decisions Greek companies
take and their consequences for the success of adaptation. We define strategic decisions
as commitments of relatively large amounts of resources, which have considerable effects
on the long- term performance of the company (Fredrickson 1985, Schwenk 1988). This
requires fundamental changes for companies in their way of interacting with the
environment, the kinds of products they produce, and their organisation. Therefore, the
restructuring and the survival of the companies, is different due to their adaptive abilities
to change. For acquisitions and joint ventures, how far away they have moved from their
former business practices determined their position, while for greenfield depended on
how they respond to the new market structures.
15 These studies have provided support for the basic fit paradigm, which portends that organisations need to
align strategy and structure (Naman and Slevin 1993, Miller 1987), strategy and environment (Tan and
Litschert 1994, Kim and Yin 1998) and structure and environment (Miles et al. 1978) to achieve optimal
performance.
16
Selecting a strategy requires that management understands internal strengths and weaknesses and
evaluates opportunities and constraints of the environment (Andrews 1980, Chandler 1962, Child 1972).
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From this review, we choose four complementary measures of adaptation: (i) internal
organisation, which involves behavioural modifications and is associated with issues of
corporate governance and internal organisation, (ii) product market, (iii) labour market,
and (iv) investments. The variables included in the above four measures are dummy
variables ranging from 1; no resource commitment, 2; low resource commitment, 3; high
resource commitment; 4 very high resource commitment and they are listed according to
their relation with the above four measures, in table 5.12. These variables are defined in
the following paragraphs. Our measures of restructuring reflect both defensive17 and
strategic restructuring18, an important distinction in the transition economics literature
(Ernst et al. 1995, Meyer 1998). Similar measures were used in Carlin et al. (1995: 433),
Charap et al. (1993) and Zemplinerova et al. (1995: 7).
a) Organisation:
1. Providing independence (autonomy) to the subsidiary: 4- point scale ranging from
'no independence has been provided to the subsidiary' to 'independence has been
provided to the subsidiary'. The costs of managing across borders exceed those of a
national company. Insufficient or ineffective control over the subsidiary can limit the
parent company's ability to co-ordinate its activities, to efficiently utilise its resources
and to effectively implement its strategy. In turn, exercising control over some or all of
17 Defensive restructuring is forced upon companies as a consequence of the decline in the demand for their
products, market liberalisation and the imposition of harder budget constraints. In this respect, it is rather an
adjustment activity than restructuring. Defensive restructuring includes labour shedding, cutting of real
wages, closing unprofitable product lines, and some training of the old management team. It can be
expected from companies, regardless of their ownership structure (Carlin and Aghion 1996) even if their
goals and their management's basic strategic orientation has not undergone a significant change.
18
Strategic restructuring measures aim at a long- run improvement of the viability and performance of the
company in a competitive environment. It takes place when a company develops and implements a long-
term business strategy in response to a profound necessity or opportunity. They are the consequence of a
radical change in goal and strategic outlook of the companies towards value maximisation and,
respectively, market orientation. They are typically accompanied by investment in new equipment,
development of new products and new markets, increasing attention to product quality, structural changes
in labour force, improvement of the organisational structure, and management turnover. Strategic
restructuring involves designing and implementing new business plans, which often requires new
management expertise and investment in new technologies. Strategic restructuring of the company should
eventually result in its successful adjustment to a new market environment and an improved performance.
While in the long- run this relationship is not in doubt, in the short- run it is not so obvious, in particular for
slow transition economies like the Balkans. Strategic restructuring of companies will in due course show up
in improvement of performance indicators if it is not confined to exceptional cases but proceeds on a broad
front thus bringing about systemic changes favourable to the working of market forces (Carlin et al. 1995,
Carlin and Aghion 1996, Djankov and Pohl 1998).
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the activities of a subsidiary helps protect the company from premature exposure of its
strategy, technological core or other proprietary components to outside groups. We want
to examine whether or not Greek investors closely monitoring their operations.
b) Product Markets:
2. Establish new production facilities: 4-point scale ranging from 'production facilities
are essentially the same as in the first year' to ' new production facilities are introduced
after the first year1. We want to examine whether the Greek investors introduced new
production facilities to their subsidiaries, and to the extent, Greek investors replaced the
old production facilities in order to meet the new demands of the market.
3. Buy new equipment: 4-point scale ranging from 'production equipment is essentially
the same as in the first year' to ' new production equipment introduced after the first
year'. We want to examine whether the Greek investors brought new production
equipment into their subsidiaries and/ or to what extent they replace the production
equipment of their local partners.
4. Upgrade existing products: 4-point scale ranging from 'existing products are the
same as in the first year' to 'radical improvement in product quality of existing products
after the first year'. We want to examine whether the Greek investors focus on upgrading
the existing products or not, as a response to the changing market needs.
5. Develop new products: 4-point scale ranging from ' products are essentially the same
as in the first year' to ' all products that introduced after the first year are new'. We want
to examine whether Greek investors introduce new products in the market place as a
reaction to the changing needs of the market.
6. Export products to foreign markets: 4-point scale ranging from 'most products are
exported to old markets' to 'most products are exported to new markets'. Access to
markets is generally a crucial factor due to loss of former markets in the CEE. The
collapse of previous trading markets resulted in disastrous consequences for many
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companies in the region. They were not prepared for changing their market orientation
toward developed industrial countries. Any measures taken to help companies to get
access to new markets were crucial for survival. We want to examine whether investors
were interested in getting orders from buyers from Western Europe and reach new export
markets.
c) Labour:
7. Maintaining excess employment: 4-point scale ranging from 'lay offs have been
made' to 'no lay offs have been made'. Since over- employment was endemic in planned
economies, company adjustment toward market behaviour involves labour shedding.
Managers react to the introduction of market forces and the hardening of their budget
constraints by cutting costs. One indicator of this is labour shedding. We look at the
extent to which companies in the sample identify the existence of labour hoarding and the
changes in employment that are reported.
d) Investments:
8. Capital investment programme: 4-point scale ranging from 'no capital investments
have been made' to 'capital investments have been made1. Due to general shortage of
capital in most of the domestic companies, these companies need financial inflow for
survival. The incoming capital is needed for restructuring the financial sources of
companies. Capital is also needed by owners to get rid of loans and use the capital for
financing operations. Because of shrinking markets, local companies have significantly
reduced financial reserves, thus making the resource commitments of the Greek
companies very appealing and very much necessary. Therefore, we want to examine the
extent of capital commitments on behalf of the Greek companies.
9. Invest in establishing wholesale network: 4-point scale ranging from 'the wholesale
network is essentially the same as in the first year1 to ' new investments to the wholesale
network have been made after the first year'. Assuming a company produces a marketable
product, but has no adequate distribution network, distribution improvements will
increase utilisation of the existing productive capacity. Greenfield investors have an
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urgent need to invest in marketing skills if they want to successfully adapt to the needs of
the market. No market networking and no previous experience of the local markets make
this strategic commitment quite necessary. Investments in distribution networks may be
critical for the performance of all the companies. For service companies this means to
establish new branches or offices.
10. Training: 4-point scale ranging from to 'no training provided to the employees' to
'new training provided to the employees'. Training employees in new business practices
and production methods is of equal importance. This transfer is necessary because
management skills in central plan system were fundamentally different than the
management skills in a market economy. Training is very important at the managerial
levels, because many managers were not familiar with the workings of a market- based
economy. This is one of the major management challenges for companies in planned
economies in transition. Therefore, we want to examine the extent to which Greek
companies train their employees in the Balkan subsidiaries. Training programs are
important for achieving knowledge transmission but also for facilitating behaviour
change.
11. New Technology: 4-point scale ranging from to 'technology employed is essentially
the same' to 'new technology is introduced and employed'. A characteristic of the region
is the technological backwardness of the Balkan companies. Therefore, we want to
examine the extent to which Greek companies employed new technology in their Balkan
subsidiaries to improve their technological and operational competencies.
Previous research has shown that the investment intensity determines a significant
portion of the performance variance in transition economies (Uhlenbruck 1997). An
important remaining question is whether restructuring efforts and related investments of
the Greek subsidiaries in the Balkans will be distributed equally across the organisation
or whether certain parts, i.e. training and technology, require special attention.19
1 '
Various studies have focused on single or multiple organisational functions as deserving most attention
in companies in transition countries, among them marketing (Albach 1994, Filatotchev et al. 1996),
production (Albach 1994) and human resources (Filatochev et al. 1996).
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5.5.2 Analysis of the Descriptive Statistics
A first look at the descriptive statistics in table 5.12, demonstrates the higher level of
resource commitments on behalf of the companies that invested in acquiring domestic
companies contrary to the level of resource commitments on behalf of the companies that
invested in joint ventures with Balkan partners. On the average, acquired companies have
committed more resources than the joint ventures in the product market category (2.62
vs. 2.56) and in related investments in capital, technology, distribution and training.
Furthermore, they committed more resources than joint ventures in maintaining excess
employment levels and fewer resources in maintaining control over their foreign
subsidiary.
Table 5.12 Descriptive statistics Adjustment measures taken by companies according to entry mode
Acquisition Joint Venture Greenfield
Internal organisation M S.D M S.D M S.D
Providing independence to the subsidiary 2.40 0.49 2.58 0.50 2.35 0.48
Product market
Establish new production facilities 2.56 0.49 2.38 0.49 2.54 0,50
Buy new equipment 2.60 0.49 2.54 0.50 2.41 0.50
Upgrade existing products 2.56 0.49 2.74 0.44 2.80 0.40
Export to new markets 2.71 0.45 2.51 0.50 1.87 0.92
Develop new products 2.65 0.48 2.61 0.49 2.64 0.48
Labour markets
Maintaining excess employment 2.55 0,56 2.48 0.50 2.48 0.50
Investment
Capital investment programme 2.58 0.49 2.35 0.48 2.35 0.48
Invest in establishing distribution network 2.65 0.48 2.64 0.48 2.64 0.48
Training 2.65 0.48 2.64 0.48 2.64 0.48
New Technology 2.65 0.48 2.58 0.50 2.61 0.49
Dummy variables ranging from 1; no resource commitment, 2; low resource commitment, 3; high resource
commitment; 4 very high resource commitment
A first look at the descriptive statistics for the greenfields, we can see that they have
committed less- resources than joint ventures and acquisition, for maintaining control
over their subsidiaries. Greenfields have committed the same amount of resources with
joint ventures for maintaining the excess labour force, but less than the amount of
resources that acquired companies did. Regarding the product market category,
greenfields have committed less- resources on the average (2.45) than acquisitions and
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joint ventures. Regarding the investment category, greenfields have invested slightly
more resources than joint ventures but less that acquired companies.
Joint ventures have a higher costs associated with control (internal organisation variable)
due to co-ordination problems between parent companies, and because of the risk of
unintended knowledge leakage. Both acquisitions and joint ventures have high control
costs compared to greenfield. Acquisitions must integrate two different sets of
organisational cultures, management philosophies, and institutionalised procedures. Joint
ventures have to manage the complexities of a three- way interdependency among two
parents and a subsidiary.
5.6 Examining the Performance of the Greek Affiliates in the Balkans
Despite the increased importance of transition markets, studies analysing the overall
business performance of Western companies in these markets have been almost non¬
existent.21' The results of the existing studies indicate that the performance has in all
studies been perhaps surprisingly good, taking into account the turbulent environment in
most of the countries. It is noteworthy that performance has not been the major focus of
these studies and unfortunately there has not been any focus on the contributing factors to
performance. For that purpose, in our research, we analyse the direct relation of
profitability to the entry mode.
In the study of and Woodcock et al. (1994) and Nitsch et al. (1996), their hierarchical
propositions regarding the relationship between the choice of entry mode and
performance were based on the existing literature, thus, in our analysis we based on the
above-mentioned study, therefore we are develop a similar hierarchical set of
propositions to examine the operating profitability of the Greek companies. Nitsch et al.
(1996) and Woodcock et al. (1994) proposed that greenfield will perform better that joint
ventures and acquisitions, and joint ventures will perform better than acquisitions.
20
As an example of survey studies where performance-related questions have been discussed in companies
in transition, the surveys reported in the studies by Hirvensalo (1993), Benito and Welch (1994), Shaukat
(1996, 1997) and Shama (1995) can be mentioned.
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Revenue performance can reflect the advantages of companies' reflection and adaptation
to the new market environment. In inflationary periods, data on profitability are highly
distorted and are a poor guide as to the viability of the companies. However, even when
data does not suffer from an inflationary bias it should be regarded as suspect.21 In order
to avoid any possible bias on profitability, we asked the managers to provide subjective
answers. Although they did not provide the actual financial figures, a dichotomous
variable -profit or loss- was employed to capture differences in the profitability ofGreek
77
companies in the region. This financial performance measurement, although limited,
represents the only information investors are willing to provide given their very private
23
nature." The measure has the virtue of being comparable across host countries and
companies, since respondents were all from Greece, and were at similar levels in the their
Managers of Greek subsidiaries in the Balkans frequently provided false data in an effort to reduce tax-
liabilities since tax- collection systems in the Balkans were not fully effective. They are also sensitive to
Balkan cross- country differences in accounting methods, making comparability much more difficult.
Furthermore, we must recognise the significant downward pressure that the early stages of transition put on
revenues.
~2 The most obvious indicator of performance is profitability (Frydman et al. 1997, Boubakri et al. 1997,
Brada 1998, Claessens 1997 et al., Pohl et al. 1997). Pohl et al. 1997 characterise restructuring as a
complex and continual process to maintain profitability in the face of a changing economic environment,
technological progress and competition from other companies. By this definition, restructuring is closely
related to a company's flexibility in adapting its business strategies to new challenges. Researchers argue
that profit is a main objective of business organisations and therefore profit can be regarded as a primary
indicator of effective performance. Profitability has been often used as a proxy for restructuring: a company
that attains or maintains profitability is implied to have taken the necessary steps to restructure (Djankov
and Floekman 1997:2). Profit represents the difference between the revenues with the costs of producing
them. This necessitates a combination of entrepreneurial creativity (making and selling the product) with
discipline (keeping the cost of production down). There is a tendency among analysts of the behaviour of
transition companies to regard profitability as an indication of the extent to which a company is adjusting
towards competitive market behaviour; loss- makers tend to be thought of as not having adjusted
sufficiently (Pinto et al. 1993).
We used subjective performance measures for three reasons. First, companies tend to be unwilling to
supply objective measures for specific countries entered, but are more willing to provide subjective
performance measures (Woodcock et al. 1994). Second, because our sample is cross national, reconciling
cross national differences in accounting practices, variations in exchange rates and financial reporting make
cross national comparisons of quantitative financial performance very difficult. Last, in several previous
studies (Geringer and Hebert 1991) researchers found that objective performance measures correlate well
with subjective performance measures. Thus, by using subjective performance measures little information
is lost.
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organisations.24 Last but not least, by examining the companies' average operating
profitability over time, we can measure the extent of restructuring- adjustment as well.23
In the earlier phase of defensive restructuring, focused on labour shedding and adjustment
in output of the initial product mix, employment and sales were pertinent indicators.
Profitability indicators became more appropriate during or after strategic restructuring,
when new accounting systems corresponding to international standards were adopted, the
organisational structure and managerial personnel were changed, investment in product
and process innovation began to bear fruit, and the effects of greater domestic and foreign
competition were felt. Since our variables are orientated towards the effects of strategic
restructuring, thus we believe that our decision to use profitability measures is justified to
this extent (Djankov and Murrell 2000). In addition, FDI would normally be undertaken
to secure profits. Therefore, profits are the reward for incurring greater risks in a foreign
country.
We further examine if a statistically significant relationship exists between entry mode
and performance in each subset of the data. The Pearson Chi- squared is often used with
categorical variables, employing a frequency table to test the differences between
predicted and observed occurrences. From a cross tabulation analysis between pairs of
modes, the Pearson Chi- squared was used to test any significance of the proportion of
profitable to unprofitable companies for paired modes of entry, i.e. acquisitions vs.
greenfield, greenfield vs. joint ventures, joint ventures vs. acquisitions.
When investigating the relationship between performance and entry mode, one must
consider the effects of entry age. The internationalisation literature has shown that entry
into a new international market requires a learning period over which entering companies
established themselves (Cardozo et al. 1989, Forsgren 1989, Johanson and Vahlne 1977,
24 The use of subjective, perceptual measures of performance is well supported in the literature, and has
been shown to be highly correlated with objective, accounting- based measures (Geringer and Hebert
1991). The use of a single measure to operationalise a multi- dimensional construct is justified.
Changes in operating profitability reflect a large number of restructuring measures. Labour
rationalisation, adjustment of input uses to reflect new relative prices, the movement of resources toward
higher productivity units, product quality, higher sales revenue, utilisation of better production processes
and equipment etc (Claessens et al. 1997). In measuring these changes, we use operating profit margins
rather than net profitability. The difference is in accounting for interest and other financial charges and
depreciation. Given the often- arbitrary allocation of liabilities, the inclusion of these variables could
introduce unnecessary noise in measuring company restructuring (Djankov and Pohl 1998: 80).
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Johanson and Wiedersheim Paul 1975). During this start- up period, performance is
depressed because a new entrant is trying to establish market penetration and achieve
economies of scale and scope. During this period of establishment, financial performance
may be poor and unstable. For instance, new entrants require time to adjust to new
markets, new organisational processes and systems, or new competitive factors in the
new market mentioned above. Because of the tendency for new subsidiaries to take some
time before their performance stabilises, this study follows Woodcock et al. (1994) in
analysing only those subsidiaries which are at least two years old at the time of data
collection. Thus in our sample we have included only Greek companies that have made
an investment in the Balkans no later than 1999.
In the last section of chapter ten we will examine causality of performance. We are
interested in the coefficients P's for the different independent variables. Again, we use
the same 11 variables that we have defined and analysed in section 5.5.1. We run a
simple regression of the following form: Performance = a + b X, where X is a vector
including measures of restructuring. For the estimation of the dependent variable Profit a
dichotomous dummy variable - profit (1) or loss (0)- was employed to capture
differences in the profitability of Greek companies in the region. We report the results of
1 1 regressions for joint ventures, acquisitions and greenfields with one performance
variable. Our intention is to examine whether and how the resources provided by the
Greek companies will assist the transformation of the local affiliates and contribute,
positively to performance. Our theoretical model based on Teece (1982) that the higher
the resource commitments ofone particular mode ofentry, the harder it is for a company
to recoup its investment and to make a profit suggests that factors modify the transactions
costs related to the resources commitment in the Balkans and controlling the new
organisational entity, which in turn affects mode performance. The extent to which
companies commit themselves to the Balkan market is expected to have an impact on
company performance. Reaching success in foreign markets usually demands continuous
and committed operation in the market to build the needed distributor and customer
networks, customer loyalty, etc.
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5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we provided the link between the literature, that was reviewed in chapter
two, and the variables employed in our research, and we explained the approach and
hypotheses for the achievement of the objectives described and analysed in chapter one.
The theoretical framework integrating the resource based theoretical approach, which
examines inter- alia ownership resource requirements, and the transaction costs approach,
which involves examining variables relating to internalisation control and resources
costs, will be applied in order to empirically examine the strategic aspects of the
internationalisation process of the Greek companies in the Balkans, i.e. the
internationalisation decision itself; the entry mode strategies; company restructuring in




FDI and Greek Companies' Internationalisation Strategies in the
Balkans
6.1 Introduction
Greek FDI is a quite recent phenomenon and it concerns almost exclusively the
expansion of Greek companies in the Balkans, and to a lesser extent in the CEE
countries. After the dramatic changes that took place in Balkans, there is increased
business activity by Greek companies in these countries.
Greece was confronted in the post WWII period with an unfavourable situation not
found anywhere else in Europe. The situation results from the interaction of a distant
location in South-eastern Europe, away from major markets, and distorted economic
relations as the northern borders of the country were, due to the post war realities, real
barriers to trade with neighbouring countries. These conditions generated an overall
unfavourable index of geographic location within the post- war European space, with
serious implications for the economic structure and performance of the country. The
isolation and distance from the European core and the EU members implied in general
limited accessibility of domestic products to large foreign markets.1
Because of the above-mentioned conditions, the trade relations of Greece took
necessarily, an inter- industry character with more advanced countries of Western
Europe, with serious impact on the industrial structure of the country. Trade theory
' Greece lost significant markets in the 1970s, due to limited accessibility to European markets and no
significant economic relations with neighbouring countries. These events explain some aspects of the
Greek economic performance during the last decades. Distance and the missing factor in trade relations
may explain why the dynamism of the economy in the 1950s- 60s was exhausted afterwards, or why the
public sector in the 1970s- 80s became so popular, so large. As export- led growth was not possible due to
limited accessible markets and the predominantly inter- industry structure of trade, the industrial sector
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indicates that trade with neighbouring countries is more intensive and usually takes an
intra- industry character, implying greater room for more industries to develop, as
international specialisations are not mutually exclusive and the division of labour takes
place within and not between sectors (Grimwade 1989). Therefore, the lack of trade
relations with other Balkan countries pushed Greece further towards an industry type of
specialisation with the technologically more advanced western European countries.
A characteristic of the post- war period in the Balkans was a strong reliance on
economies of scale and scope and a strong preference to huge industrial plants and mass
production. Although this reliance on large scale SOEs was a reasonable outcome of the
international division of labour within the Soviet bloc, it is perhaps a historic accident
that it gathered momentum at a time when the model of mass production and the Fordist-
Taylorist types of industrial organisation and growth strategies were in serious crisis and
openly questioned in the West.2
Greece has practically never followed the Fordist mode of large- scale mass production,
maintaining the smaller average industrial company size in Europe. On the other hand,
the Balkans experienced an industrial structure based on extremely large company sizes,
even by western standards,3 and they followed an industrialisation strategy that put a
strong emphasis on the development of heavy industry. This led to a total neglect of the
light, consumer orientated industry and the tertiary sector, failing to develop
unavoidably took an inward looking character, became more fragmented, less efficient and of course
smaller, leaving to the public sector the principal responsibility to absorb the expanding labour force.
While in the 1980s post- Fordist strategies of industrial restructuring and development emphasising
flexibility were discussed or even implemented in the west, in the Balkans, mass production and vertical
division of labour were the dominant trends contributing to the bottlenecks, the inefficiency, the failure and
the eventual collapse of the system.
3 The average industrial company size in Bulgaria was in 1990 close to 500 employees per company while
47% of the industrial companies employed more than 100 employees in 1993. In Romania the situation is
similar; the average employment was found greater than 2000 employees per company (Jackson 1996).
Even in Albania the average company size ranged in 1992 from 20 to 80 employees per company. For
comparison, in the EU only 2.1% of the industrial companies employ more than 100 employees, while the
average employment is 18 employees per company (Petrakos 1996).
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specialisations and branches critical for the development of a modern economy (Petrakos
and Christodoulakis 1997, 1999).
The Greek perspective in the Balkans is unique. Greece is the only country in the region,
which belongs to the EU. The changes in the Balkans have made a great impact on
Greece. Balkans is a region of hope, but finds itself also in turmoil. The transition of
most of the Balkan countries to market economies opened up a new era of collaboration
and of mutually beneficial economic relations between Greece and the Balkans. The
opening of the Balkan markets does not only provides a market opportunity for the
Greek companies to expand abroad either through FDI and- or exports. It also provides
the opportunity that many Greek companies were looking for in the production sphere in
order to be able to compete in the new competition as defined by Best (1990).4
6.2 Characteristics of the Greek Companies in the Balkans
Greek companies are well suited to doing business in the region. They are used to
dealing with heavy handed and arbitrary bureaucracy. They have experience in dealing
with backward banking systems and until recently, they have worked in a high inflation,
high interest rate environment with a weak and depreciating currency. They know how to
manipulate, manoeuvre and hedge to overcome such problems in ways their Western
European and North American counterparts often do not. The problems are nonetheless
difficult, even for them.
What is remarkable is that Greece used to be a host to FDI rather than an outward
investing country (Rizopoulos 2001). The main vehicles of FDI are, of course, large
multinationals. Whilst they still tend to dominate this process, the pattern seems to be
changing. The greater flexibility afforded by globalisation and, in particular, the diversity
of products and processes, now allows smaller companies to engage in FDI activity,
4
The new global competitive environment is a result of technological advancements and fundamental
organisational changes that demand new corporate structures to be able to produce quality products at low
cost and adjust at a fast pace to the differentiated demands and trends of the global marketplace.
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provided these companies have certain ownership advantages. Such companies do not,
necessarily, require a very large size before they can expand their operations abroad and
Greek multinationals tend to fall in this category. Greek SMEs may have technological,
organisational, financial competitive advantages compared to the Balkan companies, but
disadvantages compared to other Greek companies in their domestic market. FDI in the
Balkan markets enables these companies to take advantage of their ownership specific
assets, while mobilising entry barriers for latter entrants. Furthermore, the presence of
strategic western investors familiar with the region is limited. The local assets are small
to medium size and it is too costly and inefficient for the Western investors to invest in
the Balkans. Greek investors on the contrary are more able to respond in a speedy
manner to a business opportunity due to their familiarity with the markets.
A characteristic of companies expanding in the Balkans is that they have significant
proprietary rights in technology and patents, resulting from their R&D effort. Whilst
some of these projects are still at the initial stage, they represent commitments, which
will materialise in the next few years.3 There are a number of companies, such as
Intracom, OTE, and Delta, with considerable proprietary rights in technology and
marketing, which on the basis of the earlier theoretical discussion of the underpinnings
of FDI, have made them expanding their operations in the Balkans. For others, such as
the Vardinoyannis group, the desire to invest in the Balkans reflects the
complementarities of their operations in Greece but also the degree of diversification of
their operations. This corresponds with the earlier discussion, regarding the changing
nature of multinationals on account of the greater flexibility and diversity of products
and processes.
3 The list is dominated by the purchase by OTE of Serbia Telecom. The Mytilinaios investment is also part
of a large strategic alliance with the Yugoslav state-controlled company Trepca, as well as mining
companies in Bulgaria, Hungary, FYROM and, recently, Albania for the utilisation of mines of lead,
copper and zinc in addition to iron ores for steel production.
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It would appear that in terms of the earlier theoretical discussion a number of different
approaches could explain Greek outward FDI. The monopoly power hypothesis applies
to a number of Greek investing companies, which tend to dominate their respective
industries (Intracom, Hellenic Bottling, Petzetakis, OTE), and wish to exploit more fully
company specific advantages, resulting from their technology. The Greek food and
beverages companies investing in the Balkans possess Hymer type advantages, in the
form of advanced technological, management and marketing techniques and location
type advantages, emanating from the strategic geographical positioning of Greece and
differences in the prices of factors of production.
The above categories of Greek companies have discovered new opportunities for
expansion. First, companies facing barriers to growth in their present markets due to
saturation or intense competition could move onto a new growth path. Second, Greek
international companies in oligopolistic industries such as telecommunications, banking
and mining, invested in accordance with their strategic positioning vis-a-vis their
international competitors. Dominated companies could see new markets as an
opportunity to gain competitive advantage. Companies established in Greece, the
Balkans and the Western Europe were in a superior position to exploit opportunities of
price discrimination, product differentiation or vertical integration. In industries with
major network externalities such as banking and financial services, presence in the
region is necessary for European competitiveness. Therefore, for these Greek companies
the question of entry becomes a how and when rather than whether.
From the data at table 6.1, the large sized Greek companies6 (34 companies) that have
invested in the Balkans are subsidiaries of multinationals, owned by Greek owners (4
companies), and they are responsible for the business activities of their parent companies
in Greece and in the regional Balkan markets.7 They are assigned by their parent
c'
Companies that have invested more than US$ 10 million in their affiliates in the Balkans
7
Examples of this category are Hellenic Bottling the Greek partner of Coca- Cola and Athens Breweries,
the Greek subsidiary of the Dutch brewer Heineken.
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companies the task ofpenetrating the Balkans since this is a rather small regional market
and therefore of no direct interest to the parent companies. Yet, the Greek affiliates can
benefit from economies of scale in distribution and production. Furthermore, the Balkan
markets are characterised by high informal business barriers, in which Greek companies
are equipped with the experience of the Greek market to operate in such risky
environments. In addition, large sized Greek companies in the Balkans belong to
companies in Greece that they have foreign capital in their financial structure (12
companies). Twenty-six large companies operating in the Balkans had previously
strengthened their positions through the Stock Exchange (14 companies) or through a
process ofmergers and acquisitions (12 companies).9
It should not surprise us that MNEs have chosen to enter the Balkans through their
Greek partners. By doing so, they avail themselves of the cost advantages and the related
cost containment expertise, which are integral to the Greek activity in the region. The
small Balkan markets, with low purchasing power, and a weak infrastructure enhance the
attractiveness of the Greek partner for the MNE. But even in a more stable environment,
the skills residing within the Greek companies would have been attractive to MNEs
striving to execute global strategies while maintaining adaptability, which is
continuously threatened by the scale and range of operations that these same strategies
require.
8
Examples of this latter case are Delta and Chipita, from the French Danone the former and the US
Pepsico the latter.
9
Example of this case is Delta, a survivor of the intensely competitive food and drinks Greek sector,
became one of the first Greek multinationals. Despite not having invested in manufacturing operations
abroad before, it was one of the first companies to make the decision to invest in the Balkan markets.
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Table 6.1 Classification of large size Greek companies (number of companies in parenthesis)
Subsidiaries of foreign multinationals (4) Foreign participation in capital structure (12)
Food and Beverages (2)
Construction Materials (1)
Financial Services (1)






Companies in above two categories from table 6.1 possess distinct ownership
advantages. These include superior technology and management techniques and local
market experience established with trade links. According to their managers, these skills
allow them to expand with confidence into countries with unstable political and
economic environments. Through the expansion they seek either seek new market
opportunities for our mature or technologically standardised products. In addition, as
these managers have reported they intend to take advantage of creative local factors of
production and introduce new products designed for the regional needs and incomes.
These companies therefore follow either market or strategic asset seeking strategies or a
combination of both strategies.
In order to realise all these investment projects, Greek companies in the region must
enjoy certain ownership advantages towards the host country companies in order to be
competitive. The main ownership advantages of Greek companies in the Balkans
towards the host country companies are that they have substantial capital, established
relations with the western markets, parent companies originating from an EU member
state and management with experience in operation both in a market economy (EU) and
a heavily bureaucratic Greek market. Greek investment projects will retain the above-
mentioned monopolistic advantages only for a short period of time. It will only be a
matter of a few years until local companies develop similar skills themselves. As for the
main monopolistic advantages of Greek companies in the Balkans towards western
companies these are first, knowledge of working in an unstable environment. In fact,
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western companies due to the economic and social instability in the countries where
Greek investment projects have been established, have maintained a wait and see
attitude.10 The second advantage is the geographic proximity.
6.2.1 Stages of the Greek FDI in the Balkans
The Greek FDI in the Balkans is divided into three chronological periods. This phased
process was not shaped and conditioned by the local market structures, as we will
explain in this section.
This first period is characterised by what we would like to call uninformed optimism.
The profitability was mostly driven by the skewed implementation of international trade
rules and the link-up of Greece with the local economy networks." Chronologically this
period is from 1989-93.
The first period was characterised by the fast entry of many small companies, mainly
subcontractors to W. European and Greek companies, aiming to make a fast prof t. There
is a number of small companies (24 companies) with FDI activities in the Balkans, many
of which are mainly subcontracting companies. According to the managers of the above
companies, perhaps the most pronounced bias was their short- term approach. They
thought they could step into the Balkan markets quickly based primarily on supplies
imported from the parent company in Greece, then exit, hopefully having made a quick
10
According to the president ofNorthern Greece Industrial Association the invested funds in the CEE and
in the Balkans since 1990 are 145 billion dollars. The funds directed only to the Balkan markets are only
13% of the total funds invested in all Eastern European economies. To reinforce the argument about the
absence of big US and EU investors in the Balkans, just consider the fact that 2%-5% of the world's FDI
funds is invested in the transitional markets in Europe, and specifically in the Balkans is only 0.25%-
0.56%. It is now clear that there are still many investment opportunities for the Greek companies, given the
absence of major US and other EU investors. Greek companies have already invested 15% of all the
recorded funds in the Balkans.
" This situation created the impression of a promising market, which attracted a number of SMEs. Their
efforts concentrated on basic consumer goods, usually of poor quality, and quick returns on minimal
capital invested. This category of companies includes companies involved in the production of labour
intensive goods, with a fragile comparative advantage in the Greek market, which simply detect
opportunities for both survival and expansion in the Balkans that are sources of cheap labour.
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profit on the operation. Serving foreigners paying in hard currency was the special case
of such a strategy. The main limitation of this approach is that they did not consider the
exit barriers as well as that their withdrawal from the joint venture could cause problems
in production.'""
Twelve Greek companies (3 food companies, 7 textile companies, and 2 furniture
companies) that invested in the first period, reported that they were not interested about
the local demand for their products, although this period corresponded to the Balkan's
early consumer period when consumers used up a large part of their savings for a quick
improvement in their standards of living. Furthermore, the same companies reported that
they did not take full advantage of the investment opportunities, therefore they did not
influence consumers' attitude towards their products. Instead, they were more interested
to take advantage of the low cost of production and low labour costs, therefore export
their products back in Greece and W. Europe than serving the domestic market. They
monitor very closely the economic environment and they waited the right time to be
domestically active. However, they have a presence in the domestic market but this
market presence reflects mostly their efforts for accurate market information and
opportunities identification. Although this strategy was a feasible solution at that time,
was abandoned in 1994, since they realised that selling their products in the domestic
market is the only competitive factors in the long- run. In the short run there is a real
profit in selling in the West or in Greece products made in the Balkans, in the long run
there is a market which although poor now will be attractive eventually.
The second period is characterised by a more active investment from Greek companies,
moving from small production units serving primarily exports, to the development of
bigger production units. Chronologically this period is from 1994-97. During the second
The reason is that many companies after the initial investment, particularly in textile and clothing, invest
substantial amount ofmoney as well as transfer part of their production process in the Balkans, weakening
their production capacity and competitive edge in Greece, leaving local competitors to take advantage of
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period, a decreased consumer capacity of the market was observed. According to the
opinion of the managers of sixteen Greek companies (10 food and beverages companies,
3 construction materials companies, 3 tobacco companies) investing in that period, the
early entrants saw their profit margins shrink, while the local institutional framework in
place started to have some tangible effects on the operation of the grey economy. The
managers of eight companies (7 textile companies and 1 furniture company) that
operated as subcontractors in the first period reported that they are now investing more
money in production units, and they are using their established network and business
contacts to promote the products and business activities of other Greek companies that
now investing in the region. This is the time of the establishment of the first business
clusters. These business clusters initiated a cycle or restructuring, by sharing
information, business contacts, and creating direct and indirect links between them. The
negative connotations of the first period of quick profit mentality of the Greek investors
have left a deep mark in the local markets, therefore creating prejudices and problems to
the operation of the existing Greek investors, to the extent that they do not take the
speculative approach of their pioneering peers.
The strategy of Greek companies in the Balkans in the first two periods has responded to
two different objectives. The first objective is to improve the price competitiveness of
production, the second, to take advantage of potential domestic markets. In the early
phase of liberalisation, the first objective prevailed and industrial co-operation took
mainly the form of subcontracting production to small subsidiaries with lower labour
costs in order to export back to Greece or other foreign markets that they previously used
to serve from Greece via exports.13 Efficiency or asset-seeking motives seem to
influence Greek FDI decisions at this initial phase of their Balkan expansion. Indeed,
from the 44 companies that invested in the Balkans to take advantage of the lower costs
their absence. Therefore, a withdrawal from the Balkan markets and re- establishment in Greece was not
always feasible.
'J These subcontracting agreements can be characterised as subcontracting of quantity, rather than
subcontracting ofquality, since their major target was to minimise further the production costs.
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of production, 9 companies reported that at their first stage of investment they were
subcontracting to local partners one stage of the production process, 12 at least two
stages of the production process and 23 more than 3 stages of the production process.14
Later, satisfying the local markets became a more important component of these
companies' strategies in the Balkans. As a result 15 companies reported that a
considerable percentage of their production in the Balkans that is subcontracted is
orientated for exports back to the Greek or other markets, while 29 of the companies that
used to export back to Greece or other markets, reported that they now produce in the
Balkans either the full or vast majority range of their products to distribute in the
domestic market. A noteworthy point is that 80 companies in our sample reported that
their Balkan subsidiaries did not cause any decrease on the production output in Greece,
and 15 reported that the production output in Greece has increased on the average by
25%.
The investments during the first period and to a less extent during the second period
were not a part of a broader Balkan investment strategy. They were targeting only
investment in a single country, without considering the investment opportunities in the
neighbouring markets. Although, 16 companies that invested in the Balkans in the first
and second stages have invested in more than one site in a country (3 food and beverage
companies and 1 furniture company), or they have invested in developing a distribution
system in a neighbouring country as well (3 tobacco companies, 9 food and beverage
companies) reported that their decision was not a part of their strategy, rather it was a
response to overcome local problems such as supply of raw materials, and poor labour
iJ
Low factor costs attracted companies from Greece that exploit the cost differential through outward
processing. The relocation of production has been important in a number of industries including textiles
and furniture. It gained in relative importance in the mid 1990's as cost-seeking investors were under less
time-pressure than market-seekers. However, many cost-orientated investors were deterred by low
productivity, lack of telecommunication and transportation infrastructure, and bureaucracy. Outward
processing describes the situation in which Greek companies supplied their small affiliate subcontractors in
the Balkans with materials, parts or components to be processed or assembled, and then re-imported into
the Greek or EU afterwards. This enables the Greek companies to take advantage of lower wages and to
reduce production costs. As it did not imply substantial amounts of investment, this form of co-operation
gave the Greek companies flexibility to adjust to a changing economic environment.
162
force. In addition, they have admitted that by not investing in a production unit in
neighbouring countries, the experience that they have accumulated from their present
operations could not be used in enhancing their competitive position in the region.
In the third period the rationalisation of the internationalisation process can be
observed. There are large investing companies with long- term investment projects.
Chronologically this period starts from the second half of 1997 and brings us to the
present. Managers of companies (10 financial service companies, 2 petroleum
companies, 2 pharmaceutical companies, 3 telecommunication companies, 2 tobacco
companies, 13 food and beverages) that invested in the third period expressed the
opinion that one of the major objective was to establish a market presence at any cost,
and not to increase their sales and profits. According to the opinion of their managers
were building upon their reputations, experience and confidence to produce a
competitive advantage for doing business in the Balkans. Their strategy was to be based
upon the benefits of an experience curve over a sustained period, rather than shorter -
term, opportunistic approach. Shaping a future market according to their standards is the
primary consideration. As the market evolves, their companies could pursue the
strategies for sales and profit maximisation. Now the companies have long- term
investment plans and the number of companies that aim in a short-term profit has
substantially declined. The process of the Balkan experience of the Greek companies in
these three stages can be summarised as a process from uninformed optimism to
informed pessimism, and from total despair to informed realism.
6.3 A Qualitative Analysis of Investment Motivations in the Balkans
6.3.1 Analysis of the Market and Cost Factor Motivations in Individual Balkan
Countries
To what extent do the existing theories explain investment in the Balkans where markets
opened up almost overnight, providing unpredicted opportunities for which competitive
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pressures required rapid market entry though FDI?1 ^ In assessing the prospects for FDI.
it is important to consider the motivations of the Greek investors. A number of studies in
transition economies confirm that although there can be four main groups of motives for
FDI in transition economies they are predominately dominated by market seeking
motives (OECD 1994, Paliwoda 1995, Svetlicic and Rojec 1994, EBRD 1994).16
It is difficult to list in order of importance the true motives for Greek investors'
involvement in the Balkans, especially as the situation keeps changing. Flowever,
important differences exist among the Balkan countries. Looking at the findings from
table 6.2, market control and to a lesser extent, low labour costs, seem to be dominant
goals of FDI in the Balkans. Albania attracts investors seeking lower production costs
given that internal market is extremely narrow for reasons of population and living
standards. FYROM is attracting market orientated FDI. Even if the market size is not
very different from that in Albania, the economic growth of the country makes it a more
attractive market than Albania. Although the unfavourable situation in Yugoslavia
impeded the flow of FDI in that country, the democratic reforms in the country are now
offering great market potential. The ten companies that have invested in Yugoslavia
even saw the risks posed by the break up of Yugoslavia as a comparative advantage,
because they deterred foreigner competitors from joining the market. Bulgaria and
15 A substantial body of literature exists to explain the motives for FDI (Buckley and Casson 1976,
Dunning and Rugman 1985, Harrigan 1986, Beamish and Banks 1987, Casson 1987, Dunning 1988,
Hennart 1988, 1991, Terpstra and Yu 1988, Rugman and Verbeke 1992, Lecraw 1992, Paliwoda 1993)
ranging from pre- empting competitors, following competitors, following customers, geographical
diversity, achieving economies of scale, exploiting host government provisions, to utilising outdated
technology etc. These motivations are not specific to FDI into transition economies, but transition is likely
to impact in various ways on the opportunities and constraints involved with FDI and so on the particular
impact on FDI.
16
A study of OECD (1994) shows that motivations have been ranked by 162 companies investing in CEE
as follows: access to large domestic markets, gaining market share, low cost of production, source of raw
materials. Hence, market-seeking motives have a major impact on the investors' interest in CEE. Gatling
(1993) reveals a clear pattern of investors' motivations across all transition countries: to establish a market
share in the host market, tap into regional market, tap into the EU market, and low cost sourcing. Hence,
market- seeking motives have a major impact on the investors' interest in transition economies. Rojec and
Svetlicic (1993), and Meyer (1998) have also evidencing the market- seeking motive as predominant. On
the contrary, Lankes and Venebles (1996) evidenced a tendency towards low- cost seeking investments.
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Romania share common investment characteristics, with market control and expansion
in other regional markets be the dominant goals of FDI.
Table 6.2 Reasons for investing in the Balkans
Albania Bulgaria FYROM Romania Yugoslavia
Mean value Mean value Mean value Mean value Mean value
Establishing market share 2.79 3.63 3.47 3.78 3.50
Tap the regional market 2.65 2.96 2.53 2.69 2.40
Low- cost sourcing 3.26 2.63 2.37 2.72 2.50
Low- cost labour 3.68 2.70 3.00 2.62 3.00
Source: Questionnaire Survey. Concerns are ranked from 1 to 5: 1 being the least important and 5
extremely important.
When investing in a foreign country, investors should consider certain questions. These
questions cover the economic and political situation of the country. If Greek investors
posed these questions in early 1990s, we are sure that the replies would make them not
to invest in the Balkan economies. It may come as a surprise to many, but Greek
investors are as interested in psychology as they are in economics. Seventy-three
managers reported during the interviews that they are interested not only about the GDP
per capita, the rate on inflation, domestic interest rates, the available infrastructure, and
the banking system. To start with, they were interested to know other things: are property
rights protected by the State and by the courts? Is the right legislation in place? Are
people industrious, corrupt, educated? Is it easy to do business there, or does the
bureaucracy stifle everything?
6.3.2 Attractions and Obstacles for Investors in Market and Cost Factor Orientated
Investments
Investors reported the main attractions and obstacles of their investment decisions
separately for market and cost orientated investments. Table 6.3 reports these responses.
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Looking at the chi- square statistics of the attractions and obstacles of the local
environment between market and factor cost projects from table 6.3. the differences of
their mean values are statistically significant, with the exception of the institutional
framework (attractions), and partner and people (obstacles) variables.






M S.D M S.D
Market Attraction 4.26 0.68 2.34 0.48 0.000
Factor Costs 2.26 0.48 3.57 0.50 0.000
Institutional Framework 3.06 0.65 3.06 0.54 0.367
Partner and People 3.02 0.57 2.72 0.62 0.015
Absence ofCompetition 3.37 0.48 2.73 0.45 0.000
Obstacles
M S.D M S.D
Investment Risk 3.46 0.50 3.20 0.41 0.005
Institutional Framework 3.20 0.40 2.66 0.48 0.000
Partner and People 2.95 0.42 3.04 0.48 0.393
Economic Environment 3.23 0.42 2.98 0.40 0.003
Importance of each factor: 1= not at all important, 2= not very important, 3= quite important, 4= very
important, 5- extremely important
Market orientated investments depends on the attraction of the local market, which is
related to demand and the absence of competition, which scores second behind the
market attraction motive. The extent to which Greek companies are willing to invest in
an evolving economy may depend upon the extent to which the state is willing to share
its monopoly.17 Investors take advantage of the unsatisfied demands specific to their
industry. The Balkans had been isolated from world markets and this gave them a virgin
status. Factor cost related arguments were of secondary importance for market
investment.
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Factor cost orientated investment depends, naturally, foremost on labour costs and input
costs.
The oft quoted traditional advantages of the region, such as low labour costs and cheap
resources, though considered in the investment process, do not appear as prime
motivators and are perceived instead as potential short to medium term benefits which,
though attractive, do not form the main basis for long term strategic investment
decisions. The reason that factor- production costs only motivated a small number of
Greek market seeking investors, is the difficulty to get access to OECD markets from
export platforms in emerging economies due to various market entry barriers in the
OECD countries. Market barriers were import quotas such as those in the textile industry
and various non- trade barriers such as quality requirements. In fact, thirteen managers
from the food and beverages industry, argued that it would be extremely difficult for
their companies to export their products to the EU during the first years of operation
simply because the stringent EU health and quality standards could not be met by the
emerging economy production facility.
Interesting to note is the importance attached to the presence of specific business
partners and personal contracts in the market project category as a fourth attraction to the
Balkans. This includes prior contracts to future venture partners that are based upon
existing trading relationships as well as personal contacts.
The most frequently reported obstacles to investment in both categories relate to the high
investment risks in the region. Risks associated with the institutional framework and the
volatile economy appear to be more important in the market projects category than the
factor projects category. This reflects the slow progress in establishing the institutional
17 When domestic output declines the absolute size of the state monopoly correspondingly shrinks.
Therefore, the share becomes smaller, reducing the probability of attracting large foreign investors.
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framework that guarantees the functioning of a market economy. For the efficiency
seeking investors, the inefficiencies of the institutional framework reflect the inefficient
labour laws that significantly affect the working conditions and relationships of the
labour force with the new owners.
Twenty-eight managers from companies in the market projects category indicated a
variety of instances where problems had been encountered with official obstruction and
protracted and complex negotiations with the authorities. This was a result of difficulties
in finding the decision makers and reluctance on the part of decision makers to accept
responsibility. There have also been frequent changes in the legal framework and of
individuals in authority resulting timetable setbacks, as well as inconsistency in views
between decision makers and frequent changes in policy and direction.
6.3.3 Analysis of the Corporate Motives for Investing in the Balkan Countries
In table 6.4, the companies in the sample were asked to rank the motives for their
investment in the Balkans classified into aggressive and defensive motives. Although the
motives enumerated in table 6.4 are extremely varied, the majority of the motives fall
within the aggressive category. This shows that many of the companies invested in the
Balkans in order to exploit either a present or an anticipated opportunity more effectively
than was possible with exports or a different form of industrial co-operation.
On the five- point Likert scale used to identify the importance of the motives for
investing in the Balkans, the motives in table 6.4, had a mean of greater than two (not
very important), but less than four (very important). The motives that cited as being
quite important are market opportunities in the Balkans, to gain first mover advantages-
establish market share, to obtain a superior profit, comparative labour costs advantage,
to protect existing markets, to increase their competition in Greek and/or international
market, because offull capacity at home, utilise technological knowledge. The emphasis,
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which investors (122 companies in the FDI category) have placed on market
opportunities, prompts the conclusion that political and business risks have not been a
major obstacle to investing in the Balkans. The motives cited as being not very
important are to create an export base for countries in Western and Eastern Europe, to
follow customers, comparative material cost advantage and sourcing, and
diversification ofrisk.
Table 6.4 Motives for investing in the Balkans.
Motives Mean success rating Standard Deviation
Aggressive
A. Market induced
1 Market opportunities in the Balkans 3.38 1.13
2. To create an export base for countries in W. Europe 2.99 0.73
3. To create an export base for countries in E. Europe 2.30 0.80
4. To gain first mover advantages- establish market share 3.36 0.91
B. Company induced
1. To follow customers 2.29 0.93
2. Comparative material cost advantage 2.69 0.58
3. To obtain a superior profit 3.44 0.72
4. Comparative labour costs advantage 3.00 0.73
5. Source of raw materials 2.94 0.71
Defensive
A. Market induced
1. To protect existing markets 3.02 0.64
2. To increase their competitive position in Greek and/or international
market
3.18 0.63
3. Because of full capacity at home 3.04 0.79
B. Company induced
1. Diversification of risk 2.44 0.81
2, Utilise technological knowledge 3.15 0.63
Friedman's ANOVA Chi- square 323.55, Significance 0.0000
Source: Questionnaire survey. Importance of each factor: 1= not at all important, 2= not very important,
3= quite important, 4= very important, 5= extremely important.18
18
In the above table, since we used several variables in ordinal scale, these variables represent related
samples in mean- comparison test, i.e. the rank of one variable necessarily affects the ranks of other
variables. Therefore, Friedman test, a non-parametric test comparing the distribution of several related
variables, was used. Friedman's two way ANOVA test examine the null hypotheses that the scores in each
topic come from the same population. Referring to the results in the above table, Friedman's test was
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Among the market- induced aggressive motives, the largest single group of replies
concentrates on the need to explore market opportunities in the Balkans. Companies
interested in servicing foreign markets are expected to use a selective strategy and favour
entry into more attractive markets. This is because their chances of obtaining higher
returns are better in such markets. Therefore, the future higher profit rates, is a strong
motivation factor for companies expanding into Balkans as we can see from table 6.4.
The attractiveness of a market has been characterised in terms of its market potential and
investment risk. Market potential has been found to be an important determinant of
investment in the Balkans. Manufacturers responded to the opportunity of exploring a
virtually untapped market bigger than Greece. This is because their chances of obtaining
higher returns arc better in such markets
Greek managers explained that although the business environment in the Balkans has
improved, still many European and American companies prefer to maintain a hold
position. According to the president of the Federation of Greek Foodstuffs Industries
'when the Europeans and the Americans read about investments in Albania or FYROM,
they think about some people who have opened up a store there or have purchased a few
trucks. As they put it eloquently: But to set up a factory? The madman to do that has yet
to be found'.
Market- orientated strategy is one of the main strategies adopted by Greek companies
investing in the Balkans as it was reported in table 6.4. As we can see from table 6.4, this
is not only due to the market opportunities of the national markets but also because the
Balkans can be used as a base from which to obtain access to neighbouring markets. The
main aim of the investments is to provide access to the host countries' (market seeking
investment), and sometimes also to the neighbouring countries' market (market seeking
and efficiency seeking investment). The aim is to use the Balkans as the base with a core
highly significant for all groups of variables (p<0.0000). These results enable us to reject the null
hypotheses and to conclude that the differences in the ranking of the variables were substantial.
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strategy of backwardly integrating using the low cost countries as the value- added centre
and more affluent purchasing countries as the distribution points. The low factor costs of
production enable companies to produce in the Balkans in order to export to foreign
markets. This strategy leads companies to produce in the Balkans in order to sell in the
Balkans or other CEE and EU markets. All the market seeking investment projects
initially have focused only on local markets. At the time when the national markets
could absorb the supply of the Balkan affiliates, the affiliates increased their productivity
and start exporting to other affiliates in the investors' international network. Balkans are
regarded a production and export platform to third markets. This strategy can be related
to the defensive market induced motive for investing in the Balkans, that is the limited
growth potential of the Greek market.
Greek managers believe that the companies in the region, although badly hit by the
disintegration of the CMEA system, still have the potential of recovering the former
economic relations within the region, including the former Soviet Union states. They
also offer manufacturing and labour capacities for lower product selling prices, ensuring
higher profit gains for the investors. Consequently, Greek companies can enter these
third markets with low price strategy combined with world standard products.
Companies implementing these strategies need not only the technological, marketing and
financial capabilities, but also the will to invest in the Balkans. As we can see from table
6.4, the need to protect existing markets and to increase the competitive position in the
Greek and/ or in the international markets, scores highly among the motives of the Greek
investors. It was argued by the Greek managers that all Greek export companies are
facing world competition in their industries, so they try to enter the Balkan market either
on their own initiative to keep up with competitors, or to prevent others from entering
the market. The majority of Greek investors (as this is demonstrated by the mean value
of the market opportunities in the Balkans motive in table 6.4) are trying to End
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opportunities for growth in a newly- opened market where competition may be less
efficient.
Markets in the Balkans are attractive for many Greek companies. According to the
opinion of the Greek managers consumers in these markets had no access to many
products that are readily available to consumers at similar levels of per capita income in
other parts of the word. The attraction of the markets arises from the catch up demand to
western levels of consumption and the expectation of sustainable economic growth.
Trade liberalization unleashed a catch-up demand, especially for consumer durables for
which West European markets are saturated.
Greek investors believe that the Balkans have the potential to achieve sustainable growth
rates with growing markets, as the Balkan countries will eventually narrow the gap with
Western Europe. This will be the result of liberalisation, stabilisation and prospective
integration into the EU market. During the interviews many Greek managers express the
opinion that they expect considerable long-term growth of demand, especially as the
income of the middle class, their prime customers, grows faster than the average
measured by GDP.
FD1 to developed countries is mostly market seeking in nature. Efficiency or natural
resources seeking FD1 flows are usually orientated to developing countries (Brouthers et
al. 1996, Narula 1994). Ffowever, from the data in tables 6.2 and 6.4 we can oppose the
suggestions of the two former scholars, since in our case the highest score among the
different factors motivating FD1 in the Balkans is mostly market seeking.19 Although
19 Lankes and Venables (1996) and Lankes and Stern (1998) have noted that previous studies have shown
predominance of market seeking investors in CEE countries and factor cost considerations appeared to be
of less importance for the majority of investments. Results of a multinomial logistic regression analysis
suggested that market seeking investors are interested in making use of first mover advantage while
efficiency seeking investors postpone their projects until the risk level is acceptable to them (Lankes and
Stern 1998). Results of a survey that was carried out by EBRD showed also that market seeking
investments are dominating in these countries. This has also been reported in the large number of surveys
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from our data analysis, market- seeking FDI is scoring high, yet cost factor motives are
also important, as we can see from table 6.4.
Economic theory of location suggests that substantial FDI would enter the emerging
markets in search of lower costs (Ozawa 1979, 1992). The importance placed on cheap
labour and resources in table 6.4 indicates FDI that would take advantage of factor cost
differentials. Indeed, in table 5.3, 78 companies (64% of the companies) were classified
as market orientated companies, and 44 companies (36% of the companies) were
classified as resource orientated companies.
From the results in table 6.4, we can say that a production- orientated strategy is the
second major type for Greek companies because the Balkans offer low cost of
production. Dunning (1981) suggests that early FDI tends to be resource- orientated, at
first towards raw materials, later in using cheap labour. The Balkan markets are at an
early stage of this process in that they possess mainly natural assets and low cost labour
with some assets such as technological expertise in selected areas. In this situation, FDI
can emerge as a consequence of developmental adjustment process. The evolution of
locational advantages and especially of comparative cost advantages creates the
environmental conditions that favour low cost orientated FDI in the Balkans.
Efficiency seeking investors are interested in taking advantage of low production costs
for increasing the efficiency of regional or international activities. They can produce
either components or final products to be exported back to Greece or other countries.
According to this strategy companies relocate production, which is often labour-
intensive and low tech, such as textile and furniture companies, and many consumption
conducted among foreign companies investing in transition economies (Meyer 1998, Pye 1998, OECD
1995, Kogut 1996, Lankes and Venables 1996).
20 Our results are very similar to the findings of an EBRD report in 2000, regarding the importance for
market opportunities, labour, however, they are slightly different regarding the access to raw materials
variable. In our data, this variable is higher (2.94%) compared to the findings (2.27%) of the EBRD
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goods companies such as food and beverage companies. According to nine managers in
the textile companies and four managers in furniture companies this type of strategy does
not aim at obtaining access to the national market, at least not directly, and production
obtained in the Balkans is then mostly exported to more developed countries of West
and East Europe. By moving production processes using medium level technical skills to
the Balkans, FD1 facilitated the enhancement of efficiency in the local production.
However, a common complain on behalf of all the Greek managers is that productivity is
often low despite the workforce being well qualified. In many occasions the old
production equipment and slow pace of production diminished any capital gains that
resulted from low labour and resource costs. Furthermore, companies that reported
labour costs as a primary reason for investment reported that they have a production
process that is highly labour intensive because low productivity, and the traditional boost
in wages quickly wipe out significant wage cost advantages. Although the unit labour
costs have risen substantially, they are still significantly below West European,
especially Greek levels.21 In general, investors are concerned with the viability of the
wage gap since projects with long time horizons are inhibited by uncertainty surrounding
future labour costs. Therefore, the importance of low labour and resource costs can be
considered a complementary rather a priority motive.
The purpose of the natural resources seeking investments was to use the raw materials
available in the Balkans. From discussions with the managers, this kind of FDI is
typically orientated to export for world markets rather than for the domestic host country
market therefore refecting the strategic objective of the Greek companies in the Balkans
in the first period. However, raw materials were also used for further processing and sale
in the host country, therefore reflecting the strategic objective of the Greek companies in
the second and the third stage, as it was described in the previous pages.
survey for the Balkan region. The other two important investment determinants, i.e. market opportunities
and labour costs, maintain their hierarchical order.
21 Economic policy has strengthened this advantage in some countries through an effective undervaluation
of exchange rates or incomes policy, such as constraints on wage increases.
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The combined character of market seeking and resource seeking motives should be also
considered from the production point of view.22 A very critical aspect of the companies'
adjustment in the Balkans is the production of low- cost products, suitable for the
purchasing power of the population. Twenty Greek SMEs (10 textile companies, 6
furniture companies, 4 food and beverages companies) according to their managers
possess little or no obvious competitive advantages, other than perhaps that of the first -
mover advantage. Therefore, they find it difficult to survive for long in the Balkans.
These companies need to utilise whatever time is still available to establish themselves
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in particular niche markets. The focus from a production point of view according to the
above managers is to produce locally by taking advantage the low cost production
factors and then direct the products to the domestic market at a price suitable for the
purchasing power of the consumers. By doing this, they further reported, they could erect
some entry barriers to latecomers. As the Balkan countries still have very low levels of
disposable income they may not be able to afford the more sophisticated products of
powerful multinationals, and for this reason the above Greek companies have considered
the possibility of investing there, because of the very small size of the local market, as
their managers have reported. This may still provide the smaller Greek companies
producing products, which however are within the reach of the locals, with the
opportunity of establishing themselves.
Therefore, local facilities often allow companies to produce at lower costs, since the
costs of factors of production are considerably lower in the Balkans compared to Greece.
22 This motive was strongly emphasised in a number of surveys too (Mikelka 1996, Kosta et al 1993, Aal
1997, Csech 1997, Halpern 1997, Kovacs 1996, Legeza 1997).
23 Greece's economic presence in the Balkan's should not be over- exaggerated, since the organised
presence of countries like Germany will possibly push aside some of Greece's competitive advantage such
as geographic proximity. Progress in transition will bring the economic structure of the Balkan economies
closer to Western European patterns. Operating in physically distant countries like the Balkans, the west
European investors had to overcome the liability of being foreigners. They had to gather information, train
local staff and adapt management to the local environment. Moreover, risk assessment was hampered
because the investors were not accustomed to the nature of many sources of risk and because of political
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Market seeking motivation is likely to become even more important as the purchasing
power of the population in the Balkans will increase. As predicted by Dunning (1981,
1986), the most common destination of market seeking investment is countries less
developed than Greece, namely the Balkan countries. Therefore, it cannot be 100% clear
whether Greek companies are seeking to maximise their existing resources, or they seek
in new markets the size on which they will build their competitive advantages.24
In table 6.4, Greek investors reported that first mover advantages are quite important.
Forty- five Greek investors justified their decision to invest early, by saying that they
expected long-term benefits from early brand recognition, fast access to distribution
channels, favourable relations with local suppliers and contacts to governments. Twenty-
three of the above investors reported that they were invested early in the Balkans since
the entry barriers during the first years of reforms could be considered at rather low
levels, compared to market economies. The inherited monopolies and oligopolies were
mainly endowed with outdated or obsolete technology, while their companies (the Greek
companies) were in a better position since they have modern production capital.
According to the above twenty- three managers, they can enjoy special benefits because
of their participation in ventures with local companies, which can build up highly
undesirable competitive anomalies in a market that has traditionally been organised as a
monopoly. The first mover advantages along with the financial position of their
companies (Greek companies) allowed them to buy market share at rather low prices
compared to standards in fully- fledged market economies. In doing so, they could
implement strategies of increasing entry costs and undermine true competition. This
saves the internationalising Greek companies from the time and costs involved in
influences on international transactions. Therefore, the motivation of the Greek companies to reap the
advantages of first mover advantages is justified to this extent.
~4 Similar findings are supported by other scholars (Szanyi 1995 and Pye 1997), where no clear distinction
was made between market and factor- cost motivated investments, and are contradicting with the findings
of Konings (1996), Konings and Janssens (1996) who support the view of other surveys, that the primary
reason for FD1 in transition economies is the penetration of new markets.
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building a market share in a new foreign environment with different customs and a
different culture.
The above 45 managers suggested that they were willing to invest not for the immediate
short- run profits but rather to have a competitive advantage over competitors investing
on the market at a later stage. Many companies in industries with oligopolistic and
monopolistic structures were among the first entrants seeking the creation of competitive
advantages and the elevation of entry barriers. Indeed, the hope to benefit from first
mover advantages and monopolistic position constitutes a very attractive perspective. All
the managers from financial services companies, mining companies and
telecommunication companies during the interviews reported that relative stable
oligopolistic structures are of great importance. This particular motive seeks to expand
their sales and production into the Balkan markets. The opening of the Balkans induced
their investment activities, because the timing of their entry could determine the position
vis-a-vis their competitors and therefore the value of their ownership advantages. The
same managers further reported that they were also motivated to invest because the
Balkan market structures have been highly imperfect; monopoly or near- monopoly was
not uncommon, and competition laws were not yet fully enforced. In addition, the
disappearance or the difficulties of local companies facilitated their market share control
strategies.
Delay of entry could be costly in the Balkans, which are open to international
oligopolistic competition. According to three managers from tobacco companies, and
sixteen managers from food and beverage companies, by investing early in the Balkans
and developing a geographic space for their products, they are pre-empting rivals as well
as they are trying to develop switching costs that create barriers to late movers and
establish their products as an industry standard in order to increase their probabilities of
a profitable investment. According to the above nineteen managers, first mover
advantages are most important in their industries where brand names dominate. Speed of
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entry is important in their industries, since the local industries are fast growing in the
host economies, offering great profit opportunities and participation in a growing
market.
We have asked the first entrants whether this euphoria about first-mover advantages is
justified. All respondents to our question replied that the entry in the Balkans poses
different challenges. Even so, they (the first entrants) have to overcome obstacles in the
local environment, and strategic decisions on the location and partner choice, which
incur considerable sunk costs. Moreover, brand names may be worth less where brand
loyalty is low as consumers still experiment with new products. The managers suggested
that they did not fail to realize their expected benefits, and second-movers could not
easily build a larger market-share. Large unsaturated demand surfaced at the time of
liberalisation, and early establishment of a market share could, through brand loyalty,
contribute to a leading position in the long run and deter potential later entrants. Eleven
later entrants reported that they could not benefit from local consumers' improved
understanding of the market, and from first-movers' investments in 'educating' the
customer base by using expensive promotional campaigns. Fast followers though could
learn from successes and failures of the first-movers and adapt their strategies for
marketing and government relations accordingly.
Besides the market benefits that the first movers can benefit early entry provides a
production benefit as well. The above 45 managers have reported that if their products
are already in place, no matter how old the production equipment is, they have the
advantage when it comes to upgrading or replacement of the production equipment. The
reason, according to the 45 managers, is that they already know what the market wants,
and most importantly how much the market can absorb therefore they can adjust their
This positive spillovers has enabled many fast second followers to penetrate into the Balkans, that is the
case of the banking and food and beverages companies.
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production equipment according to the needs of the market, avoiding any excess
production.
Greek companies in table 6.4 are also reported as client followers. They enter the
Balkans to serve customers they have served before. These investments could also be
classified as market seeking ones. Ten Greek managers explained that their investment
decisions were linked to an extent to the strategies of major customers that have
established local operations and wish to produce supplies or services with their industry
standard or quality. Furthermore, the same ten managers reported that the client(s)
provides a sufficiently large and secure demand to merit the commitment, and from that
base they may expand onto the local market. This occurred because clients wanted to
preserve and extend the intimate knowledge and working relationships already built in
Greece. Especially in the financial service sector 12 companies or 63% of the companies
in that market sector report that as a major motive prior to FDI in the Balkans. In
industries with major network externalities, such as financial services, presence in the
region was necessary to offer regional- international coverage for our customers
operating abroad, according to the opinion of five managers in the financial service
sector.
Interesting comments can be made for defensive motives' results from table 6.4. The type
of investor that is interested in the Balkans is defined not only by the behaviour of
dominant and dominated companies in the specific markets. Considering the high level
of uncertainty in the Balkans, the industry's leaders are also moved by defensive
motivation. The ones that are present are facing the limitations of competition in the
already mature and familiar western- Greek markets, and they accept to be led by the risk
that less attractive regions for investment can offer chances for higher profits. Since the
demand of their products in the Greek market is saturated and the competition is
increasing, the market potential of the Balkans offers an opportunity for the Greek
companies to diversify their business risks, as the results in table 6.4 demonstrates.
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The available literature from Dunning's OLI framework supports that threats to existing
ownership advantages can be as much a driving force of internalisation as expansion
based on growing advantages. Companies facing constraints to growth in the Greek
market and with their present strategic configuration are pushed into exploring
opportunities. Barriers to growth in the domestic market create strong factors towards
restructuring, relocating and searching for new markets. Companies starting to reach
growth barriers with their present strategic configuration are restructuring their present
sourcing strategy therefore they invest in the Balkan markets.26
The employment of the more advanced Greek technology in the less developed markets
of the Balkans can enhance the chances for obtaining a higher profit. Indeed the
utilisation of the technological knowledge that the companies posses, has the highest
score among the company induced defensive motives, as we can see from the results in
table 6.4. The reason is that the Greek companies are closer to the Balkan countries as
regards their technological needs, in relation to companies from other European
countries. Greek technology is more accessible for Balkan countries, since they do not
have to cover the very large gap between the new technologies and those that they
currently use (Rizopoulos 2001).
Advantages, but also disadvantages may motivate FD1, as the results in table 6.4 shows.
In this perspective according to the opinion of the Greek managers, FDI was defined as a
26
In this case these companies cannot expect to increase their share, even if this happened, it is expected
to be marginal. In high technology markets the dominant companies had the largest share of their income
from deals with the government. So now that these deals become more difficult they face a problem of
where to find customers, therefore moving to the Balkan markets, where the public sector is the main
customer, and maintains the monopoly for the near future, since the market structures are highly imperfect,
and competition laws are not yet fully enforced. In a number of cases in different markets in Greece, the
dominant companies start reaching a point where we have a duopoly and there are no other opportunities
for increasing their market share. Greek companies are given the opportunity to maintain some of their
existing markets by applying a low price strategy by selling existing products in a profitable manner. This
is the case for example in the market for diary products. Operating in mature markets makes
internationalisation a question of survival.
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strategic movement tending to exploit and preserve advantages. Increased competition in
international or national markets reinforced the Greek companies to expand in the
Balkans in an effort to protect their international competitiveness by taking advantage of
the low cost factors of production and the demand of the domestic markets. Companies
would internationalise their activities in order to obtain a cost or differentiation
advantage enabling the amelioration of their competitive position.
Yet the need to protect an existing market is the least prevailing market induced
defensive motive, contrary to the need to increase their competitive position both in
Greek and international market, as we can see from the results in table 6.4. Twenty
Greek managers (10 textile companies, 6 furniture companies, 4 food and beverages
companies) reported during the interviews that their companies are given the opportunity
to maintain some of their existing markets by applying a low price strategy and by
selling an old product in a profitable manner in the Balkans. FD1 was considered as a
necessary condition, not to ameliorate profit, but just to preserve minimum profits or
market shares. It was a defensive action due to weak competitive position. The above
twenty managers reported that they are not interested only in exploiting the competitive
advantages of their companies, but rather in augmenting and protecting them. These
companies undertake FD1 to improve or defend market shares by pre- empting
competitors from doing likewise. They invested in the Balkans to prevent challenges
from their rivals or the emergence of new competitors from within the region. Thirty
companies dominated by larger competitors (4 tobacco, 21 food and beverages, 5
financial services) reported that they saw early entry in new markets as an opportunity to
gain competitive advantages and increase their competitive position.
All the managers from the above fifty companies agreed that their strategic intention
could be realised only through the exploitation and combinations of competitive
advantages. That is access to know how from developed market and economies, raw
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materials and low production and labour costs available in the Balkans, and re- exporting
by using the parallel distribution channels in Greece, EU and the Balkans.
Despite the importance of low cost factors of production as one of the causes of
investing in the Balkan markets, making use of these factors as a reason for investment,
scored lower that the market attraction motives as we can see from the data in table 6.4.
Our data showed that local market of the Balkan countries is the primary motive in
making FD1 and low cost factors of production played a secondary role in investing in
the Balkans during the transition process.27
From discussion with the executives of the Greek subsidiaries in the Balkans as well as
from the available data in table 6.4, we can identify two major categories of investors in
relation to their strategic objectives; (i) companies trying to develop, consolidate or
protect their positions and market shares in specific enlarged markets, while they prepare
an expansion to third markets. Food and beverages, and banks provide some good
examples; (ii) companies trying to improve their competitive positions. Textile
companies provide some good examples. They have in common their interests in
location specific advantages in order to exploit or to acquire competitive advantages. For
this reason, national market characteristics and low cost factors of production play an
important role.
6.4 Comparison of Greek Investors and Non- Investors in the Balkans
The responses to the question, why did you not invest, in table 6.5, indicate that the
primary reasons that companies did not invest in the Balkans are that these markets were
outside the scope of the company's strategy for company or industry specific reasons or
they prefer to invest in another foreign country. Second in importance, is the business
Marinov and Marinova (1999) and Pye (1997) have also reported similar results — local market is the
primary motive in investing to transition countries. From the above results our findings come in pace with
Rizopoulos (2001) that market penetration is the primary objective in the Balkans.
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risk associated with such an investment in volatile markets. Political, economic, legal
uncertainties maintain their significant importance as impediments for investments in the
Balkans. Costs of production were considered as an important reason for not investing,
since relocation of the production unit(s) was not considered a strategic option, given the
nature of the production process. This relates to the industry specific nature of the labour
cost argument. Factor cost investments were inhibited by local costs being too high due
to the lack of infrastructure, poor labour qualification as well as the expected future
labour costs. Seventeen investors are also concerned about the viability of the wage gap.
They express the concern that projects with long time horizons are inhibited by
uncertainty over future labour costs and real exchange rates. It is important to note the
importance that Greek companies have placed on the information about the local
markets. Obtaining information on the market was difficult due to its complexity and
rapidly changing patterns.
Regarding the financial constraints, Greek companies in order to finance new projects,
needed access to external finance. As sixteen managers reported the reserves of the
domestic partner, were negligible and they could not finance projects out of their
retained earnings. Loans were difficult to obtain due to underdeveloped banking system.
28Local banks in the Balkans did not have the expertise to assess investment projects.
Another constraint arises from the lack of suitable business partners. According to a
manager of a tobacco company that eventually decided not to invest, 'the management
and employees of the Balkan company were expected to take on new responsibilities for
which they have not been trained. Unfortunately, pools of alternative management
expertise were not readily available either'.
~s That was a main reason why Greek banks expanded in the Balkans following their biggest clients
abroad. They provide the necessary know- how to facilitate loan transactions and project assessment.
Among the potential external sources, bank credit was limited for several reasons. Government anti-
inflationary policies restricted the growth of the money supply and kept interest rates high. Also, the banks
themselves preferred to provide short-term rather than longer-term loans.
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Table 6.5 Reasons for not investing in the Balkans
Factors Mean value Standard Deviation
Business risks are too high 3.70 0.60
Insufficient information about the local markets 3.39 0.54
No appropriate partner was found 3.27 0.59
Financial constraints 2.83 0.74
Political environment too uncertain 3.37 0.73
Lack of physical infrastructure 3.44 0.59
Legal system too ambiguous 3.34 0.69
Negotiation with local authorities too difficult 3.54 0.90
Markets can be served from facilities outside Balkans 2.85 0.79
Expected demand for goods too low 3.56 0.55
Competition too intense 2.48 0.55
Cost of production too high 2.85 0.57
Prefer to invest elsewhere 3.78 0.61
Outside the company's scope 3.90 0.77
Importance of each factor: 1= not at all important, 2= not very important, 3= quite important, 4= very
important, 5= extremely important.29
The obstacles in the partner category include the costs of restructuring local companies,
and lack of suitable local partners. These arguments relate to the quality of local
businesses. They are specific to the Balkan region and reflect the problems that arise
when dealing with the structures of local business inherited from 40 years of socialism.
Surprisingly none of the participants report competitors as an obstacle for local
production. A response from twenty- seven the managers of companies that did not
invest in the Balkans was that in the analysis of calculating future sales and success in
the Balkan market, the main factor was not competition and market shares but whether
the local customers would have enough money to buy their products, in other words
whether the market was expected to grow or shrink.
29 In the above table, since we used several variables in ordinal scale, these variables represent related
samples in mean- comparison test, i.e. the rank of one variable necessarily affects the ranks of other
variables. Therefore, Friedman test, a non-parametric test comparing the distribution of several related
variables, was used. Friedman's two way ANOVA test examine the null hypotheses that the scores in each
topic come from the same population (i.e. their ranks are not different). Referring to the results in the
above table, Friedman's test was highly significant for all groups of variables (p<0.0000). These results
enable us to reject the null hypotheses and to conclude that the differences in the ranking of the variables
were substantial.
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In table 6.6, we examine the perceptions of risks to Greek companies with investment
activity (FDI), and no investment activity (indifferent) in the Balkans. Typical risks of
developing countries such as expropriation were perceived less important for both
categories of companies. Looking at the results in table 6.6, all the risks are perceived to
be more important for the companies that choose not to invest in the Balkans than the
companies that decided to invest. The primary consideration for the investors is the
uncertainty about the economic prospects of the Balkans and for the non- investors is the
inadequate commercial infrastructure, i.e. banking, and commercial circuits.30
Table 6.6 Perceptions of Risks to Greek Companies
Risks Investment Activity No Investment
Activity
X2 Significance
1. Business risks 3.26 3.70 0.000
2. Uncertainty about economic prospects 3.33 3.65 0.000
3. Risk of expropriation 2.70 2.88 0.022
4. Risk of political instability 3.20 3.37 0.380
5. Exchange rate risks 3.21 3.42 0.008
6. Inadequate physical infrastructure 3.24 3.44 0.006
7. Inadequate commercial infrastructure 3.24 3.73 0.000
8. Legal uncertainties 3.24 3.34 0.000
Levels of importance: l=very unimportant, 5 very important.
Cross tabulation analysis using the chi- square statistic indicates that the differences are
statistically significant. There are many differences between those companies that had
never considered investing in the Balkans and those that had made direct investment in
the region. All the risks associated with the investment environment in the Balkans,
except the risks of political instability, are significantly more important for companies
j0 Over time, the legal framework has developed, usually but not always, towards consistency and market
orientation. Bureaucracy related problems arise from inconsistent guidelines for decision-makers within
the bureaucracy as well as from interests of the local administration and, in some cases, corruption. The
legal framework has been adapted towards the rules and regulations of the EU. However, this often
complicates procedures, as the administration is not trained to implement these rules smoothly.
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that had no investment activity in the Balkans. In addition, those companies, which had
investment experience in the Balkans, gave less importance to the exchange rate risks
and to the quality of physical and commercial infrastructure as opposed to those without
experience in the Balkans.
Unanimously all the managers of the companies that have not invested in the Balkans
agreed that imperfect financial markets, corporate governance inefficiencies and the
managerial capabilities of the Balkan managers would inhibit the implementation of
forward- looking strategies therefore increasing the business risks.
Regarding the economic prospects in the Balkans, the Vice- President of Commercial
Bank of Greece in Romania, is generally optimistic, despite the current difficulties.
'What people call problems can be found anywhere in the world and these are nothing
more than issues to be resolved. At this point of time the Balkans' path is a one-way road
and the only question is when the changes should happen, not if.
Overall, the issues raised by the Greek non- investing companies are not perceived as
factors, which would necessarily prevent investment, rather as obstacles, which impede
the investment process. Very important among these obstacles are the bureaucratic and
administrative issues, related to the lack of proper commercial infrastructure. As a
finance director of a Greek company eloquently put it 'we attempt to create capitalism in
a context where there were hardly any capitalists'. Greek investors mentioned that they
received conflicting information from different ministries and government agencies.
Government and domestic companies' strategies were often ill- defined and ambiguous
and lacked a determined long-term strategy. Overall, economic risk is perceived to be
higher and more important than political risk for businesses. The results in the above
table, appears to support such a belief. In general, all the managers of the companies that
did not invest in the Balkans expressed the opinion that these drawbacks, while being a
potential hindrance to doing business, do not offset the profitability of entering the
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Balkan market. However, they do highlight the fact that business transactions are often
difficult and time-consuming under the current economic circumstances in the Balkans.
6.5 Conclusions
The start of the 1990s marked the emergence of a new form of commercial activity that
had been almost unknown in Greek companies until that time. This was the period when
Greek companies started to foray beyond the narrow domestic framework and essay
forth into markets outside of Greece in the form ofmaking investments abroad.
From discussion with the executives of the Greek subsidiaries in the Balkans we can
identify two major categories of investors in relation to size, internationalisation of
activities, strategic objectives and previous involvement in the Balkans: (i) leading
international companies with a real international strategy, trying to develop, consolidate
or protect their positions and market shares in some specific enlarged markets. They
acknowledge the different locational problems, but they are of secondary importance
concerning FDI decision in the region. Food and beverages, and banks provide some
good examples; and (ii) companies, such as textile, that trying to improve their
competitive positions. They have in common their interests in location specific
advantages in order to exploit or to acquire. For this reason, national market
characteristics play an important role.
Summarising investors' specific strategic goals from the data in table 6.4, we can
identify the following reasons motivating investment in the Balkan countries; (i) Market
penetration the creation of competitive advantages and the elevation of entry barriers;
(ii) Strengthening competitive positions in EU markets through the exploitations of
comparative advantages, i.e. access to know how, raw materials, low production costs,
low labour costs and re- exporting; (iii) To protect investor's existing markets and
increase competitiveness. Greek companies are given the opportunity to maintain some
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of their existing markets by applying a low price strategy (by exporting products
manufactured cheaply in the Balkans) and by selling an old product (existing Greek
products in the Balkans) in a profitable manner; (iv) To prepare an expansion to third
markets. Balkans are often regarded a production and export platform to third markets.
Overall, the investment constraints raised by the Greek companies are not perceived as
factors, which would necessarily prevent investment, rather as obstacles, which impede
the investment process. These drawbacks, while being a potential hindrance to doing
business, do not offset the profitability of entering the Balkan market. However, they do
highlight the fact that business transactions are often difficult and time-consuming
undertakings under the current economic circumstances in the Balkans.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
An Analysis of the Internationalisation Decision Making Process of the
Greek Companies in the Balkans
7.1 Introduction
Outward FDI is a recent activity of Greek companies. It is mostly directed towards the
Balkan countries and forms an alternative strategy to exports. An analysis of the
decision- making process of Greek companies before undertaking any type of
internationalisation strategy is attempted using a multinomial logistic model1 on
company- level (ownership specific characteristics) data. In this chapter we seek to
investigate the determinants of alternative expansion strategies, i.e. exports versus FDI
in the Balkans, FDI vs. no involvement in the Balkans, exports vs. no involvement
(classified as indifferent companies) in the Balkans, stressing the importance of
company- specific characteristics and it is tested on evidence produced by Greek
companies. Using a sample of Greek companies, headquartered in Greece, we aim at
estimating a probability for the expansion choice made by each company based on its
own specific characteristics.
Today not much is known about the way Greek companies make the decision to engage
in FDI. What are the ownership specific factors that make some companies express their
interest in the region through FDI, whereas others opt for an export strategy or decide
not to invest at all. In this study, a model is developed that focuses on the investment
decision process of the company. The model is based on the idea that the company has
1 Discrete choice models are used in a wide variety of situations in applied econometrics. By far the model
specification, which is used most often, is the multinomial logit model, which provides a convenient
closed form for the underlying choice probabilities without any requirement of multivariate integration.
Therefore, choice situations characterised by many alternatives can be treated in a computationally
convenient manner. Many empirical studies on foreign entry mode choices used multinomial logit analysis
(Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992, Contractor 1984, Erramilli 1991, Gatignon and Anderson 1988, Kim and
Hwang 1992, Kogut and Singh 1988, Pitelis and Iammarino 1999).
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initial interest in engaging in FDI in the Balkans. The model includes expected costs and
benefits, factors of uncertainty, the option to wait with the investment or the possibility
to invest in an alternative investment. Empirically the model is tested by means of a
survey of 230 companies, covers the period 1989- 1999 and conducted in Greece.
Admittedly, the term internationalisation strategy has been conspicuously absent from
the literature on the evolving Greek business presence in Balkans. However, neither
have Greek scholars utilised the vocabulary and the tools of internationalisation strategy
2 c
analysis to explain Greek business activity in the region. To reinforce our argument we
provide a simple example. What explains the formation of a Greek FDI in the region so
far? Primarily proximity- the causa prima of the Greek scholars- as has often been noted
(Petrochilos 1997, Labrianidis 2000, Labrianidis et al. 2000, Labrianidis et al. 1997)/
Petrakos (1996, 2001) argues that the role of geography seems to be the most decisive
factor affecting the allocation of Greek investment in the region. Proximity however
needs to be examined and speculated upon in its specificity and not just be evoked
mantra-like.4 Therefore, the Greek scholars studying the presence of Greek FDI activity
in the Balkans should employ a more realistic approach focusing on the characteristics
of the companies that invest there rather than just simplifying the economic penetration
2
We think this no coincidence. We detect a bias for a public policy perspective in Greek scholarship on
the issue. A bias, which in its attempt to evaluate the consequences of Greek business activity in the
region, focuses on the national and the regional while underestimating the micro (companies). Greek
business activity is seen through the lenses of its impact on national economies, either that of Greece or
that of the host countries. Such an impact clearly occurs and must be evaluated. Nevertheless, by thus
constraining our vision, we fail to understand both the modus operandi of Greek companies in the region
as well as their wider influence in the transition process. The issue definitely deserves further research but
we hope through this study to provide- to our knowledge for the first time- a holistic theoretical and
empirical justification of Greek FDI in the Balkans.
3 The relative importance of psychic distance appears to have declined since the 1970s as economic
conditions are becoming more important, for example industry- specific barriers to entry, market potential
and industry structure (Nordstrom 1991).
4
Only such an examination can point the extent to which proximity is an inherently shared asset within a
particular population of companies and individuals, an asset, which evolves through the activity of its
being shared while also affecting the evolution of those who share in it. Proximity in other words cannot
simply be registered and then disregarded as the ultimate effect, in terms of trade and FDI volumes, of the
shortness of distance from Athens to Sofia, from Athens to Bucharest.
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with terms that first are stating the obvious and second cannot be measured and certainly
do not discuss the dynamics of the FD1 agents in the Balkans.5
7.2 An Analysis of the Internationalisation Decision Making Process
Much of the literature on foreign market entry concerned the choice between exporting
and FDI (Root 1987, Young et al. 1989, Buckley and Ghauri 1993). The cost- based
view of this decision suggests that a company must possess a compensating advantage
in order to overcome the costs offoreignness (Hymer 1976, Kindleberger 1969). This
led to the identification of ownership specific skills as the key elements in successful
foreign entry (Hirsh 1976, Horst 1972).
Buckley and Casson (1976) envisaged the companies as an internalised bundle of
resources, which can be allocated between product groups and between national
markets. Entry involves two interdependent decisions on location and mode of control.
Exporting is domestically located and administratively controlled, and FDI is foreign
located and administratively controlled. Companies expand abroad through either trade
or FDI in order to capitalise on specific assets they hold, relative to the cost of doing so,
as it is affected by sectoral or locational considerations. Rational companies select their
strategy according to its risk adjusted expected return (R) (Goodnow et al. 1972,
Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Root 1987). Therefore, a company i will opt for strategy
j, jcJ (Greene 1997: 913)
IfRij>Rik, where keJ but k^ j.
By no means, we value less or disapprove the explanation of the geographic proximity to the
phenomenal Greek FDI in the Balkans. Many scholars (Meyer 1998, Borsos and Erkkila 1995, Makino
1995) using the proximity framework have addressed the pre-eminent position of the Chinese in the
economies of South East Asia, or of the Austrians in the CEE countries and the Scandinavians in the
Baltics, and of course the Germans all over CEE. Yet, we do realise the need of a framework that will
address and accommodate the ownership specific characteristics of the Greek companies in the Balkans.
Only through such an attempt at specificity in our examination of the internationalisation strategies of the
companies we can begin to evaluate how these companies expanded in the neighbouring Balkan markets,
how the corporate decision- making was affected, and how assets drive this new FDI experience of the
Greek companies.
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Dunning (1993) has emphasised that the returns to FDI, and hence FDI itself, can be
explained by the competitive-ownership advantages of companies, indicating who is
going to produce abroad and for that matter, other forms of international activity (ibid:
142), by locational factors influencing the where to produce (ibid: 143) and by the
internalisation factor that addresses the question ofwhy firms engage in FDI rather than
license foreign firms to use their proprietary assets (ibid: 145). Companies having
ownership specific advantages are expected to exploit them more profitably outside their
domestic market (Dunning 1981, Teece 1986).
7.3 The Econometric Model
For the econometric analysis of the data, unordered multiple-choice models are most
relevant (Greene 1997: 913). The choice among business strategies towards the Balkan
markets is clearly unordered (Greene 1997: 913). The alternative strategies are 0, 1 and
2 with 1 being the choice of a company to export in the Balkan area, 2 to undertake FDI
in the same area and 0 to follow any other strategy different from the first two, marked
as the indifference choice in our model. The three alternative choices depend on a set of
characteristics, w, and are not ordered. They just represent different reactions and not
ordered choices, where 0<1 <2. A random utility model can motivate unordered- choice
models.
The return of strategy j that company i expects is given by Rjj=P'W jj+ Cjj. If strategy j is
chosen (the choice Yi=j being a random variable) it must be because Ry is the largest
between the alternative returns. Therefore Prob(Rij >Rjk), Vk^ j is the highest. In the
general case Wij=[zjj, x j], where Xj contains characteristics of company i not depending
on choices, while Zjj contains the attributes of the choices varying across choices and
companies. Utility depends on Xjj, which includes aspects specific to the individual as
well as the choices. A model on the entry mode by individual Greek companies specify
that the choice depends on attributes of the ownership characteristics such as the ones
presented and described in table 5.1 in chapter five, which vary across individual
companies. In our case, only Xj is relevant, therefore, a multinomial logit model is
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suitable. If the J disturbances (strategic choices) are independent and identically
distributed following the Weibull distribution F (£ij)=CxP (e~E'j) (Green 1997: 913) and we
normalise assuming (3o= 0, (Greene 1997: 915) the following probabilities result:
ep''x' 1
P (Y=j)= for = 1,2 P (Y=0)
j J
1 +£ er>*, ] +£
k = 1 k — 1
7.4 Analysis of the Econometric Model Findings
In this section, we analyse the entry process of Greek companies in the Balkans. The
first step is to analyse the propensity to engage in Greek- Balkans business. The
determinants of activity in the region are a function of company- specifc assets that
enable companies to internationalise and of their interaction with the special condition of
the transition economies. Three sets of multinomial logit regression were estimated
using as dependent variables the three different types of strategies (FDI, export,
indifferent) and as independent variables a list of company- specifc characteristics, as
presented in table 5.1, in chapter five. The results are displayed in table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Multinomial Logit Estimation for the FDI- Export Decision
Company Specific
Variables
Exports: (P1/P0) FDI: (P2/P0) FDI: (P2/P1)
Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance
Constant 0.162 0.837 21.669 0.000* 16.300 0.000*
T Debt (% of total debt) -0.003 0.813 -0.002 0.089 * 0.004 0.696
L Debt (% of long term
debt)
0.012 0.502 -0.025 0.311 -0.016 0.338
Size (total capitalisation
in million €)
5.461 0.023" 3.114 0.000* 2.209 0.000'
Growth (% change in
turnover)
0.001 0.916 0.024 0.330 0.033 0.030**
Labour
(sales/employment)
-4.979 0.361 1.182 0.042* 1.251 0.000*
Intl t (export turnover/
total turnover) in %
0.035 0.005" 0.146 0.004** 0.055 0.093*
Geogr (number of
export markets)
0.125 0.195 -0.674 0.357 -0.957 0.150
Equation X2 20.896 (p=0.004) 106.785 (p= 0.000) 88.863 (p= 0.000)
Model X2 170.983 (p< 0.000), Log likelihood -290.411, Pseudo R2= 0.525, N= 230
*: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, ***:p<0.10. Two-tailed test, x2 is according to Likelihood Ratio Test.
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The general explanatory ability of the model is satisfactory, as the model likelihood test
ratio shows. The multinomial logistic regression has a significant overall explanatory
power with a model chi- square of 170.983 (p<0.000). Furthermore, in each of the pairs
examined, export vs. indifferent (p<0.05), FDI vs. indifferent (p<0.01), FD1 vs. export
(p<0.01), the regressions have a statistically significant explanatory power, as we can
see from their chi- square statistics.
Table 7.2 Classification- Predictions Full Sample
Predicted
Observed Indifferent Export FDI Percent Correct
Indifferent 24 9 8 58.5%
Export 19 29 19 43.3%
FDI 1 12 109 81.1%
Overall Percentage 19 1% 21.7% 59.1% 70.4%
Looking at the classification table 7.2, 70.4% of the sample observations are correctly
classified. In the indifferent category 58.5% of the companies were correctly classified
as indifferent based on the variables used in the analysis. The percent of correctly
classified companies as export and FDI based on the above variables is 43.3% and
81.1% respectively. The predictions are adequate given how unbalanced and non
homogeneous- by including both manufacturing and service companies- our sample has
been (Greene 1997: 891- 893). We included a dummy variable 0,1 to differentiate
between the manufacturing and the service companies, however the results were
statistically insignificant.
7.4.1 The Probability of Export vs. Indifferent
The positive, statistically significant relationship with export (INTLT), suggest that the
higher the export intensity the more interested companies are to export to the Balkans.
Due to the small size of the Greek market and the lack of accessible markets of critical
size, Greek companies could not benefit in many cases from economies of scale. By
exporting in the Balkan markets, with low international standards and absence of big
companies, Greek companies increased their probabilities of economic efficiency. Such
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a strategy is likely to include high start- up costs (i.e. to establish distribution networks,
investigate trade regimes) and hence demand followers that are more dynamic.
This activity is probably the best and most encouraging indicator of the emergence of a
new, integrated regional market. In addition, because of different tastes for the western
European products in the region combined with low incomes and hence low demand for
western European products, Greek companies have an opportunity to sell their products
at competitive prices, pre-empting western competition at a later stage. Alternatively, it
may suggest that companies turned their attention to the Balkans in the 1990s apparently
because of their recent opening favoured by geographically proximity and absence of
big European investors.
Finally, SIZE is an important, statistically significant, determinant for export activity.
Larger companies possess more managerial and financial resources, have greater
production capacity, attain higher levels of economies of scale and tend to be associated
with lower levels of perceived risks in exporting operations. These factors can facilitate
the development and sustenance of a sound competitive position in the Balkan markets.
It would therefore be reasonable to expect that large companies are likely to enjoy more
competitive advantages in export markets and that there would also be a positive
relationship between company size and export choice.
7.4.2 The Probability of FDI vs. Indifferent
The second set of estimations presents the effects on the probability of FDI over
indifference (P2/P0). The variables that come out as significant present some very
interesting findings. TDEBT (heavily influenced by short term debt as can be seen in
table 7.1) has a negative sign. Companies in the FDI category probably have not easy
access to short- term financing. The lower their short- term financing ability, the less
likely they are to prefer FDI, while we should expect FDI companies to be more risk
averse declining to favour FDI when their short term debt is high compared to
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indifferent companies.6 The estimated negative relationship with TDEBT reinforces the
argument that FDI orientated companies are financially apprehensive. The higher their
total debt, the less likely they are to engage in FDI.
SIZE affects the FDI choice positively underlying the large companies, are more likely
to prefer expanding their production base in the Balkans. Large organisations with a
significant analytical capability could approach these markets in a comparatively
speaking methodical and purposeful manner. Organisational capabilities determine the
opportunity costs of internationalisation. To compete with host country companies in
their own markets, Greek companies must possess superior asset and skills that can earn
economic rents that are high enough to counter the higher cost of servicing these
markets. Therefore, size may represent all or most of the possible ownership specific
advantages and-or it may describe sheer oligopolistic market power.
Internal resources of a company are just important to its growth as external ones.
Therefore, a company having expanded rapidly in its domestic location may possess the
necessary attributes, which will also enable it to develop abroad. A company's asset
power is reflected by its size and international experience. Greek companies with related
experience and economies of common governance could organise a given transaction at
lower costs. These resource based effects are particular relevant for international
business because it involves a major fixed cost component. Larger companies can use
economies of scale and of common governance because the per unit internal transaction
cost decline with increasing turnover. Capabilities arising from common governance are
especially relevant for operations in countries with high economic risks. Companies
using advantages of common governance can integrate new operations in the Balkans
into their organisation at low additional costs. Therefore, the larger the size of the
company the more active in the Balkans will be.
6 The positive sign for LDEBT indicates the companies have already established a solid financial
background before proceeding with such a demanding strategy as FDI.
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Therefore, from our data analysis in table 7.1, large companies are more likely to engage
in FDI because the marginal costs of adding a new operation are lower, and because they
have better possibilities to leverage investment risk. Companies need asset power to
engage in international production and to successfully compete with host country
companies. Resources are needed for absorbing the high costs of marketing, for
enforcing patents and contracts, and on achieving economies of scale. The size of the
company reflects its capability for absorption of these costs and engages in FDI.
LABOUR intensity favours FDI in agreement with the argument that the more labour
intensive production is in Greece, the more likely Greek companies are to initiate
outward investment in cheap labour countries, switching labour intensive activities from
high labour cost to low labour cost locations, therefore enabling these companies to
balance the increasing cost of production in Greece. Since the relative comparative
advantages of the Balkan countries are labour intensive production processes, an
efficiency- seeking role in the Balkans provides a cost- effective supply platform for
Greek companies aiming to improve their production competitiveness, thus entering the
Balkans in search of low production costs. The existence of low labour costs in the
Balkans can be useful to Greek companies in declining sectors or in highly competitive
ones. Lower labour costs in the Balkans compared to Greece are statistically and
positively determine the probability of locating a new branch plant in the Balkans.
Companies with labour intensive production processes are most likely to produce in the
Balkans. The increasing wage costs in Greece put competitive pressures on labour
intensive production. Therefore, emphasising the importance of labour costs for
decisions over location of production we can say that companies with labour intensive
production processes invest in the Balkans. As the economic growth in Greece is
accelerating, wages increasing. This made it more costly to produce labour intensive
commodities. As the Balkans are abundant in cheap labour, they possess comparative
advantages in the production of such labour intensive manufacturers.
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The positive and significant sign for INTL_T suggests that the more familiar with export
markets Greek companies are the more likely they are to undertake FDI. Internationally
experienced companies have competitive advantages that arise from internationality as
such. This includes international accumulation of know how, arbitrage opportunities,
flexibility for production shifting, superior recognition of opportunities, and
international diversification of risk.
The significant positive export (Intl t) effect suggests that the more Greek companies
export, the more likely they are to turn to FDI in the Balkans because they are more
familiar with foreign tastes and habits and they may want to create export platforms
there from which to satisfy other foreign markets. The last argument combines easily
with the positive coefficient of IntlJ in the first set of estimators (P1/P0). Companies
may not be interested in satisfying the low demand of the Balkans but in using their
local plants as export platforms. Although the Balkan countries have made progress in
the process of systemic transformation from socialist to market economy, however, still
delayed reforms increase business risks.
Experience creates- and is sometimes the only way to achieve- increased market
knowledge and uncertainty reduction, and experience is therefore considered an
ownership specific advantage in the so- called eclectic theory of international
production. Our data analysis clearly explains that companies with organisational
capabilities as they are explained by the size of the company and international
experience of exporting are more likely to internalise their business.
7.4.3 The Probability of FDI vs. Export
The third set of estimations examines the probability of FDI with exports to the Balkans
as the comparison choice (P2/P1). The SIZE effect confirms the result that the larger the
company, the more likely it is it will prefer FDI to exports. Large companies have more
resources to invest in innovation, and pursue more aggressive expansion strategies.
Large companies benefit from economies of scale, scope and learning therefore they
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have develop solid corporate foundations before they expand abroad. Our research
findings in table 7.1 emphasise the role of size, arguing, the large companies tend to
service foreign markets through FD1 rather than trade. The economies of size reduce the
costs of engaging in business with the Balkans. We suggest that the size of the company
generates economies of scale and inhibit effective competition. Larger companies are
more well equipped to defend themselves and take advantage of imperfect market
environments. Average company size is more strongly associated with the foreign
production propensity. This suggests that foreign production require a greater outlay,
which a large company is better able to overcome.
The positive GROWTH effect adds a dynamic dimension to size as a determinant of FDI
preference. The GROWTH variable is positively signed and significant, suggesting that
the transition markets are attractive to growing companies. Growing companies have
more resources to redeploy and would therefore be more likely to expand to new
regions. As the results of the multinomial model suggest, companies experiencing higher
growth rates are the ones who are pursuing an FDI towards the Balkan markets.
Therefore, companies with high, satisfactory growth rates are engaging in new business
with the Balkans, be in search of new markets, and new sources for growth.
In high market potential countries, FDI is expected to provide greater long- term
profitability to a company compared to exports, through the opportunity to achieve
economies of scale and consequently lower marginal cost of production. Even if scale
economies are not significant, a company may still choose investment modes since they
provide the company with opportunity to establish long- term market presence and thus
growth. The positive sign of GROWTH reflects the future possible gains from
expanding, accessing markets in the Balkans, satisfying the demand for new products
and services as well as using the low cost production countries of the Balkans to export
in the EU, when permitting, and the more advanced transition countries of CEE, giving a
combined character of market seeking and resource seeking motives.
199
The production relocation argument suggested that labour intensive companies would be
more active in terms of FDI activity in the Balkans because they can use labour cost
differences. Our results for the labour intensity variable (LABOUR) are in agreement
with the argument that the more productive companies, the more likely are to initiate
outward investment in cheap labour countries, switching labour intensive activities from
high labour cost to low labour cost locations. Lower labour costs in the Balkans
compared to Greece positively (and statistically significant) determine the probability of
locating a new branch plant in the Balkans. If relocation of production were a major
force to international business, then the net effect on the propensity to engage in
international business would be positive.
7.5 Conclusions
The main concluding remarks of this chapter suggest that in the 1990s Greek companies
increase markedly their shares of outward FDI in the Balkans through a rather careful
consideration of their financial and market structures apparently being urged by the loss
of local comparative advantage. An obvious example is the positive effect of the long
and medium term borrowing capacity of companies engaged in FDI in contrast to the
negative effect of short- term borrowing. The solid market basis is noticed in the positive
effect of the relative company size as well as the growth rate of sales. In addition, the
more intense the acquired familiarity with foreign markets through exports the more
likely the undertaking of FDI was found to be. The estimated different strategic
reactions of the domestic market catering and export orientated companies may
underline the resolution of the former to engage more intensely in FDI, while the latter
are more indifferent between exporting or investing possible preferring a home based
expansion strategy. Labour intensity, an old local comparative advantage, was found to
affect positively the FDI vs. export choice. New low labour cost locations are preferred.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
The Determinants of Ownership Structures in the Balkans
8.1 Introduction
The choice of entry mode has been addressed frequently in the international business
literature. Most of this work focuses on the choice ownership, between a joint venture
and a wholly owned affiliate, from a theoretical (Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Beamish
and Banks 1987, Hennart 1988, Hill et al. 1990) or an empirical perspective (Gatignon
and Anderson 1988, Gomes- Casseres 1991, Hennart 1991). However, relatively few
studies address the choice between entry via acquisition or greenfield project. These
studies focus on the investing company, developing propositions and empirical tests
primarily from transaction cost or resource based perspectives (Hennart and Park 1993,
Barkema and Vermeulen 1998).
The issue of ownership of foreign operations is central to any theory in the international
business. This issue has been addressed by a number of scholars using transaction cost
arguments (Buckley and Casson 1976, Teece 1986). The narrower question of how
transaction costs affect the choice of ownership structure of foreign subsidiaries has
received much less attention. Yet, a complete theory must explain why companies would
form a wholly owned foreign subsidiary in one case, and a joint venture in another. A
detailed study of ownership choices may throw additional light on the transaction cost
approach to company behaviour.
Transaction cost theory arguments influences the set of determinants of the optimal
ownership as produced by the maximisation of net profits. Influential contributors of
research on international entry modes have examined the contingent relationship
between company characteristics and selected entry mode (Stopford and Wells 1972,
Johanson and Vahlne 1977, Dubin 1975, Davidson 1980).
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A variety of studies have considered industry, and company specific factors and their
contingent influence on wholly owned entry mode decisions (Caves and Mehra 1986,
Zejan 1990). Another stream of literature has compared the joint venture and wholly
owned entry modes (Gatignon and Anderson 1988, Kogut and Singh 1988, Kim and
Hwang 1992, Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992).' There is considerable theoretical and
empirical support for the contingency entry mode argument. In the Balkans, specific
issues arise due to the process of systematic transition, especially the rapid opening of
the economies and the privatisation of SOE.
The ownership advantage explains a company's resource commitment, and the
internalisation advantage explains a company's organisational control difficulties.
Organisational control concepts or proxies that have been empirically supported include
ownership control, organisation culture and managerial transfers (Agarwal and
Ramaswami 1992, Caves and Mehra 1986, Kim and Hwang 1992, Kogut and Singh
1988, Li and Guisinger 1991, Wilson 1980, Yip 1982). Variables that relate to both
concepts and which have been supported in contingency entry mode research include
country experience, competitive position, and company size (Caves and Mehra 1986,
Kim and Hwang 1992, Kogut and Singh 1988) product diversification and multinational
experience (Caves and Mehra 1986). Therefore, resource commitment and
organisational control have been shown to support the contingency factor and entry
mode relationship.
Many scholars have suggested that different entry modes require different resource
commitments. Among the first to outline a relationship between resource commitments
and international business growth were Daniels (1970) and Vernon (1983). Anderson
and Gatignon (1986) developed a transaction cost model that considered the trade- off
between the costs of mode control and the costs of mode resource commitment. Hill et
al. (1990:118) elaborated on this idea of resource commitment when they differentiated
1 Joint ventures are a hybrid form between market and intra- company coordination, which reduces market
transaction costs at the expense of higher coordination costs between the parents.
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between joint ventures and wholly owned entry modes. They defined resources as
dedicated assets that cannot be re- deployed to alternative uses without cost.
The above theoretical arguments and evidence provide a model for the contingent
selection of joint ventures relative to the two other modes. To contingently differentiate
between the wholly owned and joint venture modes one has to consider the nature and
type of resource requirements. Two types of resource requirements are use to make this
differentiation. The first is the perceived inimitability or transferability of resources, and
the second is the core nature of the resources in the parent company.
The important difference between the acquisition and joint venture modes is that
companies in a joint venture mode share and provide access to some of their internal
resources, while in the acquisition mode no such access is provided. A company will use
the joint venture mode to rectify a resource deficiency only if it is willing to risk
providing access to such resource, and can find a willing and suitable partner(s) having
appropriate resources to share or provide access (Hill et al. 1990). The critical factor in
the joint venture is finding partners that are predisposed to providing such access to
resources. This predisposition must be based on inter- company trust, and a perception
that access and sharing of resources will not negatively affect the company strategically
(Daniels and Magill 1991). A company will tend to favour a wholly owned entry if it
cannot find a suitable partner predisposed to providing access or sharing the required
resources, or if it is itself predisposed to providing access to internal resources.
A variety of researchers have suggested that core resources or competencies are vital to
long- term competitive advantages (Collis 1991, Hamel and Prahalad 1990, Prahalad and
Bettis 1986, Stalk et al. 1992).2 The critical element is the perceived risk of either
exposing or sharing the core resources, and the resulting loss of future competitive
advantage, given the benefits of the joint venture mode. If companies want to protect
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these vital core resources and the perceived risks of having them transferred to the
second company are high, then they should procure the needed resources through a
wholly owned subsidiary.
International business is subject to higher transaction costs than most domestic business,
due to extensive imperfections on international markets. This makes the choice of an
optimal organisational form a key issue in international business strategy. Companies
entering a foreign market can choose among an array of possible organisational modes,
including joint or wholly owned ventures. These alternatives differ in the control that the
entrant attains over the local operations, and have been analysed in the literature by
applying transaction cost economics (Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Hennart 1991).
8.2 An Analysis of The Determinants of Ownership Structures in the Balkans
To a large degree the choice of the investment structure depends on the reason behind
the decision to invest in the Balkans and on the resources needed in the new venture, and
second on the resources that are found within the entering company.'
The nature of the company's operations in the foreign market depends on its choice of
mode of entry. This decision is one of the most critical strategic decisions. The Balkans
pose particular challenges to investors because multiple market failures such as the
unregulated markets, the incapacity of commercial infrastructure, the absence of the
legal framework protecting the interests of the shareholders and the proprietary assets of
the companies, have to be accommodated and it is not feasible to work with the
efficient- market assumptions suitable for developed economies. By exploring FDI in
the countries we found aspects of the decision that otherwise have gone unnoticed.
Therefore, our findings should be relevant for investment in the Balkan markets.
2 Collis (1991:52) defines core competencies as the irreversible assets along which the firm is uniquely
advantaged. These are the type of resources that a company would be unwilling to share or expose to a
potential competitor.
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Even when host countries do not impose restrictions on foreign ownership, as in the case
of the Balkans, profit- maximising companies should in theory rank every alternative
ownership structure in terms of expected return and select the best choice. Formally,
suppose a company i, considering investing abroad in a production plant, has a set J of
alternative choices regarding the ownership structure. Profitability of each alternative,
say 7ijj, can be derived as a function of its potential costs and benefits.4 If a company
makes the choice j (the ownership structure), we assume that the choice is the maximum
among they choices, if and only if 7rlj>7Tjk \/keJ,k ± / (Greene 1997:913).
When the expected economic gains of sharing ownership outweigh the organisational
and coordination costs, partial ownership will be the preferred mode of operation.
Otherwise, a fully owned affiliate structure would be selected. That is, the process of
weighing costs and benefits of various ownership options will shape companies'
preference. In the case of partnership, the issue of who has control of the affiliate is also
relevant in determining the observed degree of partnership. Partial ownership may imply
a mixed corporate culture and much looser ties to the parent company. Nevertheless, this
option can offer a better knowledge of local market conditions. An interesting point to
note is a relative disadvantage of acquisitions relative to greenfield and joint ventures.
This problem is related to the high cost of integrating the target company's labour and
technological asset.
In fact, one reason for the formation of partnerships between Greek companies and local
agents may be the need to share risk, notably that associated with the uncertainty of
operating abroad. The risks associated with FDI can be classified in various types. For
"
Thus, the resources that companies possess determines whether they pursuing an internal growth strategy
i.e. greenfield, or an external growth strategy i.e. acquisitions and joint ventures (Penrose 1959).
4 The first step in designing the appropriate entry mode is defined as the match of foreign market
opportunities or threats to a company's existing resources and capabilities. The choice between the three
alternative ownership structures basically involves trade- offs related to the level of resource commitment
(Stopford and Wells 1972), the degree of control (Caves 1982, Davidson 1982, Root 1987), thus the
specification and assumption of risks (resource commitment and monitoring cost) and returns (maximum
economic return on for the commitment of company's resources) (Franko 1971, Stopford and Wells 1972,
Hladik 1985, Kim and Hwang 1992).
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our study, the most relevant types appear to be control risks and resource risks.
Assuming that a foreign partner transfers to its affiliate intangible assets, i.e. technology
the expected turnover from operating abroad (T) can be specified as a function of the
amount of transferable resources (TR), for which a transfer price should be agreed, and
the profits of the affiliate (7ta). That is, T=/„ (TR,7r.,).
The amount of assets transferred to an affiliate can be seen as a positive function of the
ownership share, since the effort to transfer skills is likely to be better compensated the
higher the share of the foreign partner who then receives a larger part of the direct or
indirect rent yield by these assets. Similarly the higher the foreign partner's ownership
share the larger its share in the affiliate's profits. In addition, a company that decides to
invest abroad may incur costs, notably those associated with monitoring the affiliate's
operations, the last being a function of geographical and cultural distance. Therefore, the
total costs that a Greek partner has to balance against expected gains can be expressed as
C=/c (R, OC) where R stands for potential resource costs and OC for control costs.3
Combining the expected gains of the Greek partner and his cost of control, we obtain the
net gains he can derive from operating abroad, i.e. jtj = T- C = g (s) with 0<s< 1, which
is assumed to be maximised with respect to the Greek ownership share, s. The resulting
optimal s will be adopted. Control has a critical impact on the future of a foreign
company. Without control, a company finds it more difficult that invariably arise when
two parties to a contract pursue their own interests (Davidson 1982). Further, the entrant
can use its control to obtain a larger share of the foreign company's profit. In short,
3 The costs tend to be significant concern for Greek technology intensive companies, since the leakage of
important information based assets to direct competitors may cause a loss of competitive advantage and
hence a reduction in future profits (Nakamura and Yeung 1994). For this reason, a Greek partner has the
incentive to increase its ownership share in order to protect its property rights and to control the use of the
intangible assets. Therefore, R is assumed to increase as the Greek partner, the owner of the intangible
assets, increases its ownership participation in the affiliate. By contrast, as the foreign participation
increases, monitoring costs are expected to increase, since the domestic partner has less incentive to
supervise the affiliate operations (Nakamura and Xie 1998). Thus, OC is expected to increase as the Greek
partner increase its ownership share. When a Greek partner faces great loss in proprietary rights, the effect
of R in C tends to outweigh the effect of OC and hence, the Greek partner will demand more ownership.
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control is a way to obtain a higher return. Yet, control carries a high price (Vernon
1983). To take control, the entrant must assume responsibility for decision- making a
company may be unwilling or unable to carry out in an uncertain foreign environment.
Control also entails commitment of resources, including high overhead.6 Resource
commitment also increases the company's exposure. This is due to the possibility of
losses due to information leakage and opportunistic behaviour on behalf of a local
partner (Davidson 1982). Thus to assume control is also to assume some form of risk
(Cateora 1993, Czinkota et al. 1993, Daniels and Radebaugh 1993, Paliwoda 1993,
Young et al. 1989).
Although TR and na are not directly observable, we can see them as a function of
company- specific characteristics and host industry conditions. It would be expected that
factors related to the structure of competition in the host industry might affect the
affiliate's profits and hence the choice of ownership participation. In profitable and
growing industries, expected profits from an affiliate may be greater than those in less
profitable declining industries. Therefore, the Greek partner's demand for ownership
will be higher, the more profitable and dynamic is the host industry. However, when the
domestic competition is imperfect it may be advantageous to work with a local partner
familiar with the environment. In an oligopolistic industry, the level of profits an
affiliate can achieve may be higher but its volatility may be higher as well. Therefore,
the partnership with a domestic agent may be a mechanism to reduce or at least share the
risk associated with an unknown market.
Still, related to company specific factors is capital and R&D intensity. Companies
characterised by high capital intensity require a large resource commitment but may
yield large profits. Although high profits may induce Greek companies not to share
ownership with local partners, high capital requirement may lead them to share potential
The contrary may occur when the potential reduction in affiliate's profits due to agency problems tends to
exceed the expected costs.
6 This is turn creates switching costs, reducing the company's ability to change its institutional
arrangement should its choice turn out to be suboptimal.
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financial risks by engaging in a partial ownership structure. This may be particular
relevant if the Greek company cannot afford the entire investment and sees the
partnership option as a way to complement its resources.
A similar reasoning predicts a negative relationship between the affiliate's size and the
ownership structure. One reason underlying the decision to produce abroad may be a
reaction to the moves of direct competitors. Some companies operating in an
oligopolistic industry may find it optimal to follow the leading company's strategy and,
hence to engage in FD1 (Knickerbocker 1973, Franko 1989). Yet, the presence of
economies of scale in the industry may force some companies to set up plants larger than
they can afford and manage (Gomes- Casseres 1990). In particular, the difficulty of
managing alone a large local workforce may lead the foreign partner to reduce demand
for ownership in order to decrease the control costs (TR) associated with large affiliate
size (Nakamura and Xie 1998). In these situations, searching for local partners and
sharing the ownership may be a profitable way to follow the leading company without
compromising the success of the operation.
However, the size of the affiliate can have an opposite effect in determining foreign
ownership choice, if it is conceived as proxy of market power. The greater the size and
the market power of a company, the larger will be the potential for increasing profits.
Hence, the larger the share the foreign partner may demand. Moreover, as Nakamura
and Yeung (1994) have suggested, the affiliate's size may also affect the amount of
assets that the investor finds optimal to transfer. If size affects positively TR, the
ownership share demanded by the foreign partner will follow the size of the affiliate.
Regarding R&D activities, the company specific advantage may render large profits and
hence create increased ownership demand. In this context, the propensity to search for
local partners is lower. In R&D intensive industries, skill or technological costs tend to
be of significant concern for foreign partners, especially in transition economies, given
the existing market imperfections. The ownership control of their affiliate tends to be the
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mechanism used to protect their proprietary rights (Calvet 1981). In particular, a fully
owned affiliate has the advantage of being tailor- made to fit the Greek companies'
objectives with respect to R&D. Additionally, all the potential gains of these activities
can be fully internalised by the affiliate and parent company. In case of partial
ownership, the cost of coordinating, monitoring and defending the proprietary rights
may outweigh the potential gains of a partnership with local agents (Caves 1996).
The net gains a foreign partner can derive from operating abroad are a positive function
of the TR and na and a negative function of the control costs. While a fully owned
affiliate can minimise a foreign partner's loss due to misappropriation of its intangible
assets, it might, however, be unable to maximise the return that these assets could
potentially earn. That is, the observed 7iamay differ from the potential maximum level of
profits, say 7t*a It may well occur when the production is natural resource or skilled
labour intensive and the Greek company is unable to contract efficiently the necessary
production inputs. In particular, when the main resources are locally controlled, Greek
companies may find partnership with a local agent as the best option to produce in the
*
host country, since it may narrow the potential gap between n a and 7ia In this case, the
benefits of using the ownership channel to gain access to relevant inputs may outweigh
the cost of sharing ownership. This is, in fact, the main argument of the transaction costs
theory in relationship to ownership choices.
The theory posits (Teece 1986) that the problem of structuring ownership is solved by
evaluating the trade- off between the costs of using the market or the internal channels
for transferring or gaining access to the relevant inputs, such as natural resources, skilled
labour, R&D, or organisational capabilities. In this context, the choice of partial
ownership can be seen as an incentive mechanism used by the Greek partner to induce




Another factor that is likely to narrow the potential gap between n a and 7ta is related to
asymmetric information between Greek and domestic agents. Partial ownership may be
the appropriate way to acquire industry specific knowledge since the partnership with
local agents may facilitate access to valuable information unknown to the Greek
company.
8.3 The Econometric Model
Given the nature of the dependent variable, which represents the individual choice of
each Greek company among three alternative ownership structures for their affiliates in
the Balkans, discrete choice models offer the best approach to assessing the determinants
of the observed ownership structures. In this research, regarding the definition of the
dependent variable, we consider different types of ownership; joint venture, acquisition
and greenfield. This implies that our dependent variable assumes only three possible
values: 0 for joint venture, 1 for acquisition, and 2 for greenfield. Therefore, our
hypothesis will be tested with multinomial logit analysis, because the dependent variable
can have three possible values (Bell 1996). As we have stated above, a company will
choose alternativej if and only if it renders the highest expected profits. The profit i can
expect from choosing the alternative j is, n^= /?jiJ+£i / (Greene 1997:913), where the
vector xt compromises the observed company specific characteristics,/? is the
compatible vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and the stochastic term
associated with each choice and company.7 Given the stochastic nature of the profit
function, the probability that ownership structure j is selected by any company i can be
written as Py= Prob (7ty>7tik Vke J,k * ;)(Greene 1997:913). The results are based on
the multinomial logit model, which provides a set of probabilities for the choices of a











8.4 Analysis of the Econometric Model Findings
In this section, we analyse the choice of entry mode of Greek companies in the Balkans.
The theoretical issues and data availability drive the choice of independent variables.
These variables are based on a company's capabilities, since these capabilities yield
competitive advantage in the marketplace. These variables have been defined and
explained in chapter five, table 5.9.
Looking at the results in table 8.1, R&D intensity and advertising intensity, the resource-
based concepts that have been empirically linked to the choice ofwholly- owned modes,
are in agreement with the existing literature (Agarwal and Ramaswani 1992, Caves and
Mehra 1986, Kogut and Zander 1993, 1995). The variables that have significantly and
statistically explain the preference for the choice of entry mode for the Greek companies
in the Balkans are the affiliates' capital (SIZE), the capital intensity of the investing
companies (INV), the R&D intensity of the investing companies (R&D), the resource
intensity of the investing companies (RESRC), the labour intensity of the investing
companies (LABOUR), the adverting intensity of the investing companies (ADVERT),
and last but not least, the advantages related to the geographical diversification of the
investing companies (GEOGR).
7
The introduction of the stochastic term aims to capture unobserved company specific characteristics,
such as company capabilities and strategies, that may also determine whether or not a Greek company
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Table 8.1 Multinomial Logit Estimation of the Ownership Structure Decision
Variable Acquisition Greenfield Joint Venture
Intercept -9. 40 (0.003) * 9.39 (0.045) * 2.18 (0.512)
SIZE 1.25 (0.008) * -1.04 (0.067) *** -0.73 (0.083) ***
INV 0.01 (0.845) -0.26 (0.007) * 0.12 (0.026) **
PRF -0.04 (0.117) 0.05 (0.176) 0.02 (0.451)
GROWTH 0.02 (0.340) - 0.006 (0.807) -0.03 (0.143)
R&D 2.46 (0.065) *** -182.78 (0.191) 19.92 (0.303)
RESRC 0.26 (0.698) -1.31 (0.131) 1.18 (0.051) ***
LABOUR 7.79 (0.078) *** - 1.67 (0.038) ** -6.51 (0.069) ***
ADVERT 46.78 (0.073) ** -89.01 (0.170) -4.20 (0.911)
GEOGR 0.94 (0.028) ** -2.22 (0.001) * 0.27 (0.558)
Equation X2 22.272 (p= 0.008) 40.345 (p= 0.000) 10.762 (p= 0.292)
Log Likelihood -203.765
Pseudo R2 = 0.343
N= 122
X2 51.280*
Average of p,j 57.4
Figures in parentheses are significance levels. *, **, and *** mean that coefficients are statistically
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The indicator p,j measures the proportion of correct
predictions for choice j and, for each model, we present the average of p's.
The multinomial logit regression has a statistically significant overall explanatory power
with a model chi- square of 51.280 (p=0.000). In addition, 57.4% of the sample
observations are correctly classified.
Table 8.2 Classification- Predictions Full Sample
Predicted
Observed Joint Venture Acquisition Greenfield Percent Correct
Joint Venture 4 22 5 12.9%
Acquisition 5 46 9 76.7%
Greenfield 3 8 20 64.5%
Overall Percentage 9.8% 62.3% 27.9% 57.4%
needs contributions from local companies, and unobserved choice- specific attributes.
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In the joint venture category, 12.9% of the companies were correctly classified as joint
ventures based on the variables used in the analysis. The percent of correctly classified
companies as acquisitions and greenfield based on the above variables is 76.7% and
64.5% respectively. The predictions are adequate given how unbalanced and non
homogeneous- by including both manufacturing and service companies- our sample has
been (Greene 1997: 891- 893). Although we have tried to include a dummy variable 0,1
to differentiate between the manufacturing and the service companies, yet the results
were statistically insignificant and not robust as the results presented in the above table.
8.4.1. The Effect of R&D Intensity on the Entry Mode Choice
We suggest that a company's competitive R&D position is threatened by sharing or
exposing these core competences, as well as that the higher the risk, the higher the
ownership control is required. A manager from a telecommunications company and a
manager from an electronic components manufacturing company reported that their
companies with high R&D intensity preferred to have complete control over their
proprietary know- how in order to preserve and- or best exploit the knowledge, given
imperfections in the external markets for technology. Thus, the higher the Greek parent
R&D intensity, the greater the possibility that the Balkan affiliate will be fully owned.
Although we would expect that a parent's R&D level increases the likelihood that
foreign expansions are greenfields rather than acquisitions, from a transaction cost
perspective, the results for greenfield are in the opposite than expected direction. Our
findings from table 8.1 suggest that companies that had already developed proprietary
technology in Greece will exploit abroad through an acquisition investment, hence high
R&D intensity should encourage acquisition form of entry.
Twenty- seven Greek companies (3 tobacco companies, 12 food and beverage
companies, 3 telecommunication companies, 4 petroleum companies, 4 electronic
components manufacturers, 2 pharmaceutical companies) that acquired Balkan
companies expressed the concern that by transferring large amounts of tacit or poorly
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protected proprietary know- how to their subsidiaries the pricing and the enforcement of
contracts with potential joint venture partners will be fraught with difficulties. It is
difficult to price technology, and to prevent its leakage in a joint venture. According to
transaction cost economics, loss of control increases the transaction costs in the case of a
transfer of specific assets in combination with possible opportunistic behaviour by the
partner(s). Based on the above quotation from the Greek managers and the statistical
significance of the propensity to acquire a Balkan company, we argue that a Greek
company's transfer of technological know-how varies directly with its R&D intensity,
thus there will be an inverse relationship between R&D intensity and the propensity to
joint venture.
Our findings show that Greek company capabilities determine establishment strategy.
Greek companies transferring technology reported that they were not interested in just
gaining quick market access while they were protecting their unique capabilities. They
were geared to long- term goals that are based on utilising their unique capabilities.
Managers from the electronic components companies (4), tobacco (3) and food and
beverages (12) companies reported that in order to attain superior profit in the Balkans,
their companies should successfully commercialise goods in the local marketplace. The
first strategy- market approach was to transfer superior technological knowledge and
build technological leadership in the host country. When they could exploit
technological knowledge in the Balkan markets without losing its value, and the
advantages generated by this knowledge, they could build a strong competitive position
in a local marketplace.
Further in our discussion with the all managers from the electronic components
companies (4), tobacco (5) and food and beverage companies (19), the managers
justified their decision to acquire a Balkan company by stating that technology transfer
influences subsidiary ownership choice and performance not only because a transfer is
difficult and costly but also because the transferred technology may not always be
successfully commercialised in local marketplaces, and since greenfield subsidiaries will
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lack the networking and distribution system necessary for the commercialisation of
technology, that leaves acquisition mode as the most appropriate for the control and
commercialisation of technology in the Balkans. Since they (the above companies) were
also interested in maximising the economic rents on their knowledge, this creates a
decision scenario in which the need for protection will be traded against return potential.
Lack of protection in a joint venture would make sharing of specialised knowledge risky
in the long run particularly since it would limit the flexibility they have in adapting to
future contingencies.
Furthermore all the managers (23% of our sample companies) from the above three
industries reported that market entry to exploit existing capabilities in the Balkans
frequently necessitates associated new capabilities in order to be competitive. Due to
lack of experience in a new sphere of activity (commercialisation of technology in new
markets with different standards and requirements of technology), not only these
companies will incur substantially higher costs of information acquisition, interpretation
and absorption, but development and integration of new knowledge is gradual and
incremental process which would be more costly and less efficient relative to
competitors who are already present and more experienced in this domain, according to
the managers of the above three industries.
A theme of the transaction costs and entry mode choice literature has been the market
failure for information knowledge transfer, be it due to information symmetries (Arrow
1971) or tacitness of the knowledge (Kogut and Zander 1993). In the Balkan economies,
these issues are of particular concern because the institutional framework does not
provide for efficient protection of property rights, and potential joint venture partners are
inexperienced in complex negotiations, therefore causing problems in choosing partial
internationalisation. Furthermore, the absence, of systems providing information and
legal enforcement of contracts allowed extensive information asymmetries and
opportunities for opportunistic behaviour, thus increasing transaction costs. According to
91 Greek managers a primary motive for transitional companies is, usually, the
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acquisition of technology in order to be able to make the products themselves in the
future. Therefore, they often try to seize, or copy, the technology to become independent
from the Greek companies. For this reason, joint venture partners are viewed as potential
competitors.
Greek technology- intensive companies prefer to internalise their transactions in
technology intensive goods and services. These companies are concerned about the
transfer of strong transferable competitive advantages, which include production know-
how, assessment of market opportunities for innovative products, feedback from sales to
product development, as well as the training of sales department. Thus, our findings
suggest that entrants that transfer technology are more likely to establish a wholly owned
subsidiary having a higher level of control in technology intensive industries, thus
reducing transaction costs. Wholly owned subsidiaries provide better safeguards against
the risk of the dissemination of know- how than joint ventures, as in the latter case there
are always at least two parties involved, with possibly deviating interests. Thus, by
looking at the data in tables 4.5 and 8.1, Greek technology intensive companies are
expected to choose wholly owned entry strategies in the Balkans, since their business
activities are subject to asset specificity and thus sensitivity to market failure.
8.4.2 The Effect of the Affiliate's Invested Capital on the Entry Mode Choice
From our data analysis in table 8.1, it is clear that the larger in terms of its capital
invested the affiliate is, the more likely to possess the necessary financial resources for
full ownership of its foreign operations and it is well positioned for a more resource
demanding full ownership structure, such as acquiring a Balkan company, than a smaller
company. The propensity of a Greek company to invest in a greenfield project is
statistically negative. We suggest that a greenfield investor should invest more money in
establishing a production unit, hire and train employees and establish distribution
networks, which of course in many cases can exceed the financial costs of just building
on something that already exists such as acquiring a domestic company.
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A Greek foreign operation that requires larger resources relative to the resource
availability of the parent is more likely to be structured as jointly owned, as the findings
in table 8.1 show. In that case, a partner may provide the money, personnel and other
resources to ensure the necessary fit between the needs and resources. Without that
correspondence, the goals of the foreign affiliate and the intentions of the Greek
company will not be easily realised. Joint venture arrangements allow the Greek
companies to share costs and risks, as well as complementary assets and skills with host
country partner companies. By doing so, a Greek company is able to reduce the long-
term uncertainty at a lower cost than through pure hierarchical or market approaches.
8.4.3 The Effect of Labour Costs on the Entry Mode Choice
Our results from table 8.1 show that a company with high labour costs will opt for an
acquisition strategy. On the contrary, labour costs seem to negatively affect the choice of
greenfields and joint ventures.
Holding everything else constant, affiliates experiencing high unit labour costs tend not
to be shared by Greek partners, i.e. form a joint venture. This means that when a foreign
affiliate uses a skilled and qualified workforce, subsequently resulting in relatively high
unit labour costs, the most probable choice of the Greek partner will be an acquisition.
This finding is interesting if we consider that post- socialist Balkan economies are
experiencing a major industrial restructuring process, which increase the post-
investment costs for Greek investors. Increasing productivity often requires a lay off a
large number of employees. This is costly to organise and could severely damage the
investors' local reputation.
Greek managers in the textile (1) and food and beverages (19) companies suggested that
the higher the labour intensity of an industry, the higher the post- investment costs due
to the over- employment problem. Therefore, they preferred acquisitions to joint
ventures, since acquisition provides more managerial control compared to a joint
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venture. Thus they have more freedom and autonomy in the relations with the labour
force and they can reduce its labour force more easily, than in a joint venture where the
influence of the local partner may be stronger.
The above twenty managers further suggested that they aim at utilising the human
capital of the local company. To access local human capital, an acquisition is more
efficient because setting up a greenfield operation and hiring key individuals does not
permit the entrant to tap specialised knowledge. To engage in a greenfield venture,
complementary local resources are needed. This includes skilled labour. In the Balkans,
labour skills are underdeveloped. Local companies employ qualified employees. Local
companies are unwilling to let them go, either because they are part of their respective
competitive advantages or for political considerations. Hence, lack of resources
available on local companies can induce Greek investors to consider an acquisition entry
mode rather than a greenfield entry.
8.4.4 The Effect of Resource Intensity on the Entry Mode Choice
Comparing the estimated effects of the variable associated with resources' intensity,
RESRC affects positively the probability of observing joint ventures. It seems plausible
that access to the best resources is already in the hands of local companies, and that the
best way to access these resource is to invest in the target country company that holds
them. In these companies the need for complementary inputs appear to be a dominating
over considerations concerning post- investment costs of restructuring and integrating
the Balkan company.
The food and beverage (6), textile (9), tobacco (1), mining (1) and construction material
(1) companies' managers that formed joint ventures, in their interviews stated that they
are strongly depended on local inputs at the time of the initial investment in the Balkans
since transportation costs for raw material were high and trade barriers inhibit
international trade at that time. Even to supply the local markets, they needed access to
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local raw materials. Thus, they preferred to form joint ventures. In this case, a joint
venture simply provided a concessionary right to exploit a resource.
Managers from food and beverages companies (6) and textile companies (9) reported
that under conditions of systemic upheaval access to essential and often scarce material
inputs was eased by forming joint ventures, thus inheriting local networks, which enjoy
privileged links with primary materials producers. In tobacco companies (1) the
managers reported that the partnership with outdated processing plants translates into
access to the commodity resource that these plants are processing so they acquired
access to physical plant, expert labour and links to tobacco growers.
8.4.5 The Effect of Sales Promotion Expenditures on the Entry Mode Choice
The explanatory company- specific variable ADVERT performs as it was expected. The
sign of its estimated coefficient from table 8.1 suggests that Greek marketing intensive
companies are more likely to prefer acquisitions. The reputation of the expanding
companies is affecting the choice of entry mode. Thirty- one managers of the companies
that preferred to acquire a Balkan company reported that their companies invest heavily
in advertising to obtain a good reputation. This process and experience of reputation
building is time consuming and uncertain. This process and experience, which are often
applicable to new markets, may be difficult to communicate to a joint venture partner.
Full ownership is a way to avoid having to persuade the partner that they choosing the
optimal level and mix of advertising expenditures. High investments in reputation do not
automatically lead to a good reputation. Each minor deviation from the behaviour that
they prescribe may have a disastrous impact on their reputation. Therefore, these thirty-
one companies, according to the opinion of their managers that invest heavily in brand-
name capital will avoid free riding by other companies. High- control entry modes are
considered the most efficient governance structures in situations where the risk of free
riding is high.
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All the Greek companies' (60) that preferred to acquire a Balkan company, reported that
in general their companies opt for that entry mode so that they will take control to
protect brand names from degradation by free- riders or to prevent the local operation
from using the names in an inconsistent manner thus diluting or confusing the
international position of the brands. Although according to eleven managers of food and
beverages companies some heavily advertised products tend to be unsophisticated
goods, which local agents are capable of handling, making low control appropriate, yet
heavy advertising does make free- riding likely and control more desirable. Therefore, a
transaction cost theory of entry choice is supported, favouring acquisitions for the
purpose of brand label or product adaptation.
According to the managers' statements, their companies have set up operations in the
Balkans in order to exploit domestic proprietary advantages due to domestic partners'
brand name and networking for distributing their own brand names. Managers from the
tobacco (5) and food and beverage (19) companies reported that they choose to acquire a
domestic company since they are entering mature industries, where established brand
names are an asset, and differences in language and culture reduce the benefits of using
their Greek name in the Balkan markets.
All the sixty Greek managers in the acquisition category agreed that marketing and
advertising skills are often the basis for the industry specific advantage. While local
companies are expected to have more intimate knowledge of local customs, the Greek
companies are more experienced in using mass advertising, in product packaging and
promotion, and in sales force management. Balkan managers suffer shortages of
necessary skills, especially in the marketing and commercialisation fields.
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8.4.6 The Effect of Gross Investment in the Investing Company in the Entry Mode
Choice
Regarding the capital intensity (1NV), there are significant differences among ownership
preferences. Companies operating in capital- intensive industries tend to prefer joint
ventures as opposed to acquisitions and greenfields. Our findings suggest that holding
everything else constant, the resource commitment associated with investment intensity
may out-weight the potential effect on the subsidiaries' profits and, as a result, Greek
capital- intensive companies tend to prefer joint ventures. The more capital intensive the
company in question, the higher the cost of wholly owned subsidiaries. In capital-
intensive companies, it is more cost effective to establishing a joint venture company in
the Balkans.
8.4.7 The Effect of International Business Experience on the Entry Mode Choice
The explanatory company specific variable GEOGR performs as it was expected.
Internationally experienced companies prefer to acquire a Balkan company. The reason
according to the manager from a food and beverage company is that his company 'was
motivated by survival instincts thus opt for an acquisition to quickly counter the
potential loss of regional market share to other foreign companies. The threat and costs
associated with potential loss of regional market share to competitors would be greater
than the additional costs of assimilation of new routines into the overall corporate
system, as would be necessary under an acquisition. Since we are having great
international experience we are able to bear the risk and management responsibility
associated with an acquisition and to integrate subsidiaries of diverse managerial
nationality, and thus we find it less compatible to form a joint venture to share the risks'.
However, the explanatory company specific variable GEOGR has a statistically negative
sign for the greenfield choice. Companies with international experience choose an
organisational form that provides opportunities to learn about the local environment
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while at the same time serves to minimise their risk exposure. Although, a greenfield
investor can minimise the risk exposure of its investment, yet it has less opportunities to
learn about the local environment. On the contrary, an investor that has acquired a local
company has immediate access to market information. We have to keep in mind, that
besides the production units, the investors in the acquisition category had the
opportunity to take advantage of the market knowledge, networking, distribution
systems and experience of their local partners, assets which are very much needed in the
Balkans and they are not easily available to greenfieid investors.
International experience would lead to better capabilities to manage and integrate an
acquired company. In their internationalisation process, companies would make
incrementally stronger commitments along various dimensions. As we have already
argued in the previous chapter knowledge of foreign markets is experiential knowledge,
which cannot be taught. It can only be acquired through experience and active
involvement in foreign markets. Such knowledge is essential for resource commitment
because it enables recognition of business opportunities and reduces market uncertainty.
Therefore, past commitment and accumulated international market experience
determines current activities as well as future resource commitments and involvement on
a high level. Therefore, our findings support that a company with greater international
business experience is better able to bear the risks associated with an acquisition and to
integrate acquired foreign companies of diverse managerial nationalities into the
parent's systems. With international business experience, investors build the capabilities
necessary to restructure and integrate acquired companies. These are particularly
important in the Balkans because acquirers become involved in the restructuring of
formerly SOE, which require changes of their organisational structures.
Greek companies with related experiences can organise a given transaction at lower
costs. Experienced companies can share their resources, such as international
management cadres and organisational capabilities, across operations. Their experience
reduces costs of internal organisation, and thus facilitates internalisation. Hence, the
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marginal costs of an additional entry are lower. Eighteen Greek managers of acquired
companies in general agreed that they choose a high ownership venture to satisfy their
strategic need to coordinate activities on a broader geographic basis.
Research has suggested that such companies will or should be more concerned with
international strategic position than with the transaction costs associated with a given
market (Porter and Fuller 1986). According to the Greek managers of acquired
companies though joint venture arrangements may be more appropriate for low potential
markets (at least in the short to medium term, like the Balkans) from a risk reduction
perspective, they may not allow the strategic control, change and flexibility that are
needed to secure long- term competitiveness. However, as managers from sixteen
acquired food and beverages companies and from thirteen financial services companies
that we have interviewed stated that they were concerned that the presence of joint
venture partners could create an impediment to strategic consideration. Their
motivations could be different with that of the local company, which can lead to
significant difficulties. That is why they demanded to have their own nationals in key
positions, which is easier to achieve via ownership than negotiation. By acquiring a
domestic company, they further reported, they could gain competitive advantage by
exploitation of the strategic options provided by integrated operations. They could spot
opportunities and threats that may be beyond the horizon of individual operations. They
could also bring the full weight of their resources to bear on selected competitors or
markets, shift resources across national boundaries very easily, and they could use the
experience gained in one country in another where it may be relevant. In addition to the
above strategic advantage, the managers of the above companies said that they preferred
complete control of their foreign operations because overall profit maximisation requires




The majority of the Greek companies in the Balkans prefer mostly acquisitions (60
companies), while the preference for joint ventures and greenfield is the same (31
companies). Although the existing literature in transition markets suggests that
acquisitions are confronted with many challenges that incur high transaction costs
(Jemison and Sitkin 1986, Bouthers and Bamossy 1997, World Bank 1996, Newman
1998, Meyer and Bjerg- Moller 1998), yet acquisitions is the most popular choice of
Greek companies expanding into the Balkans.
Within organisations, hierarchies replace prices as coordination mechanisms.
Management coordinates individual activities, gives directions and monitors
performance. Many of the activities revolve around the collection, communication and
evaluation of information. The costs of managing across borders exceed those of a
national company. Firstly, this is due to specific administrative costs of international
production, and secondly, monitoring is more costly. However, from our data analysis
we show how Greek companies may reduce these costs of internal organisation if they
can utilise economies of common governance and international business experience.
Thus, by looking at the findings companies that preferred acquisition utilise economies
of common governance, accumulation of international business experience, thus
reducing the internal transaction costs.
While the resources or opportunities in the Balkan markets exist, the ability of each
Greek company to draw resources or make use of the available opportunities is
constrained by each company's individual company conditions. Greek companies will
thus choose different market entry strategies in the Balkans based upon their resources
and capabilities. Our main proposition here is that companies with greater resources and
capabilities to operate in international environment are more likely to reduce the
uncertainties associated with investments in new foreign markets as well as transaction
cost risks.
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From our data analysis, it appears that Greek companies do exert more control as
proprietary content increase. This implies that Greek companies tend to reserve
proprietary knowledge for entry vehicles they control completely. Fligh control is more
often employed for technically sophisticated products, which tend to have higher
proprietary content than unsophisticated products. Specialised knowledge comes into the
open market as the innovation diffuses. Over time, transaction- specific assets associated
with an innovation become general purpose assets associated with a well- established
product. As this diffusion occurs, we should expect to see less integration, as less
administrative control is needed. Hence, older technology is likely to be handled by a
joint venture, leaving new technology handled by a wholly ownership subsidiaries. A
product class may have reached the mature stage in the Greek market but not in the
Balkans market. Therefore, indigenous capacity is not yet widely available, and the
entrant who contracts with and trains a local independent entity is creating transaction-
specific assets. The relevant level of product maturity, therefore, is in the Balkans
market.
Company conditions form the basis for the company's strategy and determine the
company's ability to foresee and exploit external opportunities as well as to predict
coming threats from the external environment. The notion that the company's current
resources influence managerial perceptions and, therefore the direction of company
growth is a cognitive proposition that reinforces the economic rationale that a
company's resource profile will influence the company's internationalisation strategy. It
is resources that limit the choice of international markets the companies may enter, and
the manner in which it may enter markets as well as performance in the Balkan markets.
We found evidence that Greek companies investing in the Balkans select their
ownership share based on affiliate's size and capital, R&D and technology, resource
intensity of the company, labour and advertising intensity as well as on their experience
in operating in foreign countries. In previous studies of internationalisation, researchers
have tended to treat uncertainties in foreign markets as given and have viewed a
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company's international expansion as either an adaptive or a learning process in
unfamiliar local environments. This perspective suggests that Greek companies
investing in a country with a greater uncertainty tend to perceive a higher level of
investment risk and, thus, engage in less resource commitment in FD1. This theory is not
compatible with our findings for acquisitions. Based on the findings, we may suggest
that Greek companies seem to transfer to their Balkan affiliates more intangible assets,
especially in the acquisitions. Greek companies are more concerned with potential
monitoring costs in technological intangible assets, which together with the size effect
lead them to select larger ownership shares, thus preferring acquisition.
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CHAPTER NINE
Company Restructuring and Adjustment in the Balkans
9.1 Introduction
The literature on ownership structure and company restructuring during the transition
from plan to market consists primarily of studies based on evidence from CEE and
Baltic countries (Frydman et al. 1997, Pohl et al. 1997). At the opposite, little research
has been devoted to foreign companies in the Balkans. In the early years of transition,
the Balkans were struggling to create their governance structure and legislation after
decades of command economy system of governance. After a decade of market-
orientated reforms it is important to examine whether market strategies of foreign
companies have altered and to what extent.
Studies focusing on market strategies and performance in the Balkan context have been
fragmented and share some common shortcomings. Most of the studies suffer from a
narrow focus as market strategies are often discussed only from the viewpoint of entry
modes. The studies have also often been static, therefore they have being unable to catch
the dynamics of market strategies, and they have dealt with relatively small samples and
mostly big companies, therefore being unable to generalize the results of company
behaviour into a larger population. This chapter offers a view of market strategies in the
Balkans by analysing their characteristics and their resource commitment. The aim is to
obtain empirical evidence on the driving forces to company restructuring under
conditions of a typical slow- transition economic region by focusing on the following
research question. What kind of strategic restructuring and adaptation have Greek
companies adopted in terms of organisation, production and investments?
Economists, even when incorporating the resource- based view, tend to conceptualise
organisations as bundles of production factors that are combined as to optimise
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efficiency for given production functions and market prices. Hence organisational
transformation is primarily analysed as reconfiguring the production process. That is,
closing down unprofitable production lines, changing inputs and outputs, and redrawing
the boundaries of the organisation according to transaction costs considerations (Corbo
et al. 1991, IMF et al. 1991). In this chapter, we focus on the strategic transformation of
the Greek companies in the Balkans. Strategic transformation is a necessity, crucial to
long- term survival and prosperity of these companies.
The conception of transformation is broad, including changes in corporate governance,
organisation structure, management, inputs, outputs, and sales. Company transformation
therefore encompasses both short- run or defensive actions and long- run or strategic
measures. We have decided to focus mostly on what the existing literature in transition
economies calls strategic adaptation. The motivation for focusing on this aspect of
company behaviour is that defensive adjusting essentially takes measures that seek to
reduce costs and scale down business activity. Defensive adjusting is limited to the cost-
cutting activities of companies therefore it does not as such necessarily imply the
existence of a strategy for reorienting companies' activity under the new economic
conditions. The strategic component of adjusting in the Balkans is defined by a
thoughtful business project often implying a change in the production profile and a
technological breakthrough, usually necessitating investments in new activities. By
studying strategic adjusting, we aim to identify the development of marketing strategies,
reorganisation of production and intensity of investments. In table 9.1, we have
summarised the four areas that will be examined in relation to the strategies of the Greek
companies in the Balkans. Here the term adaptation is used to refer to actions taken to
change the structure of the company along four dimensions: internal organisation,
employment, output and investment. Using adjusting criteria such as adjustment of
employment, change of product mix etc., this research takes an interest in the impact of
different forms of ownership. The following four dimensions include 1 1 variables,
which are listed in table 9.1 and are defined and explained in chapter 5, section 5.5.1.
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Table 9.1 Aspects of strategic adaptation process in the Balkans
Organisation: Product Markets: Labour: Investments:
1. Providing independence 1. Export products to foreign 1. Corporate 1. Development of new
to the subsidiary markets downsizing technology.
2. Upgrade existing products. 2. Training the workforce
3. Develop new products 3. Capital investment
4. Establish new production programme
facilities 4. Establish distribution network
5. Buy new equipment
Because of the inefficiency of factor markets in the Balkans, companies able to attract
resources have the opportunity to create competitive advantage. We look at this process
of resource development starting with downsizing and then progress to upsizing. How
can organisations, move from downsizing to strategic restructuring? We argue that
changing the organisational framework, and therefore the incentives facing investors,
has a major impact on company behaviour. All the Greek managers (122 managers)
agreed that their Balkan subsidiaries needed to acquire new capabilities to be able to
compete successfully in the new economic environment. They need to raise capital for
new investments in highly imperfect capital markets.
Furthermore, all the managers reported that in order to move the company to a new
growth path, it was necessary to develop new products and processes and to enter new
markets domestically and abroad, by developing new tasks especially in the areas of
marketing, technology, human resources and finance. These were more far-reaching
tasks summarised with the term strategic adaptation. In addition, they reported that they
had to redefine their internal organization and the modes of interaction between their
companies and the Balkan organizations.
9.2 Challenges of Company Transformation in the Balkans
After interviewing companies (31 companies) that formed joint ventures with Balkan
companies or acquired a Balkan company (60 companies), we have formed a clear
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picture of the typical Balkan SOE. Sixty- one managers during the interviews reported
that their domestic partner in the Balkans had excess employment, excess inventories
and an uncompetitive product portfolio. Balkan companies were highly integrated both
vertically (due to high transaction costs of inter-company-relations) and horizontally
(due to the focus on economies-of-scale). According to the above 61 Greek managers,
Balkan managers were experienced in using relationships with political authorities,
notably the communist party and the central plan authorities to the advantage of the
company. The real existing socialism required companies to engage in informal
interactions with each other to overcome shortages. Therefore according to the Greek
managers, the Balkan managers have developed considerable political networking skills,
which they continue to utilize, but lack experience in managing in a market
environment.
Of major overall importance was the choice between adapting environment in the host
country and working toward changing it. The decision was a function of the time
horizon and resources of the companies. When a long-term perspective was used, all the
Greek companies admitted that they tried to pursue a strategy of altering the marketing
environment step by step in order to move it closer to a functional market economy.
Such an approach, however, required an understanding of current societal weaknesses.
All the managers agreed that emphasis was placed on the need to go beyond purely
commercial criteria in decision- making, by considering the long- term social and
economic repercussions of their actions.1 They were building on maintaining regional
brand identification and seeking to extend their products to a significant population
segment on a step- by- step basis. Therefore, the short- term focus of all the companies
in our sample (122 companies in the FDI category) was to maintain price segmentation
strategies, but the long-term focus was the introduction of popular Greek brand names to
a market that previously had little brand- name orientation.
1
In the Balkans, the economic, social and political dimensions differ in major ways from the environment
Greek managers are used to at home. In light of the transitions taking place, the opportunities for change
are constrained by decades of ideological pressures fundamentally opposed to the core aspects of a market
economy.
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The challenges for all companies in the Balkans, according to their managers, were
threefold. First, develop market- based concepts for the organisation. Second, learn to
reassess their position continuously. Third, develop new structures of control and power
within the organisation. To implement this new management, they need knowledge that
is not readily available. Managerial knowledge is not available on markets as it is of a
highly experiential and tacit nature.
All the Greek managers (122 managers) have addressed the weaknesses of their Balkan
affiliates to adjust to the changing environment and the changes needed to transform
them to organisations successful in the new competitive market- led environment. All
domains of a company are addressed as having major weaknesses compared to Greek
standards. Companies in the Balkans plunged into the market economy with a bundle of
resources brought together to serve the needs of the central-plan economy.2 This bundle
of resources, while serving survival under socialism, is profoundly different from the
requirements of a market economy.
Acquired companies and joint ventures therefore have to reconfigure their resources and
learn to operate successfully in the new context. According to the opinion of the
managers in joint ventures (31) and acquired companies (60), the local companies did
not have appropriate resources to change and take advantage of new opportunities.
Because factor inputs, including management and capital, are not easily available, they
(Greek companies) had to commit in developing new resources, including financial
resources. Because of shrinking markets, local companies have significantly reduced
financial reserves, therefore making the resource commitments of Greek companies very
appealing and very much necessary. Even with adequate financial resources, companies
also need to upgrade their existing capabilities with particular emphasis on the human
capital.
Resources were allocated in part in implementing the central plan, and in part through unintended
incentives created by the plan regime.
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All the managers in joint ventures (31) and acquired companies (60) revealed to us
during the interviews, they had to invest heavily in the new ventures, as their partners'
contributions did not meet their expectations. Problems with slow decision making and
conflict over the original agreement were mostly focused on decisions regarding the
product strategy and export orientation of the company. All the managers during the
interviews admitted that two were the most profound examples of conflict between the
two sides. The first example of conflict is over the initial agreement about the transfer
prices for products or components bought from or sold to the investing partners, which
are part of the Greek companies' network. In all the cases, the Balkan partners insisted
on working with Balkan suppliers whose quality of materials and terms of business,
were not approved by the Greek partners.
The second example of conflict is that in many cases the partners' decision makers
perceived the need to upgrade the existing products and serve the existing markets as
more important than developing new products and serving new markets. A Greek
manager of a tobacco joint venture company that we have interviewed reported 'that the
local partner's attitude was a result of his knowledge about the international market and
the fear of expanding. He was feeling more secure to serve the domestic and- or existing
market segments that he knew and control rather than going international and competing
with bigger and stronger competitors or launching new products serving new market
segments'. According to the same manager, it took him 'a long time to change the point
of view of the local partner and make him realise the competitive position of the
company will not strengthened by operating only in the narrow domestic market'.
All the Greek managers (122) suggested that productivity advancement often required
plant consolidation, reduction of the number of products manufactured, adaptation of
capacity of machine assets and employees to demand, reduction of inventory and input
costs by switching to suppliers of western standards. Managers from financial service
companies (13), mining companies (5) and food and beverages companies (25),
addressed necessary changes in the organisational structures and processes to improve
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the efficiency of the organisations, suggesting a change from the typical functional to a
divisional structure, flatter hierarchies and decentralisation by offering more
independency to the local decision makers. The hierarchical- bureaucratic structures
were inadequate under the new economic conditions.
The creation of a competitive market environment is a prerequisite for company
restructuring. However, during the interviews with the Greek managers, all the managers
explained that the environment of the Balkans features some serious deviations from this
condition. In particular they said that a number of specific market imperfections
emerged which turned out to be obstacles to the process of adjustment. Some of the
transitional market imperfections are inherited from the period of central planning (i.e.
weak banking sector, entry and exit conditions in an industry). Others came forth in the
transition phase itself, reflecting specific economic conditions (corruption, bureaucracy,
poor legislative discipline, the effects from price and trade liberalisation).
All the Greek managers argued that that market imperfections should not be considered
as a major obstacle to company restructuring in the transition to market economy since
imperfections were widespread in the Greek economy until the early 1990s, where the
scope and scale of market imperfections was such that they were dominated the market
in which we operated. As a result, Greek managers believe that their companies were not
distorted as much as their European competitors and hence had better market orientated
adjustment.
Before referring to the evaluation of the long- term behaviour of the companies, two key
legacies of short- term responses that appear to be critical for the success of long -term
efforts of restructuring should be mentioned. The first of these is the importance of
maintaining profitability in the first years of operations. All the managers (122) believe
that remaining even marginally profitably in the first years appear to have greater
progress in their long- term transformation and performance, since by incurring
significant losses early in the transition, it would be difficult to turn around the fortunes
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of loss- making companies/ In the early years of the transition to a market economy,
Greek companies experienced severe demand and price shocks. The period of 1989-
1996 was described from thirty- three managers as the most critical years to maintain
profitability in order to survive in the following years. How they responded to the short-
term shocks proved to be critical for their long-term survival. The quality of their short-
term responses determined many of the factors that relate crucially to their ability to
restructure in the longer term. Managers from all the profitable companies (89) in the
Balkans unanimously agreed that the companies that failed to respond quickly ended up
with debts and negative cash flows, making the restructure process looked impossible.
At some point, short term responses begun to accumulate into a long term trend, and
therefore, the sooner a company was able to shape its short term behaviour to conform to
its long term strategy, the more likely was to be successful. This illustrates the path-
dependent relationship between a company's response from the early stages of transition
and its ability to develop and implement strategies for restructuring and survival in the
long- term.
Seven managers from profitable companies expressed the opinion that one of the reasons
that some Greek companies were unprofitable is that these companies were making
passive responses to the pressures of transition, by having little, slow or no adjustment to
their levels of output and input use despite the sharp decline in demand and the large
changes in input and output prices. As would be expected, this passivity had negative
financial consequences in these companies. These companies had smaller profits or
larger losses than other companies, and, therefore, they tended to accumulate debts,
often in the form of payment to suppliers or to workers.
Demand for products from former socialist countries had declined, and the Balkan
companies were forced to find new markets in Western countries with high quality
standards. Lower trade barriers meant that they faced increased competition from
Indeed, as we will see in the next chapter, 33 companies were unprofitable in the Balkans. Fourteen
companies incurred significant losses in the first 2 to 3 years of their operations and they have not
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imported products from other countries, especially from Italy, Greece and Germany. In
addition, the Balkans experienced severe economic recessions, which lead to lower
domestic demand. In many cases the sales revenue was less than the cost of materials
used. A manager from a pharmaceutical company reported that 'if these companies
could not restructure their operations, they were unlikely to survive'. Therefore, one
fundamental measure of restructuring is whether companies were able to become
profitable in the new economic environment.
The conditions of demand and supply changed abruptly in the Balkans. Changing
relative prices alone required major adjustments in production processes. Managers from
the textile (8), pharmaceutical (2), food and beverage (23), petroleum (3) and electronic
components companies (4) reported that the costs of raw materials, labour and capital
rose 15% above the inflation rate on the average, whereas demand fell for many goods
because of increased competition. Even the most profitable affiliates would hardly be
able to avoid temporary reductions of output while adjusting to the new market
conditions. Reorganization of the production, such as changes of the product mix and an
adaptation of inputs, especially labour was required. The most common response by the
above forty managers to the replacement of state orders by a product market has been to
create a marketing capability in the organisation and to adjust to a more profitable
product profile.
The second finding about legacies has to do with the clarification of ownership rights to
the company. According to the responses by sixty- one managers, in those cases where
clear ownership rights were established early on, managerial responses could be more
active, more comprehensive and more successful. According to nineteen managers from
the food and beverages companies, although they had the ownership and the
management of the production facilities, the operations of the marketing and the
retailing departments was sometimes jointly carried out as a demonstration of good faith
and trust, therefore leading to conflicts of interests in many occasions. The same
managed to turn around their fortunes, thus remaining unprofitable.
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managers further reported that the Balkan managers did not view the product and market
strategies that they designed as credible. Therefore, they preserved with old marketing
policies, by using the influence they had on the employees, input suppliers and domestic
business partners. Such failures by the Balkan managers to accept the realities of the
transition and of the need of a new approach to the commands of a market economy,
where the demand for their products is shaped by the demand of the customers, resulted
in time lost waiting to launch new products prior to the launch of competitors' products.
This failure has also resulted in the waste of inputs and resources that were used to either
produce products with low demand, or improve the attributes of products that had no
significant growth potential.
We have to take into consideration that the absence of greater competition gave some
companies an oligopoly position in the local market and, hence, monopoly rents.
According to fourteen managers from financial services companies and three managers
from the telecommunications companies, sometimes the presence of an oligopoly simply
shielded the companies from the pressures of the market so that they can survive even
with minimal responses to the market. Oligopolies were less adverse to the pressures of
hard budget constraints and market discipline, meaning adjustment and restructuring
were less vital for survival, at least at the initial stage. Although the oligopoly status is
viewed as a counterpart of competition, and has a negative effect on restructuring
sometimes, however, many of these companies were not taking fast active steps to
secure their oligopoly powers.
Greek managers from all the companies involved in this study reported that adjusting
was even more complicated process than deciding upon entry mode strategy. No matter
which entry mode they choose, creating a management and operational structure that can
operate in a transition environment requires the continuous employment of new
resources and skills, as well as the flexibility to shape the new environment according to
the available resources.
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Balkan companies in which Greek companies have invested in and whose exports were
directed toward the CMEA suffered a relatively abrupt demand shock as the CMEA
collapsed. But the magnitude of the industrial output declines in the Balkans (see table
3.3.) was such that virtually all companies faced a sharp fall in demand. Despite the
belief that it was the so- called heavy industry of the region that was overdeveloped,
managers from consumer orientated sectors such as textiles (9) and food- processing
companies (13) said that they suffered comparable, if not greater, demand shocks as
consumers' incomes fell. Regional factors played an ambiguous role, with companies
located in distressed areas of high unemployment facing serious obstacles but according
to twenty five managers at the same time their companies benefited in their relations
with the workers and with local authorities due to the desire of the latter to keep
companies operating.
Access to markets is generally a crucial factor due to loss of former markets in the CEE.
The collapse of previous trading markets resulted in disastrous consequences for many
companies in the region. According to the managers in the food and beverages
companies (13), tobacco (2), mining (2), textile (6) and construction material companies
(6), the Balkan companies were not prepared for changing their market orientation
toward developed industrial countries. Any measures taken to help companies to get
access to new markets are crucial for survival. The same managers further reported that
they were interested in assuring the success of their companies and provided useful help
in getting orders from buyers from Western Europe. Access to new markets was
impossible however, due to technological backwardness of the Balkan companies. Rapid
technological renewal was required in order to meet the requirements of new markets.
These technologies were often not in the forefront of technological progress but
upgraded and improved the capabilities of the local companies.
Managerial skills at individual companies did appear to be important in determining how
companies responded to these shocks. Eleven managers from joint ventures reported that
some Balkan managers did not view the transition measures as credible, and therefore
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they preserved with old business policies, especially in the areas of product
development, raw materials procurement, and labour issues. Such failures by the Balkan
managers to accept the realities of the transition and of the stabilisation measures that
were introduced by the Greek managers were often accompanied by efforts of the
Balkan managers to resist the introduction of new ways of exerting outside influence
over the company, by mobilising the local labour unions and political parties.
Following market liberalisation, much of the industrial structure was rendered
economically obsolete, raising the opportunity for new investment. According to the
opinion of sixty- one managers, investment returns over the medium term could be
particularly high for those investments that facilitated the restructuring of existing
companies and which enable these companies to enter new markets. Such investments
are central to long- term growth, as in mature market economies. The introduction of
new technologies and processes and the subsequent adaptation of products, are critical in
assisting growth.
An almost universal complaint by the managers of acquired and joint venture companies
is the absence or underdevelopment of a wholesale distribution network. All the Greek
joint ventures and acquired companies attempt to overcome this by investing to establish
one. According to the experience of seventy- four Greek managers, distribution channels
were often fragmented, with small retailers accounting for a large share of consumer
markets. Greek managers reported that, reliable marketing information was scarce.
Channels of mass communication were less developed and less effective where
consumers prefer to rely on personal experiences. Therefore, the above seventy- four
managers suggested a need for high distribution intensity and multiple marketing
partners, rather than exclusive distributors. According to the resource- dependency
approach, Greek companies should prevent themselves from becoming dependent on
their external environment. Especially, the companies that control the distribution
channels in the Balkans have the power to create situations of unilateral dependency. To
avoid or reduce unilateral dependency, the above seventy- four Greek companies
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reported that they tried to keep some control over their external environment by building
up relationships with multiple distributors and other companies in the various stages of
the value- chain or by integrating vertically and bring other stages of the value- chain
into the organisation. The above seventy- four Greek managers generally believe that by
improving market access, it would allow them to learn from customers therefore more
efficiently improve their existing products. Better market access and expanded sales
based on improved products may enhance the organizations' capacity to learn and
therefore its ability to expand further, eventually developing new capabilities and new
products.4
Socialism did not necessarily reduce technical capabilities of the labour, but company
separation from the customer severely impeded their ability to adapt to market needs.
That finding reinforces the urgent need for greenfield investors to overcome a barrier of
the past and invest in distribution networks if they want to successfully adapt to the
needs of the market. No market networking and no previous experience of the local
markets make this strategic commitment quite necessary according to the managers of
greenfield companies. The above seventy- four managers reported that these
inadequacies compounded by the presence of bottlenecks at various internal and external
border and customs checkpoints, where graft and inspection slow traffic even further.
Therefore, the shepherding of a consignment of goods by an experienced distributor,
based in the recipient country, is a critical process, which safeguards timeliness and
regularity of delivery, quality and even integrity (protection against theft).
A critical determinant of acquisitions and joint ventures' performance appears to be the
control exercised by the parents over their subsidiaries' activities. All the managers in
the joint ventures (31) and acquired companies (60) expressed the concern that
insufficient or ineffective control over the subsidiary can limit their ability to coordinate
its activities, to efficiently utilise its resources, to effectively implement its strategy and
4
The above argument of the Greek managers matches Ansoffs (1957) suggestion that companies grow
first via market penetration and later via new product development, as well as our discussion about the
239
resolve the disputes that invariably arise when two parties pursue their own interest. The
above sixty- one managers further reported that by exercising control over some or all of
the activities of the Balkan subsidiary protect them from premature exposure of their
strategy, technological core or other proprietary components to outside groups, even to
their partners who might act as competitors in the future. Even if patents protect the
products or processes, companies may nonetheless fear damaging leakage of
unprotected innovations or know- how if shared with parents. Such disclosures may
have serious effects on the competitive position of the Greek companies, possible
creating new competitors or otherwise limiting the parents' overall efficiency. However,
organisational transformation of the Balkan companies involved changing existing
routines, which often inhibited organisational change.
The Greek managers unanimously agreed that the transformation and integration of
acquired and joint venture companies is subject to tensions between radical change to
match the strategy and corporate culture of the Greek investors, and preserving what is
valuable in resources and cultural attributes in the Balkan organisation. The central plan
regime was based on a hierarchy in the whole economy that established quantitative
output targets with few incentives to provide quality and customer service. Workers and
managers have therefore developed considerable experience in shirking and the
underlying routines and attitudes persist in the transition, according to the opinion of the
Greek managers. Finally, all the Greek managers agreed that the socialist experience has
equipped employees with no knowledge on how to adequately interpret the information
acquired to make the optimal decisions on opportunities to pursue in a market economy,
and where to find needed resources therefore requiring a close monitoring. Indeed as
seventeen managers in joint ventures (4 food and beverages, 3 telecommunication
companies, 2 financial services companies, 6 textile companies, 2 furniture companies)
reported that undertook major changes in their management structures. One of these was
to separate strategic decision making from the management of the day- to- day
operations. In the new business environment, Greek top managers had to devote most of
marketing strategies of the Greek companies in section 9.3.1.
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their attention to strategic issues having to do with the companies' long- term survival.
Therefore, middle and lower level managers had to make decisions regarding production
independently, something that local managers in the Balkans were not accustomed to as
Greek managers have reported.
The importance of managerial autonomy can be viewed in the light of what all the Greek
managers in acquired (60) and joint venture (31) companies called the Balkan mentality;
the Balkan managers believe that the Greek managers want to implement changes over
their companies by shock therapy, which reminds the old Stalinist mindset of cleansing
society. In addition, all the Greek managers in acquired and joint venture companies
reported that they had also to consider the mentality of the traditional local managers
who see foreigners as a threat to their survival, fearing that a foreign company might
simply strip assets such as the company's position in domestic and CEE markets.
In addition, Greek managers in the acquired and joint venture companies reported the
lack of capable middle- level management with an ability to adapt to the realities and
specificity of the new Balkan market place. The Balkan management culture was unable
at the beginning to assimilate in a timely fashion the tactics of economic penetration as
this applied in the context of the Balkan environment. Furthermore, much of the co¬
ordination and integration in the Balkan venture was done by bureaucratic control. That
is, by sharing the elements of the plan with the Greek partners on a need to know basis.
Indeed, thirty- four companies reported that in the first 2-3 years of investment in the
Balkans, horizontal communication between the two sides was not encouraged.
Therefore, it was very difficult for any sort of organic control system to emerge.
However, this managerial approach was not that much related to the Balkan
patriarchical management style3 rather than an effort of the Balkan managers to refrain
Greek managers from practising new management policies. Yet, we have to mention that
the principal factor responsible for the degree of autonomy to the new venture and the
"
A problem strongly discussed by the respondents was the one of the structure of patriarchical
management ofmost Balkan companies and the lack of collective processes of strategy formulation.
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delegation of authority to domestic managers, according to the opinion of the Greek
managers is that this level of autonomy was necessary to domestic partners as to
manoeuvre more easily through the Balkan mentality of the transition process. The
business networks of their partners proved to be invaluable during the short- term
adjustment, since they maintained a profitable level of sales, a customer base that
enabled us to build on that customer base and increase sales, according to the managers.
Eleven managers of greenfield companies (32% of greenfield companies) believe that
their companies could yield higher long-term benefits by allowing for some degree of
independence in managerial practice and organizational arrangements of their affiliates.
Many local practices developed and implemented by the Balkan managers were initially
perceived to be inferior by the Greek managers, yet they were better adapted to the
environment. Independence was needed to develop new managerial practices that are in
concordance with existing cultural values, resources, and routines of their Balkan
colleagues. Moreover, according to the above eleven managers, supporting local
management to develop their own practices by providing their (the Greek companies')
resources and experiences could lead to new practices that outperform the established
ones yielding new operational and managerial best practice for the investing companies
in a transitional Balkan market.
The economic and social instability in the Balkans produces ambiguity and uncertainty
regarding the rules of exchange. Therefore, rules are largely emergent. The ambiguity
and uncertainty makes the environment difficult to analyse. Yet, the above eleven
greenfield investors believe that they could enhance their knowledge about new
situations by actively and systematically searching for information. Knowledge about
markets allows for better adaptation and strategic fit. Therefore, it was very important
according to above eleven Greek managers to give operational autonomy to their
subsidiaries in order to have a better reflection of the market. Invariably changing
market conditions, which characterize the Balkan economies, increase this need for
knowledge acquisition even further. The position of the greenfield investors in the
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previous statement was that identification of the status quo in developing product
markets and factor markets is essential to improve strategic fit in the Balkans.
With access to resources of the Greek investors and local managerial autonomy provided
to the Balkan managers, the affiliate may generate diversity that ultimately enhances the
investors' capabilities and local presence. Maintaining diversity, however, comes at a
cost. All greenfield investors expressed the concern that very high degrees of adaptation
and diversity are likely to create high coordination costs within the two companies,
which may undermine the potential benefits. Moreover, all greenfield investors argued
that it could result in endless search for new ideas and unrelated capabilities. As fourteen
Greek managers suggested organisational knowledge and technological assets had to be
adapted to local cultures and standards and marketing assets such as products and brand
names have to be adjusted to local consumer preferences and tastes. Since in the Balkans
these assets and knowledge was not always available therefore could not be acquired
locally, the above fourteen Greek greenfield investors reported that they faced high costs
for transferring their resources in the Balkans, both organisational and monitoring costs.
Furthermore, all the managers (122) reported that in order to transfer knowledge and
train the employees what a market environment is, they need to process the information
gained from local partners, from scanning, or other means of data gathering. Managers
of greenfield affiliates (31) admitted that they interpret information based on prior
knowledge or frame of reference. Herein may lie a particular challenge for greenfield
investors because their frame of reference would be a market economy rather than
turbulent Balkan markets.
9.3 Transforming and Adjusting Companies in the Balkans
9.3.1 Explaining the Adjustment Strategies of the Greek Companies
Active responses toward the transition on behalf of the Greek companies took two forms
in the product sphere. First, changes involved changes in output in response to changes
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in demand. The most obvious response according to the managers was to modify output.
This response was most obvious in the textile companies (10), tobacco companies (4),
food and beverages companies (17), construction materials companies (9), mining
companies (3), electronic equipments manufacturers (4), furniture manufacturers (3),
plastic products manufacturers (3) and pharmaceutical companies (2). Fifty- two
managers of the above companies further reported that they altered the product mix, so
that production was concentrated on product lines that had the best market potential and
to reduce or abandon those with weaker prospects. In some cases, they improved the
quality of existing product lines so as to improve competitiveness over other local
companies. Fifty- two companies expanded their range of products during the
restructuring process, and eliminated lines in which they were not competitive. This
seems to indicate that these companies are adjusting their activity to the market
conditions, i.e. they are flexible and easily adaptable to market conditions. At the
beginning the main focus of these companies was either to follow a market penetration
(17)6 and a market development strategy (35)7. Their strategic orientation latter shifted
O Q
to product diversification (39) and product development (13) market strategies. The
objective, according to the above fifty- two managers was to revise their product
strategy by developing new products, in an effort to differentiate their products and
thereby gain some pricing power to bolster sales revenue. Growing competition,
especially from imported products, prevented the launching of new competitive products
at the first period after the initial investment. This period was on the average ten to
fourteen months. That was the period that it was required by above fifty- two managers
to decide whether the new products launch by the competitors made a hit in the market.
Such changes in product mix were generally made within the limits imposed by current
capacity and technology. The managers in general suggested that their companies
typically position the new products developed in the Balkans at the upper end of the
6 Increase sales of existing Balkan products in the Balkan markets.
7 Offer current Greek products to new markets.
s Offer new products developed in the Balkans to new markets in the Balkans
9 Offer new products developed in the Balkans to existing markets in the Balkans
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market, while they position existing local brands at the lower end of the market, in
anticipation of market growth with the emergence of the middle class.
Thirty- three companies only eliminated lines in which they were not competitive. Given
the relatively large size, broad product range and high degree of vertical integration of
the socialist companies, this restructuring behaviour is not surprising.
A second production response was to alter the input mix in response to changes in prices
and availability of input. Forty- two companies (34% of the companies) took advantage
of trade liberalisation to begin importing inputs from Greece and/or other western
suppliers.10 Joint ventures' managers reported that when they procured their inputs from
abroad, they could gain some degree of control over the local partner by establishing a
relationship where the latter is depending upon imported inputs. Foreign suppliers were
seen as more reliable and whose higher quality, albeit at higher prices, was seen as
lowering production costs and smoothing the production process.
The development of more competitive relations on the supply side is indicated by the
extent of input purchase from the private sector, and we find sharp differences between
the state and private sectors in the Balkans. Therefore, nineteen of joint ventures (16%
of the companies) purchase more than one quarter of their inputs from the private sector.
Acquired companies and greenfields purchase more than 50% of their inputs from the
private sector. Regardless of ownership form, companies consider state owned suppliers
to be in some case as good as private ones; for example forty- five (37% of the
companies) of all companies in the sample in answer to question about quality and
reliability but only twenty (16%) in terms of responsiveness. The reason for the low
response rate in terms of responsiveness is that the state- owned suppliers frequently
changed the contracts, and their restructuring often changed the output structure, prices
and sales volume. All of these tends to destabilise Greek investors and impeded their
10
12 from Greece, 20 from the local market and from Greece and 10 from Greece and the EU. 61 of the
sample companies are buying their supplies from the local market.
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market adjustment. The only area in which state- owned companies were seen as better
suppliers was in the provision of credit; seventy companies (57% of the companies)
found private suppliers worse in the provision of credit facilities while only thirty- three
of companies (27% of the companies) found them to be better. Only nineteen companies
(16% of the companies) believe that there is no difference between the private and the
state suppliers in terms of credit provision.
Since over- employment was endemic in planned economies, company adjustment
toward market behaviour involves labour shedding. However, thirty- one managers in
acquired companies reported that they had to maintain some of their excess employment.
Their decisions, as they have explained, it was affected by labour regulations, local laws,
and agreements with the companies before the acquisition. Due to the collective
mentality of the socialist legacy from years of state policy that provided a strong safety
net for employment, employees and managers in these companies did see downsizing as
a negative option for dealing with excess employment, rather than an option for survival.
Another explanation that was provided by the above thirty- one managers is that they
were expecting an upturn in sales due to improvements of local demand and export
growth, as well as it was difficult to find qualified labour, accustomed to our operations.
Competitors and greenfield investors quite often offered more competitive salaries to
attract qualified labour. As a result, they had to maintain some excess labour force. The
opportunity cost for not keeping these employees was, much higher than letting these
employees leave and work for a competing company.
The above thirty- one managers in the acquired companies further reported that a
defensive focus on short- term efficiency, i.e. downsizing could destroy valuable human
capital and employee motivation and therefore fail to realise the long- term potential of
their organisation. In fact, the very capabilities that could generate continuous
improvement could be lost. For instance, as the managers reported the employees could
take with them their knowledge of local markets and networks as well as of the
organization and its technology. While almost all managers admitted that they
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undoubtedly had excess slack, its complete elimination may have been
counterproductive since a certain degree of slack could be an important resource for
innovation, for managerial learning and therefore for transformation. Therefore, these
companies have decided to maintain excess labour. The critical question in restructuring
is not how much the companies should be downsized but how downsizing helps the
company to develop a coherent core competence and how the lay- offs are managed.
Therefore, we conclude that downsizing often undermines the resources and capabilities
that long-term productivity and growth can be build upon. In theory, it may be feasible
to separate from non-core assets and employees without damaging employee motivation,
without losing valuable assets and to an extent leaves a modest amount of slack to foster
creativity. Yet, in practice, the focus on short-term efficiency targets contradicts many of
the long-term objectives.
The questionnaire asks whether managers regard the level of employment as being
optimal, given current levels of output, capital and technology. The data reveal that even
after a decade of reform, and after a considerable labour shakeout as evidenced by the
large drop in aggregate industrial employment and the high and rising level of
unemployment, labour hoarding remains endemic in the Balkans. Only twelve (39% of
the joint venture companies) of the joint ventures believe that their employment levels
are about right, compared to eighteen of acquired companies (30% of the acquired
companies). The majority of acquired companies (31 companies) and joint ventures (19
companies) considered themselves as over staffed by at least 30% of their labour force.
The two main reasons as were cited above for over employment by all companies are the
expectation of recovery and social factors leading by managers to avoid layoffs.
Managers believe that is going to be very costly to find and train employees when the
markets fully perform according to their standards. The respondents made clear that they
all regard over employment as leading to financial problems- virtually none argue that
the extra workers do not cause a financial burden. The findings are consistent with the
view that workers' influence over employment decisions, either of a positive or negative
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sort, is the main reason for the persistence of over employment. The questionnaire
reveals that most companies have laid off some workers. However, it is not surprise that
in greenfield companies the layoffs have typically been small in scale (5% on the
average). Seventeen managers from greenfield affiliates suggested that they aim at
utilising the human capital of the local company. To access local human capital,
acquisitions and joint ventures are more efficient because setting up a greenfield
operation and hiring key individuals does not permit the entrant to tap specialised
knowledge. To engage in a greenfield venture, complementary local resources are
needed. This includes skilled labour. In the Balkans, labour skills are underdeveloped.
Local companies employ qualified employees. Local companies are unwilling to let
them go, either because they are part of their respective competitive advantages or for
political considerations. Therefore, the above seventeen greenfield investors reported
that they maintained their excess labour force for fear that they might not be able in the
future to attract qualified labour with specialised knowledge. The largest layoffs have in
fact been in acquired companies, where twenty- six companies have laid off
approximately 17% of the workers, therefore improving cash flow and made revenue
available for investment.
We can think of several reasons why efficient labour shedding would be more likely to
take place in an acquired company. The first is the Greek owners' commitment to profit-
maximisation. The second is their ability to exert authority over the restructuring
process. In the case of joint ventures, the lack of clear differentiation of restructuring
behaviour must be due to the fact that although outside ownership has been established,
dispersed outside ownership does not necessarily lead to control of the managers, and
therefore to restructuring.
Acquired companies tend to increase the number of workplaces, especially in Bulgaria
(8 companies) and Romania (4 companies). To some extent, the increase in employment
is due to the fact that preserving or increasing the number of jobs is stipulated as a
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condition in the contracts in the privatisation transactions according to the managers in
acquired companies.
The emergence of skill mismatch despite downsizing and over employment is indicated
by the vacancies situation. Thirty- three companies (27% of the companies) reported that
they had vacancies that had remained open for more than 3 months. In fact, vacancies
were the greatest problem for joint ventures, 48% of which (15 companies) reported
positions that had been unfilled for more than 3 months, and smaller for acquired
companies and greenfield, for which the proposition was 10% (6 companies) and 39%
(12 companies) respectively. This suggests that the investors in wholly owned
subsidiaries had both the incentives and financial ability to attract high- quality workers,
which in turn can explain the lower amount of net employment reduction especially for
greenfield investors.
9.4 Adjustment Measures Taken by Companies According to Entry Mode
An efficient way for companies to improve their resources is to invest in complementary
assets (Barney 1988, Hitt et al. 1999). Competence can build on synergies created
between existing and added resources. For companies in transitional economies this may
include investments in distribution networks to improve market access, in production
facilities to improve the price-quality relationship of products, or in new product
development. Therefore, the transferred resources and commitment of the Greek
partners is of significant importance.
At the interviews, all the managers of joint ventures (31) and acquired companies (60)
admitted that their Balkan partners had specific resource endowments but often needed
further resources in order to be competitive in the transitional environment. According to
the opinion of the above Greek managers, these companies at the beginning found it
difficult to compete in product technologies with companies from developed market
countries, and greenfield investors that they introduced new, competitive products at the
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domestic market. Often, they did not have the capabilities to effectively develop and
offer new and sophisticated products in sufficient quantity and quality to be competitive
with companies from other countries.
Table 9.2 Ad justment measures taken by companies according to entry mode"
Acquisition n=60 Joint Venture n=31 Greenfield n=31 X2 Significance
Internal organisation M S.D M S.D M S.D
Providing independence to the subsidiary 2.40 0.49 2.58 0.50 2.35 0.48 0.151
Product market
Establish new production facilities 2.56 0.49 2.38 0.49 2.54 0.50 0.190
Buy new equipment 2.60 0,49 2.54 0.50 2.41 0.50 0.847
Upgrade existing products 2.56 0.49 2.74 0.44 2.80 0.40 0.044
Export products to foreign markets 2.71 0.45 2,51 0.50 1.87 0.92 0.001
Develop new products 2.65 0.45 2.61 0.49 2.64 0.48 0.983
Labour market
Maintaining excess employment 2.55 0.56 2.48 0.50 2.48 0.50 0.430
Investment
Capital investment programme 2.58 0.49 2.35 0.48 2.35 0.48 0.041
Invest in establishing distribution network 2.65 0.48 2.64 0.48 2.64 0.48 0.998
Training 2.65 0.48 2.64 0.48 2.64 0.48 0.998
New Technology 2.65 0.48 2.58 0.50 2.61 0.49 0.001
1; no resource commitment, 2; low resource commitment, 3; high resource commitment; 4 very high
resource commitment
An interesting finding from our research in table 9.2 regards the level of change in
products and markets. Acquired companies, greenfields, and joint ventures adjust
themselves to the challenges of a new market economy by following proactive strategies
such as developing new export markets and upgrading existing products as the findings
of table 9.2 demonstrate. For developing new export markets, acquired companies have
committed more resources than joint ventures and greenfields. On the contrary,
greenfields and joint ventures have committed more resources than acquired companies
in upgrading existing products. According to the managers from the acquired tobacco
" In all three tables, since the variables use ordinal scale, they represent related samples in mean-
comparison tests, i.e. the rank of one variable necessarily affects the ranks of other variables. Therefore,
Freidman test, a nonparametric test comparing the distribution of several related variables, was used.
Friedman's two- way ANOVA test examine the null hypotheses that the scores in each topic come from
the same population, i.e. their ranks are not significantly different. Friedman's tests were significant. For
the acquisitions, the significance value is 0.068, for joint ventures 0.090 and for greenfield 0.001. These
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(5), food and beverages (14), and textile (1) companies given the hard-currency
shortages, goods produced in the Balkans to Western standards and sold cheaply for
hard currency have a strong competitive edge, enabling companies to establish a brand
name and a strong market position relatively quickly.
Greenfield investors have committed more resources than the other two types of
investors in upgrading their existing product portfolio rather than developing new
products for distribution in the Balkan markets. This suggests, that in general greenfield
investors are mostly orientated towards a market development strategy rather than
product diversification strategy. Greenfield investors have committed fewer resources
than the other two types of investors in developing new export markets, and along with
the higher level of resource commitment to upgrade their existing product portfolio
suggest that greenfield companies focused primarily on the domestic market.
Marketing objectives of the Greek managers could be classified as defensive (defend
against competition, hold position or prevent decline), steady sales growth, and
aggressive sales growth or market domination. Marketing objectives differ across stage
of product life cycle and economic cycle. They are also depending on overall economic
and political situation in the country. Under significant systemic changes in the Balkans
accompanies by sharp decline and unstable political situation, the domination of
defensive objectives was reported in the case of joint ventures and greenfields, therefore
focusing mostly in upgrading existing product lines as this was presented in table 9.2.
All the managers from the joint ventures (31 companies) reported that defensive
objectives were accompanied, by the internal focus on productivity improvements and
cost reduction and by entering the existing market segments with upgraded products
before the competitors. By entering these markets before competitors do, could yield an
advantageous investment position and high payoffs. According to the unanimous
results enable us to reject the null hypotheses and to conclude that the differences in the ranking of the
variables were substantial.
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opinion of the managers in joint ventures, this pattern of response was mainly connected
with the recession in the Balkans and unstable legal environment. On the contrary, in the
case of the majority of the acquired companies (31 companies or 52% of acquired
companies) according to their managers, growth was pursued through new product
development and product diversification, by expanding total market through winning
market share from local or other foreigner producers.
According to thirty- six managers of acquired companies, quality improvement of
existing products was a hot issue in the early stage of transformation. Low quality
products and services could not be sold at newly acquired markets. In spite of it, in many
occasions less managerial attention was devoted to quality development- upgrading of
existing products. The managers admitted that they did not concentrate on quality issues
in the first stage because it is a longer process requiring constant attention and
supervision, contrary to the process required for the development and production of
newly developed products. As two managers from beverage companies explained there
was no point for spending good money for old bad products. This attitude on behalf of
the acquired companies is attributed to their belief of positive future market expectations
connected with the economic reforms, though they proceeded slowly. However,
according to thirty- six managers of the acquired companies, strategies of product
development and diversification were often delayed until competition start to emerge,
and market conditions were improved.
An interesting observation to make for the acquired companies in table 9.2 is the
restructuring efforts (resource commitments) were equally distributed between
establishment of wholesale network, training and transfer of technology. On the other
hand, joint ventures appear to invest slightly more resources in establishing wholesale
networks and training the employees than transferring technology. Clearly the size of the
company matters in the acquisition of new technologies. Success in acquiring new
technologies is linked with export intensity. The more resources an acquired company is
committing to restore its export markets the more the need for acquiring new technology
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j2in order to remain competitive. Looking at the results in table 9.2, acquired companies
have committed more resources in reaching export markets, therefore finding new and
more profitable export destinations for their products, while at the same time have
invested more money in transferring and developing new technology than the joint
ventures and greenfields. The lower resource commitments on technology transfers of
joint ventures, compared to acquisitions and greenfields, indicates a threat from potential
cheating costs from their local partners.
A common problem reported by all the companies that preferred acquisition and joint
ventures, is the financial restructuring of the local company. The restructuring problems
forced the managers to reduce operational losses with external financial support, to the
point where these companies would either reduce their deficits over years or generate a
positive cash flow. These strong measures created a conflict between the two sides,
resulting a slow down in the operations. The higher capital investment reported from
acquisitions in table 9.2 can be partially explained by the fact that often the investors
assumed the financial liabilities of the acquired company. Financial resources are also
crucial in the first stage of transition. Due to general shortage of capital in most of the
Balkan companies, these companies need financial inflow for survival. The incoming
capital helped the necessary restructuring of the financial base of companies. The capital
provided by the Greek partners helped twenty- nine acquired and ten joint venture
companies to get rid of loans and use the capital for financing operations. Besides the
necessary funds for financial restructuring, sixty- one Greek companies (19 joint
12
Competitive export expansion is considered vital for successful economic transformation in the Balkans,
whose domestic markets have limited capacity and are not sufficient to support domestic producers aiming
at competitive advantages based on economies of scale and scope. At this point, we should bare in mind
the market characteristics of the previous economic regime, which is that all the CMEA countries were
considered as a unified market, serving the need of each other. Therefore, the market dynamics of each
individual country do not serve any purposes of any kind regarding economies of scale and scope. The
Balkans belongs to those small transition economies that experienced the strongest shocks of transition
and the deepest transitional depression. The high dependence of the CMEA markets made their large
producers extremely vulnerable to the external shock associated with the loss of these markets. This
indicates the existence of serious impediments to the Balkans exports during the initial transition period.
These barriers stem from different sources such as the inherited trade specialisation of countries,
geographical location, macroeconomic situation and the economic policies pursued in the transition
periods, as well as the process of company reform and microeconomic adjustments.
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ventures and 42 acquired companies) provided additional working capital to meet export
orders and redundancy payments to employees. According to the unanimous statement
of the Greek managers, the Balkan mangers were reluctant to take the latter measure
because they are either elected directly by workers or because of strong unions. Though
redundancy payments were equal to six months of pay on the average, this did not make
it easy to downsize the labour force.
In all other categories, there are not great differences in the amount of resources
committed on behalf of the companies under the three different ownership types. This
observation once again confirms the belief of the managers from all the companies
involved in this study that we have presented and analysed earlier in this chapter that
restructuring was even more complicated process than deciding upon entry mode
strategy, since no matter which entry mode they choose, creating a management and
operational structure that can operate in an a transition environment requires the
continuous employment of new resources and skills as well as the flexibility to shape the
new environment according to the available resources. This is also confirmed by looking
at the chi square statistics of the cross tabulation analysis in table 9.2. Looking at the chi
square statistics, only four variables were statistically significant, indicating significant
differences in the extent of the amount of resources that the Greek investors under the
three different ownership structures.
9.5 Conclusions
Previous research by Chackravarthy (1982) in transitional economies argues that
organisations will opt for a defender's strategy- avoiding high resource commitments-
concerning companies without material or human resources. Tan and Litschert (1994)
have shown how successful companies in the transitional economy of China, have opted
for the strategic posture of defenders. However, our results come in pace with other
authors who predicted that in turbulent environments organizations should be more
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proactive, adaptive, being able to seize every opportunity that comes along in the
external environment (Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990).
The surprisingly high levels of commitment from the majority of Greek companies bring
a new perspective into the existing theories in transition economies. However, the high
levels of resource commitments come at a cost. We intend to observe their significance
to the performance of these companies, in the next chapter, and how they affect it,
therefore being able to see if these high levels of resource commitments can be justified
in a high risk, turbulent business environments as in the Balkans.
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CHAPTER TEN
Entry Mode, Resource Commitments and Company Performance
10.1 Introduction
This final chapter examines the links between entry mode and performance of Greek
FDI in the Balkan markets. The area investigated is the effect of entry mode choice
on subsidiary performance. We investigate whether different ownership- based entry
modes have characteristics, which lead to a hierarchy of performance, irrespective of,
to industry, company or country factors. This is particularly necessary and important
because profitability is the outcome of many factors. Dang (1977) argues that if the
market structure in host countries is competitive, type of ownership has little or no
independent influence on the operating characteristics and performance of foreign
subsidiaries. However, the market imperfections and absence of a competitive
business environment in the Balkans invalidates Dang's proposition.
Despite the large volume of research studying the entry mode choice, few studies
have linked entry mode choice to performance (Nitsch et al. 1996:30). Examples of
this are the studies of Porter (1987), Janger (1980), Killing (1983), Burgleman (1983,
1985), Drucker (1974), Hill and Jones (1989). Despite these studies, few scholars
have explicitly measured and compared the performance of the various international
entry modes, and fewer still have attempted to develop a parsimonious theoretical
argument for performance differences (Woodcock et al. 1994: 253). Furthermore, the
few empirical studies that do exist have not produced consistent findings. There is
considerable disagreement over which mode tends to yield higher profitability
(Woodcock et al. 1994).
The concept of resource realignment is to bring in complementary resources through
provision of assets or through organizational learning (Uhlenbruck and Meyer 2000).
Companies in transition can benefit from their catch-up situation and import better
practices and technologies that have been developed in the West. In this way,
transition companies save the costs of internal development and ought to achieve
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major advances in productivity. Companies taken over by Greek investors have a
natural advantage in accessing complementary resources. They can overcome the
barriers faced by local companies with respect to financial resources, technological
and managerial capabilities, and to crucial business-to-business markets. The
conditions of the almost indiscriminate consumerism of the first stage of economic
transition, gives way to more varied and demanding consumer preferences in the host
countries. These preferences in turn demand the employment of more sophisticated
business practices and the building-up of the appropriate business channels. They
require the kind of investments in systems, people and infrastructure, which can only
originate from that domain of companies and individuals in which superior business
practices are undertaken as a matter of course. Therefore, our intention is to examine
whether and how the resources provided by the Greek companies will assist the
transformation of the local affiliates and contribute, positively to performance.
10.2 Analysis of the Data and Results
In this section, we examine if a statistically significant relationship exists between
entry mode and performance in each subset of the data. The Pearson Chi- squared is
often used with categorical variables, employing a frequency table to test the
differences between predicted and observed occurrences. From a cross tabulation
analysis between pairs of modes, the Pearson Chi- squared was used to test any
significance of the proportion of profitable to unprofitable companies for paired
modes of entry. Performance means and percentages within mode classification are
shown in the following table, together with the results of significance tests.
Looking at the results in table 10.1, statistically significant differences are confirmed
between acquisitions and joint ventures, and acquisitions and greenfield. The
strongest result was the acquisition/ greenfield comparison, which was significant at
p=0.020 and the acquisition/ joint venture comparison pairing at p=0.043. No
significant difference appeared to exist between the joint venture/ greenfield modes,
although the slight difference in their means was not in the hypothesised direction.
Since the value of chi-square is significant for the acquisition/ greenfield, and
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acquisition/ joint venture, this means that the proportion of profitable to unprofitable
companies is not the same for both pairs of entry modes.








1.Greenfield 38.7% (12) 61.3% (19) 0.6129 31
2.Acquisition 16.7% (10) 83.3% (50) 0.8333 60
3.Joint Venture 35.5% (11) 64.5% (20) 0.6452 31
Total
Test Significance Pearson chi- Significance
squared
Pearson chi- squared 0.038 1 vs. 2 0.020
2 vs. 3 0.043
1 vs. 3 0.793
Performance mean is based on a dichotomous variable: 1 being profit and 0 being loss.
As shown, all tests were statistically significant. The chi- square test is better than the
0.05 level. Based on the results presented in table 10.1, it is appropriate to conclude
that the mode of ownership is associated with the behaviour and performance of
Greek subsidiaries in a fairly measurable and predictable manner.1 The above
analysis provides evidence that different entry modes have different performance
levels. Our results suggest that the acquisition mode outperforms the joint venture,
and the greenfield mode in terms of profitability.
Figure 10.1 provides a graphical representation of the performance distributions
found in the dataset. Based on the above figure, there can be little doubt that: (i) the
acquisition mode tends to have the highest proportion of profits relative to losses; (ii)
greenfields and joint ventures have a mixed performance; (iii) greenfields are slightly
less profitable than joint ventures.
1 Our findings are not entirely consistent with Dang (1977) who found no significant difference
between wholly owned subsidiaries and joint ventures in terms of performance and Pan et al. (1999)
who found that joint ventures have higher profitability that wholly owned subsidiaries. Furthermore
our results are not consistent with Nitsch et al. (1996) and Woodcock et al. (1994) who found that
greenfield will perform better that joint ventures, and joint ventures will perform better than
acquisitions. Therefore, there is considerable supporting evidence that international ownership- based
entry modes have different performance levels.
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Bounded rationality may explain why joint ventures have such poor returns. All the
managers of the unprofitable joint venture companies have admitted that the
managerial optimism, growing out of perceptions and opportunism, lead to fanciful
assessments of the cost- benefit relationship in a joint venture situation. They
perceived the foreign partner as a good- cheap opportunity and as a chance to
penetrate a foreign market at virtually, no cost. In the excitement of making the deal,
realistic estimates of the costs and risks of such things as managerial, technological,
production integration were in many cases ignored or discounted.
10.3 Examining Causality: What Factors Affect Profitability in the Balkan
Subsidiaries
In this section, we want to examine causality of performance. We are interested in
the coefficients (3's for the different independent variables listed in table 10.2. The
independent variables are listed and defined in chapter 5, section 5.5.1. We run a
simple regression of the following form: Profit = a + b X, where X is a vector
including measures of restructuring. For the estimation of the dependent variable
Profit a dichotomous dummy variable - profit (I) or loss (0)- was employed to
capture differences in the profitability of Greek companies in the region. We report
the results of 11 regressions for joint ventures, acquisitions and greenfields with one
performance variable.
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10.3.1 Examining the Affect of the Restructuring Strategy to the Performance of
the Greek Companies in the Balkans
A commonly agreed perception by the managers of acquired companies is that
acquired companies often employ specific resources but often need further resources
in order to be competitive. They need more resources, especially financial and
technical in order to compete in product technologies. Therefore, they must
emphasise resource development. An efficient way for these companies to improve
their resources was to invest in complementary assets. For companies in transitional
economies this included investment in (i) distribution, (ii) exporting activities by
finding new export markets, (iii) training, (iv) new product development and (v)
capital investment programmes. Indeed, as the regression coefficients show in table
10.2, resource commitments in these five areas positively affected the profitability of
acquired companies.
Table 10.2 Explaining the Profitability of Greek subsidiaries in the Balkans
Acquisitions Joint Ventures Greenfield
Variables Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance
Constant 40.513 0.019" 33.636 0.039" 34.668 0.075*
Internal organisation
Providing independence to the
subsidiary
1.844 0.338 -0.244 0.849 6.752 0.074*
Product market
Establish new production facilities 0.904 0.478 0.405 0.777 5.375 0.096*
Buy new equipment - 1.169 0.379 0.269 0.860 3.448 0.161
Upgrade existing products - 1.732 0.198 2.396 0.225 4.895 0.173
Export products to foreign
markets
3.165 0.059" 4.035 0.086' 3.963 0.141
Develop new products 3.535 0.059" -0.978 0.551 0.492 0.763
Labour markets
Maintaining excess employment - 1.285 0.301 -3.088 0.088" -5.963 0.092'
Investment
Capital investment programme 3.294 0.078' 1.184 0.525 -2.921 0.349
Invest in establishing wholesale
network
0.230 0.902 1.731 0.270 -0.490 0.795
Training 4.303 0.063' 2.864 0.096' 7.272 0.034"
New Technology 4.162 0.028" 4.951 0.020" 3.545 0.057"
Chi- square 29.327, df 11, Sig. 0.002, R2 0.651 Chi- square 17.670, df 11,
Sig. 0.090, R2 0.597
Chi- square 24.084, df 11,
Sig. 0.0124, R2 0.733
Significance level: * at 0.10, ** at 0.05
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The x2 is statistically significant, indicating that the independent variables as a whole
make a significant contribution to explain the variation of the dependent variable.
The above regression has a very good explanatory power. Sixty-five, fifty nine, and
seventy three percent of the variability in the observed profitability is explained by
the adjustment measures undertaken by acquired, joint venture and greenfield
companies respectively.
Table 10.3 Classification Table
Acquisition Predicted Performance Correct Percentage
Observed Performance Loss Profit
Loss 7 3 70
Profit 2 48 96
Overall Performance 91.7
Joint Ventures Predicted Performance Correct Percentage
Observed Performance Loss Profit
Loss 9 2 81.8
Profit 2 18 90
Overall Performance 87.1
Greenfield Predicted Performance Correct Percentage
Observed Performance Loss Profit
Loss 11 1 91.67
Profit 2 17 89.47
Overall Performance 90.32
In addition, from the data in table 10.3, 91.7%, 87.1% and 90.32% of the sample
observations regarding the profitability of the Greek subsidiaries in the Balkans are
correctly predicted in the case of the acquired, joint venture and greenfield
companies respectively. For the acquired companies 70% of the companies were
correctly classified as unprofitable and 96% were correctly classified as profitable.
For the joint ventures, 81.8% were correctly classified as unprofitable and 90% were
correctly classified as profitable. For the greenfield companies 91.67% of the
companies were correctly classified as unprofitable, and 89.47% of the companies
were correctly classified as profitable.
One of the aims in transitional companies was to improve product quality in order to
compete more successfully on the domestic market against national products and
imports, and on foreign markets, especially the demanding Western markets. This
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was done by developing new products. Developing new products has a statistically
positive effect on the profitability of acquired companies.
On foreign markets, sixteen joint ventures and forty- four acquired companies
redirected their exports from traditional Eastern markets, where GDP and imports
had fallen, to West European customers. Finding new export markets has affected
positively the profitability both for the acquired and joint venture companies, as the
regression coefficients demonstrate in table 10.2. Finding new export markets is
significantly contributing to the performance of acquired and joint venture
companies since in transition economies many companies lost their traditional
markets due to vanished international relations and collapse of the previous CMEA
markets. The above sixty managers agreed that earnings from foreign markets in hard
currency enabled them to finance imports of necessary high quality inputs. The
companies perceived their exporting intensity as a credibility characteristic of their
potential. Furthermore, high inflation and insufficient currency devaluations,
common in the Balkans, reduced the cost advantages. Therefore, according to thirty-
five managers the only feasible solution was to raise prices in the foreign markets to
match the costs increases.
In characterising operational adjustment, financial restructuring proved to be
significantly positive for the profitability of the acquired companies, as the
coefficient of the capital investment programme variable demonstrates in table 10.2.
Hence, debt restructuring and/ or equity injection was often required to correct an
inappropriate debt- to- equity ratio of the acquired companies.
Beyond downsizing, the re-configuration of resources needs a pro-active approach to
acquiring complementary resources, through both investment in complementary
assets and organisational learning. Balkan companies had to improve their basic
competences in terms of structure, systems and processes, organizational culture and
human resources. The learning begun with top managers, who are often not well
prepared to lead the transformation process to a market based economy. Many
essential management capabilities were not developed under socialism because other
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skills were asked for. Therefore, managerial learning and employee training were
crucial elements of the profitability both for acquired and joint venture companies, as
it is shows from the positive regression coefficient in table 10.2. However, as
expected the coefficient for maintaining excess labour is negative, and affects the
profitability of the joint ventures.
Judging from the above significant results in table 10.2, we can suggest that
achieving competitiveness and profitable performance under the new economic
conditions, acquired companies have to change, not only their resource
configurations, skills and technology, but also the ways of interacting with the
environment, therefore finding new profitable markets for their products.
Greek companies were expected to gain (temporary) super- normal profits by
exploiting their company specific efficiently and effectively to establish a good fit
between strategy, structure and environment. In order to prevent the super- normal
profits from being captured by competitors, companies will create resource position
barriers, which will hamper the attempts to imitate their specific resources.
Therefore, acquired and joint venture companies decided to invest heavily in the
development of technological know- how and organisational learning. These
investments have positively contributed to the profitability of the companies, as the
coefficient signs demonstrate in table 10.2. According to the opinion of sixty- three
Greek managers (4 tobacco companies, 22 food and beverages companies, 6
telecommunication companies, 4 construction companies, 3 mining companies, 7
textile companies, 5 petroleum companies, 4 electronic components manufacturers, 2
plastic product manufacturers, 2 pharmaceutical companies) training and transfer of
new technology allowed for deeper organisational transformation and subsequent
performance than general downsizing, contributing to the development of indigenous
innovative capabilities.
The learning requirements for investing in the Balkans are one of the most important
elements of resource commitment. To be able to adapt to the new situation,
companies have to recognize the changes and understand the impact these changes
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are likely to have on the company. The environmental changes result in new
conditions for the company to which it has to react in new ways, which requires
learning.
Training of the employees in the Balkan affiliates is very importance, because
management skills in the central plan system were fundamentally different, mostly
due to organisational and cultural barriers. According to the Greek managers in joint
ventures and acquired companies significant investments were necessary into
employee training programs, which focus not only on achieving knowledge
transmission, but also facilitate behaviour change. Training programmes needed to
be developed which educate and assist the employees to understand the workings of
a market and enable them to make better decisions. While such an approach to new
market opportunities may appear to be overly cautious and expensive, it is crucial to
take these steps in order to gain gradual acceptance for a market orientation in the
former centrally planned economies.
Training and transfer of knowledge have significantly and positively affected the
profitability both of the acquired and joint venture companies. The above sixty- three
Greek managers reported that the Balkan managers were generally not well prepared
to lead the transformation process because many capabilities essential in a market
environment were not developed under socialism when other skills were asked for. In
fact, as the above sixty- three managers reported, the required capabilities are often
beyond the experience-horizon of individuals used to the central-plan system. They
require not only acquisition of new techniques, but implementation of new systems
and procedures as well as a change of the cognitive framework to reassess the criteria
of business success and factors contributing to that success. These new capabilities
require the acquisition of tacit know-how through interactive learning and training.
Moreover, the organization had to change its corporate culture to shed the remnants
of the socialist bloc culture and to meet the competitive challenges of the market
economy. This organizational transformation involved changing existing routines,
attitudes and possibly even value-systems, which often inhibit organizational change,
therefore explaining the high resource commitments of Greek companies in training.
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Investments in strategic change significantly contribute to the profitability of the
acquired and joint venture companies. As we can see from table 10.2 companies
improve their performance based on capital, technological, production and
knowledge resources provided. Our findings show that commitment of resources on
the above four areas contributes to the performance of acquired and joint venture
companies and enables them to be competitive. The importance of resource
commitments in these four areas by the companies is illuminated by the fact that
these resource commitments are the only commitments clearly associated with better
performance and profitability of the acquired and joint venture companies.
We argued that a company's lack of host country knowledge has substantial
influence on performance, particularly in volatile environments, such as in the
Balkans. The information required to differentiate products to match local market
conditions is not readily available and would be difficult to foreigners to acquire.
Looking at the findings in table 10.2, providing independence is a crucial component
of greenfields' strategy, especially for the acquisition of knowledge and intelligence
of the market characteristics, and has significantly affected the profitability of the
greenfield investors. This is not a surprise, since the greenfield affiliate is a
continuation of the Greek investing company therefore the Balkan affiliates has
similar structures, cultures, systems and procedures, and is expected to has higher
integration costs. This suggests that the integration of the Balkan affiliate was easier,
and the local affiliate had a better understanding of the venture and higher levels of
trust and commitment were established between the Greek parent company and its
Balkan Greenfield affiliate.
All the Greek greenfield investors (31 companies) during the interviews express the
opinion that are joint ventures and acquired companies that reforming Balkan
companies are too preoccupied with removing corporate legacies of the past for the
sake of introducing their corporate structures and strategies. This results in the
wholesale importation of existing Western- Greek concepts on the organizational
level, while too few efforts have been spend on developing new solutions that are
better adapted to the transition context. Therefore, Greek greenfield investors
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encourage their Balkan affiliates to focus on learning through experimentation and
the internal development of new routines and capabilities adapted to the specific
Balkan context, rather than the wholesale imposition of imported Greek strategies.
This would enhance companies' capabilities to operate successfully in the present
environment and to react to shocks occurring in this environment.
Training allowed for deeper organisational transformation and subsequent
performance in the Greenfield affiliates, contributing to the development of
indigenous innovative capabilities. As a result, the risk assessment of operating in the
unknown domestic (Balkan) market was reduced because the greenfield investors
reported that they get feedback from the local affiliate. Furthermore, according to ten
Greek managers the principal factors serving to promote active adjustment were the
degree of autonomy enjoyed by the local managers and the credibility of the
prospects of the restructuring. Post investment integration between the Balkan
affiliate and the parent company required effective communication in order to be
successful as well as to provide a vision for the acquired company. The effective
communication was achieved based on the training that we provided to the affiliates'
managers and employees, therefore we have avoided conflicting corporate cultures or
lack of organisational fit, between the Balkan affiliate and the Greek parent
company.
All the greenfield unanimously reported that are less concerned on maintaining a
close eye on their affiliates, leaving more room for local decision making, therefore
providing more autonomy to the local managers, who have the ability to change
systems and methods quickly and at a low cost. Autonomy was an important
consideration, particularly in lesser-known foreign markets where they were likely to
change systems and methods as they learn the new environment. In that respect,
understanding of local managerial cultures did not require extra effort, therefore the
cultural distance did not become a constraint on rationality of operations.
The ability of the organization to absorb knowledge and to process information
depends not only on managerial learning. It is a function of characteristics of the
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organization itself, notably its organizational forms and combinative capabilities.
Greenfield organizations (31) improved, according to the opinion of their managers,
the ability to process acquired knowledge over the years by encouraging
collaboration and exchange of information within the organization, therefore
employees and local managers were given greater latitude in altering activity
patterns, and processes were adapted to perceived changing needs and conditions.
Providing more autonomy to local decision makers has been able to realise more of
the potential contributions therefore increasing dynamic efficiency, and affecting
positively the profitability of the investors. According to eight managers (four from
food and beverages companies, two from the financial services companies and two
from the building material companies) supporting local employees to develop their
own practices by providing resources and experiences of the investing company lead
to new practices that outperform the established ones yielding new best practice for
the investing company, as well as providing the necessary networking.
A notable example of this are from four textile companies, which according to their
managers the major initial motivation is to produce locally in order to take advantage
of the local factors costs and then export back to Greece or the EU, while the local
managers discover many market opportunities to sell also in the domestic market
and/or export in the CEE countries.
Consequently, all greenfield investors believe that they may have more to gain in the
long-run if they provide the local affiliate with a higher degree of autonomy, promote
learning processes and knowledge exchange (in both directions), yet abstain from the
strict imposition of best practices and short-term efficiency targets. As two Greek
managers of banking institutions agreed the greater local idiosyncrasies are, the more
loosely the subsidiary should be integrated with the investor, because the more
important is the utilization of local assets and sensitivity to local culture. These two
Greek managers believe that loose integration permits two-way learning processes
instead of the frequently observed one-way dissemination of what Greek investors in
the acquisitions and joint ventures consider best practice.
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Eleven companies after 2-3 years flattened the organization chart by a reduction in
the number of decision-making levels while they shifted from a more centralized to a
more decentralized structure with a headquarters staff responsible for strategy,
investment allocation, and control, and divisions whose managers were in charge of
day-to-day operations. The proposed structure from the Greek partners helped
Balkan managers and employees who had good business ideas to develop them into
viable business by providing assistance and aid in planning the business, among
other services. It was revealed by 12 Greek managers in greenfield companies (three
food and beverage companies, one telecommunication company, six financial service
companies, and two electronic components manufacturers) that an effective
transmission of managerial techniques takes place only when this is based on joint
problem solving. Therefore, it was of paramount importance for these twelve
companies, according to the opinion of their managers, to study and understand the
inner logic of traditional local managerial values and practices and provide the
necessary training and managerial autonomy.
The resources that greenfield investors have committed in establishing new
production facilities have positively and significantly influenced their profitability,
while the negative coefficient for maintaining excess labour suggests that the
greenfield companies are not strongly focused on the defensive short- term
efficiency. On the contrary, the technological transfers of the parent company
positively affected the profitability of the greenfield subsidiaries.
By providing the subsidiary with a degree of autonomy and access to investors
marketing, organisational and technological skills could increase the performance in
the long term by improving local adaptation and diversity of practices. Providing a
degree of autonomy requires that the investing company possesses and provides via
transfers distinct organisational and technological competencies, which as we can see
from the coefficients of table 10.2, these competencies statistically and positively
affect the profitability of the greenfield companies.
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10.4 Conclusions
This final chapter examined the links between entry mode and performance of Greek
FDI in the Balkan markets. The area investigated is the effect of entry mode choice
on subsidiary performance. We investigated whether different ownership- based
entry modes have characteristics, which lead to a hierarchy of performance,
irrespective of to industry, company or country factors. This is particularly necessary
and important because profitability is the outcome ofmany factors.
The extent to which companies commit themselves to the Balkan markets is expected
to have an impact on company performance. Because of the high level of resource
commitments, profitability can be negatively affected given the highly unstable
business environment. In the study of and Woodcock et al. (1994) and Nitsch et al.
(1996). their hierarchical propositions regarding the relationship between the choice
of entry mode and performance were based on the existing literature, therefore, in
our analysis we based on the above-mentioned study, therefore we are develop a
similar hierarchical set of propositions to examine the operating profitability of the
Greek companies. Nitsch et al. (1996) and Woodcock et al. (1994) proposed that
greenfield would perform better that joint ventures and acquisitions, and joint
ventures would perform better than acquisitions.
From the data analysis, the acquisition mode tends to have the highest proportion of
profits relative to losses; greenfields and joint ventures have a mixed performance;
and greenfields are slightly less profitable than joint ventures. Our results are not
consistent with Nitsch et al. (1996) and Woodcock et al. (1994) who found that
greenfield will perform better that joint ventures, and joint ventures will perform
better than acquisitions. Based our data analysis it is appropriate to conclude that
mode of ownership of the Greek subsidiaries in the Balkans is associated with the
behaviour and performance of the Greek subsidiaries in a fairly measurable and
predictable manner.
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The above analysis provides evidence that different entry modes have different
performance levels. Therefore, there is considerable supporting evidence that





Across South Eastern Europe (SEE), an entire new system of economic relations and
institutions was designed and enacted after 1989. Transition progress was not easy.
Old habits and lack of experience thwarted the transitional process. With the lifting
of the Iron Curtain, SEE opened up a window of opportunity for FDI. Where foreign
capital had been vilified, it was now vindicated. It was difficult to see how the region
could develop without it. Indeed, inward FDI was touted by reform governments in
SEE as a potential white- knight, creating new jobs, bringing new technology, and
transferring sophisticated production techniques. From a Greek investor's
perspective, suddenly there was access to largely untapped markets that had literally
been starved of consumer goods. Local competition was almost non-existent. FDI
entailed substantial risk, but potentially huge rewards as well.
However, capital inflows in the region are quite low and the attractiveness of
different transition economies in the Balkans is unequal. Indeed political and
economic instability, as well as overall weak performance of the Balkan countries
have a negative impact on the amounts invested by foreign companies and
furthermore, determine the nature, the objectives, the degree of involvement, and the
modus operandi of FDI in the region.
Since the transition to a free market economy, FDI start to emerge in the Balkans,
both demand and supply led. Companies seeking to expand into foreign markets have
a choice regarding their modus operandi, ranging from exporting, FDI, joint ventures
and wholly- owned subsidiaries among others. These strategies are distinguished by
the degree of investment and the risk- investment potential. Given the above, while
knowledge of the appropriate entry strategies into industrial markets and many parts
271
of the developing world is well established,' this is not the case in the Balkans.
Indeed, because significant FDI into this region is occurring for the first time, much
can be learned about the primary motives, etc. of the Greek companies. Hence whilst
previous studies on the internationalisation process were developed and tested on
familiar markets, Balkans with their unique characteristics, offer unique
opportunities to explore changing patterns of investment. Therefore, the purpose of
the study is to try to contribute to the field of international business; the strategic
aspects of a company's internationalisation decisions in the Balkan markets.
Research in the field of transition economics is more exploratory, and so are these
conclusions. The main result is that determinants of Greek FDI activity in the region
are in agreement with those suggested by the literature. Still some aspects of
investors' behaviour are different, but they reflect the different business environment
of the post- socialistic economies.
This study presents an analysis of Greek FDI in the transition economies in the
Balkans, as well as an analysis of the economic environment and privatisation
strategies of these countries, by using the accumulated available statistical and
qualitative evidence to assess research questions specific to the region. In this
research, the theoretical literature of FDI was reviewed, and used to develop an
analytical framework for internationalisation decisions. On this basis, a questionnaire
instrument was developed covering business relationships with five countries in the
Balkans. Using a combination of postal survey and personal interviews, data
collected from 230 Greek companies. The empirical part examined the decision
process of Greek companies entering the region. Hypotheses derived from the
literature were examined under the special conditions of economic transition in the
Balkans.
Methods of empirical analysis were innovative for the research on entry decisions, in
that multiple decisions were analysed in the same board data- set of potential
1 For more details see the studies of Kogut (1983), Root (1987), Young et al. (1989), Daniels and
Radebaugh (1993), Kim and Hwang (1992), Johanson and Wiedersheim- Paul (1975), Cavusgil
(1980), Buckley and Casson (1981), and Root (1987).
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investors, and integrated with a three- step decision model. At the first stage, the
propensity of firms to be active was examined. The second stage investigated their
choice between trade and FDI. The third analysis tested hypotheses concerning the
entry mode and ownership preferences of actual investors, as well as the performance
resulted from the chosen ownership structure (entry mode). This concluding chapter
interprets the research results and discusses the implications for both the international
business literature and for research and policy in the economics of transition.
The purpose of this research was not to deal with every particular question
concerning FDI in the Balkans, but to provide an adequate theoretical and empirical
framework to make its distinctive traits intelligible and analyse the aspects of the
Greek economic activities and Greek FDI in the Balkans during a systemic
transformation process.
11.2 FDI During Transition: The Specificity of the Balkan Countries
The opening of the Balkan economies and their progressive integration in the world
economy constitutes a new competitive arena for Greek companies. The widening of
oligopolistic competition can be a factor of new opportunities such as access to
specific knowledge, new markets, economies of scale, cost advantages etc. On the
other hand, investment in these countries is risky, given the fluidity and instability of
the local markets. Consequently, the opening of the Balkan economies offers new
perspectives of profit and, at the same time, aggravates uncertainty. This
contradiction seems to have a significant impact on the strategic goals, the ways and
the modalities of Greek investment in these countries.
Balkan economies are a specific case regarding FDI. From the point of view of the
Greek investors, they have some favourable characteristics: insufficient local supply,
old products and an open oligopoly structure, given the decline of domestic
production. On the other hand, the Balkans are less developed than other transition
economies; they suffer poor economic performance and infrastructure and shortage
of necessary skills, especially in the marketing and commercialisation fields and a
pronounced bureaucratic behaviour of the local authorities.
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FDI flows in the Balkans remain relatively weak compared to the CEE transition
countries. Meanwhile, systemic change has favoured a growing internationalisation
of the Balkan economies. Economic liberalisation and reforms have alleviated at
least partially, the constraints burdening entrepreneurial activity under the former
regime. So, a significant number, in comparison to other foreign investors, of Greek
investors have invested in the Balkans since 1990. Greek companies were quick to
position themselves in the new markets of the Balkans, as it was illustrated by the
acceleration of Greek direct investment and reorientation in the pattern of
international trade between Greece, the EU and its northern neighbours. However,
companies operating in the region faced a distinct institutional framework, which
predetermined the strategic opportunities for businesses. That created challenges for
Greek companies, which differ not only from Greek- Western experience, but also
among transition economies.
11.3 The Experience of the Greek Companies in the Balkans
Greek companies are well suited to doing business in the Balkans. They are used to
dealing with heavy handed and arbitrary bureaucracy. They have experience in
dealing with backward banking systems and until 1996, they have worked in a high
inflation, high interest rate environment with a weak and depreciating currency. They
know how to manipulate, manoeuvre and hedge to overcome such problems in ways
their Western European and North American counterparts often do not. The
problems are nonetheless difficult, even for them.
What is remarkable is that Greece used to be a host to FDI rather than an outward
investing country (Rizopoulos 2001). The main vehicles of FDI are, of course, large
multinationals. Whilst they still tend to dominate this process, the pattern seems to be
changing. The greater flexibility afforded by globalisation and, in particular, the
diversity of products and processes, now allows smaller companies to engage in FDI
activity, provided these companies have certain ownership advantages. Such
companies do not, necessarily, require a very large size before they can expand their
operations abroad and Greek multinationals tend to fall in this category. Greek SMEs
may have technological, organisational, financial competitive advantages compared
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to the Balkan companies, but disadvantages compared to other Greek companies in
their domestic market. FDI in the Balkan markets enables these companies to take
advantage of their ownership specific assets, while mobilising entry barriers for latter
entrants. Furthermore, the presence of Western investors familiar with the region is
limited. The local assets are small to medium size and it is too costly and inefficient
for the Western investors to invest in the Balkans. Greek investors on the contrary
are more able to respond in a speedy manner to a business opportunity due to their
familiarity with the markets.
Regarding the privatisation programmes of the Balkan countries, the Greek investors
in general agreed that the main characteristics of these programmes were similar to
the characteristics of the Greek privatisation programmes in the early 1980s.
Although bureaucracy and corruption were endemic and privatisation slow, and
opaque in the Balkans, yet the Greek investors faced the same challenges and
problems that they experienced with the Greek privatisation schemes. Attracting FDI
has not been in the focus of the Balkan governments' economic policy, as it was the
case of the Greek governments' economic policy in the early 1980s.
The main characteristics of the above mentioned economic policy was first that the
share and role of the state sector in the economy, remained profound. Second, the
rather weak impact on the financial and capital market development. Third, the
insufficient demonopolisation of the market and development of the competition
policy. Fourth, the low transparency of the continuously changing legal framework
for the privatisation process which created a favourable space for many arbitrary
decisions which led to different irregularities, expansion of corruption, and
widespread perception of privatisation as an irregular activity. According to the
Greek managers, problems in the Greek as well as in the Balkan markets had been
encountered with official obstruction and protracted and complex negotiations with
the local authorities, because of inconsistency in views between decision makers and
frequent changes in policy and directions.
This negative position of the economic policy, both in Greece as well as in the
Balkan countries, can be mainly explained by the strong influence of local economic
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interests who felt that they could not compete with foreign investors in an open and
transparent environment and try to maintain an advantage by keeping foreign
investors at a distance.
11.4 Discussing the Empirical Findings
No evidence suggests that the search for low labour costs has been the only motive
for Greek companies. Investors reporting factor- cost motivation also report the
market motive. This implies that only jointly with attractive markets do lower factor
costs attract FDI. Competitive pressures and recession seem to induce companies to
seek new markets at least as much as lower labour costs. Since the study covers
different industry sectors, and labour costs are not relevant in all sectors, this
conclusion may be generalised: with possible industry- specific exceptions, low
labour costs are not the dominant motive for FDI in the Balkans.2
From discussion with the executives of the Greek subsidiaries in the Balkans, we can
identify two major categories of investors in relation to size, internationalisation of
activities, strategic objectives and previous involvement in the Balkans. First, leading
international companies with a real international strategy, trying to develop,
consolidate or protect their positions and market shares in some specific enlarged
markets. They acknowledge the different locational problems, but they are of
secondary importance concerning FDI decision in the region. Food and beverages,
and banks provide some good examples. Second, companies that are trying to
improve their competitive positions. They have in common their interests in location
specific advantages in order to exploit or to acquire. For this reason, national market
characteristics play an important role.
2 Why is this so? Whether or not factor costs play an important role in a companies' locational
decision depends on its labour intensity, minimum efficient economies of scale and transportation
costs. These vary substantially between industries and between the home and the host country. Low
labour cost operations are not sensible, for instance in the capital- intensive food and beverage
industries where transportation is cost- intensive. However, low labour costs are strongly considered
due to the high Greek- Balkan wage differential. The general trend in Greece is towards capital-
intensive production and manufacturing close to the customer. Thus there are few companies left in
Greece who would have their competitive advantages in managing labour- intensive operations. At
their advanced stages of internationalisation, companies are increasingly competing on the basis of
organisational rather than technological capabilities. Their priority is to undertake market and strategic
asset- seeking FDI and then factor- cost minimising strategies.
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Summarising investors' specific strategic goals we can identify the following reasons
motivating investment in the Balkans; (i) Market penetration the creation of
competitive advantages and the elevation of entry barriers; (ii) Strengthening
competitive positions in EU markets through the exploitations of comparative
advantages, i.e. access to know how, raw materials, low production costs, low labour
costs and re- exporting; (iii) To protect investor's existing markets and increase
competitiveness: Greek companies are given the opportunity to maintain some of
their existing markets by applying a low price strategy and by selling an old product
in a profitable manner; (iv) To prepare an expansion to third markets: Balkans are
often regarded a production and export platform to third markets. The companies in
the region, although badly hit by the disintegration of the CMEA system, still have
the potential of recovering the former economic relations within the region, including
the former Soviet Union.
Overall the investment constraints raised by the Greek companies are not perceived
as factors, which would necessarily prevent investment, rather as obstacles, which
impede the investment process. Companies in the transition economies face three
major constraints inhibiting the implementation of forward- looking strategies:
Imperfect capital markets, corporate governance and managerial capabilities. General
bureaucratic, administrative and legislative issues were the main external constraints,
although their existence impeded the investment process rather than prevented it
outright. These drawbacks, while being a potential hindrance to doing business, do
not offset the profitability of entering the Balkan market. However, they do highlight
the fact that business transactions are often difficult and time-consuming
undertakings under the current economic circumstances in the Balkans.
FDI is expected to utilise lower factor costs in the Balkans and invest in export-
orientated facilities. However, the costs advantage was eroded by low manufacturing
productivity, due to outdated capital stocks, weak infrastructure and an
underdeveloped legal and institutional framework. The issues of investment have
been of prime interest among Greek investors. They consistently report that markets
are the main attraction of the region. The attraction of the markets arises from the
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catch up demand to western levels of consumption and the expectation of sustainable
economic growth. The cost differential is also utilised by outward processing trade,
where the Balkan partner manufactures a labour intensive stage of the production
process. Correspondingly, this study confirms that market size and expected growth
are the most important determinants of FDI. Factor costs, especially labour costs,
are reported as a secondary aspect in attracting foreign investors.
The main concluding remarks suggest that in the 1990s Greek companies increase
markedly their shares of outward FDI in the Balkans through a rather careful
consideration of their financial and market structures apparently being urged by the
loss of local comparative advantage. An obvious example is the positive effect of the
long and medium term borrowing capacity of companies engaged in FDI. The solid
market basis is noticed in the positive effect of the relative company size as well as
the growth rate of sales. In addition, the more intense the acquired familiarity with
foreign markets through exports the more likely the undertaking of FDI was found to
be. Labour intensity, an old local comparative advantage, was found to affect
positively the FDI vs. export choice. New low labour cost locations are preferred.
Greek companies- through their expansion- either seek new markets for their mature
and technologically standardised products or they intend to take advantage of
creative local factors of production and introduce new products tailored to cater for
wider regional tastes and needs. Companies in this category thus follow either market
or strategic asset seeking strategies.4 Specific location characteristics in the Balkans,
3
With respect to markets, the transition economies were seen as highly attractive, as they offered a
large number of potential new consumers with low levels of consumption of many products and with
substantial prospects for future growth. These markets could be served by exports or FDI. In terms of
the related motivation of acquiring and building market share, the low existing consumption levels
also offered Greek companies the prospect of building brand and product loyalty in a new growing
market. This suggests possible strong first mover advantages, reinforced by prospects of being the
first to develop distribution systems. The transition economies also had high pre- existing levels of
monopoly, offering strategic advantages through acquisition.
4 Dunning and Narula (1996) identified five main stages of development at a country level. Greece
could be classified as a stage three country. The key characteristics of this stage include the
deterioration of comparative advantage in domestic labour intensive industries and the advent of
outward investment in stage one and stage two countries, which possess cheap labour and/or natural
resources, such as the Balkan countries. Greek FDI investment in this case could be either market
seeking or resource seeking, or perhaps a combination of both, which could eventually suggest the
creation of export-processing zones in the Balkan economies.
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such as cheap labour, access to raw materials and some form of existing physical
infrastructure provide the necessary foundations for the realisation of such strategies.
At the same time, the gradual opening of the EU's market to products from the
European transition economies might be a source of concern for Greek companies as
their products might be competed away by the cheaper products. Investment in the
Balkans appears to be driven by the intention of Greek companies to sustain and
advance their international competitiveness, and to add the Balkans to their
geographic portfolio in order to maintain their competitive advantage vis-a-vis their
main competitors, as well as to prevent challenges from their rivals or the emergence
of new competitors from within the region.
Within organisations, hierarchies replace prices as coordination mechanisms.
Management coordinates individual activities, gives directions and monitors
performance. Many of its activities revolve around the collection, communication
and evaluation of information. The costs ofmanaging across borders exceed those of
a national company. Firstly, this is due to specific administrative costs of
international production, and secondly, monitoring is more costly. However, from
our data analysis we show how Greek companies may reduce these costs of internal
organisation if they can utilise economies of common governance, international
business experience, and strong financial base. Thus, by looking at the findings
companies that preferred acquisition utilise economies of common governance,
accumulation of international business experience and profitability, thus reducing the
internal transaction costs. Greek companies with larger turnover are able to utilise
economies of common governance and incur lower marginal costs when adding an
additional operation to their portfolio.
Company resources form the basis for the company's strategy. It is the company's
conditions that determine the company's ability to foresee and exploit external
opportunities as well as to predict coming threats from the external environment. The
notion that the company's current resources influence managerial perceptions and,
hence the direction of company growth is a cognitive proposition that reinforces the
economic rationale that a company's resource profile will influence the company's
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internationalisation strategy. It is resources that limit the choice of international
markets the companies may enter, and the manner in which it may enter markets as
well as performance in the Balkan markets.
While the resources or opportunities in the Balkan markets exist, the ability of each
company to draw resources or make use of the available opportunities is constrained
by each company's individual company resources. Companies will thus choose
different foreign market entry strategies based upon their resources and capabilities.
Our main proposition here was that companies with greater resources and capabilities
to operate in international environment are more likely to reduce the uncertainties
associated with investments in new foreign markets as well as transaction cost risks.
We found evidence that Greek companies investing in the Balkans select their
ownership share based on affiliate's size, R&D and technology, resource and capital
intensity of the company, labour and advertising intensity, and geographical
diversification of international business activity. In previous studies of
internationalisation, researchers have tended to treat uncertainties in foreign markets
as given and have viewed a company's international expansion as either an adaptive
or a learning process in unfamiliar local environments. This perspective suggests that
Greek companies investing in a country with a greater uncertainty tend to perceive a
higher level of investment risk and, thus, engage in less resource commitment in
FDI. This theory is not compatible with our findings for the resource commitments
of the Greek companies in the Balkans.
Although the joint venture may actually speed up entry into the market in the short
term compare to acquisitions or even a greenfield investment, it does not necessarily
facilitate activities in the medium- long term as modernisation is time consuming,
expensive and can jeopardise the unique ownership assets of the companies by
sharing knowledge specific assets in a joint venture or failing to exercise this
knowledge in a greenfield investment, lacking the access to networking and markets.
From our data analysis in table 8.1, it appears that Greek companies do exert more
control as proprietary content increase. R&D expenditures, which generate
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proprietary knowledge, have a negative relationship with the greenfield entry mode
rather than acquired subsidiaries, while the relationship with joint ventures although
it is positive it is not statistically significant. This implies that companies tend to
reserve proprietary knowledge for entry vehicles they control completely; high
control is more often employed for technically sophisticated products, which tend to
have higher proprietary content than unsophisticated products. Specialised
knowledge comes into the open market as the innovation diffuses. Over the time
transaction- specific assets associated with an innovation become general purpose
assets associated with a well- established product. As this diffusion occurs, we
should expect to see less integration, as less administrative control is needed. Hence,
older technology is likely to be handled by a joint venture, leaving new technology
handled by a wholly ownership subsidiaries.
Previous research by Chackravarthy (1982) argues that organisations will opt for a
defender's strategy- avoiding high resource commitments- concerning companies
without material or human resources. Tan and Litschert (1994) have shown how
successful companies in the transitional economy of China, have opted for the
strategic posture of defenders. However, other authors have predicted that in
turbulent environments organizations should be more proactive, adaptive, being able
to seize every opportunity that comes along in the external environment (Ansoff and
McDonnell, 1990). These arguments have been sustained by findings in Western
economies (Ansoff and Sullivan 1993, Naman and Slevin, 1993, Miller 1988).
Concerning the Balkans, the general lack of human and material resources, may be a
constraint, which effectively refrain companies from adapting a more aggressive or
proactive strategic posture in the face of problematic uncertainty. However, our
results bring a new perspective into the existing theories in transition economies.
From the data in table 9.2, the surprisingly high levels of commitment from the
majority of Greek companies, enables us to conclude that Greek investors undertook
important not only for the survival but also to fulfil the long- term strategic
orientation of these companies strategies; to establish a strong local presence.
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Responses in the business sphere involved changes in the way companies did
business, the internal organisation, the mix of business activities they carried out, the
strategies they deployed to remain or become competitive on specific markets, the
technologies they use to produce and distribute their products. Investment activities
and production reorganisation, as it shows in table 10.2, were the key element of
successful restructuring, contrary to early concerns about the amount of money that
would be required to restructure Balkan companies. In addition to responses in the
business sphere, Greek companies began to design and implement strategies for
long- term survival. Such strategies involved changes in the way that these
companies conduct business, meaning the way in which the organise themselves,
means of industrial relations, the mix of business activities they carried out, the
strategies they deployed to remain or become competitive on specific markets, and
the technologies they used to produce their products.
However, the high levels of resource commitments do not come at no cost, so we
intended to observe their significance to the profitability of these companies, and
how they affect it, thus being able to see if these high levels of resource
commitments can be justified in a high-risk environment as in the Balkans.
Thus, we finally examined the links between entry mode and performance of Greek
FDI in the Balkan markets. The area investigated was the effect of entry mode choice
on subsidiary profitability. We investigated whether different ownership- based entry
modes have characteristics, which lead to a hierarchy of performance. This is
particularly necessary and important because profitability is the outcome of many
factors. We based our hypothesis on a transaction cost analysis of entry modes,
predicting the three modes' relative performance based on their anticipating costs.
Our theoretical model suggests that factors modify the transactions costs related to
the resources commitment in the Balkan markets and controlling the new
organisational entity, which in turn affects entry mode performance (Buckley and
Casson 1988, Caves and Mehra 1986, Daniels and Magill 1991, Hennart 1988,
1991).
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The extent to which companies commit themselves to the Balkan market is expected
to have an impact on company profitability. Reaching success in foreign markets
usually demands continuous and committed operation in the market to build the
needed distributor and customer networks, customer loyalty, etc. By providing the
investment costs that the Greek ventures in the Balkans had, we were able to explain
the effect these resource commitments had on the operating profitability of these
companies. In the study of and Woodcock et al. (1994) and Nitsch et al. (1996), their
hierarchical propositions regarding the relationship between the choice of entry mode
and performance were based on the existing literature, thus, in our analysis we based
on the above-mentioned study, therefore we are develop a similar hierarchical set of
propositions to examine the operating profitability of the Greek companies. Nitsch et
al. (1996) and Woodcock et al. (1994) proposed that greenfield would perform better
that joint ventures and acquisitions, and joint ventures would perform better than
acquisitions.
However, we found that: (i) the acquisition mode tends to have the highest
proportion of profits relative to losses, (ii) greenfields and joint ventures have a
mixed performance, (iii) greenfields are slightly less profitable than joint ventures.5
The above findings provide evidence that different entry modes have different
performance levels. Therefore, there is considerable supporting evidence that
international ownership- based entry modes have different performance levels.
11.5 The Contribution of the Study and Propositions for Future Research
For scholars and practitioners wishing to examine the history of FDI in CEE, they
can put themselves in the tradition of a huge number of previous researchers who
studied strategic decision-making by Western companies.6 On the contrary for
scholars and practitioners wishing to examine the decision making of foreign
5 These findings are not entirely consistent with Dang (1977) who found no difference between
wholly owned subsidiaries and joint ventures in terms of performance and Pan et al. (1999) who found
that joint ventures have higher profitability that wholly owned subsidiaries. Furthermore our results
are not consistent with Nitsch et al. (1996) and Woodcock et al. (1994) who found that greenfield will
perform better that joint ventures, and joint ventures will perform better than acquisitions.
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companies in the Balkans, research will depend on the interpretation of only recently
available data. Hence while previous studies on the internationalisation process were
developed and tested in CEE, the Balkans with their unique macro and
microeconomic characteristics, as these explained in detail in chapter three, offer
opportunities to explore different patterns of investment in transitional economies.
Furthermore, a surprisingly small amount of empirical research has dealt with the
changes taking place at the business level in the Balkans (Maroudas 1995,
Rizopoulos 1995, 2001, Perakaki 2000). A more thorough understanding of the ways
how foreign companies establish and develop their business activities was needed.
Indeed, because significant foreign investment into this region is occurring for the
first time, much can be learned from the experience of the Greek companies, as this
was presented in this study. The opening of the Balkan markets provided
opportunities for studying the conditions influencing the choice of market entry
strategies, and thus of the strategic aspects of internationalisation in transitional
economies. As such, improved understanding of the growth of the company in the
Balkans not only has theoretical contributions toward a more complete theory of
company growth. It also has implications for foreign companies aiming at improved
effectiveness when investing in formerly planned economies.
Today not much is known about the way Greek companies make the decision to
engage in FDI. What are the ownership- company specific factors that make some
companies express their interest in the region through FDI, whereas others opt for an
export strategy or decide not to invest at all? The term internationalisation strategy
has been conspicuously absent from the literature on the evolving Greek business
presence in Balkans. But neither have Greek scholars utilised the vocabulary and the
tools of internationalisation strategy analysis to explain Greek business activity in
the region. We think this no coincidence. We detected a bias for a public policy
perspective in Greek scholarship on the issue. A bias, which in its attempt to evaluate
the consequences of Greek business activity in the region, focuses on the national
6 For more details see the studies of Meyer (1998, 2000), Uhlenbruck (1997), Hoesch (1998), Alter et
al. (1993), Artisien (1998), Benito et al. (1994), Brouthers et al. (1998).
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and the regional while underestimating the micro (companies). Greek business
activity is seen through the lenses of its impact on national economies, either that of
Greece or that of the host countries. Such an impact clearly occurs and must be
evaluated. But by thus constraining our vision we fail to understand both the modus
operandi of Greek companies in the region as well as their influence in the transition
process. To reinforce our argument we provide a simple example. What explains the
formation of a Greek FDI in the region so far? Primarily proximity- the causa prima
of the Greek scholars- as has often been noted (Petrochilos 1997, Labrianidis 2000,
Labrianidis et al. 2000, Labrianidis et al. 1997).7 Proximity however needs to be
examined and speculated upon in its specificity and not just be evoked mantra-like.8
Therefore, for the purpose of studying the presence of Greek FDI activity in the
Balkans we employed an approach focusing on the characteristics of the companies
that invest there rather than just simplifying the economic penetration with terms that
first are stating the obvious and cannot be measured, (i.e. geographic proximity) and
second do not discuss the dynamics of the FDI agents in the Balkans. The entry
strategies of the Greek companies in the Balkans were analysed based on their
ownership- company specific factors, based on Dunning's theory, that make some
companies express their interest in the region through FDI, whereas others opt for an
export strategy or decide not to invest at all. Only through such an examination of the
internationalisation strategies of the companies we evaluated how these companies
expanded in the neighbouring Balkan markets, how the corporate decision- making
was affected, and how assets drove this new FDI experience of the Greek companies.
Few studies have explored the implications concerning the issues associated with
both determinants and performance of entry strategy in international markets
(Lieberman and Montgomery 1998). Studies focusing on market strategies and
performance in the Balkans have been fragmented and share some common
7 Petrakos (1996, 2001) argues that the role of geography seems to be the most decisive factor
affecting the allocation of Greek investment in the region.
8 Only such an examination can point the extent to which proximity is an inherently shared asset
within a particular population of companies and individuals, an asset, which evolves through the
activity of its being shared while also affecting the evolution of those who share in it. Proximity in
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shortcomings.9 These studies suffer from a narrow focus as market strategies are
often discussed only from the viewpoint of entry modes, and financial performance,
without considering issues of company restructuring, but most importantly the
factors that have motivated the specific entry market strategies. Thus these studies
are unable to catch the competitive dynamics of market strategies. Furthermore, they
have also dealt with relatively small samples of companies undertaking FDI and
mostly big companies, thus being unable to generalise the results of company
behaviour into a larger population.
Therefore, this study explained the strategic aspects of internationalisation of the
Greek companies, and used this framework to explain the entry strategies of Greek
companies entering the emerging markets of Balkans and performance consequences
of such entry, while considering issues of company restructuring. After a decade of
market orientated reforms in these markets it was first of all important to examine
whether market strategies of Greek companies have been successful and to what
extent. By offering different strategic entry options and describing their
repercussions to the specific environment of the Balkans and the experiences of
Greek companies, the study provided insights into the environment for Greek
companies wishing to enter the Balkan markets during their transition from a
command to a market economy. By analysing the characteristics and the resource
commitments of the Greek companies, we provided insights in the analysis of the
companies' development in understanding and evaluating their environment. The
aim was to obtain empirical evidence on the driving forces to company restructuring
under conditions of a typical slow- transition economic region by focusing on the
following research question: what kind of strategic restructuring and adaptation have
Greek companies adopted in terms of organisation, production and investments?
The link between foreign entry mode and subsidiary performance in the Balkans has
only begun to be investigated. While location and industry factors were partially
other words cannot simply be registered and then disregarded as the ultimate effect, in terms of trade
and FDI volumes, of the shortness of distance from Athens to Sofia, from Athens to Bucharest.
9 For more details see the studies of Arvanitides (1999), Boukogiannis (1994), Drakos (1994),
Sarantopoulos (1994), Lambrou (1996), Pepelasis (1996), Seimanidi (1996).
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controlled in this study, a more fine- grained analysis, which controls for these and
various other variables would provide further insight. The relationship between
company- specific factors, country factors, transactions, entry mode, and finally,
performance, is much more complex than the methodology employed here is hoping
to reveal. Our empirical evidence provides support for the theoretical model
developed in this study. It must be acknowledged, however, that this study represents
only an exploratory investigation of an otherwise complex causal relationship. As
such, it establishes a base theoretical model and evidence upon which subsequent
work can be based. In addition, industry- specific factors, such as barriers to entry
and exit, may improve the explanatory capacity of the model.
11.6 Conclusions
The beginning of the 1990s gave rise to a number of questions concerning the impact
of changing economic geography on the economic performance and outcomes on
both sides of the East- West frontier. In this new setting, several border conditions
are changing, as Germany for example is transformed from the eastern border to the
central part of the new Europe, and Greece, the most peripheral member of the EU,
finds neighbours to trade with after decades of isolation. The Balkans seems to
provide Greece with opportunities for rapid expansion of its international business
activities
FDI could be an important element of economic restructuring and adjustment in the
Balkans. However, flows and stock of FDI are still very low. The infrastructure and
institutional features of the Balkan countries often surprise Greek investors.
Furthermore, great uncertainty has a negative impact on FDI operations. It is clear
that the rapid dismantling of the former system should create a more favourable
institutional framework for foreign investment opportunities. But, alternatively, the
instability arising from an excessively rapid reform may discourage future FDI
flows.
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The Greek economic presence in the Balkans has been remarkable. A zone of major
Greek economic influence comprises its neighbouring countries. The economics of
Greek performance in the Balkans are sensible but do cast some doubt on future
prospects. Greece is exploiting its comparative advantages, which beyond geography
and history include such factors as flexibility in a volatile environment and
intermediate prices and quality in conditions of limited incomes and domestic
production recovering from collapse. These latter factors are likely to erode with
time, and Greek exporters and investors will meet increasing competition from
Balkan and other Western producers.
On the whole, Greece profits from economic integration with the Balkans. The real
problem, however, as it was discussed on chapter 3, is that the Greek economy seems
to be turning away from the demanding EU market, finding easier outlets in the
Balkans. There is thus a risk that the Balkan opening will take the form of a
quantitative downgrading of Greek production. Such a process could in the long run
have serious economic consequences, as Greece would seem to be seeking refuge in
a marginalized Balkan area.
The market opening of the Balkan markets presented four alternative investment
scenarios for the Greek companies. The first scenario is that Greek companies
organise production in Greece, but the cheap labour in the Balkan countries
assembles the finished goods. The second scenario is that competitive Greek
companies would acquire technologically- backward Balkan companies in order to
monopolise local consumer markets. The third scenario is that Greek companies
would organise cross- national networks, that is companies managed by Greek
companies, but involving technological and production innovation in the Balkan
companies. The fourth scenario is that Greek companies would invest and produce
locally to serve the local markets.
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Questionnaire Survey: The questionnaire must be returned before the 1st of
October 2000. If you cannot return the questionnaire before the 1st of October
2000, please contact Constantinos Choromides at the above address.
The answers that you will provide are strictly confidential and for no reason will
be forwarded to any third parties. Your answers and supportive material will be
used for academic purposes only! If you require an analysis of the questionnaire,
please indicate that in your response. If you have any further questions regarding
the confidentiality of the questionnaire please do not hesitate to contact professor
John S. Henley, Head of the Department at the above address.
I would like to thank you in advance for your co- operation.
Constantinos Choromides
Ph.D. Candidate, University of Edinburgh
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A. Company's Industrial Structure
1. Using the scale below please indicate the degree of competition faced by your company for its major
products in Greece?
(moderate competition) 5 4 3 2 1 0 (no competition)
2. Using the scale below please indicate the degree of competition faced by foreign competitors in the Greek
market.
(very high) 5 4 3 2 10 (very low)
3. Which of the following closely resembles the formal organisation of your company?
• Parent company in Greece to which all subsidiaries report
• International division (all subsidiaries report to one international division)
• Geographical divisions
• Other (please specify)
4. What pattern does your company follow for its major international operations?
• Operations are integrated across borders
• Subsidiaries operate as local companies with little relationships with other subsidiaries.
• Other (please specify)
B. Company's Perception of the Balkan markets
1. How important is the opening of the Balkan markets for your industry?
(Very important) 5 4 3 2 10 (not important)
2. Before your company decided to carry out operations in the Balkans after the reforms (1989) what was your
company's prior experience in the Balkans?
(No experience) 0 12 3 4 5 (Great experience)






• Others (please specify)
4. For your main products involved in the Balkans, how high do you think is the market potential?
(very high) 5 4 3 2 3 2 1 0 (very low)
5. For your main products involved in the Balkans, how high do you think is the growth potential?
(very high) 5 4 3 2 1 0 (very low)
6. Which of the following closely resembles your products in different Balkan markets?
• Products are offered in each country tailored to local needs
• Products are standardised with minimum local adaptation
• Other please specify
7. For your industry involved in the Balkans at what stage is the industry's life cycle?
(Declining) 5 4 3 2 10 (Introduction)
8. For your industry involved in Greece at what stage is the industry's life cycle?
(Declining) 5 4 3 2 10 (Introduction)
9. At what stage of development were your main products when introduced to the Balkan markets?
(Declining) 5 4 3 2 10 (Introduction)
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10. Please choose the statement that closely resembles your prices for your products in the Balkans?
• Prices were reduced to levels far below cost in order to survive in those markets
• Prices were set to satisfy consumers' needs, but more importantly to achieve a return on the capital
invested.
• Prices were set lower than competitors' so as to keep competitors at a distance.
• Prices were set lower to prevent other competitors from entering the market.
• Prices were set to indicate unique value of product.
• Prices were set to generate a high cash flow.
• Other (please specify)
C. International Activities- Investment History
1. Are you currently doing business in the Balkans?
Yes No
2. If yes, do you export or you have invested in the Balkans?
3. When the Balkan operation (s) established?
4. How important were competitors' actions in your decision to invest? Were you either following or aiming to
pre- enrpt competitors?
5. What product or service does this business involve?
6. Is your company itself a subsidiary of a foreign company located in Greece?




8. What are the most important factors for choosing joint venture? Importance of each factor: 1= not at all
important, 2= not very important, 3= quite important, 4= very important, 5= extremely important.
• Slow pace and complexity of the evolution of the economic and legal framework regulating acquisitions
• Only route available
• Partner for political reasons
• Perceived local or national identity of the venture
• Partner for business acumen
• Fast market entry
• To increase sales to the local market
• To obtain a superior profit
• To achieve greater control
• Partner's labour force
• To safeguard company's interests
• To overcome entry barriers
• Tap distribution channels
• Way to purchase only parts wanted
• Avoid potential liabilities and debt
9. What are the most important factors for choosing acquisition? Importance of each factor: 1= not at all
important, 2= not very important, 3= quite important, 4= very important, 5= extremely important.
• To purchase market share
• To overcome entry barriers
• Take better advantage of synergies
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• To bring direct control over marketing
• To increase sales to local markets
• To obtain superior profit
• To achieve greater control over execution of the project
• To safeguard companies interests
• To achieve first mover advantages
• To access distribution channels
• To control knowledge transfers
10. What are the most important factors for choosing greenfield? Importance of each factor: 1= not at all
important, 2= not very important, 3= quite important, 4= very important, 5= extremely important.
• Could reemploy resources
• Could not find a suitable partner
• Avoided restructuring costs
• Avoiding labour redundancy issues
• Costs of upgrading to Greek standards too high
• Could not reach agreement with government- negotiating partner
• Could not establish clear ownership
• Could not establish clear corporate governance
1 1. Ifacquisition or joint venture; was the entry mode part of privatisation programme?
Yes? No? (please tick)
12. What type of activity is involved in your Balkan subsidiary?
• Manufacturing (Supply export demand)
• Manufacturing (Supply local demand)
• Sales outlet
• Other (please specify)
13. What is your strategic approach to the Balkans?
• Country specific strategy/ case by case
• Regional strategy
• Overall regional strategy with country specific emphasis
• Opportunity basis
• No defined strategy
• Other (please specify)
14. Did your strategic approach changed during time? If yes, how and why?
D. Key Investment Concerns
1. Primary reasons for investing in the Balkans
Albania Bulgaria FYROM Romania Yugoslavia
Establishing market share
Tap the regional market
Low- cost sourcing
Low- cost labour
Concerns are ranked from 1 to 5; 1 being the least important and 5 extremely important.
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2. Attractions and Obstacles of Local Environments











Importance of each factor: 1= not at all important, 2= not very important, 3= quite important, 4= very
important, 5= extremely important




1. Market opportunities in the Balkans
2. To create an export base for countries in W. Europe
3. To create an export base for countries in E. Europe
4. To gain first mover advantages- establish market share
B. Company induced
1. To follow customers
2. Comparative material cost advantage
3. To obtain a superior profit
4. Comparative labour costs advantage
5. Source of raw materials
Defensive
A. Market induced
1. To protect existing markets
2. To increase their competition in Greek and/or international market
3. Because of full capacity at home
B. Company induced
1. Diversification of risk
2. Utilise technological knowledge
Importance of each factor: 1= not at all important, 2= not very important, 3= quite important, 4= very
important, 5= extremely important.
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4. Perceptions of Risks to Greek Companies
Risks Investment Activity No Investment Activity
Business risks
Uncertainty about economic prospects
Risk of expropriation





Levels of importance: l=very unimportant, 5 very important.
5. What factors affected your decision not to invest in the Balkans (Levels of importance: i=very
unimportant, 5 very important)?
• Business risks are too high
• Insufficient information about the local markets
• No appropriate partner was found
• Financial constraints
• Political environment too uncertain
• Lack of physical infrastructure
• Legal system too ambiguous
• Negotiation with local authorities too difficult
• Markets can be served from facilities outside Balkans
• Expected demand for goods too low
• Competition too intense
• Cost of production too high
• Prefer to invest elsewhere
• Outside of the company's scope
E. Investment and Internal Organisation of Production
1. Do you finance your investments from a domestic bank? Yes No (please tick)





3. Give an account of the division of responsibilities between the head office and the subsidiaries.
4. To what extent do subsidiaries have decision- making powers?
5. Describe the communication structures within the firm. How is information gathered and processed?
6. What are the major functions undertaken by the subsidiaries.
7. How was the organisation of production changed?
• Significant change in organisation structure of the firm
• Rationalisation of production
• Improvement in marketing, distribution network was created
• Changes in basic phase of production
• Some changes (please specify)
• No changes
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8. How was the production programme changed?
• Completely different products from before
• Innovated products in the original branch
• The same products as before
9.The change in market share of your firm
• Significant decrease
• Decrease
• No significant change
• Increase
• Significant increase
10. How did the competitiveness of your markets change?
• A significant rise of competition
• A rise of competitiveness
• No change
• Decline of competitiveness
• Significant decline of competitiveness
11. If the competitiveness of your markets changed, what was your reaction?
12. How was your organisation structure changed? (please specify)
13. How was the organisation of production changed? (Mark one to three possibilities)
• significant change in organisation structure of the company
• rationalisation of production
• changes in basic phase of production
• some changes
• no changes
14. How was the quality control changed?
• completely new approach
• more serious attempt
• some small changes
• no changes
15. Who are your main competitors?
• small private companies
• large private companies
• state- owned companies
• foreign companies based in the same country as your company
• foreign companies importing in the same country as your company
• we do not feel any competition
16. How do you approach the issues of transferring technologies and know- how to Balkan subsidiaries?
17. What difficulties have you encounter in transferring technologies and know- how to Balkan subsidiaries?
18. Number of employees was
• decrease
• remain the same
• rise
19. Production of your company was
• decrease
• remain the same
• rise
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20. Your company is orientated on
• upper end ofmarket
• middle series
• lower end market
• mainly domestic market
• mainly foreign market
21. How you would describe your relations with your suppliers?
22. Do you purchase suppliers locally or internationally?
F. Ownership Advantages of Investing Companies
Regarding the ownership characteristics of your company please provide the following information:
TDEBT: Total debt/ total assets in the year prior to investment in the Balkans.
LDEBT: Medium & long- term debt/ total assets in the year prior to investment in the Balkans.
SIZE: Total capitalisation of the company in the year prior to investment in the Balkans.
GROWTH: Growth rate of sales in the year prior to investment in the Balkans.
LABOUR: Number of sales/employees in the year prior to investment in the Balkans.
INTL T: Value of exports/ sales in the year prior to investment in the Balkans.
GEOGR: The number of different geographical markets the company is active in the year prior to investment in
the Balkans.
SIZE: The affiliates' capital in the year of the investment.
INV: Total assets to sales in the relevant company in the year prior to investment in the Balkans.
PRF: The operating profit margin over the year prior to investment in the Balkans.
GROWTH: Growth rate of sales turnover over the year prior to investment in the Balkans.
R&D: R&D expenditures over sales in the year prior to investment in the Balkans.
RESRC: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the main economic activity of the company is in a resource- intensive
industry and 0 otherwise.
LABOUR: Number of sales/employees in the year prior to investment in the Balkans.
ADVERT: Sales expenditures over sales in the year prior to investment in the Balkans.
GEOGR: The number of different geographical markets the company is active in the year prior to investment in
the Balkans.
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D. Company Adjustment, Restructuring and Performance
The available funds for investment in the Balkan subsidiary were directed to (in terms of investment intensity- I;
no resource commitment, 2; low resource commitment, 3; high resource commitment; 4 very high resource
commitment):
1. Internal organisation
Providing independence to the subsidiary
2. Product market
Establish new production facilities
Buy new equipment
Upgrade existing products






Invest in establishing distribution network
Training
New Technology
Please indicate whether your subsidiary in the Balkans is generating a profit or loss.
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire! In the second stage, this research shall deepen the
analysis in the Balkans in a series of interview with managers. These interviews with individuals actively
involved in business with the region will take no more than 60 minutes and focus on your actual business
activities and investment motivations. We would very much appreciate your cooperation in this research, and
will provide participants with its results.











Table 1. Construction Companies- All
Total Total Debt Long Term Debt Total Assets Number Sales Growth Rate Exports Number of
Capitalisation of Employees (%) Turnover Export
Markets
146203200 61149780 13514050 334922120 997 71847770 27.00 16330998 14
40700000 56016455 0 270082373 1000 120875395 41.13 26471711 16
11895000 100517293 26279863 256672871 550 92856660 31.67 22536311 1 1
7214589 18183026 4050 53732209 573 9752276 41,95 0 0
23661066 16455597 1476877 51515427 679 16554455 5.26 0 0
43878053 17623960 765 61502013 750 11117443 14.08 0 0
38885000 30052678 8116038 95660326 545 50395862 31.98 0 0
62000000 52380973 75192 494796124 547 141300727 54.48 29432941 15
18540000 49646000 918000 187937000 500 30371000 10.70 0 0
44249040 52862535 5321317 122141438 310 30738658 34.30 0 0
109467369 154275411 99656492 425842012 2204 481048944 10.73 93948858 14
100490429 326090532 193289121 692231156 1230 378872642 4.61 54368224 11
27171139 26161605 4803045 80938425 167 61603302 8.05 0 0









Exports Turnover Number of
Export Markets
13819222 47529697 28528321 105935365 390 103963493 15.19 14326169 8
7665625 25226621 5951040 49169626 250 84015205 5.28 13181985 13
8900456 8900394 2309111 39027111 583 39087111 7.34 7774426 9
14340730 20198645 1298300 29039111 641 39401999 12.32 5610844 11
12000000 9098446 0 18928000 436 18902007 2.63 2572563 7
30557165 11029478 1029884 26093770 564 38902993 20.27 4746165 7
46587930 18928990 9810384 33094091 301 34901992 -2.34 1867256 10
9668929 17829000 4568000 28913764 329 29019447 -6.46 4164290 6
4744803 12027863 89262 25860050 133 28944036 13.32 4691828 15
8280640 33874679 1459358 58409765 132 22256246 -9.11 4952014 12
37057500 28353691 9496294 255138510 801 94413745 -11.16 12443731 9
17640384 8887740 307907 73710511 273 18428342 CO bo 00 1901804 6
16919934 4921617 240813 41542054 119 19692845 8.07 4738098 8
28342648 26131783 13043180 81216328 453 26859776 16.75 5718446 11
3514747 3735315 1936068 11075059 48 2982546 3.74 0 0
Table 3. Financial Companies- All









760729910 23106225696 3213098474 28017965852 8077 1492660399 23.41 179119247 15
76039425 894657521 39817446 1245317523 753 48653534 5.1 1 1459606 8
856355287 14895310000 587325000 18112048000 7068 1369508000 5.42 169818992 24
14143084 1843787100 288471878 2019824313 1022 84301479 12.05 0 0
140954772 2225610084 188433972 2582716918 1968 169679383 3.63 0 0
111558275 1844637144 47488617 2137726558 1283 163985291 11.36 0 0
29951417 955164410 594099459 1163891217 172 54179116 -7.42 0 0
1026362034 43660575504 3126617230 47846539205 15194 2964328892 4.28 385362755 24
635180589 1929861029 18362834 2773779323 480 227116643 9.88 0 0
427258940 15275144554 1845854411 17721237882 6863 1052186605 6.41 84069709 9
198066295 1225610084 101434322 1582777318 1974 110837129 14.60 0 0
548276548 10598386000 1242875739 11663830964 3583 629819763 -5.76 0 0
52494553 136331975 7525351 235911941 385 58506532 -0.77 0 0
65366600 250328396 8870468 326004308 492 61005228 3.03 0 0
34388050 247043378 10300038 354060530 514 137585016 14.60 0 0
71726000 1036096488 59387600 1250820731 1980 501732463 5,54 0 0
12263926 84343306 9583000 123111129 287 44959282 8.57 0 0
10636385 220701582 12092841 366105104 803 140550838 3.18 0 0
12603885 131798000 13940292 234571000 455 118178000 12.80 0 0
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Table 4. Food and Beverages Companies- All
Total Total Debt Long Term Total Assets Number Sales Growth Rate Exports Number of
Capitalisation Debt of Employees (%) Turnover Export Markets
11120201 100536548 38584221 197388379 1240 1 11367568 7.50 18531563 23
2090725 8836754 706095 11499695 210 10765500 7.05 1200353 10
4310400 6611428 3809250 16735645 295 4848472 22.71 650664 5
10369024 77452733 13133124 147686704 673 42240166 1.59 5009683 7
22254461 31547227 311169 98397614 270 56689716 4.30 16508045 8
9183310 41408772 8444464 98356617 220 12406522 9.94 914360 6
9012080 3230368 1648063 18142388 187 2631694 21.05 189745 11
20081820 25309871 3571 69586106 403 50989000 11.42 0 0
1407636 8989388 42003 11598568 172 6659772 19.21 1546399 10
1522993 19103583 1054123 23869573 139 7426426 37.58 1448153 16
1486427 18615765 10228184 49194341 165 20330667 30,74 3429783 15
71000579 747407000 630707000 3510558000 2300 580304000 9.63 139563112 20
46989187 38932834 7129657 151228174 410 49342839 5.03 2674381 13
27801036 27963976 9119787 118111330 239 20467701 8.62 2724251 8
20022000 2000000 33520 25266465 563 120000000 32,40 0 0
6186590 7046000 0 48866301 568 14303940 6.39 14303940 7
8167278 22024180 4583018 35952602 1907 49206227 7.45 14053298 1 1
8802659 23600247 10259665 42650865 823 20375510 35.75 1299957 4
12254347 43516029 9233059 117306000 198 21970100 12.80 3829388 23
14397768 255838600 1264725 314575729 4491 620614280 13.42 39905498 16
11254548 290718300 1565512 391000000 3029 456059009 6.84 0 0
8067188 15423900 9348082 31525434 467 15881171 18.34 1205380 5
22859109 31544810 860480 103297260 1430 160648110 2.14 20595087 9
22498550 60034195 7143457 177538533 2115 270349062 4.24 39579102 14
3897168 23765163 4346524 45265973 349 16091550 15.59 934919 7
10564930 12439046 104794 43495715 537 34045412 9.57 3033446 17
4631390 14510069 2510965 30887638 312 12748591 4.38 764915 9
9831255 32842195 935205 74892793 495 44633790 29.98 10042602 13
5120201 9700259 902144 23366599 477 19429990 4.30 1313467 8
2679820 27963976 9119787 118111330 1984 18091992 -4.27 0 0
1310400 9823006 834342 15645000 145 17414000 23.87 0 0
2578143 57342259 762837 85033569 511 9000932 19.92 0 0
1354666 8234291 1009854 19307453 298 12058377 -14.14 0 0
1900310 5411093 867524 17645081 414 6167230 47.26 0 0
1000459 12320456 1756090 19867443 593 27710934 6.43 0 0
1190363 4657594 0 9109668 817 46039853 17.34 0 0
1680206 13000000 5738920 21043911 220 11107530 21.13 0 0
1000000 19382711 0 24910311 187 12035676 30.06 0 0
704170 11029315 3910001 17823900 668 39682860 18.02 0 0
11352619 5728001 1201292 17823911 423 9286670 2.34 1883336 16
12530381 3291000 1291444 10234734 296 9987092 0.62 742040 10
873164 11029147 6758001 15780443 627 19986332 27,01 0 0
670000 7382805 5000540 12980333 347 12009435 30.20 0 0
3613040 4093814 1300659 11948339 238 21645320 2.87 2610425 15
5110043 11938227 9039883 17839332 311 19029128 -0.07 2525165 23
3219519 3586000 0 9019388 435 29300000 -1.03 7629720 11
2534785 15000000 7283109 24019885 375 11928347 -6.31 1507743 18
6918653 11092384 7890882 19827333 293 11920384 4.18 0 0
2409000 14567822 9103292 22019332 654 15637223 9.26 0 0
3833671 9000192 3091192 13092885 329 19039277 16.67 0 0
1591090 6785332 0 11928007 765 18938445 4.10 0 0
1550388 3429018 1200672 9801993 184 12364600 7.52 0 0
1937000 6866453 1092300 10938225 467 19003945 11.39 1083224 6
3530887 3495800 183938 9011589 396 16726394 6.52 0 0
1792450 4505948 2019223 11029385 563 19204755 14.39 0 0
3615973 5056225 345094 8900000 349 12094775 7.41 2646336 14
3201667 4323028 349000 7630921 106 9837000 3.72 0 0
1331205 4637329 2930293 12000293 275 5409951 44.72 0 0
1100730 12039283 7690000 22918377 495 31093774 27.99 0 0
1572197 8117632 3578432 19024349 477 11948333 7.48 0 0
6461756 11560925 2019111 19827004 1984 21547489 5.14 0 0
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2183310 13049728 2019876 25610000 145 16130574 30.13 0 0
3012080 9534427 109288 12039881 177 9028372 21.04 0 0
2820335 4901928 102902 9019278 154 10293475 3.93 1433881 11
1123636 15069783 1203968 22006927 306 11948873 17.49 0 0
1211366 19029335 3981901 25503946 368 11475663 28.75 0 0
1542998 20391103 348509 89281104 540 14356000 14.72 0 0
1670000 6732659 938111 17645100 199 10549005 1.31 0 0
1009171 10928477 1029882 19029475 257 11876044 4.29 0 0
1123675 10920353 890974 19024773 268 10485999 3.91 0 0
1000000 6049128 980224 9019283 100 4300000 8,54 0 0
1623763 10291000 1029855 19029331 290 9800385 0.31 0 0
2953143 7582329 910921 9192883 133 6097000 42.90 0 0
1166390 5333948 0 11632637 188 5495000 37.36 0 0
Table 5. Furniture Companies- All
Total Total Debt Long Term Total Assets Number Sales Growth Rate Exports Number of Export
Capitalisation Debt of Employees (%) Turnover Markets
20073880 39508944 11840323 74886537 375 40966371 6.68 4936447 19
3752794 1896014 33949 11704279 144 10924884 23.66 2032028 12
5121200 38752298 683145 41434949 187 13466932 8.26 3048913 7
7630227 9050163 253967 72762840 250 22330807 15.85 3539432 5
98596379 8297300 544325 110991011 186 20405383 3.09 3191401 11
59344771 95781273 10026444 235786900 1228 132447719 -2.59 27376943 13
3902036 6036408 460740 50255500 321 35822112 17.04 6938743 8
3762000 19596599 1032741 34209330 290 25314270 4.82 6318441 14
8674093 2340556 0 13448657 456 16700945 -1.23 0 0
13200394 19029556 8677530 34833664 309 23001556 5.09 0 0
9019487 15093558 7839220 29093446 531 17821009 -8.19 0 0
11968039 32938000 19023557 45869001 328 32918000 13.42 2304260 12
17833754 34029109 11000549 50930858 671 34101900 1.12 0 0
21303667 31005652 18932000 46700837 440 63019005 7.98 0 0
15645889 19885322 9019559 67049000 506 87000191 9.98 0 0
Table 6. Mining Companies- All
Total Total Debt Long Term Debt Total Assets Number Sales Growth Rate Exports Number of Export
Capitalisation of Employees (%) Turnover Markets
222685373 162020629 40816213 431513013 1250 404609736 11.91 176976298 17
53142979 103474003 47571481 325730294 403 89512682 20.33 18197928 14
35035446 114369214 69029263 299316258 319 254625318 20.39 28568960 18
26952018 185174688 85520894 254583964 663 118001299 58.71 19198811 21
31022561 112979331 67035897 259375963 680 294357530 15.00 32555942 13
30140960 143000000 89748113 243457000 980 340390912 18.00 44591209 12
16687135 25051259 4562145 62005834 138 26343516 11.95 5144888 16
Table 7. Petroleum Companies- All
Total Total Debt Long Term Total Assets Number Sales Growth Exports Number of Export
Capitalisation Debt of Employees Rate (%) Turnover Markets
383954885 679102662 170885480 1950716334 2276 2885524589 34.15 479574186 11
33234894 302487221 175725001 551121430 1028 1508807748 14.19 148919324 14
192599853 185171241 954913 512607144 534 1194257602 17.06 133995702 9
12532475 27224071 11962862 43052872 175 119879042 14.38 0 0
14776456 298761 10 13435980 49029665 230 165793220 9.04 0 0
8913748 21928000 8971000 38918007 315 13029003 -3.40 0 0
6318242 29810000 12093090 33409006 392 11092000 -4.98 0 0
5870110 19029024 8910000 27819556 385 9019119 -10.23 0 0
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Table 8. Pharmaceutical Companies- All
Total Total Debt Long Term Debt Total Number Sales Growth Exports Number of Export
Capitalisation Assets of
Employees
Rate (%) Turnover Markets
2958225 7895630 2093646 29181557 286 19092446 9.13 0 0
12742640 3636751 2656 21864572 190 7417714 15.64 1927863 9
7897836 10094501 82286 29299964 230 23492462 12.83 7120565 7
4560000 1684979 173300 11724768 245 6328528 14.06 795495 5
11449050 24135154 3234631 58438764 289 50351226 15.00 5568845 14
13720340 41774248 1260576 86146990 502 59480795 13.11 11682028 13
Table 9. Plastic Companies- All
Total Total Debt Long Term Total Assets Number Sales Growth Rate Exports Number of
Capitalisation Debt of
Employees
(%) Turnover Export Markets
6400152 5429990 442937 40156276 106 9238425 1.10 1928059 16
4299348 7651393 302086 29265115 135 18378960 7.91 6947246 20
4500000 4704552 152049 23726970 150 11748745 10.17 2038407 14
2415949 10154102 95308 17426159 165 11464647 12.64 2460313 12
24750792 142467214 69776651 219056021 536 68640210 7.79 12506246 23
4220960 17387486 67824 56855011 270 55509150 9.76 98084666 13
4299348 9211283 2792066 22269720 312 16547993 -2.34 155551 1 7
3445878 6403906 1948637 20466945 196 13203775 -1.98 2609065 13
8406080 13664902 2953006 20646774 184 14650900 2.35 0 0
7908446 19462188 5632817 42336786 237 16726000 8.11 2744736 9
2000968 5764301 3928101 24019334 295 11503460 -3.44 1535711 16
1000000 6091882 2093674 11938532 238 13029449 4.12 0 0
690000 5685000 1323469 12938444 320 11920339 -6.57 0 0
987000 8902647 4574320 14467000 347 9549010 -2.31 0 0
879550 9182554 5960231 19053885 453 12094995 3.58 0 0
Table 10. Telecommunication Companies- All
Total
Capitalisation
Total Debt Long Term Debt Total Assets Number
of
Employees





264115650 777479000 191990000 1550294000 4119 770481000 28.06 0 0
11850000 145740041 9532585 410670580 756 413597781 15.30 0 0
179293620 544271281 4233693 1006261388 2552 950923968 19.57 0 0
1108919238 3383636807 2496094114 7401058466 18545 3443908900 13.06 0 0
155126259 570321260 48978033 1141620070 1533 848695314 -7.89 0 0
15319497 120483557 65710332 298000761 431 129254600 -2.22 0 0
44175935 89118558 74850332 298100472 360 134039475 12.98 0 0
Table 11, Textile Companies- All
Total Total Debt Long Term Total Assets Number Sales Growth Rate (%) Exports Number of
Capitalisation Debt of Employees Turnover Export Markets
7326648 9645950 316326 17537576 211 12407349 11.53 4559700 13
7565205 19803206 6750202 41851432 326 34609615 12.80 16339199 14
2992500 1366233 0 11790095 107 8351882 -2.54 1360521 21
10305079 18641773 14769311 47929961 324 22032495 4.00 8976038 17
20127574 35571013 11979052 102143218 590 81491864 16.87 13201681 13
3369143 3266064 0 14014285 150 13923680 8.34 5300744 9
12176805 29891768 462518 86774040 772 56114826 6.34 17895018 12
12331025 19507444 1428338 70568049 460 35656768 43.72 8910626 10
98050454 103139750 3356071 482670360 950 98091706 17.73 298000260 16
1834072 8884848 27704 17924505 80 10209781 6.25 1395677 7
22522500 4576549 0 49732968 236 12719166 7.14 3794127 8
30227956 49293055 1443742 100276918 1150 56526297 8.69 3685514 3
20020000 22885898 9621691 101544830 540 45091996 7.57 2299691 12
7296206 2946842 195831 25169904 154 15753188 8.58 1791137 8
4454400 3164775 0 14115302 128 9224992 18.38 349627 4
1647000 3128657 86851 6663867 101 6529157 37 28 0 0
329
12616787 30633930 7007485 58160180 336 34290321 4.90 9800173 16
2356000 5746640 1100 19571310 381 18237600 6,03 0 0
15690000 43330094 22387756 72632155 545 34178215 10.38 0 0
4365900 10616405 4761682 24053915 150 16391013 13.93 0 0
5688616 18651190 1813124 29209878 234 25833673 19.20 5954661 23
5000869 779054 162157 9545596 396 5170756 24.55 664959 19
21045419 21413008 8614391 99269130 398 19029478 21.14 1619408 11
18222296 12001542 2195831 91259001 547 17645111 0.73 5769951 7
14556177 2981335 0 12675302 871 6091000 13.32 522607 12
6072185 3000657 0 6663867 645 18000000 45.14 2034000 6
4166774 30673921 4114965 58160180 761 13549200 30.67 834630 9
2121190 3816530 314067 14091912 631 5871620 3.16 0 0
6233129 28555794 12963001 64009640 540 17098841 8.64 4462797 14
15017574 12755912 6000000 24053915 541 8000000 18.21 0 0
3143367 19361227 6728950 30203605 488 9483761 12.09 0 0
9805203 1289061 223604 5315068 438 7934870 7.08 0 0
6000991 1092874 0 4867000 344 5643200 7.56 0 0
9184799 3657119 985772 9013764 375 11029347 -0.79 1704034 6
1114193 7630928 1099741 13465118 352 16273881 -1.81 0 0
12300184 9381700 3645000 19092835 407 9103988 -2.08 0 0
1227956 11882565 332674 15130662 ISO 10952856 21.58 0 0
Table 12. Tobacco Companies- All
Total Total Debt Long Term Total Assets Number Sales Growth Rate Exports Number of Export
Capitalisation Debt of Employees (%) Turnover Markets
11809479 74062128 2257824 154073245 474 147463451 23.56 24375708 8
44056436 282286878 17210968 353929138 1200 291289086 6.70 17302571 13
8344706 10900381 9781900 15093882 462 9032885 35.29 0 0
12008435 94976438 77400000 162764590 513 15196340 5.20 537950 11
11343519 67890066 65110200 160557712 574 13000000 15,89 1472200 9
5159528 154292434 123699664 301928116 490 12056003 44.28 1193544 9
2306559 3861000 2617223 12981711 351 13046784 8.43 0 0
13206557 210381061 170458980 297661900 488 15567100 -8.00 0 0
2005102 890000 519664 4981664 369 11230000 67.66 0 0
2808069 2056637 1143000 5298300 407 2300564 -35.52 0 0
2000000 2552921 1503918 5879012 417 1975200 3.78 0 0
2304129 3330290 3010830 6755209 476 1437627 1.59 0 0
1261089 2449445 1300000 5897110 452 980119 6.51 0 0
1872371 3339110 2571002 6754091 489 12100027 11.91 0 0
330
able 1. Electronic Companies- Export
Total Total Long Term Total Number of Sales Growth (%) Exports Turnover Number ofExport Markets
Capitalisation Debt Debt Assets Employees
7665625 25226621 5951040 49169626 250 84015205 5.28 13181985 13
8900456 8900394 2309111 39027111 583 39087111 7.34 7774426 9
14340730 20198645 1298300 29039111 641 39401999 12.32 5610844 11
12000000 9098446 0 18928000 436 18902007 2.63 2572563 7
30557165 11029478 1029884 26093770 564 38902993 20.27 4746165 7
46587930 18928990 9810384 33094091 301 34901992 -2.34 1867256 10
9668929 17829000 4568000 28913764 329 29019447 -6.46 4164290 6
4744803 12027863 89262 25860050 133 28944036 13.32 4691828 15
8280640 33874679 1459358 58409765 132 22256246 -9.11 4952014 12
fable 2. Food and Beverages Companies- Exports
Total Total Long Term Total Number of Sales Growth (%) Exports Turnover Number ofExport Markets
Capitalisation Debt Debt Assets Employees
2578143 57342259 762837 85033569 511 9000932 19.92 0 0
1354666 8234291 1009854 19307453 298 12058377 -14.14 0 0
1900310 5411093 867524 17645081 414 6167230 47.26 0 0
1000459 12320456 1756090 19867443 593 27710934 6.43 0 0
1190363 4657594 0 9109668 817 46039853 17.34 0 0
1680206 13000000 5738920 21043911 220 11107530 21.13 0 0
1000000 19382711 0 24910311 187 12035676 30.06 0 0
704170 11029315 3910001 17823900 668 39682860 18.02 0 0
11352619 5728001 1201292 17823911 423 9286670 2.34 1883336 16
12530381 3291000 1291444 10234734 296 9987092 0.62 742040 10
873164 11029147 6758001 15780443 627 19986332 27.01 0 0
670000 7382805 5000540 12980333 347 12009435 30.20 0 0
3613040 4093814 1300659 11948339 238 21645320 2.87 2610425 15
5110043 11938227 9039883 17839332 311 19029128 -0,07 2525165 23
3219519 3586000 0 9019388 435 29300000 -1.03 7629720 1 1
2534785 15000000 7283109 24019885 375 11928347 -6.31 1507743 18
6918653 11092384 7890882 19827333 293 11920384 4.18 0 0
able 3. Furniture Companies- Exports
Total Total Debt Long Term Debt Total Number of Sales Growth Exports Turnover Number of Export Markets
Capitalisation Assets Employees (%)
3902036 6036408 460740 50255500 321 35822112 17.04 6938743 8
3762000 19596599 1032741 34209330 290 25314270 4.82 6318441 14
8674093 2340556 0 13448657 456 16700945 -1.23 0 0
13200394 19029556 8677530 34833664 309 23001556 5.09 0 0
11968039 32938000 19023557 45869001 328 32918000 13.42 2304260 12
able 4. Petroleum Companies- Export
Total Total Debt Long Term Total Number of Sales Growth (%) Exports Turnover Number ofExport Markets
Capitalisation Debt Assets Employees
8913748 21928000 8971000 38918007 315 13029003 -3.40 0 0
6318242 29810000 12093090 33409006 392 11092000 -4.98 0 0
5870110 19029024 8910000 27819556 385 9019119 -10.23 0 0
able 5. Pharmaceutical Companies- Exports
Total Total Debt Long Term Total Number of Sales Growth (%) Exports Turnover Number of Export Markets
Capitalisation Debt Assets Employees
2742640 3636751 2656 21864572 190 7417714 15.64 1927863 9.00
7897836 10094501 82286 29299964 230 23492462 12.83 7120565 7.00
1449050 24135154 3234631 58438764 289 50351226 15.00 5568845 14.00
3720340 41774248 1260576 86146990 502 59480795 13.11 11682028 13.00
331








Number of Employees Sales Growth (%) Exports
Turnover
Number of Export Markets
4299348 9211283 2792066 22269720 312 16547993 -2.34 1555511 7
3445878 6403906 1948637 20466945 196 13203775 -1.98 2609065 13
8406080 13664902 2953006 20646774 184 14650900 2.35 0 0
7908446 19462188 5632817 42336786 237 16726000 8.11 2744736 9
2000968 5764301 3928101 24019334 295 11503460 -3.44 153571 1 16
1000000 6091882 2093674 11938532 238 13029449 4.12 0 0
690000 5685000 1323469 12938444 320 11920339 -6.57 0 0
987000 8902647 4574320 14467000 347 9549010 -2.31 0 0
879550 9182554 5960231 19053885 453 12094995 3.58 0 0
Table 7. Textile Companies- Exports








5688616 18651190 1813124 29209878 234 25833673 19.20 5954661 23
5000869 779054 162157 9545596 396 5170756 24.55 664959 19
21045419 21413008 8614391 99269130 398 19029478 21.14 1619408 1 1
18222296 12001542 2195831 91259001 547 17645111 0.73 5769951 7
14556177 2981335 0 12675302 871 6091000 13.32 522607 12
6072185 3000657 0 6663867 645 18000000 45.14 2034000 6
4166774 30673921 4114965 58160180 761 13549200 30.67 834630 9
2121 190 3816530 314067 14091912 631 5871620 3.16 0 0
6233129 28555794 12963001 64009640 540 17098841 8.64 4462797 14
15017574 12755912 6000000 24053915 541 8000000 18.21 0 0
3143367 19361227 6728950 30203605 488 9483761 12.09 0 0
9805203 1289061 223604 5315068 438 7934870 7.08 0 0
6000991 1092874 0 4867000 344 5643200 7.56 0 0
9184799 3657119 985772 9013764 375 11029347 -0.79 1704034 6
1114193 7630928 1099741 13465118 352 16273881 -1.81 0 0
12300184 9381700 3645000 19092835 407 9103988 -2.08 0 0
1227956 11882565 332674 15130662 150 10952856 21.58 0 0
Table 8. Tobacco Companies- Exports
Total Total Debt Long Term Total Assets Number of Sales Growth Exports Turnover Number of Export
Capitalisation Debt Employees (%) Markets
2306559 3861000 2617223 12981711 351 13046784 8.43 0 0
13206557 210381061 170458980 297661900 488 15567100 -8.00 0 0
2005102 890000 519664 4981664 369 11230000 67.66 0 0
332
Table 1. Electronic Companies- FDI
Total Total Long Term Total Assets Number of Sales Growth Exports Number of Export
Capitalisation Debt Debt Employees (%) Turnover Markets
13819222 47529697 28528321 105935365 390 103963493 15.19 14326169 8
37057500 28353691 9496294 255138510 801 94413745 -11.16 12443731 9
17640384 8887740 307907 73710511 273 18428342 -8.88 1901804 6
16919934 4921617 240813 41542054 119 19692845 8.07 4738098 8
28342648 26131783 13043180 81216328 453 26859776 16.75 5718446 11
3514747 3735315 1936068 11075059 48 2982546 3.74 0 0
Table 2. Food and Beverages Companies FDI
Total Total Debt Long Term Total Assets Number of Sales Growth Exports Number of Export
Capitalisation Debt Employees (%) Turnover Markets
11120201 100536548 38584221 197388379 1240 111367568 7.50 18531563 23
2090725 8836754 706095 11499695 210 10765500 7.05 1200353 10
4310400 6611428 3809250 16735645 295 4848472 22.71 650664 5
10369024 77452733 13133124 147686704 673 42240166 1.59 5009683 7
22254461 31547227 311169 98397614 270 56689716 4.30 16508045 8
9183310 41408772 8444464 98356617 220 12406522 9.94 914360 6
9012080 3230368 1648063 18142388 187 2631694 21.05 189745 11
20081820 25309871 3571 69586106 403 50989000 11.42 0 0
1407636 8989388 42003 11598568 172 6659772 19.21 1546399 10
1522993 19103583 1054123 23869573 139 7426426 37.58 1448153 16
1486427 18615765 10228184 49194341 165 20330667 30.74 3429783 15
71000579 747407000 630707000 3510558000 2300 580304000 9.63 139563112 20
46989187 38932834 7129657 151228174 410 49342839 5.03 2674381 13
27801036 27963976 9119787 118111330 239 20467701 8.62 2724251 8
20022000 2000000 33520 25266465 563 120000000 32.40 0 0
6186590 7046000 0 48866301 568 14303940 6.39 14303940 7
8167278 22024180 4583018 35952602 1907 49206227 7.45 14053298 11
8802659 23600247 10259665 42650865 823 20375510 35.75 1299957 4
12254347 43516029 9233059 117306000 198 21970100 12.80 3829388 23
14397768 255838600 1264725 314575729 4491 620614280 13.42 39905498 16
11254548 290718300 1565512 391000000 3029 456059009 6,84 0 0
8067188 15423900 9348082 31525434 467 15881171 18.34 1205380 5
22859109 31544810 860480 103297260 1430 160648110 2.14 20595087 9
22498550 60034195 7143457 177538533 2115 270349062 4,24 39579102 14
3897168 23765163 4346524 45265973 349 16091550 15.59 934919 7
10564930 12439046 104794 43495715 537 34045412 9.57 3033446 17
4631390 14510069 2510965 30887638 312 12748591 4.38 764915 9
9831255 32842195 935205 74892793 495 44633790 29.98 10042602 13
5120201 9700259 902144 23366599 477 19429990 4.30 1313467 8
2679820 27963976 9119787 118111330 1984 18091992 -4.27 0 0
1310400 9823006 834342 15645000 145 17414000 23.87 0 0












Sales Growth (%) Exports Turnover Number ofExport Markets
20073880 39508944 11840323 74886537 375 40966371 6.68 4936447 19
3752794 1896014 33949 11704279 144 10924884 23.66 2032028 12
5121200 38752298 683145 41434949 187 13466932 8.26 3048913 7
7630227 9050163 253967 72762840 250 22330807 15.85 3539432 5
98596379 8297300 544325 110991011 186 20405383 3.09 3191401 11
59344771 95781273 10026444 235786900 1228 132447719 -2.59 27376943 13




Total Debt Long Term
Debt




Exports Turnover Number of Export Markets
760729910 23106225696 3213098474 28017965852 8077 1492660399 23.41 179119247 15
76039425 894657521 39817446 1245317523 753 48653534 5.11 1459606 8
856355287 14895310000 587325000 18112048000 7068 1369508000 5.42 169818992 24
14143084 1843787100 288471878 2019824313 1022 84301479 12.05 0 0
140954772 2225610084 188433972 2582716918 1968 169679383 3.63 0 0
111558275 1844637144 47488617 2137726558 1283 163985291 11.36 0 0
29951417 955164410 594099459 1163891217 172 541791 16 -7.42 0 0
1026362034 43660575504 3126617230 47846539205 15194 2964328892 4.28 385362755 24
635180589 1929861029 18362834 2773779323 480 227116643 9.88 0 0
427258940 15275144554 1845854411 17721237882 6863 1052186605 6.41 84069709 9
198066295 1225610084 101434322 1582777318 1974 110837129 14,60 0 0
548276548 10598386000 1242875739 11663830964 3583 629819763 -5.76 0 0
52494553 136331975 7525351 235911941 385 58506532 -0.77 0 0
65366600 250328396 8870468 326004308 492 61005228 3.03 0 0
34388050 247043378 10300038 354060530 514 137585016 14.60 0 0
71726000 1036096488 59387600 1250820731 1980 501732463 5.54 0 0
12263926 84343306 9583000 123111129 287 44959282 8.57 0 0
10636385 220701582 12092841 366105104 803 140550838 3.18 0 0
12603885 131798000 13940292 234571000 455 118178000 12.80 0 0
Table 5. Petroleum Companies- FDI
Total Total Debt Long Term Total Assets Number of Sales Growth Exports Number of Export
Capitalisation Debt Employees (%) Turnover Markets
383954885 679102662 170885480 1950716334 2276 2885524589 34.15 479574186 11
33234894 302487221 175725001 551121430 1028 1508807748 14.19 148919324 14
192599853 185171241 954913 512607144 534 1194257602 17.06 133995702 9
12532475 27224071 11962862 43052872 175 119879042 14.38 0 0
14776456 29876110 13435980 49029665 230 165793220 9.04 0 0
Table 6. Pharmaceutical Companies- FDI
Total
Capitalisation
Total Debt Long Term Debt Total Assets Number of Employees Sales Growth (%) Exports Turnover Number of
Export Markets
2958225 7895630 2093646 29181557 286 19092446 9.13 0 0
4560000 1684979 173300 11724768 245 6328528 14.06 795495 5
Table 7. Plastic Companies- FDI










6400152 5429990 442937 40156276 106 9238425 1.10 1928059 16
4500000 4704552 152049 23726970 150 11748745 10.17 2038407 14
2415949 10154102 95308 17426159 165 11464647 12.64 2460313 12
24750792 142467214 69776651 219056021 536 68640210 7.79 12506246 23
4220960 17387486 67824 56855011 270 55509150 9.76 98084666 13
4299348 9211283 2792066 22269720 312 16547993 -2.34 1555511 7
Table 8. Textile Companies- FDI
Total Capitalisation Total Debt Long Term
Debt




Exports Turnover Number of
Export Markets
7326648 9645950 316326 17537576 211 12407349 11.53 4559700 13
7565205 19803206 6750202 41851432 326 34609615 12.80 16339199 14
2992500 1366233 0 11790095 107 8351882 -2.54 1360521 21
10305079 18641773 14769311 47929961 324 22032495 4.00 8976038 17
20127574 35571013 11979052 102143218 590 81491864 16.87 13201681 13
3369143 3266064 0 14014285 150 13923680 8.34 5300744 9
12176805 29891768 462518 86774040 772 56114826 6.34 17895018 12
12331025 19507444 1428338 70568049 460 35656768 43.72 8910626 10
98050454 103139750 3356071 482670360 950 98091706 17.73 298000260 16
334
1834072 8884848 27704 17924505 80 10209781 6.25 1395677 7
22522500 4576549 0 49732968 236 12719166 7.14 3794127 8
30227956 49293055 1443742 100276918 1150 56526297 8.69 3685514 3
20020000 22885898 9621691 101544830 540 45091996 7.57 2299691 12
4365900 10616405 4761682 24053915 150 16391013 13.93 0 0
Table 9. Tobacco Companies- FDI
Total
Capitalisation
Total Debt Long Term
Debt






11809479 74062128 2257824 154073245 474 147463451 23.56 24375708 8
44056436 282286878 17210968 353929138 1200 291289086 6.70 17302571 13
8344706 10900381 9781900 15093882 462 9032885 35.29 0 0
12008435 94976438 77400000 162764590 513 15196340 5.20 537950 11
11343519 67890066 65110200 160557712 574 13000000 15.89 1472200 9
5159528 154292434 123699664 301928116 490 12056003 44.28 1193544 9
Table 10. Telecommunication Companies- FDI
Total Total Debt Long Term Debt Total Assets Number of Sales Growth Exports Number of Export Markets
Capitalisation Employees (%) Turnover
264115650 777479000 191990000 1550294000 4119 770481000 28.06 0 0
11850000 145740041 9532585 410670580 756 413597781 15.30 0 0
179293620 544271281 4233693 1006261388 2552 950923968 19.57 0 0
1108919238 3383636807 2496094114 7401058466 18545 3443908900 13.06 0 0
155126259 570321260 48978033 1141620070 1533 848695314 -7.89 0 0
15319497 120483557 65710332 298000761 431 129254600 -2.22 0 0
44175935 89118558 74850332 298100472 360 134039475 12.98 0 0









Sales Growth (%) Exports Turnover Number of Export Markets
146203200 61149780 13514050 334922120 997 71847770 27.00 16330998 14
40700000 56016455 0 270082373 1000 120875395 41.13 26471711 16
11895000 100517293 26279863 256672871 550 92856660 31.67 22536311 11
7214589 18183026 4050 53732209 573 9752276 41.95 0 0
23661066 16455597 1476877 51515427 679 16554455 5.26 0 0
43878053 17623960 765 61502013 750 11117443 14,08 0 0
38885000 30052678 81 16038 95660326 545 50395862 31.98 0 0
62000000 52380973 75192 494796124 547 141300727 54.48 29432941 15
18540000 49646000 918000 187937000 500 30371000 10.70 0 0
44249040 52862535 5321317 122141438 310 30738658 34.30 0 0
109467369 154275411 99656492 425842012 2204 481048944 10.73 93948858 14
100490429 326090532 193289121 692231156 1230 378872642 4.61 54368224 1 1
27171139 26161605 4803045 80938425 167 61603302 8.05 0 0
Table 12. Mining companies- FDI






Sales Growth (%) Exports Turnover Number of Expor
Markets
222685373 162020629 40816213 431513013 1250 404609736 11.91 176976298 17
53142979 103474003 47571481 325730294 403 89512682 20.33 18197928 14
35035446 114369214 69029263 299316258 319 254625318 20.39 28568960 18
26952018 185174688 85520894 254583964 663 118001299 58.71 19198811 21
31022561 112979331 67035897 259375963 680 294357530 15.00 32555942 13
30140960 143000000 89748113 243457000 980 340390912 18.00 44591209 12
16687135 25051259 4562145 62005834 138 26343516 11.95 5144888 16
335
Table 1. Food and Beverages Companies- Indifferent
Total
Capitalisation
Total Debt Long Term Debt Total Assets Labour Sales Growth (%) Exports
Turnover
Number of Export Markets
2409000 14567822 9103292 22019332 654 15637223 9.26 0 0
3833671 9000192 3091192 13092885 329 19039277 16.67 0 0
1591090 6785332 0 11928007 765 18938445 4.10 0 0
1550388 3429018 1200672 9801993 184 12364600 7.52 0 0
1937000 6866453 1092300 10938225 467 19003945 11.39 1083224 6
3530887 3495800 183938 9011589 396 16726394 6.52 0 0
1792450 4505948 2019223 11029385 563 19204755 14.39 0 0
3615973 5056225 345094 8900000 349 12094775 7.41 2646336 14
3201667 4323028 349000 7630921 106 9837000 3.72 0 0
1331205 4637329 2930293 12000293 275 5409951 44.72 0 0
1100730 12039283 7690000 22918377 495 31093774 27.99 0 0
1572197 8117632 3578432 19024349 477 11948333 7.48 0 0
6461756 11560925 201911 1 19827004 1984 21547489 5,14 0 0
2183310 13049728 2019876 25610000 145 16130574 30.13 0 0
3012080 9534427 109288 12039881 177 9028372 21.04 0 0
2820335 4901928 102902 9019278 154 10293475 3.93 1433881 11
1123636 15069783 1203968 22006927 306 11948873 17.49 0 0
1211366 19029335 3981901 25503946 368 11475663 28.75 0 0
1542998 20391103 348509 89281104 540 14356000 14.72 0 0
1670000 6732659 938111 17645100 199 10549005 1.31 0 0
1009171 10928477 1029882 19029475 257 11876044 4.29 0 0
1123675 10920353 890974 19024773 268 10485999 3.91 0 0
1000000 6049128 980224 9019283 100 4300000 8.54 0 0
1623763 10291000 1029855 19029331 290 9800385 0.31 0 0
2953143 7582329 910921 9192883 133 6097000 42.90 0 0
1166390 5333948 0 11632637 188 5495000 37,36 0 0





Long Term Debt Total Assets Labour Sales Growth (%) Exports
Turnover
Number of Export Markets
9019487 15093558 7839220 29093446 531 17821009 -8.19 0 0
17833754 34029109 11000549 50930858 671 34101900 1.12 0 0
21303667 31005652 18932000 46700837 440 63019005 7.98 0 0
15645889 19885322 9019559 67049000 506 87000191 9.98 0 0
Table 3. Textile Companies- Indifferent
Total
Capitalisation




Number of Export Markets
7296206 2946842 195831 25169904 154 15753188 8.58 1791137 8
4454400 3164775 0 14115302 128 9224992 18.38 349627 4
1647000 3128657 86851 6663867 101 6529157 37.28 0 0
12616787 30633930 7007485 58160180 336 34290321 4.90 9800173 16
2356000 5746640 1100 19571310 381 18237600 6.03 0 0
15690000 43330094 22387756 72632155 545 34178215 10.38 0 0
Table 4. Tobacco Companies- Indifferent
Total
Capitalisation
Total Debt Long Term
Debt
Total Assets Labour Sales Growth (%) Exports
Turnover
Number of Export Markets
2808069 2056637 1143000 5298300 407 2300564 -35.52 0 0
2000000 2552921 1503918 5879012 417 1975200 3.78 0 0
2304129 3330290 3010830 6755209 476 1437627 1.59 0 0
1261089 2449445 1300000 5897110 452 980119 6.51 0 0
1872371 3339110 2571002 6754091 489 12100027 11.91 0 0
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Joint Venture Companies
Table 1. Construction Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour Intensity Advert Geogr
334922120 2937000 71847770 4.66 2867320 3.99 27.0 0 1 72064 668184 14
Table 2. Financial Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Geogr
2019824313 6589000 84301479 23.96 47775281 56.67 12.05 0 0 82487 724992 0
2137726558 2000000 163985291 13.04 38284716 23.35 11.36 0 0 127814 1590657 0
1163891217 5768000 54179116 21.48 9043898 16.69 -7.42 0 0 314995 65014 0
2773779323 23000000 227116643 12.21 60320569 26.56 9.88 0 0 473160 124941 0
17721237882 20000000 1052186605 16.84 388047029 36.88 6.41 0 0 153313 8733148 9
1582777318 7000000 110837129 14.28 32415000 29.25 14.60 0 0 56148 520934 0
Table 3. Food and Beverages Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Geogr
197388379 5000000 111367568 1.77 6205665 5 57 7 50 0 1 89812 94350 23
11499695 1053000 10765500 1.07 1287000 11.95 7.05 430620 1 51264 59210 10
16735645 3000000 4848472 3.45 540596 11.15 22.71 0 1 16435 45575 5
147686704 5394000 42240166 3.50 3768001 8.92 1.59 0 1 62764 130944 7
98397614 13968000 56689716 1.74 4968000 8.76 4.30 0 1 209962 124717 8
98356617 5306000 12406522 7.93 934447 7.53 9.94 0 1 56393 14888 6
Table 4. Furniture Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Geogr
72762840 2010000 22330807 3.26 1691888 7.58 15.85 0 1 89323 290300 5
110991011 9364000 20405383 5.44 751625 3.68 3.09 0 1 109706 153040 11
235786900 3166000 132447719 1.78 3751541 2.83 -2.59 0 1 107856 1324477 13
Table 5. Mining Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Geogr
325730294 37000000 89512682 3.64 3509000 3.92 20.33 0 1 222116 170074 14
Table 6. Petroleum Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Geogr
1950716334 24000000 2885524589 0.68 50635964 1.75 34.15 173131457 1 1267805 259697 11
Table 7. Telecommunication Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Geogr
1006261388 86000000 950923968 1.06 146747901 15.43 19.57 7131929 1 372619 7036837 0
1141620070 20000000 848695314 1.35 100546778 11.85 -7.89 16973906 1 553617 4328346 0
298000761 5000000 129254600 2.31 14039556 10.86 -2.22 1292546 1 299895 361912 0
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Table 8. Textile Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Geogr
17537576 2877000 12407349 1.41 3134218 25.26 11.53 0 1 58803 29777 13
41851432 1735000 34609615 1.21 3495887 10.10 12.8 0 1 106164 283798 14
11790095 1674000 8351882 1.41 2386912 28.58 -2.54 0 1 78055 0 21
47929961 2736000 22032495 2.18 3624763 16.45 4.00 0 1 68001 158633 17
102143218 1892000 81491864 1.25 5343223 6.56 16,87 0 1 138122 513398 13
14014285 1391000 13923680 1.01 1772113 12.73 8.34 0 1 92824 40379 9
86774040 2520000 56114826 1.55 2821764 5.03 6.34 0 1 72688 269351 12
70568049 2965000 35656768 1 98 5706223 16.00 43.72 0 1 77515 199677 10
482670360 2650000 98091706 4.92 4552579 4.64 17,73 0 1 103254 147137 16
Table 9. Tobacco Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Geogr
160557712 5346000 13000000 12.35 2109301 16.23 15.89 0 1 22648 83200 9
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Acquired Companies
Table 1. Construction Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Pro tit Profit (%) Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Geogr
270082373 15320000 120875395 2.23 20435833 16.91 41.13 1087878 1 120875 1136228 16
256672871 6543000 92856660 2.76 20853058 22.46 31.67 0 1 168830 696424 11
53732209 4365000 9752276 5.51 128305 1.32 41.95 0 1 17020 64365 0
51515427 14000000 16554455 3.11 3527765 21.31 5.26 0 1 24381 496633 0
61502013 52000000 11117443 5.53 1420069 12.77 14,08 0 1 14823 111174 0
Table 2. Electronic Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit (%) Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Geogr
105935365 5892000 103963493 1.01 2608319 2.508879728 15.19 0 0 266573 946067 8
255138510 2236000 94413745 2.70 2453462 2.598627986 -11.16 0 0 117870 217151 9
73710511 4118000 18428342 3.99 729550 3.958847736 OOOOo6 0 0 67503 221 14 6
81216328 1574000 26859776 3.02 5138516 19.1308967 16.75 0 0 59293 25248 11
Table 3. Financial Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intnsity
Advert Geogr





1245317523 10732000 48653534 25.60 6179639 12.70 5.11 0 0 64613 4719392 8
18112048000 25000000 1369508000 13.22 433247000 31.64 5.42 0 0 193762 31498684 24
2582716918 30000000 169679383 15,22 96180424 56.68 3.63 0 0 86219 882332 0
47846539205 207000000 2964328892 16.14 700157940 23.62 4.28 0 0 195099 25789661 24
Table 4. Food and Beverages Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Geogr
18142388 5791000 2631694 6.89 247308 9.40 21,05 0 1 14073 23948 11
69586106 10000000 50989000 1.36 4052328 7.95 11.42 0 1 126524 234549 0
11598568 5000000 6659772 1.74 502729 7.55 19.21 0 1 38720 39292 10
23869573 1000000 7426426 3.21 1000888 13.48 37.58 0 1 53427 49757 16
49194341 4000000 20330667 2.42 2753400 13.54 30.74 0 1 123216 187042 15
3510558000 32000000 580304000 6.05 58068000 10.01 9.63 40621280 1 252306 6383344 20
1 151228174 26591000 49342839 3.06 3034000 6.15 5.03 0 1 120348 365137 13
1 118111330 78000000 20467701 5.77 1347657 6.58 8.62 0 1 85639 24561 8
25266465 12000000 120000000 0.21 7890000 6.58 32.40 0 1 213144 10920000 0
1 48866301 4912000 14303940 3.42 1970000 13.77 6.39 0 1 25183 0 7
■
| 35952602 7000000 49206227 0.73 5417165 11.01 7.45 0 1 25803 0 11
42650865 7000000 20375510 2.09 2871861 14,09 35.75 0 1 24758 0 4
117306000 6000000 21970100 5.34 2147300 9.77 12.80 0 1 110960 0 23
314575729 9000000 620614280 0.51 10816975 1.74 13.42 18618428 1 138191 8688599 16
1 391000000 8000000 456059009 0.86 13472811 2.95 6.84 13681770 1 150564 3830895 0
■
31525434 7000000 15881171 1.99 1193690 7.52 18.34 0 1 34007 0 5
103297260 15000000 160648110 0.64 16574700 10.32 2.14 0 1 112341 0 9
1 177538533 14000000 270349062 0.66 11119000 4.11 4.24 5406981 1 127825 865116 14
45265973 1300000 16091550 2.81 725636 4,51 15.59 0 1 46108 0 7
Table 5. Mining Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Geogr
431513013 170000000 404609736 1.07 46650944 11.53 11.91 1618438 1 323688 1537516 17
299316258 13689000 254625318 1.18 16004310 6.28 20.39 7638 1 798198 916651 18
254583964 6000000 118001299 2.16 4196950 3.56 58.71 0 1 177981 188802 21
259375963 20000000 294357530 0.88 25056046 8.51 15 0 1 432879 749765 13
243457000 5209000 340390912 0.72 18928000 5.56 18 408469 1 347338 408469 12
62005834 5640000 26343516 2.35 1567799 5.95 11.95 0 1 190895 42149 16
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Table 6. Petroleum Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Geogr
551121430 5481000 1508807748 0.37 84767434 5.62 14.19 15088077 1 1467712 2564973 14
512607144 182000000 1194257602 0.43 12773623 1.07 17.06 107483 1 2236437 23885515 9
43052872 5723000 119879042 0.36 2918382 2.43 14.38 0 1 685023 839153 0
49029665 5662000 165793220 0.30 3901948 2.35 9.04 0 1 720840 828966 0
Table 7. Pharmaceutical Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Geogr
29181557 2099000 19092446 1.53 567899 2.97 9.13 572773 1 66757 0 0
11724768 2396000 6328528 1 85 870015 13.75 14.06 0 1 25831 0 5
Table 8. Plastic Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit (%) Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Geogr
40156276 5032000 9238425 4.35 102957 1.11 1.10 0 1 87155 27715 16
23726970 945000 11748745 2.02 1987000 16.91 10.17 70492 1 78325 93989 14
17426159 1000000 11464647 1.52 392796 3.43 12.64 0 1 69483 19489 12
219056021 851000 68640210 3.19 8593312 12.52 7.79 0 1 128060 391249 23
56855011 8430000 55509150 1.02 5313000 9.57 9.76 0 1 205589 377462 13
22269720 678000 16547993 1,35 498430 3.01 -2,34 0 1 53038 134038 7
Table 9. Telecommunication Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Geogr
1550294000 64000000 770481000 2.01 103594000 13.44 28.06 4622886 1 187055 7165473 0
410670580 8000000 413597781 0.99 42952468 10.39 15.30 1116714 1 547087 3929178 0
7401058466
675000000







Table 10. Textile Companies







17924505 2002000 10209781 1.76 2217238 21.72 6.25 0 1 127622 74531 7
Table 11. Tobacco Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Geogr
154073245 9000000 147463451 1.04 46793275 31.73 23.56 265434 1 311104 958512 8
353929138 5000000 291289086 1.22 49699204 17.06 6.7 0 1 242741 1339929 13
15093882 5111000 9032885 1.67 849994 9.41 35.29 0 1 19552 78586 0
162764590 9000000 15196340 10.71 2333490 15.36 5.2 0 1 29622 115492 11
301928116 2852000 12056003 25.04 901947 39.76 44.28 0 1 24604 85597 9
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Greenfield Companies
Table 1. Construction Companies
Assets Size Sales invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Advert Geogr
95660326 3712000 50395862 1.90 7919530 15.71 31.98 0 1 92469 337652 0.0067 0
494796124 5370000 141300727 3.50 17701608 12.53 54.48 706503 1 258319 1215186 0.0086 15
187937000 5000000 30371000 6.19 6297000 20.73 10.7 0 1 60742 157929 0.0052 0
122141438 3000000 30738658 3.97 3339093 10.86 34.3 0 1 99157 233613 0.0076 0
425842012 25000000 481048944 0.89 125706174 26.13 10.73 962097 1 218262 428133 0.00089 14
692231156 10000000 378872642 1.83 130371884 34,41 4.61 0 1 308026 375084 0.00099 11
80938425 5320000 61603302 1.31 15116463 24,54 8.05 0 1 368882 51747 0.00084 0
Table 2. Electronic Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Advert Geogr
41542054 3671000 19692845 2.11 5082321 25,81 8,07 0 0 165486 25411 0.005 8
11075059 1430000 2982546 3.71 657890 22.06 3.74 0 0 62136 0 0 0
Table 3. Financial Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Rcsrc Labour
Intensity
Advei t Advert Geogr
11663830964 19000000 629819763 18.52 173935187 27.62 -5.76 0 0 175780 4660666 0.0074 0
235911941 7000000 58506532 4.03 -2322795 -3.97 -0.77 0 0 151965 526558 0.009 0
326004308 4195000 61005228 5.34 10175493 16.68 3.03 0 0 123994 463639 0.0076 0
354060530 5800000 137585016 2.57 31429000 22.84 14.6 0 0 267675 1100680 0.008 0
1250820731 16000000 501732463 2.49 59611698 11.88 5.54 0 0 253400 4666111 0.0093 0
123111129 2192000 44959282 2.74 1502196 3.34 8.57 0 0 156652 260763 0.0058 0
366105104 6000000 140550838 2.60 3498111 2.49 3.18 0 0 175032 1363343 0.0097 0
234571000 5780000 118178000 1.98 6483000 5,49 12.8 0 0 259732 768157 0.0065 0
Table 4. Pood and Beverages Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Advert Geogr
43495715 10000000 34045412 1.28 1855334 5.45 9.57 0 1 63399 0 0 17
30887638 3100000 12748591 2.42 1220756 9.58 4.38 0 1 40861 0 0 9
74892793 4131000 44633790 1.68 4993000 11.19 29.98 0 1 90169 84804 0.0019 13
23366599 1600000 19429990 1.20 1641850 8.45 4.3 0 1 40734 0 0 8
118111330 2100000 18091992 6.53 1300000 7.18 -4.27 0 1 9119 0 0 0
15645000 4560000 17414000 0.90 1313856 7.54 23.87 0 1 120096 0 0 0
Table 5. Furniture Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Advert Geogr
74886537 950000 40966371 1.83 483964 1.18 6.68 0 1 109244 3H344 0.0076 12
11704279 1120000 10924884 1.07 805466 7.37 23.66 0 1 75867 92861 0.0085 19
41434949 850000 13466932 3.08 3738398 27.76 8.26 0 1 72016 70028 0.0052 7
Table 6. Telecommunication Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Advert Geogr
298100472 19000000 134039475 2.22 17829000 13.30 12.98 16084 1 372332 549561 0.0041 0
Table 7.Textile Companies
Assets Size Sales Invest Profit Profit
(%)
Growth R&D Resrc Labour
Intensity
Advert Advert Geogr
49732968 1926000 12719166 3.91 1740775 13.69 7,14 0 1 53895 49604 0.0039 8
100276918 2966000 56526297 1.77 7206890 12.75 8.69 0 1 49153 293936 0.0052 3
101544830 1788000 45091996 2,25 6092220 13.51 7.57 0 1 83504 211932 0.0047 12
24053915 1926000 16391013 1.47 4884610 29.80 13.93 0 1 109273 47534 0.0029 0
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